LIBRARIES
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON

Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. China. Volume XIX 1958/1960

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958/1960

https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

S1.1:958-60/v.19


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPOSITORY
DOCUMENT
96-0053-S

S 1.1:958-60/v.19

DOCUMENTS COLLECTION

JUL 09 1996

University of Michigan - Flint Library

DEPOSITORY
DOCUMENT
96-0053-S

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960

Volume XIX

China

Editor Harriet Dashiell Schwar
General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie

United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1996

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10131

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-041757-0

Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accordance with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, *et seq.*).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The editors of this volume are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Although this volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, the *Foreign Relations* statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series for the years 1958–1960. The subseries presents in 19 volumes and 7 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the final 3 years of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Within the 1958–1960 subseries, five volumes, with two microfiche supplements, present the record of U.S. policy toward East Asia. This volume provides documentation on U.S. policy with respect to China, both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China government on Taiwan. Documentation is included pertaining to Sino-Soviet relations and issues relating to Tibet. Volume XV of the 1958–1960 subseries presents material on South and Southeast Asia, and Volume XVI includes an overview of U.S. regional policy for East Asia as well as material on U.S. policy toward Cambodia and Laos. Volume I is devoted to U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Volume XVII documents U.S. policy toward Indonesia; Volume XVIII documents U.S. policy regarding Korea and Japan.

A microfiche supplement to the volume presented here contains additional documentation on China, and additional documents are included in the microfiche supplement to Volumes XV and XVI. Other volumes in the subseries that pertain to China include Volume II, United Nations and General International Matters; Volume III, National Security Policy; and Volume IV, Foreign Economic Policy.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of the statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below.

The editors have had complete access to all the retired records and papers in the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the decentralized files (lot files) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. Certain intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became available to the Department historians only after this volume was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future volumes.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Eisenhower Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense (particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants).

Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanding access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency. Department historians' expanded access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of this access, and the variety of documentation made available and selected for publication in the volumes has expanded.

The List of Sources (pages XV–XIX) lists the files consulted and cited in this volume.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the *Foreign Relations* series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in a microfiche supplement or in editorial or bibliographical notes.

The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors give priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes).

Selection Criteria (in general order of priority):

1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States;

2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted;

3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy;

4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members;

5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies;

6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues;

7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State;

8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State;

9. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies;

10. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions;

11. Economic aspects of foreign policy;

12. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance;

13. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies;

14. Documentation that illuminates special decisionmaking processes that accomplished the policies recorded in particular volumes;

15. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.

Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume XIX

Most of the research for this volume was completed in 1981. The editing was largely completed in 1985–1986.

The Eisenhower Library is the most important repository for records on high-level policy formulation for this period. The Library's collections were especially valuable for the period of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, when President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were deeply involved in policymaking. The Whitman File, constituting Eisenhower's papers as President as maintained by his secretary Ann Whitman, and the Papers of Secretary Dulles were especially valuable. The Staff Secretary's Records and the Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs contain a number of documents which were originally in the Project Clean Up file and are so cited in the volume.

The Department of State played the leading role in formulating foreign policy alternatives and providing advice on foreign policy matters to the President, and it had the principal responsibility for conducting exchanges of views and negotiations on policy matters with foreign governments. The Department of State's files include cable traffic between the Department and U.S. embassies, consulates, and other overseas missions, memoranda of conversations with foreign representatives and internal meetings, and internal memoranda. They also include many White House and National Security Council documents, interagency communications, and records of interagency discussions, some of which are duplicated at the Eisenhower Library and in other-agency files, and some of which are not found elsewhere. The records of the United States Mission at the United Nations in New York were also consulted in the research for this volume.

Military records were also important, especially for the period of the Taiwan Strait crisis. Copies of many Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff documents are in the Department of State files and the

Eisenhower Library. In addition, the editor had access to retired records of the Department of Defense at the Washington National Records Center, the Burke Papers at the Naval Historical Center, and declassified records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. Copies of classified JCS documents were obtained from the Joint Staff by request.

Expanded Central Intelligence Agency access for Department of State historians resulted in the inclusion in this volume of relevant documents, including a few documents from the Allen Dulles Files and from the CIA History Staff Historical Files. Other intelligence documents were found in Department of State files and were obtained at the Eisenhower Library with the cooperation of the CIA History Staff.

Other sources that were used in researching this volume include the John Foster Dulles Papers at Princeton University Library and the Burke Papers at the Naval Historical Center.

The volume focuses on the formulation of U.S. policy with regard to China and on the most significant aspects of the U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China and U.S. relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. The editor gave primary consideration to the formulation of policy within the U.S. government, with emphasis on the highest level at which policy on a particular aspect of U.S. policy was determined, and to high-level exchanges with foreign governments. Policy recommendations to President Eisenhower and his decisions with respect to government policies and actions are documented as fully as possible. Discussions and actions of the National Security Council and Presidential discussions of policy with Cabinet-level officers are included, as are discussions between Secretary of State Dulles and his top advisers. During the Taiwan Strait crisis, both Eisenhower and Dulles played more active roles in policymaking on China than was usually the case. The editor tried to include as much as possible of the extensive documentation reflecting this.

Space limitations for this volume and the series as a whole necessitate great selectivity in the choice of documents beyond those at the highest level. Documentation on relations with the Republic of China is generally confined to discussions of key issues between high-level officials. In general, the emphasis is on political developments, but some material is included on U.S. efforts to encourage economic development on Taiwan. Summary records of all the Ambassadorial talks at Warsaw are included. As a rule, space constraints preclude the inclusion in the series of reportage on internal developments in foreign countries, but the editor sought to include reportage, analyses, and intelligence estimates, especially concerning the China mainland, which were seen by high-level policymakers and may have influenced the making of policy.

A small amount of material on U.S. policy toward Hong Kong is included in the documentation on China, but no attempt was made to document relations with the British authorities in Hong Kong. Documentation on issues relating to Tibet is included in a separate compilation at the end of the volume.

The microfiche supplement contains additional documents on all these subjects. Many of those documents are cited in the volume with an indication that the document is in the supplement.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this print volume and from the microfiche supplement because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets and ellipses that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Declassification Review

The declassification review process for this volume resulted in the withholding from publication of less than two percent of the selected documentation. Material withheld from the China compilation (pp. 1–750), constituting less than one percent of the selected documents, consists largely of information pertaining to intelligence activities, sources, and methods, some intelligence analyses, and some material concerning planning for possible military contingencies. The documents declassified and published here provide an accurate account of the major foreign policy issues and the major policies undertaken by the U.S. Government pertaining to China during this period, apart from issues relating to Tibet.

The compilation on Tibet in this volume falls short of the standards of thoroughness and accuracy mandated for the *Foreign Relations* series by 22 USC 4351. Portions of documents, comprising approximately 12 percent of all the documentation about Tibet selected by Department of State historians for inclusion in this compilation, were denied declassification by the Central Intelligence Agency, in accordance with existing laws, procedures, and policies. The portions withheld from declassification concern intelligence activities, including sources and methods, relating to U.S. sympathy for and assistance to the Tibetan national independence movement throughout the last years of the Eisenhower administration and the provision of covert support to the failed Tibetan armed resistance. Although a substantial part of the official record of assistance to the Tibetan rebellion originally proposed for publication is presented here, it contains many deletions of various length. The CIA determined that the disclosure of various particular details of aspects of the planning and implementation of these intelligence activities would damage national security interests.

The final declassification decisions were made following a final appeal process established by 22 USC 4353 to resolve the conflicting requirements for historical accuracy and for the protection of national security information in preparing the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation also made repeated recommendations for the fullest possible disclosure. While the record of major U.S. policy and activities with regard to Tibet as presented here is incomplete, the editors believe it should be included with this acknowledgment of its limitations. At such time as the portions of documents withheld from this Tibet compilation, as well as any additional significant documentation, is declassified, the Department of State will make it available in a subsequent *Foreign Relations* volume or some other appropriate manner.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
3) foreign government information;
4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
8) cryptology; or
9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all volumes in the series.

The Committee has reviewed this volume and been apprised of the decisions of the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council regarding declassification review of the Tibet compilation. The Committee concluded that a full explication of U.S. policy with regard to Tibet was integral and essential to a comprehensive and accurate record of U.S. policy toward China. In light of the decisions against declassification of the complete record at this time, the Advisory Committee has recommended including an acknowledgment of the incompleteness of the volume.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, in particular David Haight, who provided invaluable help in the collection of documents for this volume. Mary McAuliffe of the Central Intelligence Agency History Staff assisted in arranging access to that Agency's records. Others who deserve special thanks include Nancy Bressler at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, Edward Marolda at the Naval Historical Center, and Sandra Meagher at the Department of Defense.

Harriet Dashiell Schwar compiled and edited the material presented in this volume under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. David W. Mabon provided planning and direction. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editing and publication process. Gabrielle Mallon prepared the lists of persons and abbreviations. Rita M. Baker and Althea W. Robinson performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw the production of the volume. Max Franke prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1995

Contents

Preface III

List of Unpublished Sources XV

List of Abbreviations XXI

List of Persons XXV

China

January–August 1958, background of the Taiwan Strait crisis: possible renewal of the Ambassadorial talks; Secretary of State Dulles' visit to Taiwan in March 1958; U.S. concern with growing tension in the Taiwan area 1

August–October 1958, the Taiwan Strait crisis: the decision for U.S. naval escort of Nationalist vessels; resumption of Ambassadorial talks at Warsaw; diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions; Secretary of State Dulles' visit to Taiwan and the joint communiqué of October 23, 1958 69

November–December 1958, aftermath of the crisis: the question of Nationalist forces on the Offshore Islands; increased U.S. military aid to the Nationalists 479

1959–1960, the Sino-Soviet rift: U.S. views on the situation in Mainland China; continuing discussions at Warsaw; efforts to encourage economic development on Taiwan; President Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan in June 1960 511

U.S. response to the rebellion in Tibet, 1959–1960 751

Index 815

List of Unpublished Sources

Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files:* The principal source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. The following files were most useful in compiling this volume:

110.11–DU, travel and correspondence by Secretary of State Dulles
110.11–HE, travel and correspondence by Secretary of State Herter
211.93, Chinese nationals in the United States
293.11, U.S. nationals in China
303, representation in the United Nations
320, U.N. General Assembly
411.93, U.S. trade with China
493.00, general issues concerning trade with China
611.93, political relations between the United States and China, including the Ambassadorial talks between U.S. and People's Republic of China representatives
661.93, Sino-Soviet relations
693.94A, relations between the China mainland and Taiwan
711.11–EI, travel by and correspondence with President Eisenhower
746G.00, political affairs and conditions in Hong Kong
790.5411, U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in Asia
793.00, political affairs and conditions in China
793.02, Chinese recognition issue
793.5, Chinese military affairs; defense of Taiwan
793.5–MSP, U.S. Mutual Security Program in Taiwan
793.5411, U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in territory under Chinese jurisdiction
793B.00, political issues concerning Tibet
794A.00, political affairs and conditions in Taiwan
794A.5, defense of Taiwan
893.00, economic affairs and conditions in China
911.6293, question of U.S. news correspondents in China

2. *Lot Files:* Documents from the central files are supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by bureaus, offices, divisions, and the Executive Secretariat. A list of the lot files cited or consulted in this volume follows:

CA Files: Lot 67 D 579

Top Secret files relating to China for the years 1956–1965, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs.

Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the year 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1958–1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

FE Files: Lot 60 D 90

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the year 1958, including country files, letters, and memoranda of conversation.

FE Files: Lot 61 D 6

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the year 1959, including country files, letters, memoranda of conversation, and conferences and visits.

FE Files: Lot 62 D 26

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the year 1960, including country files, letters, memoranda of conversation, and conferences and visits.

FE Files: Lot 63 D 76

Files maintained by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the years 1955–1960.

FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168

Files relating to China, Japan, and Korea for the years 1958–1960, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE/EA Files: Lot 65 D 93

Files relating to China for the years 1960 and 1961, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225

Files relating to China, Japan, and Korea for the year 1964, with some files for the years 1954–1963, maintained by the Office of East Asian Affairs and its predecessors, the Office of Chinese Affairs and the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

FE/RA Files: Lot 65 D 497

Top Secret files maintained by the Regional Planning Adviser and later by the Office of Regional Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the years 1957–1962.

Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368

Files relating to the U.S.-China Ambassadorial talks at Geneva and Warsaw for the years 1955–1962, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs and the Office of Asian Communist Affairs.

Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415

Files relating to the U.S.-China Ambassadorial talks at Geneva and Warsaw for the years 1955–1968, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs and the Office of Asian Communist Affairs.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates for the years 1958–1960.

Intelligence Files: Lot 58 D 776

Country, subject, and administrative files relating to U.S. intelligence organizations and activities for the years 1945–1960, maintained by the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files: Lot 60 D 216

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the year 1958.

OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained in the Operations Staff.

OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84

Files maintained by Karl L. Rankin during his tours of duty at Athens, Vienna, Canton, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Belgrade, 1932–1961.

ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517

Top Secret files relating to China for the years 1954–1963, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Republic of China desk in the Office of East Asian Affairs.

ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76

Political files for the years 1954–1973, maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs and the Office of Republic of China Affairs.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings during the years 1952–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1957–1961.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1960, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of NSC documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous NSC files, including records of action, for the years 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of the meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Top Secret records of the meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1959–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

United States Mission at the United Nations, New York

USUN Files

Files of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, 1950 to date.

Naval Historical Center

Burke Papers

Papers of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 1953–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

President's Daily Appointments

White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Executive Appointments, 1952–1961.

White House Office Files, Project Clean Up

See Staff Secretary's Records and the Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Staff Secretary's Records

White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell, 1952–1961. Includes some material formerly in Project Clean Up file.

Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952–1961. Includes some material formerly in Project Clean Up file.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, NSC Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administrative Series, and International File.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

JCS Records

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Item 114 (Lot 65 F 163)

Classified central files of the Embassy for the years 1959–1961.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Department of State, Record Group 84: Files of U.S. Foreign Service Posts

Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147 (Lot 62 F 83)

Top Secret central files of the Embassy for the years 1953–1958.

Department of Defense, Record Group 330

Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803

Subject and country files maintained by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale as Deputy Assistant and later Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) for the years 1957–1961.

OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1574

Subject files of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for 1959.

OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2093

Subject and country files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Administrative Secretary to the Secretary of Defense for the year 1960.

OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698 and 62 B 1698

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for the year 1958.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, including the Dulles Daily Appointment Book, the daily log of his meetings and appointments as Secretary of State for the years 1953–1959.

List of Abbreviations

AF, Air Forces
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AP, Associated Press
ASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
CAF, Chinese Air Force (Republic of China)
ChiCom, Chinese Communist
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
COMTAIWANDEFCOM, Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command
COMUSKOREA, Commander, United States Forces, Korea
COMUSTDC, Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command
CPR, People's Republic of China
C/S, Chief of Staff
CSUSA, Chief of Staff, United States Army
CSUSAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
CT, Country Team
CUSA, Council for United States Aid (Republic of China)
CY, calendar year

DA, Department of the Army
DAF, Department of the Air Force
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
Def, Defense
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DOD, Department of Defense
DS, Defense Support Assistance Program
DTG, date-time group (date and exact time on telegrams)

Embtel, Embassy telegram

FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FSL, Foreign Service local employee
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GAO, General Accounting Office
GBS, government budget support
GOJ, Government of Japan
govt, government

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

HE, high explosive
How Bns, Howitzer Battalions

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICA/W, International Cooperation Administration/Washington
ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA, International Development Association
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPI, International Press Institute
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ISA/FE, Far Eastern Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

JCRR, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Republic of China)
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LST, tank landing ship
LVT, landing vehicle tracked

M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Military Armistice Commission
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MG, Military Government
MinDef, Minister of Defense
MND, Ministry of National Defense
msg, message
MSP, Mutual Security Program

NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NACC, Naval Auxiliary Communications Center
NCO, non-commissioned officer
Niact, night action, requiring immediate reply
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIS, National Intelligence Survey
Noforn, No foreign distribution
NSC, National Security Council

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OCDM, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
OEC, Office of the Economic Coordinator
OPI, Office of Public Information
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
P.L., Public Law
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants

POLAD, Political Adviser
PRC, People's Republic of China

REAT, designation for documents from Secretary of State Dulles' trip to Rome, England, Alaska, and Taiwan, October 1958
ref, reference
reftel, reference telegram
Rep, Representative
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROKG, Republic of Korea Government
rptd, repeated

SAM, surface-to-air missile
SDMICC, Joint State/Defense Military Information Control Committee
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his party to the Department of State
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement
S/P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning; Policy Planning Staff

TDC, Taiwan Defense Command
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
Tng Ctrs, Training Centers
T/O, Table of Organization
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his party from the Department of State

U, Under Secretary of State
UK, United Kingdom
U/MSC, Deputy Coordinator of Mutual Security in the Office of the Under Secretary of State
UN, United Nations
UNC, United Nations Command
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
unn, unnumbered
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
U/OP, Office of the Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State
UPI, United Press International
USAF, United States Air Force
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USPOLAD, United States Political Adviser
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTDC, United States Taiwan Defense Command

W/MSC, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

List of Persons

Note: This list generally covers only the years 1958–1960. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the person usually held the position throughout the period. Chinese names are spelled according to contemporary usage.

Allen, George V., Director of the United States Information Agency
Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury

Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to Poland; U.S. Representative in the Ambassadorial talks with the People's Republic of China from September 1958
Becker, Loftus E., Legal Adviser of the Department of State until August 1959
Bennett, Josiah W., Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, January 1958–September 1960
Berding, Andrew H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Bowen, General Frank Sayles, Jr., Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, until July 1958
Brucker, Wilber M., Secretary of the Army
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations

Cabell, General Charles P. (Lieutenant General until July 1958), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States
Calhoun, John A., Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, September 1958–September 1960
Ch'en Ch'eng, Vice President of the Republic of China; President of Executive Yuan (Premier) from July 1958
Ch'en Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China; Foreign Minister from February 1958
Chiang Ching-kuo, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary General, National Defense Council, Republic of China; Minister without Portfolio from July 1958
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China
Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China; Foreign Minister through February 1958
Clough, Ralph N., Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, through July 1958
Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Cutler, Robert, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until June 1958

Dillon, C. Douglas, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs through June 1958; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State
Doan, Major General L.L., Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, July 1958–July 1960
Dowling, Walter C., Ambassador to the Republic of Korea until October 1959
Doyle, Vice Admiral A.K., Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, through July 1958
Drumright, Everett F., Consul General in Hong Kong through February 1958; Ambassador to the Republic of China from March 1958
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State until April 1959

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States
Elbrick, C. Burke, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1958

Felt, Admiral Harry D., Commander in Chief, Pacific, from July 1958

Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J., Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower
Gray, Gordon, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until July 1958; thereafter President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Green, Marshall, Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until July 1959; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, July–October 1959; Counselor of Embassy in Korea from November 1959
Green, Theodore Francis, Democratic Senator from Rhode Island
Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, Soviet Foreign Minister

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President
Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Haraldson, Wesley C., Director, International Cooperation Administration, Taipei, 1958–1960
Henderson, Loy J., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
Herter, Christian A., Under Secretary of State until April 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
Huang Shao-ku, Vice Premier of the Republic of China through July 1958; Foreign Minister until June 1960

Irwin, John N., II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until September 1958; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Jones, G. Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman of the Council of Ministers from March 1958
Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February 1958–December 1959; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council until 1959
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until July 1959; Chief of Staff, July 1959–September 1960; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lloyd, Selwyn, British Foreign Minister until July 1960; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer
Lutkins, Larue R., Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Acting Director, July–September 1958

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister
Macomber, William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), Chairman of the People's Republic of China through April 1959; Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
Martin, Edwin W., First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom through September 1958; Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from September 1958
McConaughy, Walter P., Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from December 1959
McElroy, Neil H., Secretary of Defense until December 1959
Menshikov, Mikhail Alexeyevich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from April 1958

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, November 1958–August 1959; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Morgan, Thomas E., Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania; Acting Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Parsons, Howard J., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until April 1959

Parsons, J. Graham, Ambassador to Laos through February 1958; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, March 1958–June 1959; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from July 1959

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Department of State until January 1960

Rhee, Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs through June 1959

Shen Chang-huan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China through 1959; Ambassador to Spain, 1959–June 1960; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs

Smith, Gerard C., Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning; also Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board

Smoot, Vice Admiral Roland N., Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command/Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, from August 1958

Sprague, Mansfield B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs through September 1958

Steeves, John M., Political Adviser to CINCPAC until March 1959; Consul General, Hong Kong and Macau, March–October 1959; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from October 1959

Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, through June 1959

Tong, Hollington K., Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States through July 1958

Twining, General Nathan F., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1960

Wang Ping-nan (Wang Bingnan), Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Poland, 1958–1960; Representative of the People's Republic of China in Ambassadorial talks with the United States from September 1958

Wang Shu-ming ("Tiger" Wang), General, CAF, Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China through June 1959; Vice Chairman, Military Strategy Advisory Committee, from June 1959

White, General Thomas D., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Yeh, George K.C. (Yeh Kung-ch'ao), Foreign Minister of the Republic of China through July 1958; Ambassador to the United States from September 1958

Yu Ta-wei, Defense Minister of the Republic of China

Zhou Enlai, *see* Chou En-lai

CHINA

JANUARY–AUGUST 1958, BACKGROUND OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS: POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF THE AMBASSADORIAL TALKS; SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES' VISIT TO TAIWAN IN MARCH 1958; U.S. CONCERN WITH GROWING TENSION IN THE TAIWAN AREA

1. Editorial Note

Ambassador to Czechoslovakia U. Alexis Johnson and Chinese Ambassador to Poland Wang Ping-nan held a series of meetings in Geneva between August 1, 1955, and December 12, 1957. Documentation concerning their meetings is in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, volume III and volume III Microfiche Supplement. At their last meeting, Johnson informed Wang that he was being transferred from Prague to a new post and that Edwin W. Martin had been designated to replace him as the United States representative; see volume III, page 657.

A letter of January 14, 1958, from Wang to Johnson refused to accept this arrangement and stated that if the United States intended to continue the talks it should designate a representative of ambassadorial rank. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pages 1129–1130. It was transmitted in telegram 588 from Geneva, January 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1558)

A January 20 memorandum from Robertson to Dulles recommended naming an ambassador to resume the talks within 2 or 3 months. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/1–2058) A January 21 memorandum from Dulles' Special Assistant, Joseph N. Greene, Jr., stated that Dulles wished to defer action until after a pending visit to China by the mothers of three imprisoned Americans. It reads in part as follows:

> "The Secretary's particular concern is that if we move to resume the Geneva talks, we may find that following release of the prisoners the only things left to talk about are those subjects which the Communists insist upon. He feels that with the transfer of Ambassador Johnson and the Chinese reply to notification thereof, we may have a plausible opportunity to break off the talks and that if we do not take advantage of this opportunity, we may be in for trouble." (*Ibid.*, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368, Geneva talks—Memos)

These documents are in the Supplement.

2. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Rankin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

Washington, January 23, 1958.

DEAR WALTER: You asked me to write down the points I raised in our recent conversation regarding the handicaps, avoidable and unavoidable, under which we are trying to implement our policy toward China. I emphasized difficulties of our own making about which something could and should be done. Certainly, our whole position in the Far East is so delicate and so grave that we cannot afford to handicap ourselves unnecessarily. This is particularly true in the case of China, since our China policy is fundamental to our policies toward other Asian countries.

For several years I have pointed out repeatedly, both orally and in writing, that United States Government operations in Taiwan were being carried on by an excessive number of American personnel and by an unnecessarily large number of independent or quasi-independent organizations. While the authority of the Ambassador is well established in principle, his immediate staff comprises only one percent of the United States officials on Taiwan. These 4,000 officials function with a dozen or more separate lines of communication and authority, making central coordination extremely difficult. Despite my representations and those of various other responsible persons, the number of official Americans on Taiwan has remained for some time around 4,000 (plus a similar number of dependents) and promises to increase somewhat during the coming months. The fact that the American taxpayer is called upon to provide perhaps $50 million annually for overhead in Free China, to carry out our programs, is less significant than the related political factors. Why are more official Americans needed to operate an aid program in a sovereign state than formerly were required to govern a colony of equivalent size? Such neo-colonialism gives substance to Red charges of American "occupation."

Our experience seems to establish that the best hope of improving the situation lies in a consolidation of various operations, with consequent savings in overhead and housekeeping, as well as in a clearer delineation of responsibility and an undoubted gain in general efficiency. At present at least five organizations are occupied with what normally would be considered Air Force business. Five are concerned with radio broadcasting. An indefinite number are engaged in psychological war-

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Rankin. Confidential. Marked for action by the Office of Chinese Affairs. Rankin had headed the Embassy in Taipei from August 1950 through December 1957 as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim until April 1953, and thereafter as Ambassador.

fare. Two or more are occupied with political reporting, and so it goes. While consolidation of such activities into single units may not always be desirable, a considerable tightening up is in order to improve coordination and efficiency, as well as to achieve economies and give a better political effect to one effort as a whole.

A majority of the American personnel in Taiwan are military, and Admiral Doyle has submitted a plan which is an important step in the right direction. It would place substantially all military activities directly under the authority of the senior American military officer on Taiwan, instead of the present system under which various units, large and small, report directly to someone in Japan, the Philippines or Hawaii. I have urged this step repeatedly since our military organizations began to proliferate in 1955. It is my understanding that Doyle's plan has been approved by CINCPAC and is now in the Pentagon for consideration. Probably it does not go far enough, but its implementation would be very helpful.

Another set of complications arises from historic rather than rational distinctions between overt and covert operations. Genuinely covert activities by the United States Government scarcely exist in Free China today. But a variety of operations continue to be treated as more or less covert even though they involve close cooperation with the Chinese and their nature is known in some detail to various countries, including Red China. Perhaps it may not seem particularly important whether the Embassy, ICA, USIA, the Air Force or some other agency performs a given function, as long as no actual duplication exists. But when two or more organizations operate in a field which logically belongs to one, it is almost inevitable that there should be redundant personnel and housekeeping, not to mention the added difficulties of coordination. Treating some phases of certain activities as covert, when they need not be, serves only to compound the trouble.

In the field of political opinion and reporting it is essential that the Embassy have complete control. Anyone is welcome to send a memorandum to the Embassy on any subject. If it contains anything new or otherwise of value the Embassy will be glad to pass it on to the Department with appropriate comments and indication of the source, if the latter so desires. But the Embassy is not in a position to cope with reports sent in through separate channels which transmit the political opinions of American officials belonging to other organizations, particularly when such officials remain anonymous. Calling such reports "estimates" is no justification for this procedure, which may result in the dissemination among top circles in Washington of slanted material calling into question the validity of approved United States policy. (Here in Washington it would seem to me that while the preparation of NIE papers should be centered in another agency, the Department should have primary control of NIE papers dealing with foreign policy and prospects.) All of this is of major importance in so sensitive and vital a matter as the China policy.

In summary, I would recommend the following:

1. Approval of Admiral Doyle's plan for U.S. military organizations on Taiwan.
2. Consolidation of so-called covert activities with related overt operations where there is no longer any valid reason for a separation.
3. Authority for the Ambassador to instruct all United States Government agencies in China to channel through the Embassy all political reporting, including all "estimates" and all economic and military reporting bearing on policy.
4. Continued efforts to reduce the number of United States Government entities in Free China and to consolidate housekeeping and "headquarters" operations, military and civilian, wherever possible.
5. In general, the replacement of American personnel by Chinese in all positions where the latter can perform substantially as well.

I would not leave with you the impression that the foregoing paragraphs reflect the existence of unsatisfactory working relationships among official Americans on Taiwan. On the contrary, there has been a most friendly and cooperative attitude on the part of all concerned. They have done the best they could under the circumstances, but they could do better if unnecessary handicaps were removed.

Sincerely yours,

K.L. Rankin[1]

---

[1] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

3. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Herter) to President Chiang

Washington, February 11, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During our meeting on September 14, 1957, at Taipei,[1] you provided Ambassador Richards and me with the outline of a plan for training parachutists and dropping them on the mainland of

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/2–1158. Secret.

[1] See telegram 245 from Seoul, September 16, 1957, *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, p. 603.

China to foment and organize resistance against the Communists. You asked that this plan be brought to the attention of President Eisenhower.

Following our return to the United States, the Department of State received additional details of your plan. It was given careful study by the Government of the United States, and I discussed it with President Eisenhower.

After thorough consideration of all the factors involved, we have concluded that it would be desirable to train additional paratroopers in order to be better prepared for possible contingencies, provided this can be done without increase in the cost of the military aid program. The Military Assistance Advisory Group has recently been authorized to begin the training of 3,000 troops in parachute techniques and unconventional warfare within the limits of the aid program for Fiscal Year 1958. We now propose that the military authorities of the United States and the Republic of China consult to see what further economies might be achieved in the aid program and in the Chinese military budget which would permit the training of additional paratroopers beyond this 3,000. Agreement to the training of additional paratroopers does not, of course, imply agreement as to their use, which would be subject to the provisions of the exchange of notes of December 10, 1954, pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty,[2] and other understandings between the United States and the Republic of China concerning the employment of the Chinese armed forces.

In considering the development of free world military capability in the Far East, as elsewhere, it is essential to bear in mind that we may face a struggle extending over many years in which victory will fall to the side with the greatest staying power. Consequently, both the United States and the Republic of China must continue to shape their military programs so as not to jeopardize long-term economic and political stability.

I take this opportunity to express again my gratitude for your kindness and hospitality during my visit to Taiwan, and to offer my highest regards.

Sincerely yours,

Christian A. Herter[3]

---

[2] For text of the U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty signed at Washington on December 2, 1954, and related notes exchanged on December 10, 1954, by Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh, see 6 UST 433.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

4. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, February 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Reply to Chinese Communists Concerning Geneva Talks

You indicated that you wished to defer a decision on continuation of the Geneva talks until it was known whether during or following the visit of the three mothers to Communist China, any or all of the remaining American prisoners there were released.[1]

The Chinese Communists did not release any of the prisoners during the mothers' visit nor did they give the mothers any reason to hope for early release, beyond their standard statement that the prisoners could be released before termination of their sentence for good behavior. The Indian Ambassador to Peiping, who had been instructed by Nehru to intercede with the Chinese Communists on behalf of the American prisoners, informed our Consul General in Hong Kong that Mao Tse-tung had told him only that two prisoners would be released this year. Presumably, these are the two priests whose sentences expire in June. The Indian Ambassador expressed a personal view that the prisoners might receive a "favorable break" in the not too far distant future, but I do not place much weight on this speculative remark.

I think we should, within the next two or three months, resume the talks at the ambassadorial level. They provide an avenue for continuing to press for release of the prisoners. Moreover, given the present world-wide preoccupation with negotiations between East and West, these talks may serve to divert embarrassing pressures to meet with the Chinese Communists in a less advantageous forum.

There is attached (Tab A)[2] a proposed reply to the Chinese Communist letter of January 14 (Tab B) to be signed by Edwin Martin, as present United States representative, and transmitted to Wang Ping-nan about March 1. This reply would inform the Communists that although we were not able to designate a representative of ambassadorial rank at the present time, we planned to do so as soon as feasible. Peiping would thus

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2458. Secret. Drafted by Clough and Lutkins and cleared with EUR.

[1] See Document 1.

[2] Not attached to the source text. For text of the March 12 letter from Martin to Wang, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1131–1132. A copy of the draft is in Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Ambassadorial Discussions with the Chinese Communists; see Supplement.

be assured that we were not moving to break off the talks, and we would retain flexibility as to when we decide to resume them.

I will consult with EUR and make a recommendation later concerning the ambassador who might best continue the talks.[3]

Recommendation:

That you approve the proposed reply to the Chinese Communists (Tab A).[4]

---

[3] In Robertson's January 20 memorandum, he recommended Ambassador-designate to Czechoslovakia John M. Allison. In a handwritten note on that memorandum, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy suggested Ambassador to Poland Jacob D. Beam, noting that this would facilitate contacts and save time and expense. A February 8 memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Howard P. Jones to Robertson stated that Murphy still saw advantages in having Beam conduct the talks in Warsaw, since he and Wang "could contact each other informally without the eyes of the world upon them", offering "a useful channel for communication." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–858)

[4] Dulles initialed approval of the recommendation.

---

5. Editorial Note

National Intelligence Estimate 10–58, "Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc," dated March 4, 1958, dealt in part with China. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were interdepartmental reports drafted by officers from agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the President, the National Security Council, and other appropriate officers of cabinet level. NIE 10–58 consisted of an introductory note, a brief estimate, and 11 annexes. The annexes were prepared by the IAC's Resistance Intelligence Committee and noted but not approved by the IAC.

Annex C, "Communist China," stated that the volume and intensity of dissidence had "increased significantly" in the preceding 2 years but that there had been "no significant organized resistance or active resistance on other than a purely local level, with the important exception of Tibet, where dissidence flared into armed rebellion in 1956, forcing important shifts in the Communist time-table for this area." After a discussion of disaffection among various groups, it stated:

"While it may be possible, on the basis of the preceding analyses, to make an assessment in general terms of the major sources and areas of ill will, the intensity of dissidence in Communist China and the degree to which it may be transformed into actual resistance remain largely matters of conjecture. It is logical to conclude that some degree of dissidence exists at almost every level of Communist Chinese society. However, this does not mean that such dissidence can develop into resistance unless the control capabilities of the regime were greatly weakened."

The paper estimated that in peacetime, "organized resistance to the Peiping regime has virtually no chance of developing on a significant scale" and that in time of war, "the extent of resistance in Communist China would depend on the nature and fortunes of the war."

The introductory note to NIE 10–58 defined dissidence as "a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime", resistance as "dissidence translated into action", and organized resistance as "resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system." (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

---

6. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC–7 Taipei, March 14, 1958, 8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles	Pres. Chiang Kai-shek
Ambassador Drumright	Madame Chiang
Walter Robertson	V. Pres. Chen Cheng
Frederick Reinhardt	Prime Minister O.K. Yui
Admiral Felix Stump	Foreign Minister George Yeh
	General (Tiger) Wang Shu-ming
	Secy. Gen. to Pres. Chang Chun
	Secy. to Pres. James Shen

SUBJECT

Exchange of Views

General Situation

The Generalissimo asked what was the U.S. attitude toward Communist China; then changed his question to an inquiry regarding what

---

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt and Robertson. Secretary Dulles visited the Republic of China March 14–15 following his attendance at the SEATO Council Meeting in Manila, March 11–13.

might be the next move of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Secretary replied that for the present the Communists appeared to be effectively deterred from initiating any military aggression. They were now concentrating their efforts in the economic and subversive fields, towards neutralist countries, particularly those of the Middle East. They were also alert to exploit any trouble between countries of the free world. The threat appeared greatest in the Middle East and Asia and in North Africa if the French did not change their policy.

Indonesia

The Generalissimo said he wished to invite the Secretary's attention to the Asian question. Developments in Indonesia posed a very serious problem. The dissidents should have all the moral support possible. If Sukarno won it would greatly enhance the position of the Communists in Indonesia and might lead to their control of the country. This would be disastrous given the key geographic position of Indonesia in South East Asia. The Secretary assured the Generalissimo that the U.S. shared his estimate of the situation and would gladly assist in any scheme which would not involve the U.S. but would be a contributing element to a satisfactory outcome. He pointed out that the capacity to help from the outside was limited and that any overt foreign involvement risked evolving a nationalistic reaction which would tend to unify the country.

Korea

The Generalissimo thought that the Chinese Communist proposal to withdraw their troops from Korea merited more attention than it was getting. He believed that it was an element in a larger scheme, an intrigue. He had had intelligence reports that when in Moscow last November Mao had reached an agreement with the Soviet Government for an attack on Taiwan this summer. Although he had discounted these reports initially, Chiang said the Communist troop withdrawal in Korea lent them more credence. He was now inclined to think that there might be some Communist military action somewhere in South East Asia this year. The Secretary observed that an attack on Taiwan would probably cause the South Koreans to move against the North, therefore if the Chinese Communists had an attack in mind they would not be withdrawing troops from Korea. He did, however, agree with Chiang that the situation in North Korea needed watching.

Japan and Ryukyus

Chiang spoke of Communist infiltration in the Ryukyus, particularly Okinawa and the revival of Japanese influence throughout the Islands. The U.S. would have to take steps to ensure the security of its position there. In Japan itself the situation was developing badly and he feared Japan had charted a neutralist course. Chiang thought the situation throughout Asia was not encouraging if one looked closely. It was like a man covered with many sores, anyone of which might suddenly develop into a fatal ailment. He thought it was important to grasp this pivotal point. The United States, he said, had in the past put its emphasis on Japan. Chiang asked where was the emphasis now?

Mr. Robertson responded that U.S. policy in Asia found expression in our defensive arrangements with our friends: SEATO, the Japanese security agreement and the several bilateral defense agreements. These are all designed to deter Communist aggression and avert it wherever it might appear. Our actions in Korea and with respect to Dien Bien Phu were demonstrations of this. If this policy was not clear to our Asian friends, it was certainly clear to us. Chiang observed that this was a statement of policy and it was well understood, but had nothing to do with emphasis.

Communist China

Chiang then observed that Chinese influence came from the mainland and that, therefore, in order to deter any expansion of the Chinese Communist regime, it was important to find ways and means of exploiting instability on the mainland. At present we were on the defensive, building dams, and this was not adequate. We should sponsor those elements of opposition already in being and keep alive their hopes. There were many signs, he said, that the foundations of the Chinese Communist rule on the mainland were shaken. This was particularly noticeable in the anti-rightist movement and the return-to-the-farm movement. The Chinese Communists were encountering many economic and fiscal difficulties which were demonstrated in the failure of the first five-year plan and the launching of the second five-year plan. Now was the time to put pressure on the regime, but we thought any overt action we might take would bring about world war and the Communists would continue to expand. The crux of the problem in Asia was on the mainland and unless we dealt with it, we were not facing the issue squarely.

Chiang went on to say that the continued existence of his regime in Taiwan was a challenge to the Communists and it was necessary to exploit their rapidly deteriorating condition. If we could not strengthen the opposition forces on the mainland, then our political influence would fade away.

Formosa, he said, still served as a rallying point for anti-Communists the world over but the British and French did not recognize its importance to their existence.

Chiang then said that the U.S. and free China should discuss three points:

1. How to strengthen anti-Communist forces on the mainland;
2. How to use forces in Taiwan without involving the U.S. and launching a world war;

3. How to leave Taiwan free to make such use of special guerrilla units (not regular forces) for commando raids and to hold beachheads.

It was necessary, Chiang said, to widen the scope of psychological warfare in order to quicken the fall of the regime on the mainland. There were two types of approach which were wrong, namely, that the solution of the Chinese Communist problem could not be achieved without world war and that the defeat of the Chinese Communist was a function of global strategy. The free world, he observed, had been too timid in taking advantage of its opportunities which could be exploited without bringing about world conflict. The success of the Soviet Union had been its understanding of this free world fear. Chiang said he had received from Mr. Herter about two weeks ago a reply on the subject of the 3,000 Paratroopers. Their training and use was to be subject to the terms of an exchange of notes. The U.S. could of course insist on any conditions it wished but he thought these forces should be used to assist the growth of the anti-Communist movement. To restrict their usefulness would nullify the effect of the aid program. The Communists on the mainland regarded free China as the enemy and for the U.S. to tie their hands and feet created a pathetic situation. Communist propaganda insisted that those on Formosa were under U.S. control and that people on the mainland need not expect any action from them. Finally, Chiang said he hoped it would be possible to get together and discuss these things. His purpose was to preserve the existence of free China and maintain the respect of people on the mainland.

Referring to Chiang's remarks on the subject of Japan, the Secretary pointed out that it was one of the four industrial areas of the world and that, therefore, great importance was attached to it. He recognized that there was neutral sentiment in Japan. The Government however was not dominated by it. Japan as an island kingdom had a great urge and need to trade. The experience and policies of Great Britain with respect to the blockade in World War I offered an explanation of what might otherwise seem inconsistent motivation in our point of view on this problem.

In reply to Chiang's assertion that defensive measures were not enough, the Secretary said we did in fact conduct psychological offensives which might or might not account for the recent troubles in Eastern Europe. We also did so in Asia but here it was more difficult. The Secretary said we had not run away from any opportunity through fear, but there was often a difference of opinion regarding the existence of an opportunity. He thought it was in the realm of possibility that an opportunity might come but because of the potential importance of such an opportunity, he did not want to waste or fritter away our assets on questionable situations. The provisions of the agreement Chiang had referred to were not designed to keep free China in a permanent state of paralysis but they did mean that any action should be on the basis of a real opportunity and not an illusory one. The Secretary saw no reason from the political standpoint why there should not be some quiet military planning along the lines suggested, but he would defer to military advice as to the scope it might properly assume. Finally, he begged of the President not to think that his partners were paralyzed by fright. This was simply not so.

Chiang replied that he did not consider the Secretary subject to any fear for he knew he was a staunch anti-Communist and he agreed with what the Secretary had said. He was not suggesting an invasion but simply a coordinated effort in psychological warfare to exploit opposition elements in being but not yet recognized. The Generalissimo hoped something could be done without using regular troops and which would not involve the U.S. position but would hasten the downfall of Communist China.

---

7. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

No. 581 Taipei, April 3, 1958.

SUBJECT

Transmitting Memoranda of Conversations held by President Chiang with Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary

Transmitted are copies of memoranda of 1) the conversation held among President Chiang, Secretary Dulles and certain other persons, on the evening of March 14, 1958;[1] and 2) the conversation held among President Chiang, Assistant Secretary Robertson and certain others on March 17, 1958.[2] The summary of the conversations with Secretary Dulles was prepared by President Chiang's secretary. It is my understanding that this transcript was carefully checked by the President and the Foreign Minister before a copy was released to me. No doubt there has been some editing of the conversation, but it is my impression that

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–358. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright.

[1] See Document 6. The enclosure, a summary record of the conversation prepared by Chiang's secretary James Shen, is not printed.

[2] The memorandum of conversation, drafted by Drumright and revised subsequently by Robertson, is not printed.

the enclosed summary is a relatively full and accurate account of the conversation that took place.

One problem arose from the conversations which, in my opinion, requires consideration and a decision from Washington. I refer to President Chiang's proposal that what we might call irregular or unconventional activities be undertaken on the mainland. It will be observed that, in his conversation with Mr. Robertson, President Chiang went so far as to suggest the formation of a small joint Sino-American committee, whose existence would be kept secret, to consider the general problem of guerrilla and/or other small-scale operations directed against the mainland. It was clear to me, from President Chiang's remarks to Secretary Dulles and Mr. Robertson, that he is chafing under the strings which he considers the United States has attached to him in connection with the mutual defense treaty and related agreements. His feelings apparently came to a head following receipt of Undersecretary Herter's letter of February 11, 1958, which suggested that the "special forces" group now under training and perhaps paratroopers and other unconventional units coming within the purview of our support and training would be subject to the inhibiting provisions of our mutual agreement to consult together before applying force to the mainland. It is obvious that the President is becoming more restive as his regular forces complete their training and equipping. He considers inactivity in the face of the enemy to be wrong in principle, and he is also fearful that a "do nothing" attitude will be damaging to his prestige among his own followers here, among the general populace of this island, among the mainland public, which he regards as looking to him for deliverance, and to the anti-Communist world in general. The President senses it to be his destiny, his responsibility, to liberate his shackled people and to rehabilitate his own prestige and reputation before he dies. He said to Secretary Dulles that he is not suggesting an all-out attack or anything of that sort. I believe that he is sincere in that statement. He knows that he could not mount a counterattack without our all-out support, and he knows we would not give that support in an aggressive endeavor to unseat the Chinese Communists. But he believes our present posture (and that includes him) is entirely negative. He believes, and apparently sincerely, that the Chinese people on the mainland are disaffected and ripe for revolt. He wants to exploit this situation, of course. I understand that he has some ideas on how this might be done. As the Department knows, MAAG is now engaged in training 3,000 "special forces". In addition, the Chinese are using their airborne regiment to train about 10,000 selected Chinese in paratrooper operations. We are not supporting this latter activity. The President is known to want to train a total of 30,000 selected forces in dropping operations. He is known to have a plan for the use of these forces. Apparently, it would envisage the dropping of selected and varied-sized units either in support of uprisings that might take place in certain areas of China or small-sized units might be infiltrated either by sea or air into the mainland where it would be their function to establish contact with the people, seek their support, and proceed to build up bases of resistance. Whether this latter activity is feasible under existing conditions on the mainland is unknown. In any event, so far as is known to the Embassy and related agencies, no guerrilla bases now exist which are supported by the Chinese on Taiwan.

Moreover, it appears that efforts formerly made to penetrate and build up on the mainland were discontinued following the fall of the Ta Chen islands. I gather that the United States retired from practically all activity in this field, and that there is no existing directive authorizing U.S. agencies to encourage and support infiltration and build-up activities on the mainland. Indeed, our current directives (which I have not had an opportunity to examine) apparently are directed to stopping the Chinese from engaging in infiltration activities on the mainland. There also seems to be a tendency both in American and Chinese quarters here to draw the mutual defense provisions over the control of such activities, that is, to stop them almost completely.

I have discussed this problem in a general way with Admiral Doyle, General Bowen and Mr. Duggan. They all appear to concur that encouragement and support should be given to the Chinese to resume infiltration activities on the mainland. The consensus is that these activities should be well-prepared, carefully planned and conducted on a small scale in areas such as eastern Kwangtung. My colleagues also appear to believe that we should seriously consider the formation of a joint committee to help the Chinese in formulating their plans, et cetera. I share their views that we should encourage the Chinese to attempt small-scale infiltration activities which would have as their basic purpose the creation of bases of resistance on the mainland. I think that we should encourage and support such activities, in order to ascertain whether the Chinese have the capability to create resistance bases from small initial starts and also to ascertain whether the mainland population is prepared to support such endeavors. This would, of course, rescue President Chiang and his followers from their present aimless course, so to speak, and give them at least some spirit of purpose and something to concentrate on. If confined to small limits, as I think it would have to be to have any chance of ultimate success, such a program should not involve us in any hostilities of consequence against the mainland.

I would also favor the formation of a small joint committee to study the problem of mainland infiltration. I would like to see it limited, at first at least, to an exploratory or advisory function. Its terms of reference, in other words, could be limited to study and exploration of what President Chiang has in mind and to a study of prospects of infiltration of the mainland, and to an examination of ways and means of carrying out any infiltrations that might be deemed feasible or in prospect within the capabilities of the Chinese on Taiwan. If such a joint committee is formed, I would hope that we would place on it not only military experts skilled in unconventional warfare, but also experts trained specially in guerrilla techniques and an officer or two who are specially trained in psychological warfare. If we would agree to discussing this with President Chiang, I believe that we could diminish the spirit of frustration which seems gradually to be overtaking him. I personally believe we could enter into talks with him that might perhaps offer him some useful guidance and channel his activities in the infiltration field in directions that might be mutually useful. I believe, also, that we could do this in such a way as not to get committed to operations that would involve us in large-scale hostilities with the Chinese Communists, but which would gradually give them increasing difficulty and at the same time hold out growing hope of liberation to mainland Chinese.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to CINCPAC, in view of his interest in this subject.

Everett F. Drumright

8. Editorial Note

A letter dated March 25, 1958, addressed to Edwin W. Martin and signed by Lai Ya-li, Assistant to Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, declared that the Chinese Government could neither consent to a "unilateral change in the level of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks" nor agree "to leave the talks in a protracted suspension . . . so that no reality exists of the talks under an empty name." Extracts are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pages 1132–1133. The text was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 961 from Geneva, March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2658)

On April 12, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China released Wang's January 14 letter to Johnson (see Document 1), Martin's March 12 letter to Wang (see footnote 2, Document 4), and Lai's letter, along with a statement charging that "for the past four months, the United States has been playing fraudulent tricks to stall the Sino-American talks." A copy of the statement was delivered to the Consulate General in Geneva with a covering letter of April 12 from Lai to Martin; a translation was transmitted in telegram 1117 from Geneva, April 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4–1258)

A Department of State press officer at the weekly press briefing on April 14 made the following statement: "Despite the disappointing results of the Geneva talks brought about by Chinese Communist intransigence, the United States believes that they should continue." The statement continued: "As Mr. Martin indicated to the Chinese Communist representative in his letter of March 12, the United States intends to appoint an ambassador as soon as feasible as United States representative. In the meantime, Mr. Martin stands ready to meet with a Chinese Communist representative." (Filed with a letter of April 24 from Robertson to Mary V. Downey; *ibid.,* FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Americans Held in China)

9. Notes of the Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, April 16, 1958.

[Here follow notes of the discussion at the OCB luncheon on unrelated matters.]

7. *Report and Operations Plan on Taiwan (Secret)*[1]

Mr. Ralph Clough, Office of Chinese Affairs, was present for the discussion.

The Report stated that "reasonably satisfactory progress" had been made during the past nine months toward NSC policy objectives. Governor Herter noted that a number of overseas Chinese attending school on the island was increasing and that there was some evidence of decrease in the number of those attending Red Chinese schools on the Mainland. Mr. Dulles (CIA) suggested that a special study should be undertaken of the schooling situation for overseas Chinese on the Mainland and that, if the results were favorable for U.S. propaganda, they be publicized. Mr. Clough pointed out that Taiwan educational facilities for overseas Chinese were limited. Mr. Harr, Vice Chairman, suggested that U.S. aid in expanding the facilities be considered.

General Cutler opened a broad-ranging discussion of the two papers by saying that he found the paragraphs on the Taiwan economy "insufficient". He thought that the increase of American personnel from 9,902 on September 1, 1957 to 11,292 on March 1, 1958 "appalling" and suggested that the Report should take some note of the effect of "external happenings" on the future of Taiwan. In this latter regard he said that the possibilities were now greater that New Zealand [and?] the U.K. might support the admission of Red China to the U.N. In general, he thought that the Report failed "to show the seamy side" of the picture on Taiwan. United States policy toward Taiwan was removed from reality, yet the Report "was Pollyannaish". The "U.S. dream" would one day "blow up in our faces, for example when the Gimo died", and the OCB "had a responsibility to present a realistic paper to the NSC even if such a paper should be objectionable to those who pretend that all is rosy as regards Taiwan".

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Preliminary Notes. Secret. The document is headed "Preliminary Notes of OCB Meeting, April 16, 1958."

[1] Reference is to two draft OCB documents, "Report on Taiwan" and "Operations Plan for Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China," prepared by an interagency working group and approved by the Board Assistants as part of the Board's function of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of NSC policy papers. The final documents were dated April 16 and April 23, respectively. (*Ibid.*, Taiwan, 1958–1959; see Supplement)

Mr. Allen (USIA) said he generally supported the views of General Cutler but recognized that the problem was complicated. Mr. Harr thought that the Report presented a good general picture and said that the U.S. cannot expect to have the Chinese measure up to U.S. standards, including that of budget administration. Mr. Clough mentioned that since the Report was prepared some effective steps have been taken toward simplifying the dollar-yuan exchange rate.

Mr. Scribner of Treasury said that the GRC should be required to budget more funds for economic development and expressed some dissatisfaction with the phrasing in the Report of a few of the economic paragraphs. Governor Herter, while noting that U.S. policy would have to be reviewed at some time, said that the OCB was not the forum for the review of policy.

Mr. Smith (ICA) said that he had spent the morning testifying before a Congressional Committee and therefore wished to emphasize that no policy can be carried out without money and that the effectiveness of a policy is bounded by the amount of funds appropriated. He wondered whether Congress would continue "to pour money into Taiwan." Mr. Allen Dulles remarked that Congress had so far authorized funds for Taiwan without reluctance. Mr. Smith then wondered whether it would be possible to put some of the 600,000 Taiwan troops to work on such productive military engineering work as road and bridge building. Governor Herter said he thought this was a matter within the jurisdiction of the Military Advisory Group.

The Board approved the Report and the Operations Plan subject to its revision by the Working Group in the light of the discussion.[2]

Arthur L. Richards[3]

---

[2] The "Report on Taiwan," dated April 16, was forwarded to the National Security Council with a briefing note by Special Assistant to the President Karl G. Harr, Jr., and was noted by the Council without discussion at its meeting on May 29. (Memorandum of discussion dated May 29 with attached briefing note dated May 28; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

10. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Drumright)

Washington, April 29, 1958.

DEAR DRUM: I have read with much interest and have carefully considered your Despatch No. 581[1] transmitting memoranda of conversations between President Chiang and the Secretary and myself and recommending acceding to President Chiang's request that we cooperate with the GRC in establishing guerrilla bases on the China mainland. We have also held preliminary talks with [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] at the working level.

I agree entirely with your assessment that President Chiang is becoming more restive and that he and the GRC officials concerned would be much encouraged if we found it possible to support the type of operation they propose. However, we should frankly recognize from the outset that our cooperation in such operations might only give a temporary fillip to their morale and, indeed, might terminate by leaving them more frustrated than at present if the operation should fail or if, it having developed to a certain point, we felt we could not under conditions then prevailing, face the risk which further expansion would entail. In short, before starting down the recommended road, we must try to satisfy ourselves where it is leading.

I am not sure how much detailed knowledge you have of the efforts to support guerrilla operations on the mainland during the early 1950's. The Chinese Communist security services proved highly successful in nipping all such efforts in the bud. It is true that today there is more widespread dissatisfaction with the Communist regime, but on the other hand their security services also appeared to have improved. There is a wide gap between the existence of extensive dissatisfaction with the Communists and a willingness on the part of individuals to risk their necks by becoming a part of a resistance movement. It is only when the latter condition prevails among a sufficient number of people that the type of guerrilla action proposed would be of any use. This means that we have to know more than we do today of the state of mind of the people in the areas of the mainland which might be selected for guerrilla bases.

We have, of course, pointed out to President Chiang the failure of previous efforts to organize guerrilla resistance on the China mainland as, for example, in Admiral Radford's conversation with President

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Drumright. Secret; Official–Informal.

[1] Document 7.

Chiang on August 1, 1956.[2] According to Karl Rankin's letter of October 8, 1956 to Admiral Radford,[3] President Chiang believes that those efforts failed because they were on too small a scale. He now seems to be thinking in terms of training some 30,000 or more paratroopers and dropping large numbers of them more or less simultaneously in various parts of China. This seems to us a very risky operation and one which should not be undertaken until we have more evidence than we have today that it might be successful. The failure of such an attempt would not only be a heavy blow to morale in Taiwan, but might well create difficult international problems for us to no purpose.

Certainly, we should carefully study President Chiang's proposal and discuss its feasibility among ourselves. We intend to have further talks here on the subject. It might be that a small, carefully worked out effort, beginning with the acquisition of good intelligence on a particular area would be well worthwhile. However, the matter should be approached cautiously and we must avoid giving President Chiang the impression that on the basis of present intelligence we could accept any proposal for large scale operations against the mainland.[4]

In our discussions here we will consider your proposal for a small joint committee to study the problem of mainland infiltration.

I will write you further on this and in the meantime would welcome your comments.[5]

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson[6]

---

[2] For a memorandum of the conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 411–415.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84)

[4] In a May 27 letter to Robertson, Drumright wrote that at a meeting with U.S. representatives on May 23 Chiang had declared that for 3 years he had advocated dropping trained guerrilla paratrooper units in selected areas on the mainland and that he still believed in the efficacy of that type of operation. Drumright wrote that he intended to suggest to General Bowen, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, that he discuss the subject with Chiang in order to point out the "difficulties and fallacies" of this concept. (*Ibid.*, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Drumright)

[5] In a May 22 letter to Robertson, Drumright withdrew his suggestion for concurrence in the establishment of a joint committee. He wrote that a combined U.S.–GRC Special Forces exercise was to be held later in the year, the purpose of which would be "to provide the GRC with realistic training in the preparation and use of Special Forces in their role of supporting conventional military operations", and which was expected to "disabuse them of certain incomplete and inaccurate concepts regarding the proper role of Special Forces and the difficulties of their employment." (*Ibid.*)

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

11. Editorial Note

At the 364th meeting of the National Security Council on May 2, 1958, there was a brief discussion pertaining to U.S. policy toward China during a discussion of NSC 5810, "Basic National Security Policy," dated April 15, 1958. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5810 Series) The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, May 2, reads as follows:

"General Cutler then went back to his briefing note in order to deal with the second of the two most significant paragraphs in the new statement—namely paragraph 41, dealing with Communist China. He pointed out that paragraph 41 in NSC 5810 repeated the guidance in last year's basic policy with respect to Communist China. However, this paragraph contained no guidance as to a future attempt by other nations to seat Red China, rather than the Chinese Nationalist Government, in the United Nations. In view of the fact that there were many straws in the wind to indicate that such a move might be made, and that the United States might not be able to block it, he personally believed, along with certain Planning Board members, that the United States should be considering now, while it still enjoys its strong majority in the UN, alternative ways of dealing with such a contingency, and of finding a way to preserve the independence of Taiwan despite the loss of its status as representative in the UN of all China. Upon concluding his remarks, General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles to speak to this problem.

"Secretary Dulles pointed out that, in line with General Twining's fears as to the unfortunate psychological impact of a change in basic policy, he believed that the last thing in the world we would want to commit to writing was a proposal of the sort suggested by General Cutler for paragraph 41. Furthermore, he doubted whether the tide was actually running against the United States in the UN with respect to seating Communist China. On the contrary, there was some evidence that the tide had turned in favor of our position against the admission of Red China. For example, the United Kingdom has committed itself to support the moratorium during the lifetime of the Macmillan government. Secretary Dulles doubted, therefore, whether any change in British policy on this subject was imminent.

"General Cutler asked if there would not certainly be a change if Aneurin Bevan were soon to become Foreign Secretary. To this point, Secretary Dulles replied that if we were to review all our policies on such assumptions as this, there were a lot more significant changes to be made than our attitude toward the admission of Red China to the UN. If Bevan became Foreign Secretary, we would presumably be ousted from all our missile bases in the United Kingdom.

"The President expressed the belief that if the United States were to recognize Red China and agree to the admission of Red China to the United Nations, there would be a wave of insistence in Congress and among the American people that the United States withdraw completely from the UN." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The Council made no changes in paragraph 41 of NSC 5810, which was approved with amendments as NSC 5810/1, May 5, 1958; the text is scheduled for publication in volume III.

---

12. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, May 10, 1958, noon.

926. Commander USTDC/MAAG now preparing letter to Minister National Defense seeking GRC–US agreement on details of policy governing employment of MAP supported 3,000-man GRC special forces.[1] Action complements that taken by Embassy October 28, 1957 pursuant Deptel 264[2] informing Foreign Ministry as to restrictions on use special forces.

Embassy understands Under Secretary Herter letter February 11, 1958, where it speaks of "training of additional paratroopers", intended as response to that part of President Chiang's proposal relating to training of 10,000 Chinese in basic parachute use and does not imply approval additional special forces over and above 3,000 already authorized. Please clarify.[3]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–1058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Passed to CINCPAC/POLAD.

[1] The letter from Vice Admiral A.K. Doyle to Defense Minister Yu, May 28, stated, inter alia, that U.S. support of the program was predicated upon the understanding that use of the Special Forces was subject to the same considerations as those applicable to the use of other Chinese forces. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/6–658; see Supplement) Chief of General Staff General Wang Shu-ming concurred in a September 9 letter to Doyle's successor, Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot, and a September 25 letter to Major General L.L. Doan, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group; copies were enclosed with despatch 168 from Taipei, October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–358)

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, p. 633, footnote 4.

[3] Telegram 721 to Taipei, May 14, confirmed the Embassy's interpretation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5–1058)

As point information, Embassy understands neither Chief, MAAG, nor Commander TDC has received instructions to consult with Chinese military authorities as proposed in Herter letter. Nor has GRC taken initiative with MAAG or TDC.[4]

Drumright

---

[4] Foreign Minister Yeh asked Drumright on June 7 whether the United States had agreed to train special forces in addition to the 3,000 under training. Drumright replied in the negative but said the United States would consider training additional men if it could be done within the limits of the existing military assistance program. The memorandum of conversation was transmitted with despatch 747 from Taipei, June 9. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/6–958)

---

13. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–58 Washington, May 13, 1958.

COMMUNIST CHINA

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To analyze Chinese Communist domestic developments and external relations during the period of the First Five Year Plan (1953–1957), and to estimate probable trends during the next five years.

Conclusions

1. We believe that the Chinese Communist ability to exercise firm and effective control of mainland China will continue. The leadership of

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 13 May 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

the party continues to demonstrate cohesion and determination and, at the same time, a considerable degree of flexibility. It is supported by a party membership of about 13 million and controls a large and efficient military and public security apparatus. We believe that the death or incapacitation of Mao Tse-tung would not endanger the regime's control of the country, although it might complicate the achieving of some objectives and reduce the party's policy flexibility. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. The regime apparently has made considerable progress in its efforts to recast the traditional structure of Chinese society in the Communist mold. It has collectivized almost all the peasants and has virtually eliminated private ownership in industry and commerce. Although the Chinese people have viewed with favor some of the regime's achievements, the regime's stringent curtailment of consumption and the constant pressures to conform and to work harder have provoked much dissatisfaction and disillusionment, especially among the peasants. The party's experiments during the past two years to gain wider popular support by admitting problems and encouraging their discussion—the "letting 100 flowers bloom and diverse thoughts contend" program—has been sharply cut back. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. In its efforts to elicit a more positive popular response, the regime, because of its determination to achieve rapid industrialization, will have little to offer in the way of material inducements. Dissatisfactions and occasional popular outbursts will continue, especially among the peasantry and certain minority groups, but we believe the net effect on the regime's programs will be no more than a complicating or retarding one. Most Chinese, conscious of the regime's power and seeing no alternative, will probably continue to acquiesce in Communist rule. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. The Chinese Communists achieved a high rate of economic growth during their First Five Year Plan (1953–57), demonstrating their capability to marshal resources for investment despite the backward nature of the economy. A vital factor in their economic program was the assistance rendered by the USSR in expanded trade, credits, and technical aid. Starting from a very small base, the average annual rate of growth of industrial output was about 16 percent, but industrial output at the end of 1957 was still small compared to the industrial output of Japan or the UK. Agricultural output was adequate to meet basic needs, but its expansion fell far short of that in other sectors of the economy. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. During the next five years, the regime will have to cope with difficult economic problems stemming from the forced pace of industrial development. However, the basic problem will continue to be the race

between population growth and food production. The Chinese population is now probably about 640 million and increasing at about 2.0–2.5 percent per year; agricultural output during the next five years will, at best, probably not exceed the 3 percent per annum increase achieved during the First Five Year Plan. In the event of a series of bad crop years and of widespread lack of cooperation among the peasants, the regime would face grave difficulties. However, even in these circumstances, the regime, because of its control apparatus, probably could maintain itself in power and, at the same time, maintain industrial growth, although at a reduced rate. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. We believe that Communist China during the next five years will probably be able to maintain a rate of economic growth roughly comparable to that of the past five years. By 1962 its Gross National Product will probably be on the order of US $65–67 billion, as compared with US $46 billion in 1957. The contribution of the industrial sector will probably have increased to about 26 percent, as compared to about 19 percent in 1957. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. Communist China's military power in the Far East will bulk even larger by 1962 than it does at present. The army will probably be somewhat smaller, but it will be better equipped and more mobile. The air force and navy will have increased in size and effectiveness. The Chinese Communist armament industry, with Soviet technological assistance, will probably be able to meet most, if not all, army requirements for small arms, artillery, transport, and ammunition. Shipbuilding and aircraft production will probably have increased considerably. Nevertheless, Communist China will still be dependent on the USSR for heavy and complex military equipment and for many components. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

8. Although Communist China will almost certainly not have developed a missile or nuclear weapons production capability of its own by 1962, we believe that the Chinese Communists will press the USSR for such advanced weapons. [*13-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]

9. Communist China will almost certainly remain firmly aligned with the USSR. Peiping will continue to acknowledge Moscow as the leader of world Communism, but as Communist China grows in strength and stature, it will probably play an increasingly important role in the formulation of general Bloc policy. Although there will almost certainly be some frictions, these are unlikely to impair Sino-Soviet cooperation during the period of this estimate. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

10. In its efforts to reduce and eliminate Western influence in Asia, Communist China will probably proceed primarily by non-military means. Its foreign policy will probably display more initiative and

assertiveness, while continuing to emphasize coexistence and a readiness to increase economic and political relations with other states. Without compromising its stand on basic issues, Communist China will continue to portray itself as willing to reach a rapprochement with the US. At the same time, the Chinese Communists will almost certainly continue their subversive efforts throughout the Far East. They will almost certainly continue their efforts to undermine the will of the Nationalists on Taiwan, and to discredit them internationally. They will probably not resort to overt military aggression as long as they believe it would involve them in military action with the US. Although their attitude towards the Offshore Islands may become more aggressive, a decision to initiate military action to seize these Islands would probably be contingent on an estimate that the US would not intervene militarily. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

11. Japan will continue to be one of Peiping's most important targets, especially because there is a growing area of competition between Communist China and Japan. Peiping will continue to seek to reduce conservative strength and US influence in Japan by exploiting Japanese fears of becoming involved in a nuclear war, any areas of friction with the US, and Japan's eagerness to expand trade with mainland China. In pursuit of these objectives, Communist China will continue to employ both conciliatory and tough tactics. Trade between Communist China and Japan will probably increase, and Peiping will probably be able to gain at least quasi-diplomatic status for a trade mission in Japan. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

12. Assuming a general continuance of present Bloc and Western policies, we believe that intercourse between Communist China and the Free World will increase considerably during the next five years. This trend will probably involve added diplomatic recognition of Peiping by a number of states, but will occur whether or not formal diplomatic ties are established. It will also involve greater difficulty in excluding Communist China from the UN. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

13. If Communist China continues its present international policy, we believe that its prestige in Asia will continue to grow during the next five years. This will occur whether or not additional countries recognize Communist China, or it is admitted to the UN. But it does not necessarily follow that as a result of increased prestige the Chinese Communists will be able to induce non-Communist Asian countries to adopt internal or external policies desired by Communist China. Communist China's future role in Asia will be determined to an important extent by develop-

ments in five fields, in varying degrees beyond the control of the Chinese Communists:

a. The course of events in the US-USSR relationship and in the broad aspects of the cold war.

b. Developments within the Bloc such as spectacular scientific achievements or major political upheavals.

c. The extent to which local Communist parties, e.g., those in Indonesia, Laos, and India, gain or lose political strength.

d. The extent to which the growth of Communist China's power gives rise to increased apprehensions among Asian governments as to Communist China's future intentions and thus causes them to take increasingly effective measures at least to counter their own internal Communists.

e. The extent to which the US has the confidence and trust of non-Communist Asian governments, and in turn helps these governments not only to resist the Communists, but also to meet their national aspirations. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 36-1/2 pages of source text originally scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified, comprising the "Discussion" portion of the estimate, with an introduction and sections on economic and political developments during the period of the first 5-year plan, probable trends during the next 5 years, and Communist China's external relations, [*text not declassified*].]

---

14. Letter From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clough) to John B. Dexter at the Consulate General in Geneva

Washington, June 27, 1958.

DEAR JOHN: I can appreciate that you must be growing somewhat restive at the continued suspension of the talks and wondering whether you will ever have a chance to put your interpreting training to use. As you are aware, there has been little eagerness here to resume at the ambassadorial level what has been for the past two years a sterile exercise. However, now that the two priests have been released and their release

---

Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368. Confidential; Official–Informal. Drafted by Lutkins. Dexter had been assigned to the Consulate General to serve as interpreter for the U.S.–PRC talks.

cannot be interpreted as resulting from resumption of the talks, it has been decided to resume them primarily to keep before the world the continued violation by the Chinese Communists of their agreement to release the remaining four Americans.

It has tentatively been decided that it would be desirable to shift the venue of the talks to Warsaw and that the Chinese Communists should be sounded out to determine whether they are agreeable to such a move. The latter step is necessary, since if we were to propose the shift in a formal way and the Chinese Communists rejected it, we would be placed in the embarrassing position of having to back down or making an issue over what is a technical point.

We believe that the most suitable way to ascertain Peiping's reaction to the contemplated Warsaw arrangement is through an approach from you to your opposite number, Wang's interpreter. This is the channel we have used in the past to communicate with the Chinese Communists on administrative matters related to the talks. As soon as feasible you should seek an opportunity to inform Wang's interpreter that we are considering appointing our Ambassador to Warsaw as our representative at the talks, and meeting henceforth in Warsaw, with a view to obviating time-consuming travel on the part of the two ambassadors. You should ask him to report your approach to his superiors and obtain their reaction to our suggestion.

Not unnaturally, you must be wondering how such a shift, if it goes through, will affect you personally. We would hope to be able to arrange your transfer to Warsaw, preferably in a newly created FE slot but possibly in an EUR one as is the case at present. However, there is no point of our trying to work out these arrangements until we receive a response from the Chinese Communists. In the meantime, it would be helpful if you would notify us whether there are any personal problems regarding your lease or any other matters that would stand in the way of your transfer.

Sincerely yours,

RNC

15. Editorial Note

A statement issued on June 30, 1958, by the Government of the People's Republic of China charged that the United States had broken "the agreement between China and the United States on holding talks at the ambassadorial level." It concluded: "The Chinese Government demands that the United States Government designate a representative of ambassadorial rank and resume the talks within 15 days counting from today; otherwise, the Chinese Government cannot but consider that the United States has decided to break up the Sino-American ambassadorial talks."

The text of the statement, printed in *Peking Review*, July 8, 1958, pages 21–22, is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 1133–1135.

Department of State Spokesman Lincoln White responded on June 30 that the Department had been considering the selection of an ambassador and possible change in the locale of the talks but that it did not intend to submit to the "fifteen-day ultimatum." The text of the statement was transmitted to Geneva in telegram 1654, June 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–3158) At a news conference on July 1, Secretary Dulles, when asked what was delaying the appointment of an ambassador, replied, "At the moment what is delaying it has been the Chinese Communist blast of yesterday." He stated that a memorandum concerning the possible shift of the talks from Geneva to Warsaw was in the process of delivery (no memorandum has been found, but see Document 14) and that the United States would continue to carry out that inquiry but did not intend to be bound by the "15-day ultimatum." For the transcript of the news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, pages 104–111.

Telegram 7 to Warsaw, July 1, stated that a press leak had forced the Department to make public the possible shift of the talks to Warsaw, but that, as a result of the ultimatum, it was delaying its approach to the Chinese. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–158) Telegram 5 to Geneva, July 2, instructed Dexter to take no action on Clough's letter pending further instructions. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–258)

16. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville

Paris, July 5, 1958.

In the course of driving to Orly in the car with Couve de Murville we spoke of the Chinese Communists. The Foreign Minister said that they surmised that the Chinese Communists now had quite an influence on Soviet policy. I said I assumed that "you do not contemplate any change in your non-recognition policy." The Foreign Minister said that they did not contemplate any such change at least for the time being. Some consideration had been given to it on the theory that the Chinese Communists were there to stay, but the Foreign Minister said that he had pointed out to President de Gaulle that recognition would run strongly counter to the policies of President Diem of Vietnam and that it was important to preserve French influence in Vietnam. Thus we could assume that at least for the present there would be no change. I pointed out that the UK recognition policy had brought no good results and that the whole free world position around the Sino-Soviet orbit would be greatly weakened particularly in Asia if France should change its policy.

JFD

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential. Drafted by Dulles. The Secretary visited Paris July 3–6.

---

17. Editorial Note

During a meeting between President Eisenhower and Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker in Ottawa on July 8, 1958, there was some discussion relating to China. The relevant portions of the memorandum of conversation read as follows:

"The Prime Minister then raised the question of China. He said that, as we knew, Canada did not recognize Communist China and that he contemplated no change although the Government was under very considerable pressure in this matter. The President interjected that if Canada recognized China it would 'wreck' us, and he added it would probably also wreck the United Nations. He urged strongly that Canada maintain its policy of non-recognition and its support of the moratorium in the United Nations.

"The Prime Minister then went on to the question of exports to China and raised the matter of the Ford car order which had been blocked. The President indicated both familiarity and sympathy in this matter. He pointed out the difficulties which faced us, among which he mentioned the problem which would be created domestically in the United States if foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies could trade with China whereas domestic companies with no foreign subsidiaries were barred from such trade. The Prime Minister indicated his understanding of this aspect of the problem which apparently he had not considered before. There ensued some further discussion of the matter with both the Secretary and Sidney Smith entering into discussion. At one point Mr. Smith suggested that a 'cut-off' date be applied to U.S. companies owned by U.S. corporations with respect to the matter of China trade. The apparent thought behind this was to prevent U.S. parent companies from benefiting in future from any relaxation of trade with Communist China via foreign subsidiaries through the formation of subsidiaries after some established date. There was a little desultory discussion on this point but it was not seriously considered."

The discussion turned to other subjects but returned to China:

"The discussion then swung around again to the problem posed by the Ford case. The President indicated an understanding of Canadian concern and said that he was sure some modus vivendi could be worked out. He suggested that Secretary Dulles and Mr. Smith discuss this in more detail and report back with some proposal. He re-emphasized the importance of avoiding any solution which would have the effect of weakening our own policy with respect to Communist China. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the attitude expressed." (PVC/MC–2; Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, MC—Canadians)

---

18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 17, 1958, 1:42 p.m.

508. 1. London for Edwin W. Martin. You should write Ambassador Wang soonest through usual Geneva channel stating Ambassador Jacob D. Beam designated United States representative to continue Ambassadorial talks and will be contacting him to discuss arrangements

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1758. Confidential. Drafted by Lutkins, cleared with EUR, and approved by Robertson. Also sent to Warsaw and repeated to Geneva and Bern.

for resumption talks.[1] Send copies letter to Ambassador Beam, Clough, and Department.

2. Warsaw for Beam. After interval few days following receipt copy Martin letter contact Wang to confirm your designation as new United States representative. In talking to him speak in terms our assumption talks will henceforth be conducted Warsaw. Report his attitude this point and any proposal he makes re date first meeting. Department considers meeting not feasible before second week August at earliest in view time needed make space arrangements, prepare necessary instructions, for you, and permit advisor Clough and interpreter Dexter plan travel from Bern and Geneva. Would welcome your comments.

3. Geneva for Dexter. Take no action on Clough letter June 27.

Dulles

---

[1] Martin reported in telegram 395 from London, July 18, that he was sending to Geneva a letter for Wang confined to the substance of this sentence. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–1858) Telegram 73 to Geneva, July 21, instructed Dexter to amend the letter to include a reference to previous correspondence on the subject "so that it will appear as normal resumption correspondence and not permit unfortunate impression we bowing to Chinese Communist demand for renewal talks." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–2158) After further telegraphic exchanges, Martin sent to Geneva a revised letter for Wang, dated July 28 and delivered that day to the Chinese Consulate General. (*Ibid.*, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Ambassadorial Discussions; see Supplement)

---

19. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 100–7–58 Washington, July 22, 1958.

SINO-SOVIET AND FREE WORLD REACTIONS TO U.S. USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WARS IN THE FAR EAST

[Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. Not declassified in time for publication; the full text is in the Supplement.]

20. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, July 30, 1958, 6 p.m.

99. At regular country team meeting this morning there was general agreement that ChiCom shooting down yesterday near Tungshan Island of two GRC F–84 planes on routine patrol flight has worsened an already tense situation here. GRC is not only uneasy over what are regarded as unfavorable Middle East, Cambodian and Indonesian developments, but agitated over indications of growing ChiCom belligerence toward Taiwan as witnessed by mass mainland demonstrations of late and moves to strengthen Red military capabilities opposite Taiwan. These include unconfirmed reports that Reds are shuttling aircraft between Manchuria and Southeast China and basing aircraft on Swatow northeast airfield.

Admiral Doyle reported Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei told him this morning that situation is "getting tense", that it might provide opportunities for those wanting to return to mainland to start something, and that he was urging restraint and caution. Yu told Doyle that basing of MIGs at Swatow or other coastal air fields would be "serious matter" and would denote Red intentions to move toward offensive position that could jeopardize off-shore islands or lead to air warfare. Yu suggested to Doyle that US bring in squadron of modern fighters for psychological purposes. Doyle told Yu he would report conversation to CINCPAC.

It was consensus of country team that psychological move of sort suggested would be useful, but need could be met by regularly scheduled quarterly deployment of unit of F–100s due here August 4, followed two weeks later by unit of all-weather fighters. It was also felt consideration should be given to publicizing these flights of US aircraft to warn Reds and induce calming effect among local populace.

There was general agreement that yesterday's incident will stimulate GRC to ask for more modern aircraft. General Dean[1] reported two remaining groups of F–84s are expected to be replaced by F–86s by end of year. Latter could cope with MIG 15s, but would have difficulty with MIG 17s and 19s (no confirmation here that 19s are on mainland). Meanwhile, in view of growing international tension, recommendation is going forward that provision of F–100s to GRC, now two years away, be accelerated.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–3058. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC.

[1] Brigadier General Fred Murray Dean, Commander, Air Task Force 13, and Chief, Air Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan.

View was expressed at country team meeting that present international situation may provide Reds with opportunity and pretext to occupy coastal airfields and with capability to interdict off-shore islands. It was conclusion of team that such a move on part of Reds could have grave consequences, including possibility CAF might bomb such airfields as emergency self-defense measure. In this connection, Commander CAF has informed General Dean CAF is ready for action, but would not act without orders from above.

I believe time has come for us to face up to possibility Reds will soon occupy coastal airfields, followed by actions by Reds or GRC that will lead to hostilities. My colleagues and I would welcome Washington estimate of situation and guidance. Meanwhile, it would appear highly useful if ways could be found publicly to let Reds know of our continuing support of GRC in terms of defense treaty and to warn them of risks of extending their activities into Taiwan strait area.

Drumright

---

21. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, July 30, 1958, 8:29 p.m.

97. Warsaw's 130.[1]

1. Department recognizes desirability Dexter accompanying you on first approach to Wang. Suggest you consult with Geneva with view arranging his travel in such way as minimize inconvenience to Consulate General. When date decided notify Department so travel orders can

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–2858. Confidential. Drafted by Lutkins, cleared with EUR, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Geneva and Bern.

[1] Telegram 130 from Warsaw, July 28, responded to telegram 88 to Warsaw, July 26, which conveyed the Department's instructions on administrative arrangements for the pending ambassadorial talks. The latter stated that, in view of the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the "Chinese Communist regime," the Department opposed holding the meetings in the U.S. and Chinese Embassies. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–1958; see Supplement) Telegram 130 from Warsaw stated that Beam was at a loss to suggest a meeting place other than the respective Embassies, commenting that both sides might have understandable reservations about the security of any accommodation offered by the Polish Goverment. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–2858)

be issued (similar action required for each later trip by Clough and Dexter).

2. For policy reasons alternate use respective Embassies must be ruled out. In making decision transfer talks to Warsaw Department recognized and discounted probable inability maintaining security of talks. In view past Chinese Communist practice of publishing proceedings of meetings when suited their purpose this regarded as minor consideration. Request you investigate and submit your comments on following alternative possibilities for meeting places: a) Swiss (or possibly Swedish) Embassy; if in your opinion this feasible we would request cooperation Swiss (or Swedish) Government; b) suitable space at one of local hotels.[2]

Dulles

---

[2] In telegram 146 from Warsaw, July 31, Beam recommended waiting until after his first talk with Wang and then approaching the Swiss. He commented that use of a local hotel "would in effect probably make Poles silent partner to talks." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–3158)

---

22. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Acting Secretary of State Herter

Washington, August 1, 1958.

SUBJECT

Comment on Moscow's 223 of July 24[1]

Ambassador Thompson, in his telegram 223 of July 24, states that, if the proposed summit meeting is held under Security Council auspices, he hopes we will not reject the desire expressed by Khrushchev for discussions outside the Security Council. In the Ambassador's opinion,

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/8–158. Secret. Drafted by Marshall Green, Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Josiah W. Bennett, Officer in Charge of Political Affairs in the Office of Chinese Affairs; and Lutkins. A notation on the source text reads: "Noted. C.A.H."

[1] A copy was attached to the memorandum but is no longer attached to the source text. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/7–2458; see Supplement)

Khrushchev obviously wishes to meet privately with President Eisenhower, though what he wishes to raise with the President is open to speculation.

Ambassador Thompson goes on to say that he is much intrigued by the possibility that Khrushchev's primary objective may be to discuss certain questions relating to Red China with the President. He advances two lines of reasoning in support of this thesis: (1) various so-called indications of Sino-Soviet differences; (2) that there is no other "fully satisfactory" explanation for Khrushchev's apparent belief in the magic of a meeting with the President.

The indications of Sino-Soviet differences cited in the telegram are not very convincing, as the Ambassador readily admits. I would add to his reservations that similar evidences of Sino-Soviet differences have been cited repeatedly in the past, only to be belied by subsequent events. It is true that Peiping in recent months appears at times to have taken a tougher line than Moscow toward Yugoslavia. However, as DRS and EE have pointed out, these are differences of tone and interpretation and not of substance and can be explained by the existence of more pressing internal problems in Communist China and by the inhibiting effect of the USSR's broader international obligations.

On the other hand, Khrushchev might find it expedient for Moscow and Peiping to drop little hints, such as those the Embassy seems to have picked up, of Sino-Soviet differences in the hope that the United States and other countries would be misled and drawn into false policy conclusions. This has been done before, and it is certainly possible that another attempt to deceive us on this point is being made.

Ambassador Thompson goes on to say that Communist China can hold little threat for the Soviets so long as it lacks nuclear weapons and that, in his view, it must be a cardinal objective of Soviet policy to prevent Peiping from obtaining atomic weapons. I agree that the Soviet Union has reason to be disturbed over the prospect of Red China possessing an atomic weapons capability, but there is no reason to suppose that Moscow would be more fearful over Peiping's acquiring nuclear weapons than ever, say, France's acquiring such weapons. Even assuming that Khrushchev is disturbed at the possibility of Peiping's becoming a nuclear power and a threat to the USSR, why should he turn to the U.S. for assistance? In view of Peiping's military and economic dependence on the USSR, it is the Soviets, and not we, who are in a position to check Chinese Communist ambitions in the nuclear field.

The Ambassador says that his main reason for speculating that Khrushchev desires to raise the problem of Red China with the President is that there is no other "fully satisfactory" explanation for Khrushchev's apparent belief in the magic of a meeting with the President. While I am in no position to fathom the inner workings of Khrushchev's mind, I scarcely think it likely that Khrushchev would wish to discuss with the United States any troubles he might be experiencing with his Chinese Communist partners. To bare these difficulties before the United States would be a sure way to risk disclosure of fatal weaknesses of the whole Communist empire, and to undermine the objective of Bloc solidarity to which Khrushchev is dedicated. To bare these difficulties would also tend to confirm to the United States the wisdom of continuing present policies relating to these questions.

In conclusion I would like to reemphasize a basic point which I fear is often obscured in speculations over potential rifts between Moscow and Peiping. That point relates to all the important factors holding Moscow and Peiping together. Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders are wholly dedicated to the cause of international Communism under the leadership of Moscow. They slavishly follow the twists and turns of Moscow-directed orthodoxy. They never fail to acknowledge the Kremlin's supremacy, unlike the Yugoslav Communist nationalists. Not only are the two great Communist powers of China and Russia bound by ideological ties, but they are dependent upon each other militarily, both offensively and defensively, as they pursue their common long-term goal of bringing about a world order under Communism. Red China's military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union is, of course, extensive. I allow that this interdependence may give way some day to serious differences. But in the absence of any real evidence that Moscow and Peiping are drifting apart, it would be dangerous, even fatal, to base our policies or actions on the shifting sands of hopes and speculations.[2]

---

[2] Telegram 124 from Taipei, August 4, commented that in the Embassy's view, "little credence should be placed in reports of Soviet-Chinese Communist 'divergences'." (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/8–458) Thompson replied in telegram 345 from Moscow, August 6, that although he remained convinced that "there are important frictions and lack of confidence between Moscow and Peking," he agreed that "neither government is likely to allow these to get out of hand or to break their unity at present time." (*Ibid.*, 661.93/8–658) These documents are in the Supplement.

23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, August 2, 1958, 4:02 p.m.

81. Urtel 99[1] referred for appraisal to Joint Chiefs who examined situation Taiwan Straits area at meeting yesterday. On basis available intelligence they concluded no evidence of Chinese Communist build-up or other military moves suggesting intention to take offensive action in area. Stationing MIG 17s Swatow Chinghai airfield accepted as probable, but significance as indicator lessened by fact ChiComs have operated aircraft out of this field on previous occasions. Agency estimate identical.

Important you and other country team representatives make concerted effort allay GRC sense of alarm and dampen crisis atmosphere which conducive to type precipitate GRC action we seek prevent. Smoot reply to Minister Yu representations (urtel 115)[2] welcomed.

Department concerned at reports (e.g., para 3 Embassy's memorandum July 9 Weekly Meeting Heads of U.S. Agencies)[3] that GRC will bomb coastal airfields in event Chinese Communists station planes on them and at possibility suggested reftel it might take such action without prior consultation on grounds emergency self-defense. While we reluctant believe GRC would violate its commitment under exchange of notes December 10, 1954 you should seek earliest opportunity to remind Shen and at your discretion Premier Chen of commitment and emphasize we do not believe emergency exercise right of self-defense language can be stretched to permit action against coastal airfields without prior consultation unless GRC territory or forces are attacked. You should urge Smoot do same with Minister Yu.

Flights of F–100s proposed by Minister Yu to Smoot regarded as useful psychological move. Concur in Smoot recommendation (urtel 115) they be continued regularly in small numbers in addition to or in lieu of regular deployments. However, flights should not receive special publi-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–258. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Lutkins, cleared in substance with INR, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] Document 20.

[2] Dated August 2, telegram 115 from Taipei repeated a message to CINCPAC from Admiral Smoot, who had just replaced Admiral Doyle as Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, reporting his meeting with Yu that morning. Yu told Smoot that his government was exercising every restraint and that he would try to continue to do so but could not guarantee it. Smoot told him the policy of restraint was "most wise." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–258; see Supplement)

[3] Not found.

cizing which would tend have undesired effect of heightening tension in area.

Dulles

---

24. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)

Taipei, August 4, 1958, 5:40 p.m.

040940Z. Prolonged conferences with President, Minister of Defense and General Wang this date emphasizes importance attached to growing development in Communist China. Seriousness of situation demonstrates need for immediate attention at highest levels. Briefly I analyze as follows:

The issue is strategic control of Taiwan Straits and tactical threat to offshore islands. Chinese consider the former lost and the latter imminent. Paramount politico-military implication is positive affirmation of US support which Chinese officials honestly feel is luke warm. In 2 hour conference with President his views dramatically and rather excitedly given to me and US Ambassador which he requests be transmitted to CINCPAC in essence as follows.

President attaches gravest significance to Krushchev Mao Tse-tung conference in Peiping.[1] Considers conference dominated by Soviet Minister of Defense. Is convinced Chinese Communists are prepared and have the capability to attack Taiwan. That they will do so with all out conclusive effect. That they are willing to take risk of retaliation and that now is most timely and propitious time. President points out that our urging calmness and restraint issuing from points 5 to 8,000 miles away do not recognize the imminence and nearness of the real threat to GRC. He did however assure us that he has always and will in the future continue to honor treaty agreements. Action required which he most urgently em-

---

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Sec. 37. Secret; Priority. Received by CNO at 6:16 p.m. Repeated to CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT; repeated from CINCPAC to CNO and from CNO to State, OSD/ISA, Air Force, JCS, Army, and CIA.

[1] July 31–August 3.

phasized was positive demonstration of US recognition of the seriousness of the situation and to this end urges the most rapid action on acquiring sidewinder speedup of F–86 program as show of force by 7th Fleet in the area and "the permanent stationing of a group of F–100's on Taiwan." The latter in spite of careful explanation of impracticability and other implication.

I am not being stampeded in this my 1st conference but am firmly convinced urging calmness has worn thin. In view of all of the foregoing I believe the situation so strained as to require me to have early information to pass to GRC in the form of definite plans and promises to show the united backing of the American military and US Government particularly in regard to providing sidewinders a show of force by the Seventh Fleet and a speedup in the F–86 program. Strictly political implications being transmitted separately by US Ambassador.[2]

---

[2] Telegram 127 from Taipei, August 4, contains Drumright's report of the conversation with his comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–458; see Supplement)

---

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 7, 1958, 11 a.m.

147. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embassy's 127[1] and 133[2] to Department, repeated CINCPAC unnumbered. Believe President Chiang's warning of possible Chinese Communist action against Taiwan should be evaluated in light of following consideration:

1. Communists must realize direct attack on Taiwan makes US involvement certain, posing clear risk of unacceptable US retaliation, and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–758. Secret. Received at 3:20 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] See footnote 2, Document 24.

[2] Drumright commented in telegram 133 from Taipei, August 5, that the Communists were probably testing Nationalist and U.S. reactions by the occupation of the coastal air fields and that the second step was likely to be an attempt to assert air control of the Taiwan Strait. He urged strong support of the Nationalists. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–558; see Supplement)

greatly strengthening GRC morale and confidence, thus rendering prospects for "liberation" of Taiwan even more remote. See little reason to believe Communists have abandoned "peaceful liberation" (i.e. capture by psychological means) as major hope for ultimate seizure Taiwan.

2. Communist action which would probably place heaviest psychological strain on GRC would be seizure of control of air over Taiwan Strait, exertion of maximum degree of interdiction and other pressures against Offshore Islands that is possible without risking US counteraction. Communists would thereby create situation which would offer them several favorable possibilities. If interdiction succeeded, Offshore Islands would eventually wither on vine with serious consequences for GRC military strength and morale and for GRC–US relations if we failed to go to rescue. If interdiction provoked violent GRC counter-action, Commies could either (A) seize pretext for all out assault against islands with even sharper psychological impact on GRC morale than loss through interdiction or (B) launch propaganda and diplomatic offensive against GRC in UN and elsewhere designed to damage GRC's international position. Whatever course Commies pursue following assertion of air superiority over Strait, GRC confidence in its own future and in US as ally could be greatly undermined.

3. Possibility exists that Commies, in occupying coastal airfields and in stiffening attitude toward patrols and overflights, are to some extent reacting to indications of GRC intention to step up guerilla and other unconventional activities against mainland. Recent propaganda has stressed activities of "Chiang's [garble] agents", and claims that some of graduates of GRC jump training program have been captured by Commies. We can hardly expect Commies to remain wholly passive while GRC carries out type of anti-mainland operations contemplated under this program.

4. I believe Chiang is probably more deeply concerned about possibility of Commie action such as described under (2) above, than about possibility of direct attack on Taiwan. Chiang's stress on direct threat to Taiwan may be partly designed to strengthen case for inclusion Offshore Islands in treaty area, or for US intervention under "Formosa resolution",[3] in event of Communist military action against Offshore Islands. He is also obviously making a strong case for modernization and strengthening of his forces.

Since main current threat to Taiwan probably lies in psychological field, a public show of continuing firmness toward Chinese Reds coupled with an unwavering attitude of support of and confidence in our GRC allies, is regarded as of the highest importance.

---

[3] Congressional Joint Resolution approved January 29, 1955 (Public Law 4); 69 Stat. 7. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. II, p. 162.

Drumright

---

26. Editorial Note

At the 375th meeting of the National Security Council on August 7, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. A brief discussion followed:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said the situation in the Taiwan Straits was 'heating up'. He then displayed a map showing the movement of the Chinese Communist air forces into hitherto unoccupied bases on the mainland opposite Quemoy. Only fighter planes—no bombers—were believed to be involved in this deployment, which might be designed to distract attention from other parts of the world or might be part of a build-up for military action. The significant thing about this deployment was not the numbers involved, but the fact that Chinese Communist air forces were now located in these bases for the first time. One result of the Chinese Communist deployment had been an increase in air combat over the Straits. No Chinese-Communist ground build-up or movement of naval forces from the Shanghai base had been detected. In Mr. Dulles' opinion, the Chinese Communists would not attempt an invasion of the offshore islands without a prior ground forces build-up on the mainland opposite.

"Mr. Dulles said the problem for the future was control of the air over the Taiwan Straits. The possibility must be considered that the Chinese Communists, while refraining from invasion, would seek to starve out the offshore islands by an air blockade, perhaps reinforced by a naval blockade. The offshore islands, being dependent on shipment of provisions and ammunition from Taiwan, are vulnerable to such a blockade. The Chinese Communist planes in the area were mostly MIG–17's, which were superior, plane for plane, to the Chinese Nationalists' F–84's and F–86's. General White agreed with this estimate of MIG–17 capabilities.

"Mr. Dulles then said the Chinese Nationalists had reacted strongly to the new situation in the Taiwan Straits and had, in fact, overplayed and over-dramatized the situation for their own purposes. U.S. military observers saw no immediate threat of invasion.

"Secretary Herter said that the attitude of Chiang was a significant aspect of the situation. It was to be hoped that Chiang, who was becoming very 'edgy', would not impulsively start hostilities on his own initiative.

"General White felt there was a strong possibility that the Chinese Communists could, if they desired, establish an air blockade of the offshore islands, which could not be supplied by an airlift because of their lack of airfields.

"Secretary Herter asked whether such a blockade would not be an overt act.

"Mr. Dulles said the Chinese Nationalists, by their well-advertised attacks on Chinese Communist junks, had supplied the Chinese Communists with a precedent for air attacks on shipping. The Chinese Communists would say they were merely engaging in reprisals in kind.

"The President said that even with the Formosa Resolution there would be no excuse for U.S. intervention in the situation unless we concluded that Chinese Communist air activity was merely the preliminary to an attack on Formosa. We had no warrant to defend the offshore islands unless an attack on them was a prelude to an attack on Formosa.

"Mr. Dulles then reported that Khrushchev's visit to Peiping was obviously a sudden decision. Mr. Dulles believed the Chinese Communists were disturbed over Khrushchev's acceptance of a Middle East discussion in the UN Security Council, and thought it possible that Mao did not like Khrushchev's tendency to espouse Nehru as the spokesman of the East in connection with the proposed Summit meeting. There might now be an opportunity to develop jealousy between Mao and Nehru. Mr. Dulles thought these affairs had damaged Khrushchev's prestige among his colleagues, as well as internationally." (Memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, Director of the NSC Secretariat, August 8; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, August 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Emergence of New Situation in Taiwan Straits

During the past week the Chinese Communists have deployed advanced-type jet aircraft (probably MIG 17's) to certain coastal airfields opposite Taiwan which they had not previously used operationally. Photographic reconnaissance has revealed the presence of 36 aircraft at Chenghai airfield (near Swatow) and at least 29 aircraft at Lungchi airfield (near Amoy), only 40 miles from Quemoy. Stationing of aircraft at Liencheng (further inland in Fukien province) has been reported but not confirmed, and indications have been observed of Chinese Communist intent to occupy a fourth field, Lungtien (south of Foochow). No evidence has been received of any corresponding moves to build up Chinese Communist ground and naval strength in the coastal area facing Taiwan. The first indication of the increased Chinese Communist air strength in the area was a clash on July 29 in which two GRC F–84s were shot down near Swatow while on a routine patrol flight over the Straits. Both Taipei and Peiping reported an encounter between a patrol of GRC Sabrejets and Communist jets in the Amoy–Quemoy area yesterday.

The Chinese Communist move to occupy and use the coastal airfields involves at a minimum their determination henceforth to defend their airspace against GRC incursions. GRC reconnaissance and other aerial operations will be seriously impeded if not virtually prevented. It is highly possible that in addition Peiping's move represents the first of a series of probing actions designed to test GRC and, more importantly, United States reactions. After gradually occupying all or most of the coastal airfields the probable next step would be to attempt to assert air control of the Taiwan Straits. Rather than launch a full-scale military attack on the Quemoy or Matsu island groups with the attendant risk of involving the United States, their probable strategy would then be to interdict the islands with the objective of causing the GRC forces there to wither on the vine or of forcing their evacuation. There is also a possibility that Peiping might seek to provoke a crisis over the offshore islands for the purpose of creating demands for their participation in "a confer-

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Nationalist China. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The documents cited in footnotes 2–5 below are in the Supplement.

ence of the heads of government of the big powers" (Mao–Khrushchev communiqué of August 3).[1]

There are clearly serious dangers inherent in the new situation that has emerged. The GRC will certainly resist Peiping's efforts to gain air control over the Taiwan Straits and thus interdict the offshore islands. The large-scale aerial warfare that could be expected to result from an increasingly aggressive Communist posture in the Straits could spread to Taiwan or lead to GRC bombing of mainland airfields. If the Chinese Communists were successful in interdicting the offshore islands, the consequences would be grave in view of the concentration of a third of GRC forces and equipment there and the GRC's determination to fight to the bitter end to defend them. We would be faced with a situation in which we would either have to stand by and watch the islands wither on the vine or take military action to preserve the GRC's position in the area. Failure on our part to come to their support would severely damage GRC morale and gravely strain United States–GRC relations. It could also be expected to have a serious impact upon United States allies in the Far East, especially Korea and Vietnam, which are exposed to the threat of Communist aggression.

Reports from Ambassador Drumright and Admiral Smoot state that the GRC leaders have evidenced extreme concern over the new situation in the coastal area. At a two-hour meeting with them on August 4 President Chiang, with his top officials present, expressed the view that the most important topic of discussion at the Khrushchev–Mao conference was the Far East and stated that military action against Taiwan should not be ruled out. The President asked that certain specific steps be taken by the United States for the purpose of reassuring the GRC armed forces and population: the delivery of Sidewinder missiles (air to air, non-nuclear), expediting of delivery of F–86s, permanent deployment of at least one group of United States F–100s on Taiwan, and a show of force by the Seventh Fleet in the area. Following JCS consideration of the situation, action has been taken on an urgent basis to provide a supply of Sidewinders and to ship 20 F–86–Fs. A carrier group has been ordered to the area and instructed to conduct a routine Air Defense Exercise. The stationing of USAF F–100 Units in Taiwan on a permanent basis is regarded by the military as impracticable because of maintenance considerations, but arrangements have been made to carry out rotation deployments of such aircraft to Taiwan on a more regular basis and in larger numbers.

In addition Admiral Smoot was asked by the GRC Defense Minister on August 5 to transmit a message requesting President Eisenhower to issue a public statement to the effect that he would consider an "attack on

---

[1] For text of the communiqué issued in Peking, see *Peking Review*, August 12, 1958, p. 6.

Kinmen (Quemoy) or Matsu at this time to be a threat to Taiwan."[2] On advice from Ambassador Drumright, Admiral Smoot informed the Defense Minister that such a request should come formally through the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the President.[3] No approach has been made to the Ambassador on the subject, but he has requested guidance from the Department in the event it is raised with him formally or informally. A more recent message states that in a private conversation with the Ambassador on August 7 George Yeh suggested that a generally worded United States statement to the effect that "a Communist attack on the offshore islands would be disturbing to the peace of Asia" would be extremely beneficial.[4]

The GRC has declared a full alert of its armed forces, taken emergency precautionary measures in the offshore islands, and taken some preliminary steps with respect to civil air preparedness. However, Ambassador Drumright reports that the mood of the GRC officials has become calmer during the past few days, in part because of our military moves, and expresses the view that the GRC is acting with restraint.[5]

---

[2] Drumright reported the conversation in telegram 134 from Taipei, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–558)

[3] Drumright reported this in telegram 139 from Taipei, August 6. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/8–658)

[4] Telegram 158 from Taipei, August 8. (*Ibid.*, 601.9311/8–858)

[5] In telegram 150 from Taipei, August 7. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/8–758)

---

28. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, August 8, 1958, 6:03–6:20 p.m.

TAIWAN STRAITS

PRESENT

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
FE—Mr. Robertson
CA—Mr. Lutkins
S/S—Mr. Howe

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1158. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe on August 11. Howe sent the memorandum to Herter with a covering note dated August 13. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

Defense

Mr. Quarles

General Byers[1]

White House

Gordon Gray

The Secretary noted that unlike the situation in late 1954 the Offshore Islands were now sufficiently integrated with Taiwan and a sufficiently large proportion of GRC troops were stationed on the Islands to mean that an attack on the Offshore Islands would now constitute an attack on Formosa itself. The Secretary noted that this was possibly not clearly recognized by responsible officers and possibly not by the President.

Gordon Gray said that he planned discussion of the problem at the Planning Board on Tuesday and the NSC on Thursday. Mr. Quarles felt instead that the need was for intensive contingency military planning with political assistance from the Department, comparable to the military planning for Lebanon.

Governor Herter thought it important we think out what steps we would take if the Communists start to "interdict" the supply route or threaten to do so. The Secretary recognized that it may also be necessary to make a more clear public declaration of our position so that it could not be misunderstood by the Communists.

Mr. Quarles speculated that Khrushchev's visit to Peiping may have been designed to prepare a diversionary activity in case the USSR got more directly involved in the Middle East.

Mr. Quarles estimated that even with the U.S. presence in the Straits an effort by the Chinese Communists to control the Straits could not be stopped unless the Mainland air bases themselves were bombed with atomic weapons.

Taipei's 161[2] was read by Mr. Robertson.

No decision was taken on the question of public announcement nor on the NSC discussions.

It was agreed that Defense, in cooperation with the State Department, should prepare a statement of alternative contingencies which could be given to the JCS for military planning on an urgent basis.

---

[1] Lieutenant General Clovis E. Byers, Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

[2] Telegram 161 from Taipei, August 8, reported that Defense Minister Yu had told Admiral Smoot that he had information suggesting the movement of one division of Communist troops to the Amoy area and the movement of IL 28 planes to an unspecified airfield. He told Smoot that in case of an attack on the offshore islands, the Nationalists would "fight to the end" with or without U.S. support. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–858; see Supplement)

29. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 11, 1958, 8:57–9:10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining said that the Chiefs had been considering the situation in China, in the Formosa Straits area. They have started the preparation of contingency plans, and have alerted commanders in the area, but have directed no specific action. He understood the matter would come up for consideration in the NSC this week, and commented that the situation is unclear, perhaps intentionally so, with respect to the objective of defending the offshore islands. The President said he had spoken to Gordon Gray a few minutes earlier on this same subject, and had suggested it might be best to have just the statutory NSC members meet with him to discuss the question. He confirmed that the picture is cloudy regarding the offshore islands. There are good reasons for taking the view that they should be abandoned. However, a great part of the Chinese Nationalist forces are now deployed on the islands, and their removal or loss would be a signal to all of Asia that there is no hope that can be held out against the Communists in China. General Twining commented that the military authorities are concentrating on getting the F–86s on the islands into operational status quickly.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster. The time of the meeting is taken from Eisenhower's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

30. Editorial Note

On August 11, 1958, the Department of State released to the press a paper entitled "United States Policy Regarding Non-Recognition of the Chinese Communist Regime." (Press Release No. 459; see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pages 1136–1143)

The paper, with an additional concluding paragraph, was sent to all U.S. diplomatic and consular posts as an enclosure to CA–1452, August 12, which noted that it had been handed recently to a friendly government. The concluding paragraph reads as follows:

> "Forty-five non-Communist countries recognize the Republic of China. Only nineteen have recognized Peiping, and most of these did so before the Korean War in 1950. Recognition by a leading free world nation would therefore be interpreted as an important victory for the Chinese Communists, as a sign of free world reluctance to stand up to Communist pressures, and as damaging evidence of a serious difference of opinion within the free world concerning the problem of how to deal with the expansionist forces of international Communism. It would have an especially serious effect in the Far East where the free world nations most directly exposed to Chinese Communist expansionist pressures would be dismayed and confused and some would no doubt be tempted to follow suit for fear of being left alone in the face of Communist power. Nations in other areas of the world whose governments are less conscious of the critical nature of the situation in the Far East and less immediately affected by developments in that area might follow the example thus set. The inevitable consequence of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by other free nations would be greatly to enhance its prestige, influence, and power and to make more difficult the effort to maintain free world security interests in the Pacific area." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1258)

A memorandum of August 26 by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff states that the paper had been prepared as an aide-mémoire for the Canadian Government at Secretary Dulles' suggestion after Prime Minister Diefenbaker raised the recognition question in his conversations with the President and the Secretary (see Document 17). Fuller's memorandum, entitled "United States Policy toward China: A Dissenting Opinion," was apparently seen by Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning Gerard C. Smith, but no action was taken on his recommendation that Policy Planning Staff, together with "other appropriate offices willing to cooperate," undertake a "searching appraisal" of U.S. policy toward China in terms of the next 3 to 5 years. The memorandum is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1957–58; see Supplement.

31. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, August 12, 1958, 10:11–10:43 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Mr. C.D. Jackson[1]
General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion concerning plans for the President's address before the U.N. General Assembly the following day.]

The President and the Secretary next discussed the situation around Taiwan. The Secretary reported that things are "heating up" in the area. While he was not asking for a decision, he pointed out that during the last five years the offshore islands have been closely integrated by the Chinese Nationalists into the defense of Formosa. He suggested that perhaps we should consider that an attack on them constitutes an attack on Formosa. The President felt that Quemoy and Matsu of themselves mean little to a further Chinese Communist attack on Formosa. Such an attack requires shipping above all. Mr. Dulles pointed out that if Quemoy and Matsu were lost, the Chinese Nationalists do not consider that they could hold Formosa. Morale would crumble and Chiang's control would be lost. The President agreed that the key point is an evaluation of morale, since physically the islands would not help the Chinese Communists against Formosa. He added that he had been thinking very hard about the problem.

Secretary Dulles said he thought maybe the Chinese Communists and the Soviets are together probing us, to see whether Soviet possession of ballistic missiles is softening our resolve anywhere. The loss of Formosa would in his opinion be a mortal blow to our position in the Far East. The President commented that if we were to get into a fight on any scale at all he would have to call the Congress back at once. He suggested that Mr. Dulles consider stating in a press conference that the islands have now been so tightly integrated with Formosa that there is no possi-

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on August 14. The time of the conference is taken from the President's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*) A memorandum of the conversation by Dulles is *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

[1] A Vice President of Time, Inc., Jackson was serving temporarily as a speechwriter and consultant to the President.

bility that an all-out attack could be conducted against them without bringing in the United States.

[Here follows discussion relating to arms control.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

---

32. Editorial Note

At the 376th meeting of the National Security Council on August 14, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The President then commented on the subject. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, August 15, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that the situation in the Taiwan Straits was developing along the lines which had been foreseen last week. There was still no concrete evidence of a Communist Chinese plan to attack the offshore islands; but the Communist Chinese Air Force was in a position to take over air control above the Taiwan Straits, and clashes with the Chinese Nationalist aircraft had occurred. The increasing aggressiveness of the Communist Chinese Air Force since August 9 was making it very difficult for the Chinese Nationalists to continue to carry out reconnaissance of the Chinese mainland. The Nationalists were now asking for a U.S. public statement to the effect that a Communist attack on the offshore islands would be equivalent to a Communist attack on Taiwan itself.

"The President pointed out that this problem would have to be considered in the light of whether such a Communist Chinese attack on the offshore islands was a preliminary to an attack on Taiwan. We had earlier tried desperately to make Chiang Kai-shek see what a difficult situation he was getting into when he put so many of his troops and supplies on these offshore islands. The President also reminded the Council of the obligation of the Administration to consult with the Senate in deciding what to do in the contingency of a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

33. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 14, 1958.

Following the 376th meeting of the National Security Council today, at which the Director of Central Intelligence gave a briefing on the situation in the Taiwan Straits area, the following met with the President in his office:

The Vice President of the United States
Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense
Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury
Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State
Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Mr. Gray read and explained the three policy questions relative to the GRC held off-shore islands, contained in the enclosure to the memorandum for the NSC, dated August 13, 1958 of "The Situation in the Taiwan Straits Area."[1]

General Twining stated that the Joint Chiefs views on these questions were as follows:

1. The U.S. should support Chinese Nationalist forces, if necessary with U.S. forces, in resisting a Chinese Communist blockade of Quemoy and Matsu (hereafter referred to as the off-shore islands).
2. U.S. forces should be used, if required, to assist the Chinese Nationalists in defending against a major Chinese Communist assault on the off-shore islands. [2 *lines of source text not declassified*]
3. The U.S. should not state publicly its policy on 1 and 2 above, but should continue the so-called practice of "keeping them guessing", par-

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by James S. Lay, Jr. Attached to the memorandum of discussion at the August 14 NSC meeting. An abbreviated version headed "Summary of the Principal Points Made in the Discussion of the Taiwan Straits Situation at the Meeting in the President's Office Following the NSC Meeting on August 14, 1958," was sent by Lay with a covering memorandum dated August 15 to Gerard C. Smith. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1558) Goodpaster's record of the meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries; see Supplement.

[1] The memorandum was from Lay; the enclosure was unsigned and undated. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 File; see Supplement)

tially because the Chinese Nationalists, if they know we are committed to the defense of the off-shore islands, may start something on their own.

The President observed that when, as in this case, we are being shoved into something that we do not think is correct because of someone else's intransigence, this is when the American public and press say that the U.S. has a vacillating policy. The President said that there is no strategic value to the off-shore islands. Previously it was argued that they were stepping stones to the mainland, but they are certainly not stepping stones to Taiwan. Yet we find ourselves in a dilemma even though in 1953 at the Denver NSC meeting[2] we decided against committing ourselves to the defense of the off-shore islands. Now we have let it develop so that Chiang says he cannot hold out in Taiwan if the off-shore islands are lost, and he has put 100,000 people on those islands. The decisions facing us are not what we need to do regarding the Chinese Communists or the Chinese Nationalists but how to deal with a very difficult psychological problem. The President said that Secretary Dulles now thinks we should make a public statement regarding the off-shore islands. When Public Law No. 4 was passed in 1955, it provided that the President would decide whether it was necessary or appropriate to defend the off-shore islands in order to defend Taiwan. Now the Chinese Nationalists have 100,000 men on those islands, and this puts a very difficult decision up to us.

Secretary Herter said that it looks as if Chiang would if necessary put everything he had into the defense of the off-shore islands. This would have a direct effect on the defense of Taiwan if Chiang sent in all his air and whatever army troops he could get there by junk or navy.

The President commented that the Chinese Nationalist Air Force would be hampered in defense of the off-shore islands by their distance from Taiwan.

The Vice President asked General Twining if Chinese Communists launched attacks against Quemoy and Matsu, would they also have to strike airfields on Taiwan. General Twining thought they would.

The President said that if this happened we would have to act but he did not think it was necessarily true that the Chinese Communists would have to attack Taiwan. Of course once the Chinese Communists came at our bases in Taiwan, this would pose a very difficult decision. This would show clear Chinese Communist intent, and might result in general war. If the Chinese Communists attack our Taiwan bases, he should think we would have to put everything we have on a general war alert.

---

[2] Reference is to a meeting on September 12, 1954; see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, p. 613.

Secretary Herter said that he understood that if we assisted in the defense of the off-shore islands, we would not only have to bomb nearby airfields but also go up as far as Shanghai deep into the Chinese Communist mainland. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs were presently working out the details of the type of operations we would undertake in this contingency.

The President observed that we should be very careful, if there were an overt act against the off-shore islands on the part of the Chinese Communists, that we do not take instantaneous action which would spread the hostilities. This would be of great concern to the Soviets because Communist China is their greatest ally. The President thought that U.S. reaction to such a Chinese Communist overt act should have fixed definite limits.

Secretary Herter said that the new Chinese Nationalist Ambassador Mr. Yeh had suggested that the U.S. might make a formal statement that a Chinese Communist attack on the off-shore islands would be a grave threat to peace in that area. Such a statement would be very general and not a specific commitment.

In answer to a question by Secretary Anderson as to the Chinese Communist reaction if the U.S. bombed 1 or 2 ChiCom airfields, General Twining said he did not think there would be any retaliatory attack on Taiwan.

Secretary Quarles said that the MAAG chief, who is back here in Washington, thinks that a Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands is very likely. He said that the Chinese Nationalists had only about 45 days' to two months' supplies on the islands unless they kept them resupplied. He also thought that Chinese Communist blockade of the off-shore islands could not be stopped unless U.S. forces intervened.

The President questioned whether the Chinese Nationalists could not use fast vessels at night, heavily armed with anti-aircraft. He said that it would be hard for the Chinese Communists to do an accurate job of bombing, and he cited the difficulty we had in Africa trying to stop the German boats from crossing the Mediterranean. The President thought we might have to give the Chinese Nationalists better equipment to use. He thought that this was possibly a war of nerves and that the Chinese Communists may be seeing how far they can go if we do not react. He thought we might be creating the conditions of a major war simply by doing nothing.

Mr. Dulles cited the naval action by the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists which had taken place today.

The Vice President thought that Mr. Yeh's approach seemed very wise. Rather than the use of a statement, however, the Vice President suggested that the President might make a response along that line to a question in a press conference. This would have the same impact but not be quite so dramatic.

Secretary Herter said there was a question as to whether this would be a firm enough statement to stop the Chinese Communists.

The President observed that it was a funny thing that the United Nations still recognized the Chinese Nationalists and, therefore, in theory the Chinese Communist attacks were overt aggression. He noted that the UN had recognized the status quo now for 8 or 9 years. Possibly we could make a storm about these Chinese Communist attacks in the current UN debate. The President said he did not agree with the logic of putting all the Chinese Nationalist strength on these two off-shore islands but "there you are".

The Vice President noted that the Chinese Communists claim recognition on the basis that they control the mainland. He thought there was no more support of that position in International Law than the position of the Chinese Nationalists in control of the off-shore islands.

The President thought that it is possible that you could weaken yourselves trying to defend those islands.

Secretary Herter asked [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].

The President said that if the Chinese Communists attack Taiwan, we have got to do what is necessary. Such action, however, would be all-out war and not limited war, but he did not think such an attack on Taiwan was probable.

Mr. Dulles asked a question as to what would happen if the Chinese Communists attacked the ships which provision the off-shore islands. Secretary McElroy said that the MAAG Chief thought that the Chinese Nationalists would try to reinforce their position on the off-shore islands. Secretary McElroy reiterated that this was part of the psychopathic attitude of the Chinese Nationalists toward these off-shore islands.

The President closed the meeting by saying that he did not believe that we could usefully do more regarding this matter at this time.

JSL

34. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

Recommended Warning to Peiping Against Attacking the Offshore Islands

Accompanied by Bob Murphy, Walter Robertson and Gerry Smith, I attended a special JCS meeting this morning[1] called at my request to discuss the Taiwan Straits situation where tensions are mounting. What I learned at this JCS meeting confirmed my view that there is need to warn the Chinese Communists that, if they attempt to seize Quemoy or Matsu by assault or interdiction, they run the clear risk of U.S. military countermeasures to keep those islands in GRC hands. This seems to be the most effective way to preserve these islands and the peace, but involves terribly serious risks.

We and the Joint Chiefs agreed that free China's loss of these islands would almost inevitably lead to attacks on Taiwan in which the free world has such a vital stake. JCS planning recognizes that if there is a direct assault on the Offshore Islands, the U.S. must intervene or the islands will be lost. If the Chinese Communists attempt to blockade the islands and starve them out, the JCS do not plan for at least initial U.S. intervention, but if the blockade is at last a success—and the Chinese Communists have the capability to make it successful—then we would have to go in. The JCS pointed out that, in either the event of an assault or an interdiction, effective U.S. intervention would necessitate nuclear bombing of mainland bases. This would be done on as selective a scale as possible beginning with six to eight airfields in the vicinity of Amoy. However, if the Communists persisted in attacking the Islands, we would have to face up to the possibility of having to conduct nuclear attacks deep into China and as far north as Shanghai involving likely Communist nuclear retaliation against our positions in Taiwan, Okinawa and perhaps elsewhere.

The Joint Chiefs consider it quite possible that the Chinese Communists will keep closing in on the Offshore Islands, probing to see our reaction, but that they might well be dissuaded from carrying this operation too far if they knew it was our intention to intervene.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1558. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Sec saw 8/16." Secretary Dulles was away from Washington August 12–22. During most of that time he was in New York for an emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly.

[1] A record of the substance of discussion at the State–JCS meeting on August 15 is *ibid.*, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, Volume VI.

We considered a number of ways of conveying a warning to Peiping and came to the conclusion that it should not be in the form of an explicit public statement or declaration, but rather through an effective confidential diplomatic channel. However, if we do so warn Peiping, we must, of course, be prepared to make good on our stated intentions, bearing in mind all that that might involve.

I therefore recommend that you might wish to confer with the President again with a view to your conveying informally and verbally to Gromyko or Menshikov an indication of our intention to prevent the seizure or successful interdiction of the Offshore Islands. If any such conversation as suggested above took place with Russians, Macomber feels it essential to consider Congressional implications in advance. In spite of the urgent situation, I think you should delay decision until your return to Washington and further talks with the President.[2]

If a question on this issue should come up at a press conference, I hope that you could fall back on the Formosa Resolution.

C.A.H.

---

[2] The handwritten note "OK" appears in the margin of the source text.

---

35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

The Offshore Islands

1. It is my understanding that the President and the JCS are of the opinion that the Offshore Islands have no strategic value.

2. The Islands have acquired psychological significance because of—

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–1558. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads "I showed this to Gov. Herter. GCSmith."

a. The conditional mantle of protection we have thrown over them;

b. The extent to which the GRC has become committed to retaining the Islands and the consequent impact of their loss on ChiNat morale; and

c. The reluctance of a number of our allies to have the issue of war or peace staked on these Islands.

3. Yesterday General Twining explained to the President the outlines of military thinking for the defense of the Islands against ChiCom attack or interdiction and blockade. Today, the Joint Chiefs further developed their general planning for Governor Herter, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Robertson, and myself. [*6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

[*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] [See Tab A][1]

5. It is my judgment that if the present JCS plans are carried out in the event of ChiCom blockade or attack, it is very likely that we shall find ourselves engaged in a general war with Communist China. This will entail a grave risk of general war with the USSR.

6. I believe, therefore, that the President should now direct the Department of Defense urgently to examine the possibility of a local defense of the Offshore Islands against sustained interdiction or attack that would not involve nuclear strikes against the Chinese mainland.

7. The Department of Defense will almost certainly maintain that it cannot even consider local defense unless use of nuclear weapons in the immediate vicinity of the Islands is authorized. It may well report to the President that it is unable, even with this authorization, to plan or undertake effective local defense.

8. If this is the military judgment, I believe that we should reexamine our policy toward the Offshore Islands. We should not, in my opinion, maintain our present conditional commitment, or move to an unconditional commitment, to defend these Islands if the only military means available to us to carry out the commitment involves grave risk of general war with Communist China and in consequence with the USSR.

9. We may never be in a better position than at present to alter our policy. Most of the world now believes that we can defend the Offshore Islands whether or not they agree with our position. Our recent resolute action in the Near East has demonstrated that we are prepared to resort to force to defend vital interests. Hence, a change of policy would be interpreted not as a sign of weakness but as a calculated reassessment of national interest.

10. If we wait until the ChiComs have substantially increased their military strength in the vicinity of the Offshore Islands and particularly if we wait until they acquire nuclear weapons, we shall be faced with an

---

[1] Not attached to the source text; see Document 19. The second pair of brackets is in the source text.

even more dangerous choice. On the one hand, a change of policy would then be interpreted as weakness; on the other, the risk of general war if we had to defend the Islands would be greater.

11. I do not underestimate the difficulty of persuading Chiang Kai-shek to accept a change of policy and the resultant necessity of withdrawing ChiNat troops from the Islands. We would certainly have to assure him of military support and cover for the evacuation.

12. What we do at this juncture must be based upon a careful evaluation of our own national security interests. In these terms, to risk general war for the Offshore Islands is, in my view, unacceptable.

Gerard C. Smith

---

36. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)

Washington, August 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Questions re Defense of Quemoy and Matsu

You will recall that before last Friday's special State–JCS meeting on the Taiwan Straits,[1] Gerry Smith had submitted five questions to the Joint Chiefs for answer. These questions are attached.[2] The Chiefs' answer to the first question[3] was "yes, but difficult"; to the second,[4] "no." They re-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–1858. Top Secret. Drafted by Green.

[1] See Document 35.

[2] See Supplement.

[3] "Can we keep open, without using nuclear weapons, supply lines to Quemoy and Matsu in the face of a local ChiCom blockade? In general, what methods would be available?"

[4] "Can we defend the Offshore Islands with conventional weapons, assuming the Chinese Communists' intent is limited to taking the islands?"

fused to answer the remaining three.[5] I understand from a friend in the Pentagon that their refusal to answer was not based on secrecy or orneriness but simply due to the fact that the JCS has not yet agreed upon plans to meet the points and contingencies we had projected.

In addition to the attached questions which Gerry, Bert Mathews and I had worked up, I consider it important that we get answers to the following questions:

1. What is the pattern of Chicom shelling of Quemoy and little Quemoy? Do the Chicoms have the capability of cratering the airfield or shelling port installations? If so, why has this capability not been implemented?

2. Do we have any plans to take over the air defense of Taiwan and Penghus so as to release GRC aircraft for other missions? How effective would this be in expanding GRC capabilities to withstand a Chicom interdictory campaign?

3. U.S. air or sea escort of GRC resupply operations might be effective in warning the Chicoms against further interdiction. How might such an escort operation be implemented so as to involve us in a minimum way yet produce the desired psychological impact?

4. What are the relative capabilities of our latest TAC aircraft in comparison to MIG 15's and 17's. Could we achieve anything like the superiority we enjoyed in Korea?

5. To what extent do the Chicoms depend upon their Amoy area fields? If they were to be knocked out, would Chicom capabilities to control the skies above Quemoy and Matsu be seriously reduced? Could these fields be knocked out effectively with conventional bombs?

6. How many military warning stages could we expect to have between now and, if each warning failed in its effect, a selective nuclear bombardment of Chicom airfields?

---

[5] The remaining three questions asked, if the answer to question 2 was "no," for information concerning the type of targets, range of weapon yields, and the number of civilian casualties which might be expected under three contingencies: if Communist action was restricted to the vicinity of Quemoy and Matsu, if it included conventional air strikes against the Seventh Fleet, Taiwan, and other base areas, and if it included nuclear strikes.

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, August 20, 1958, 8:30 p.m.

158. Warsaw for Beam; Bern for Clough; Geneva for Dexter. Your 234.[1]

1. Especially in view present tension situation Taiwan Straits Department considers desirable talks be renewed with minimum delay following Chinese Communists response. Concur your plan arrange earliest feasible initial meeting (i.e. before departure Vienna) if Wang replies this week. In event response made after your departure suggest Embassy inform you in Vienna and you then instruct Embassy arrange date soon after your return notifying Dexter accordingly. In this case would be desirable you plan return on basis minimum period after September 7 considered necessary for inspection fair exhibition.

2. Injunction para 2 Deptel 97[2] applies with as much or greater force to presence United States representative in Chinese Communist Embassy as to reverse. No calls should be made at Chinese Communist Embassy; even initial contact should be made at 3rd country embassy or other suitable neutral locale.

3. Not considered you require any credentials other than letter July 28 to Wang from Martin our previously designated representative.[3]

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1858. Confidential. Drafted by Lutkins, cleared with EE, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Bern and Geneva.

[1] Telegram 234 from Warsaw, August 20, requested guidance concerning plans for Beam's initial meeting with Wang. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Telegram 97 to Warsaw, July 30, stated that alternate use of the two Embassies was ruled out for policy reasons. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–2858)

[3] See footnote 1, Document 18.

38. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, August 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

Recommended Action to Meet the Taiwan Straits Issue

The time has come, I believe, when it is essential that we make a decision on whether or not to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at our meeting with them last Friday urged that such a decision be reached.[1] They pointed out that the military situation in the Straits has reached a stage where it is highly advisable to convey some warning to Peiping that if it attempts to seize Quemoy or Matsu by assault or interdiction, Peiping runs the clear risk of U.S. military countermeasures to keep those Islands in GRC hands. However, if we do so warn Peiping, we must be prepared to make good on our warning. That is why it is so important that a decision on the defense of the Islands be made as soon as possible.

If it is our decision not to defend the Islands under all circumstances, then I believe we must plan accordingly—politically, militarily and psychologically. Such a decision might call for intensive efforts on our part to persuade the GRC to withdraw its forces from the Offshore Islands. For example, it might be better to induce a withdrawal before those Islands were blockaded and starved out, resulting in the loss of its present defenders (one-third of the GRC fighting effectives) and a probable collapse of free China. The Chinese Communists already have the capability and probably the general intention to impose such a blockade.

If it is not our policy to defend the Islands under all circumstances, then we should also not make statements that would deepen our commitments and enhance impressions that we will defend them. We should not take military moves we were not prepared to carry through, moves that might lead to an ignominious retreat when it came to the showdown. We should not even issue warnings to Peiping via private diplomatic channels that we would intervene, because sooner or later our bluff might be called with disastrous consequence.

If, on the other hand, we consider it essential in the over-all situation to hold on to Taiwan and prevent the collapse of free China, then I believe we must now decide to defend the Offshore Islands under all circum-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2058. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Sec saw," but there is no indication of Dulles' approval or disapproval of the recommendations.

[1] See Document 34.

stances. I am not suggesting that that decision be announced. On the contrary, I believe it should be closely held. But such a decision would enable us to make a series of diplomatic and military moves to dissuade and deter the Communists from attempting to seize the Islands by assault or interdiction. In this connection, a draft National Intelligence Estimate[2] has just reached my desk, which states that the Communist Chinese may believe that the U.S. is less resolved than in 1956 to assist in the defense of the Offshore Islands; they will probably attempt progressively to increase present military and psychological pressures, testing our reactions.

A decision to defend the Islands must nevertheless be taken only with a clear understanding of the possible military consequences. The JCS maintain that, in either the event of a Chicom assault or interdiction, effective U.S. intervention against a determined and undeterred enemy [*6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].

I fully recognize the grave risks involved in defending the Islands. However, I believe the risks of not being prepared to defend them are greater. I therefore recommend that the decision be in favor of our being prepared to defend them under all circumstances, it being borne in mind, however, that our objective is not retention of these Islands but of Taiwan and free China. My reasons for the above recommendation are several:

1. You will recall all our unsuccessful efforts in late 1954 and early 1955 to induce the GRC to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. Since that time, the GRC has lavished efforts and substance in building up the defenses of the Islands; and it has become even more strongly confirmed in its view that these Islands, which they are prepared to defend to the last man, are vital to free China. I doubt that we could pressure them to withdraw.
2. Regardless of whether or not we could persuade the GRC to withdraw, our very efforts to do so would shatter confidence in the U.S., severely undermine morale on Taiwan and jeopardize the position and cause of free China. Worse, our efforts might conceivably precipitate a do-or-die GRC attack against the mainland, involving Chicom counterattacks on Taiwan. Unless we were to stand by the GRC at that moment, Taiwan would be seized by the Communists.
3. It is true that neutralists and even others would welcome the removal of this powder keg, but it is a matter of some practical importance that we not convey the impression of thus "clarifying" our commitments and contracting our area of responsibility. Other exposed small countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery would wonder if they, too, might be considered expendable by the U.S. when the heat was really on. There would be particular concern in Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos and among Overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia. The Communists would be confirmed in their view that the exercise of military power and threat pay off handsome dividends.

---

[2] Apparently a draft of SNIE 100–9–58, Document 47.

4. A withdrawal from the Offshore Islands would not liquidate the crisis. Peiping is sworn to seize Taiwan, by force if necessary. With the Offshore Islands in their hands and with a resulting severe decline (if not collapse) of morale on Taiwan, Communist aggressive appetites would be whetted, not appeased.

5. There is a long accumulation of evidence to show that the Soviets seek to avoid war—in particular a nuclear war with the United States—in pursuing their expansionist aims. They would undoubtedly exercise strong restraints on Peiping if the latter were to probe so far as to invite a shooting war with the U.S. Peiping has equal cause to avoid war with the United States and in recent years has shrewdly abstained from provoking us into open battle, seeking rather to gain its objectives through more subtle and devious means. The Joint Chiefs consider it quite possible that the Chinese Communists will keep closing in on the Offshore Islands, probing to test U.S. reactions. If it appears that we will defend the Islands, the Communists may well be persuaded to hold off. But if we give any indication we will not defend them, the chances are far greater that they will attack the Islands either by assault or an accelerated interdictory campaign.

6. It is true that we are becoming perilously dependent upon nuclear weapons. We may have already lost that degree of conventional capability which, supplementing nuclear power, would permit us to pose a graduated series of counters to enemy military actions to dissuade him from further aggression and to clearly forewarn him of the nuclear consequences of any persistence on his part. I am no expert in these matters but I understand that, if we were to make clear our intent to Peiping to resist Communist interdiction of the Offshore Islands and if that failed to deter, it does not necessarily follow that even today we would be led into a nuclear conflict. We still have the capability to pose certain graduated deterrents using conventional weapons. Challenging the Chinese Communists in the air or on the sea while assisting in GRC resupply operations might be sufficient deterrent. If the Chinese Communists were not fully dissuaded, we could bomb certain airfields in the Amoy area using conventional weapons. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] All these steps would be supported by parallel diplomatic efforts to stop or contain hostilities, which we would have shown by our actions to have been the result of persistent Communist aggressiveness in the face of repeated warnings.

Summary and Recommendations

In summary, I am proposing a course of action which involves the risk of deepening military engagements and which may have adverse reactions in Japan, in the neutral countries and elsewhere. But, as I have said before, the alternative of yielding the Offshore Islands would in my opinion lead sooner or later to the loss of Taiwan which would breach our defense line in the West Pacific and, what is even more serious, would weaken our whole position in Asia. Moreover, yielding the Islands does not liquidate the crisis; indeed it would whet Peiping's aggressive appetite.

Meanwhile the Chinese Communists are closing in on the Islands. Every day that we let this process continue, they score limited gains which they will not relinquish, making their situation ever more favorable and our decisions tougher. Also every day that passes involves the danger of rash GRC actions. It therefore stands to reason that, once a U.S. decision is reached to protect these Islands against assault or interdiction, we will be in a position to proceed with a series of moves designed to warn the Chinese Communists, to improve U.S. and GRC military capabilities for defense and to impose calmness and restraint on our Chinese allies.

I therefore recommend that steps be immediately taken with a view to reaching a high-level, closely held decision within our government to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances.

Secondly, I recommend that Peiping be warned via a quiet diplomatic channel of our intention to prevent the seizure or interdiction of the Offshore Islands. This might most advisedly be done via the Russians for I think we could assume that Moscow, which seems genuinely concerned lest Peiping at some point drag them into a war, would get the full impact of our warning and would pass it on to Peiping in terms and in a manner that might be more effective than any we could devise.

Thirdly, regardless of whether or not the above recommendations are approved, I recommend that a generally worded U.S. statement should be made to the effect that "a Communist attack of the Offshore Islands would be disturbing to the peace of Asia." This would indirectly warn Peiping and reassure Taipei. It is almost inevitable that questions about the Offshore Islands will be put to you or to the President at press conferences and something will have to be said. The above language (suggested by George Yeh) seems moderate and non-committal. If any further questions are asked, you could fall back essentially on the language in the Formosa Resolution.

Fourthly, I recommend that we continue to clarify our intentions to Peiping through (a) firm well-timed public assertions of support for the GRC, (b) speeding up the modernization and improvement of the GRC force, (c) sending more of our latest and best aircraft to Taiwan bases, (d) concentrating the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan vicinity.

39. Editorial Note

At the 377th meeting of the National Security Council on August 21, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said that the situation in the Taiwan Straits was being most carefully watched by the intelligence community. In this regard he pointed out that at a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) last Tuesday, the military members of the IAC had presented a view of the situation in the Taiwan Straits which he believed should be reported to the National Security Council. This view was that the Chinese Communist build-up in the area of the Taiwan Straits was of such character and magnitude that a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands could occur with virtually no advance warning. Mr. Dulles cautioned that this did not mean that we estimated that the Chinese Communists were likely to mount a direct frontal assault on the offshore islands, but simply that they were in a position to do so at any time.

"Thereafter, Mr. Dulles described developments on Chinese Communist airfields adjacent to the Taiwan Straits and the numbers of additional MIG aircraft which had recently been placed on the five or six airfields in the area. He also pointed out that the Chinese Communists had in recent days exercised considerable caution and were attempting to avoid clashes with Nationalist patrols. There had likewise been no build-up in the 'Liberate Taiwan' propaganda emanating from Communist China. The Chinese Nationalist Minister of Defense has requested U.S. advance concurrence to Chinese Nationalist retaliation in case of Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands." (Memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, August 22; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

40. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, August 22, 1958, 2 p.m.

TAIWAN STRAITS

PRESENT

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
C—Mr. Reinhardt
FE—Mr. Robertson, Mr. Parsons, Mr. Green, Mr. Lutkins (late)
L—Mr. Becker
H—Mr. Macomber
S/S—Mr. Howe

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles
Gen. Cabell

Defense

ISA—General Byers

JCS

General Twining
Admiral Burke

Conclusions

1. That the following steps would be taken to improve the GRC situation:

(a) Seventh Fleet increased to three carriers (already done).
(b) Possible fleet exercise in the neighborhood but not in the Straits.
(c) Admiral Smoot make a trip to the Islands.
(d) Increase U.S. fighters in rotation on Formosa.
(e) Increase the flow of supplies by the U.S. with possible daylight supplying.
(f) Possible increase of LST's or shipping for GRC supplying.
(g) Possible increase of quality of equipment for GRC forces including recoilless weapons, with attempted assurance of deployment to the Offshore Islands.

2. A draft reply to a Presidential press conference inquiry was to be prepared for Governor Herter's review along the following lines:

Over the past four years the ties between the Offshore Islands and Formosa have grown closer and the integration increased to a point where the Islands could not be detached. Doubtful that any effort by the ChiComs to detach the Islands could be made as a limited operation

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2258. Secret. Drafted by Howe.

without broader consequences; such an effort could constitute a real threat to the peace.[1]

3. The GRC should probably be assured again that a "major" attack from the Mainland airfields which looks like a real attack on Taiwan would constitute an "emergency" in the terms of the Dulles–Yeh exchange of notes of December 1954 and warrant retaliation by GRC.

Discussion

The general situation on the Offshore Islands was reviewed by JCS representatives and Allen Dulles.

With respect to possible steps to be taken there was general agreement that what we did would be more important than what we said. The Secretary indicated that any attempt to inform the ChiComs of our readiness to fight to resist an attack on the Islands did not appeal to him as it implied that we do not want to fight; instead we should continue to look as if we would welcome a fight as this was the stance best calculated to deter.

There was considerable discussion of the level of equipment in the hands of the GRC on the Islands and the utility of trying to improve it. In this connection, both the JCS and Allen Dulles indicated that a new study of this was needed together with an evaluation of the actual ability to resist attack. Some of the discussion centered on the ability to hold the fringe islands close to the Offshore Islands.

The Secretary at the outset had noted that the ChiComs might seek to starve the Islands or attack directly. He also indicated that he did not believe that the ChiComs would start anything except by miscalculation; that they had lived with the Offshore Islands situation for nine years.

With respect to the press conference, the inevitability of some question occurring soon was generally agreed. In the discussion of what might be said at the press conference, Mr. Macomber said that it would be important not to have a statement which would have the effect of broadening the Formosa resolution.

With respect to the GRC it was noted that the possible GRC retaliation in the event Quemoy was bombed had already arisen in Taipei and the Military and Drumright had drawn upon the interpretation of the exchange of notes. Admiral Burke said that the matter hinged on whether it was a heavy and repeated attack or a light attack. Mr. Becker noted that our position was based on a determination based on the circumstances at any one time.

---

[1] A statement to this effect was made in a letter of August 23 from Dulles to Acting Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Thomas E. Morgan. (*Ibid.*) For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1144. The form and substance of the letter was discussed at meetings on August 22 and 23 between Dulles and Eisenhower. (Memorandum of conversation by Herter, August 22; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

AUGUST–OCTOBER 1958, THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS: THE DECISION FOR U.S. NAVAL ESCORT OF NATIONALIST VESSELS; RESUMPTION OF AMBASSADORIAL TALKS AT WARSAW; DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS; SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES' VISIT TO TAIWAN AND THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF OCTOBER 23, 1958

41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to Acting Secretary of State Herter and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

August 23, 1958.

Allen Dulles had just phoned me that the Chicoms have reportedly been subjecting the Offshore Islands to extremely heavy bombardment.[1]

If this seems really serious and critical there is perhaps room for the good offices of some acceptable third power.

I do not feel that we have a case which is altogether defensible. It is one thing to contend that the Chicoms should keep their hands off the present territorial and political status of Taiwan, the Ponghus, Quemoy and Matsu and not to attempt to change this by violence which might precipitate general war in the area.

It is another thing to contend that they should be quiescent while this area is used by the Chinats as an active base for attempting to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread propaganda through leaflets, etc., against the Chicom regime. We are, in effect, demanding that these islands be a "privileged sanctuary" from which the Chinats can wage at least political and subversive warfare against the Chicoms but against which the Chicoms cannot retaliate.

I wonder whether there is not the basis for some peaceful modus vivendi, although I realize that it would be extremely difficult to persuade the Chinats not to attempt to be active against the Chicoms. I assume that such activity is important for their morale, although I am

---

Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Misc), July 19–Aug. 31, 1958. Secret. At a meeting on August 24, Herter referred to this memorandum as the "message dictated on the plane." (Memorandum of meeting dated August 25; *ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/8–2558) Dulles flew to Watertown, N.Y., on August 23 on his way to a week-long vacation cruise on Lake Ontario.

[1] Allen Dulles telephoned the Secretary just before his departure for the airport. In a telephone conversation after the Secretary arrived in Watertown, Allen Dulles told him that the most intense firing was over and there was no reason for him to return to Washington. (Notes of telephone conversations, August 23; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

inclined to doubt that it has any appreciable effect. We ourselves have, I understand, suspended the dropping of leaflets by balloons, etc., into Eastern Europe.

I suspect that the determining cause of change in both Communist China and Eastern Europe will be natural forces within rather than stimulants from without.

Possibly this situation could be taken to the UN Security Council as was contemplated at one stage back in 1953 or 1954.

---

42. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 24, 1958, 11 p.m.

212. Department pass CINCPAC for information.

1. Admiral Smoot and I were conferring today when Deptel 136[1] arrived. We agreed it would be desirable to see President Chiang as soon as possible in order to discuss most recent developments and also to convey substance of Deptel 136 to him. We saw President at 6 p.m. today. Also present were Prime Minister Chen, Foreign Minister Huang, Defense Minister Yu, and Chief of General Staff Wang Shu-ming.

2. After I had conveyed substance of reftel, President asked specific nature of additional assistance contemplated. I said we would hope to be able to provide him with that information at an early date. He expressed hope highest priority could be accorded Taiwan requirements and earliest possible arrival would be appreciated. Both Admiral and I stressed urgent consideration being given Taiwan requirements in Washington and Admiral gave assurances items already committed for delivery since emergency started are being rushed here as quickly as possible.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2458. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.

[1] Dated August 23, telegram 136 to Taipei summarized the steps agreed upon at the meeting recorded in Document 40 and transmitted the text of Dulles' letter to Morgan (see footnote 1, Document 40). It instructed Drumright to make clear to GRC officials the U.S. expectation that the GRC would consult with it concerning any use of force against the mainland unless an attack on the islands were such as clearly to require emergency action and that "regardless of gravity and emergency nature of situation GRC would consult us to maximum extent feasible before taking retaliatory action against Chicom positions or forces on mainland." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2358; see Supplement)

3. President said GRC is using utmost restraint in face of growing Commie provocations, pointing out GRC has not retaliated against last night's very heavy bombardments of Kinmen. (Reds are estimated to have fired minimum of 35,000 rounds and caused over 500 casualties.) He said GRC would consult with United States if at all possible before using force against mainland. Here Prime Minister intervened to say if there further attacks on Kinmen which are not met with strong retaliation the morale of the GRC defenders will deteriorate, adding GRC cannot sit by indefinitely while its forces are attacked. I said we appreciated cogency of this argument, but urged GRC to consult US regardless of gravity of emergency before retaliating against mainland. (I consider Chinese have exercised commendable restraint thus far and will make every effort to consult with US before launching attacks against adjacent mainland areas.)

4. Defense Minister Yu spoke up to ask again for a formal public US statement to effect defense of Kinmen and Matsu are inseparable from defense of Taiwan and attack on those islands would be regarded by US as threat to Taiwan. I responded that Secretary Dulles' letter to Chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee appeared to address itself to that problem. Yu expressed view letter would not be read or interpreted correctly by Peiping, and a more specific and direct statement is needed if Commies are to be deterred from attacking offshore islands. President indicated he was inclined to agree with Yu and would appreciate a further more directly worded statement from Secretary of State, but he would not insist on it if we did not find it possible or desirable to issue such a statement now. At this point I went over 1955 developments when a similar statement was sought[2] and described difficulties President of United States confronted with in issuing such statement. President asked if Kinmen and Matsu could be incorporated within defense treaty area, to which I replied this could be done only by treaty amendment and Senate approval. I followed this with review of provisions of Joint Resolution of 1955 (P.L. 4)[3] under which President is empowered to act. (I believe this discussion was useful in clearing Chiang's mind of some of confusions involved in this problem.)

5. Admiral Smoot said he thought it would be useful if he visited offshore islands in near future. President agreed. He asked Admiral to keep in constant touch with Yu and Tiger Wang. Admiral also suggested it would be useful if President would pay visit to Seventh Fleet in near future. President responded he would be delighted to visit fleet. Admiral Smoot will firm up both visits as soon as practicable.

---

[2] Prior to the evacuation of the Tachens in February 1955; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations,* 1955–1957, volume II.

[3] Dated January 29, 1955; for text, see *ibid.,* p. 162.

6. While we were still conferring, information was received that Reds had resumed artillery bombardment of Kinmen as of 6:20 p.m. today. Ta Tan, Erh Tan and headquarters area of main island were reported to be main targets. Shelling was reported lighter than last evening and ceased after two hours. On our return to TDC headquarters, we were shown report that enemy aircraft had dropped ten bombs at 7:30 this evening on northwest corner of main island.

7. Shellings of yesterday and today, plus bombing by air this evening are clear indication of unfolding nature of Commie aggressive designs. Reds probably are still testing US reaction and are at same time deliberately creating additional tensions. Possibly Reds have not yet had opportunity to evaluate import of Secretary State's letter to Morgan, but if aggressive activities are continued after another day or two, I believe that we should consider issuance of more explicit warning of consequences of such activities. And, in addition to taking concrete steps set forth in Deptel 136 and in messages from CNO, I think we should in some way let ChiComs get an inkling of what we are doing. I believe that if we are prepared to commit ourselves, and I think we have no honorable alternative but to do so, we should by all means make our position clear to Reds. If we do, I believe Reds will draw back. If we do not, Reds are likely to continue probing until we are engaged in hostilities with them.

8. President and his chief officers are clearly determined to fight to end to hold offshore islands come what may. It is my definite impression that Chiang is not seeking a fight and would rather avoid same at this time. But he will not be able to wait long to retaliate if Reds continue and expand provocations. President needs our moral and material support most urgently at this critical time. I urge that we strive to utmost to deliver material help soonest and that we be as explicit as we can now in warning Commies of consequences of attacking offshore islands.

Drumright

43. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, August 25, 1958, 3:02–3:55 p.m.

SUMMARY OF MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE ON TAIWAN STRAITS SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Acting Secretary of State
Acting Secretary of Defense
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
General Twining, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Burke, Chief Naval Operations
General Goodpaster, White House
J. Graham Parsons, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

After a current intelligence briefing by Mr. Dulles, Governor Herter said he believed the meeting should first know clearly what islands were included in the scope of discussion. He proposed that this meant the two main Chinmen (Quemoy) Islands, and the five larger islands in the Matsu area. This was agreed to and that in other words the United States was concerned only with the major islands which the GRC is seriously committed to hold against attack.[1]

Noting that while in 1954 we were mainly concerned with Taiwan and the Pescadores, the President remarked that there was now a tendency to extend our protection to all the off-shore islands. Our involvement with these islands would be for one reason and one alone, namely, to sustain the morale of the GRC which had deliberately committed major forces to their defense contrary to our 1954 military advice. In this connection, Admiral Burke remarked that as result of the Chinese commitment of the "heart" of their defense to the islands, they now had acquired a strategic importance which they had not had previously.

Governor Herter informed the President that subject to his authorization State and Defense had approved the transfer of the USS *Essex* and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2558. Top Secret. Apparently drafted by Parsons. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) Goodpaster's memorandum of the meeting, August 29, is *ibid.*, DDE Diaries; see Supplement.

[1] Telegram 138 to Taipei, August 25, informed the Embassy of this decision but directed that it should not be discussed with the GRC. As corrected by telegram 172 to Taipei, September 2, it identified the islands as Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the five larger islands in the Matsu area: Kaoteng, Pei-Kan-F'ang, Ma-Tsu Shan, Hsi-ch'uan Tao, and Tung-ch'uan Tao. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2558 and 793.00/9–258, respectively; see Supplement)

four destroyers through the Suez Canal to join the Seventh Fleet. The President preferred that no press announcement of this be made but authorized the State Department to inform Ambassador Hare in Cairo and other Embassies as necessary. It was recognized that information given to the UAR Government would quickly reach Moscow and thus Peiping. At the same time the information would make clear that the movement had nothing to do with the Persian Gulf or any other Middle Eastern situation. With respect to the movement of the *Essex,* the President further directed that in any information given on this subject it be made clear that replacements for the *Essex* and the destroyers were already under orders to proceed to the Mediterranean.

General Twining submitted a redraft of an operational immediate instruction to the Commander Taiwan Defense Command[2] regarding certain U.S. actions to be taken in anticipation of continued Chicom action against the off-shore islands. After discussion, the President authorized informing the GRC of paragraphs 1(a), (d), (e), 2(b), 3(a, b, and c) but not repeat not paragraphs 1(c), (f) and 2(a). Paragraph 3(a) was amended by the insertion of the words "certain types of" before the words "modern equipment"—. With respect to 1(f) and 2(a) which mention possible use of nuclear capability in certain contingencies, the President directed that the matter must be brought back to him again first for decision before any such use.

Mr. Quarles pointed out with reference to paragraph 2(c) of the draft order that statements designed to curb the Chicoms risk inciting the Chinats to go too far for purposes of their own. During discussion of this point The President remarked that the Generalissimo had been good in observance of his commitments to us in this respect.

Governor Herter raised the question of a further public statement additional to the release of the letter from the Secretary of State to Chairman Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He said that several such statements had been prepared including one in the Department which brought out the important fact that on no less than 54 occasions in the Johnson–Wang talks we had to no avail discussed the question of the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits. The President indicated, however, that he did not wish any further public statement to be made at this time. Statements could be dangerous as they tended, sometimes unnecessarily, to limit and commit us. He did say, however, that if queried at his press conference this Wednesday, he might make some such statement as the following:

"I think we should read again the Formosa resolution and the letter which the Secretary of State wrote the other day to Congressman Morgan. If you take the two of them together that will show where we stand."

---

[2] Document 44.

The Acting Secretary remarked that until intelligence clearly shows that a determined effort is being made against the main off-shore islands, we should avoid public commitments. The President and Admiral Burke agreed and added that one should not get into the question of naming or not naming islands. The President recognized that in effect we were getting closer to the central question posed by the Formosa resolution and expressed his concern.

Mr. Quarles said it appeared that the Communist intention was to blockade the off-shore islands and force the GRC out of them in that way. There followed discussion of the way in which U.S. action to escort Chinats supply vessels would be handled. Presumably these would leave Taiwan at midday and Chinat navy vessels would take over from US escorts at dark in the vicinity of the islands.

Mr. Dulles anticipated that the Chinese Nationalists would raise the question of retaliation for attacks on the islands. There followed a discussion of steps already taken by our Ambassador in Taipei to prevent premature or too extensive reaction. The President expressed the view that if Chinat and Chicom planes were in combat over the Straits or the off-shore islands, it would be perfectly normal to follow them in hot pursuit. He remarked, however, that the retaliation question was a most delicate one.

---

44. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, August 25, 1958, 4:47 p.m.

JCS 947046. 1. In anticipation of continued ChiCom action against the off-shore islands, the following actions are directed:

a. Reinforce US air defense forces on Taiwan from PaCom sources, including Air Force and Marine Air units at your discretion. Prepare to assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan, using US forces to extent

---

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 37. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Also sent to COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US) and repeated to CINCAL, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCONAD, USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCSAC, COMUSFJ, COMTAC, USNMR, HICOMRY, COMUSKOREA, CINCSPECOMME. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–2558.

practicable. Advise if you desire to take over this responsibility prior to initiation of Phase II of your OpPlan CINCPAC 25–58.[1]

b. If you anticipate need for augmentation forces from CONUS as shown in Annex "A" OpPlan 25–58, advise JCS.

c. Prepare to escort and protect ChiNat re-supply ships to offshore islands.[2]

d. Augment 7th Fleet units as practicable. Clearance has been obtained to sail *Essex* and 4 DD's from Mediterranean through Suez Canal for this purpose.

e. Sail *Midway* and other elements of task group from Pearl Harbor and expedite sailing of two ChiNat LST's now there.

f. In event major attack seriously endangers the principal offshore islands, prepare to assist ChiNats, including attack against coastal air bases. It is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons. Prepare, if the use of atomic weapons is authorized, to extend bombing of ChiCom targets deeper into China as required.

2. For your information:

a. SAC B–47 squadron of 15 aircraft now ready on Guam can be made available by JCS for use if hostilities broaden to require atomic attacks against mainland targets. This squadron has no conventional capability. Wing strength reinforcement can be ready for first strike 30 hours after approval of request.

b. 6 F–100–F's (two-place) aircraft for training by American crews of ChiNat pilots are enroute to Taiwan by air.

3. The following actions are being taken:

a. Department of Army being directed to expedite delivery of certain types of modern equipment for use of 7 divisions deployed on offshore islands. This will start moving at once and will close within 60–90 days.

b. Department of Defense has authorized restoration of Nike battalion to FY 59 MAP for expeditious dispatch to Taiwan. This unit will be originally manned by US personnel and progressively turned over to ChiNats. It will start in one month and be operational in two months.

c. Department of Defense has authorized furnishing within several months 3 additional LST's and other landing craft as requested by ChiNat's in MAP.

4. You may inform ChiNats of paragraphs 1 a, d, e, 2 b, 3 a, b, and c. Do not inform ChiNats of paragraphs 1 c, f, and 2 a.

---

[1] Not found.

[2] Telegram 292223Z from CNO to CINCPAC, August 29, stated that this was meant to apply only to the islands listed in telegram 138 to Taipei; see footnote 1, Document 43. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–2958)

45. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 26, 1958, 10 p.m.

230. Deptel 139.[1]

1. On receipt by Admiral Smoot of JCS message, arrangements were made to see President Chiang to communicate authorized portions to him. Admiral Smoot and I met with him at 6:30 p.m. Chang Chun[2] was present in addition to officials set forth in Embtel 212.[3]

2. I recalled that on August 24 President had asked what specific steps US was prepared to take in present crisis. I said we now had reply which Admiral Smoot would convey. Admiral then orally set forth measures we would take authorized for disclosure to GRC. Chiang expressed appreciation which he requested be conveyed to President Eisenhower.

3. Chiang then launched into an intense, prolonged discussion of present situation of Off Shore Islands. Briefly, his point was that Reds have adopted tactic of creeping interdiction of Kinmen. He stressed particularly threat posed by Communist use of PT boats (apparently having in mind action of night of August 24 when Red PT boats sank one GRC LST and damaged another). He said if Reds could keep up combined shelling, bombing and sea action as at present, Islands would be soon cut off. It was his view that after some days of such action success fully carried out by Reds morale of defending forces and civilians would decline seriously and seizure of Kinmen would then be no problem to Reds. Therefore, he believed that emergency action is required to cope with Red threat of interdiction. He then intimated that GRC is not capable alone of coping with this problem and expressed hope that we could take emergency action to see that Taiwan Strait is kept open to Off Shore Islands.

4. Admiral Smoot agreed that Red interdiction is a growing threat to Off Shore Islands, that he had reported threat to his superiors and that they are giving it study. Admiral Smoot asked for Chinese suggestions and it was agreed that he should discuss situation further with Defense Minister Yu and Chief of General Staff Wang Shu-ming.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 12:07 p.m. Passed to CINCPAC.

[1] Telegram 139 to Taipei, August 25, informed the Embassy that Smoot would soon be receiving the message transmitted in JCS 947046 (Document 44). (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2558)

[2] Secretary General in the Office of the President.

[3] Document 42.

5. Chiang spoke again and again of interdiction threat and was in fact so obsessed with it and so intent on pleading for our help to cope with it that significance of help we were offering seemed lost upon him. Admiral Smoot will report at further length on this aspect of conversation, so let it suffice here to say that Admiral and I both assured him within limits of our authority that US Government would give this matter urgent consideration and would no doubt come up with a solution.

6. Defense Minister Yu again advocated issuance of public US statement warning Reds unequivocally of consequences of attack on Off Shore Islands.

7. Prime Minister Chen Cheng spoke up to say our measures will strengthen GRC, but are not adequate to solve urgent problem of interdiction described by President. He then urged use of Seventh Fleet to maintain security of Taiwan Strait and uninterrupted communication with Off Shore Islands. President said he concurred with Prime Minister's observations and asked that they be passed to high US quarters.

8. Just as discussion was breaking up Prime Minister came to me and urged in an aside that we try to take steps to prevent crisis from spreading into large-scale hostilities. (By this he apparently was suggesting appropriate warnings should be conveyed in some way to Communists of consequences of their present actions.)

9. It is apparent that actions of past three days have President deeply worried that GRC cannot unaided hold Off Shore Islands against gradual strangulation tactics. He is now most concerned to get our assurances that we will see to it that communications with Islands are kept open and Islands remain secure. As of now he does not have those assurances, and under our instructions Admiral Smoot and I were unable to give them to him.

10. In view of growing threat of interdiction and in view of Chiang's current frame of mind, I believe we should lose no time in telling him that we propose to help in keeping Taiwan Straits open to Off Shore Islands.

11. I continue to believe also that we should issue a more direct warning to Reds of likelihood of our intervention in hope it will deter them from pressing attack and thus perhaps prevent general war.

Drumright

46. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Honolulu, August 25, 1958, 10:43 p.m.

260843Z. T13. JCS 947005 DTG 242047Z.[1]

A. My evaluation follows:

1. Outstanding feature is that both ChiNats and ChiComs are uncertain regarding actions US forces will take in event a major attack is made on offshore islands. This is good. I am in thorough agreement with JCS 947046 DTG 252148Z[2] and particularly concerning withholding info contained Paras 1C, F and 2A thereof. Despite CTDC strong feeling that ChiNats will retaliate against coastal airfields without US consent if offshore islands are attacked by ChiComs, fact is that they have not done so. On other hand, reports available to me indicate that ChiComs are working up to making a major attack on one or both of the island groups.

2. There is great diversity of opinion concerning importance to GRC and free world of holding these islands. From a pure military point of view, they are not worth the risk of getting involved in a war even though it be possible to keep it limited. However, I agree with the view that these islands are symbolic in the eyes of neutral and weak friendly Asian nations. This part of the world is waiting to see whether the US will retreat in the face of armed aggression against one of its allies or whether she will take positive action to hold small pieces of territory which are being disputed by use of armed force. In this case. I believe that the psychological factors outweigh the pure military ones. However, universal favorable reaction to our intervention in saving the offshore positions is not at all guaranteed. We must recognize that some Asiatics feel that Quemoy and Matsu do not constitute clearcut GRC national territories justifying our direct intervention.

3. I suggest that the employment of progressive steps might be effective. Augmentation of the air defense of Taiwan and defense of the Taiwan Straits is the first step. Step two is the enhancement of ChiNat capability to defend the islands with their own forces. You are taking these steps. Associated with step one should be a clear understanding that US

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 37. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CNO, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US). Received on August 26 at 2:25 p.m. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–2658.

[1] It requested CINCPAC's evaluation of the offshore island situation and his recommendations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 37)

[2] Document 44.

forces will not countenance ChiCom combatant actions against friendly forces in international waters. Step three should be to provide surface escort and air cover for ChiNat logistical support ships resupplying the forces on the islands. It is entirely possible that shoot down of ChiCom aircraft east of the mainland and by US air forces may effectively quench the Commies' desire for further engagement. Step four would be offensive action against the mainland and should not be taken except as a last resort. I think we can anticipate a continuation of provocations to lead us into taking offensive moves and to be branded as aggressors.

4. All of my commanders are convinced that ChiComs have the air power to cut off garrison troops on the islands from their sources of supply. If the ChiComs decide to make an all out effort, CTDC estimates that the garrison could hold out for 5–7 days without US help. We are all agreed that air offensive action against ChiCom air fields is essential if the islands are to be held against major attack. (Step 4) It is questionable that success could be attained by use of non-nuclear weapons, but planning is being done on urgent basis to determine our capabilities and force requirements in the event that the use of nuclear weapons is not authorized. See CINCPAC ADMIN 250800Z.[3]

5. In summary, I believe that policy currently expressed by SecState in his letter to Congressman Morgan and by you in your 252148Z is sound and good. ChiComs are probing. They are trying to provoke US into taking actions which can be condemned in the world press and the UN. I believe they can be discouraged with action short of a full-scale war.

B. I recommend, therefore, that we continue to demonstrate forebearance and not be stampeded into precipitous action. I heartily concur with your policy that the US must keep her own counsel regarding eventual action if the other side forces the big issue.

---

[3] This telegram requested the component commanders of the Pacific Command to provide information needed for this purpose. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Tels.), Aug. 19–Sept. 3, 1958)

47. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 100–9–58 Washington, August 26, 1958.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in the Taiwan Strait area over the next few months, with particular reference to (a) Chinese Communist capabilities, (b) Chinese Communist courses of action, (c) Chinese Nationalist courses of action, and (d) Chinese Communist reactions to Chinese Nationalist and/or US measures to maintain control of the Nationalist-held offshore islands.

Conclusions

1. We believe that Communist China's principal purpose in stepping up its military pressures in the Taiwan Strait area is to test the intentions of the US and of the Republic of China (GRC) with respect to the offshore islands. Communist China probably expects that the resultant increase in tensions will also increase pressures for its participation in world decisions, arrest any drift toward acceptance of a de facto "two Chinas" situation, and, especially if the US should seem reluctant to take strong measures to hold the offshore islands, accelerate the erosion of Nationalist morale. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. In view of US commitments to defend Taiwan and our estimate that neither Communist China nor the USSR is willing to risk a major war at present, we believe that Communist China will not attempt to seize Taiwan or the Penghus during the next six months at least. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. Although Communist China might risk a sudden assault upon the major offshore islands, we believe it more likely that it will not attempt to do so in the immediate future, because of its fear of possible US intervention. Communist China will probably continue to exert military pressures against the Chin-men (Quemoy) and Matsu groups, seeking to avoid a clear point of military showdown. Depending on US reactions, these pressures could include intensive and sustained artillery harass-

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 26 August 1958."

ment of Chin-men (Quemoy), aggressive air and naval action in the Strait area, provocative overflights of Taiwan, seizure of lightly-defended offshore islands, and a serious effort to interdict supply of the Chin-mens and Matsus. If US reactions to these pressures should lead the Chinese Communists to believe that the US would not intervene, they would probably then attempt to seize Chin-men or Matsu, or both. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. If opposed only by Chinese Nationalist forces, the Chinese Communists have the capability to deny the Taiwan Strait to the Chinese Nationalist air force, interdict supply of the offshore islands, or seize these islands. Timely warning might not be available that preparations had been completed for an assault on either the Chin-men or the Matsu groups. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. We believe that the Chinese Communists will not be deterred from increasing their military pressures by US moves which stop short of either an explicit guarantee of the offshore islands or the commitment of US air or naval forces at least to the protection of the supply of these islands. However, if the US gave an explicit guarantee or committed its forces to the defense of the major offshore islands, the Chinese Communists would probably not attempt to seize those islands or interdict their supply. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. Nevertheless, Communist China's activation of its coastal airfields and aggressive attempts to deny its airspace to overflights are probably here to stay, regardless of Chinese Nationalist and US actions. To a somewhat lesser degree, so are Chinese Communist air sorties and other probing actions in the Taiwan Strait area. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. The Chinese Nationalists will probably not resort to unilateral action against the mainland so long as Chinese Communist pressures stop short of a heavy and sustained air or artillery bombardment of the offshore islands, or a determined effort to interdict supply of Chin-men or Matsu. Should the Chinese Communists take such steps, the chances are better than even that the Nationalists would take whatever military action they could against the mainland. They might then bomb mainland targets, even in the face of explicit US objections. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 11-1/2 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement, but not declassified, comprising the "Discussion" portion of the estimate, with an introduction and estimates of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions, Chinese Nationalist courses of action, and Chinese Communist reactions to Chinese Nationalist and/or U.S. measures to maintain control of the offshore islands, [*text not declassified*].]

48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 27, 1958, 7 p.m.

241. Telegraphic message from President Chiang Kai-shek to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

"Mr. President:

"Ambassador Drumright and Admiral Smoot called on me on the 24th and 26th of this month to inform me of measures which were taken by the US Government to strengthen China's defense capability and its own forces in this region in coping with the hostile activities of the Chinese Communists in the Kinmen area. I appreciate your government's concern over developments on the offshore islands and the steps it has taken.

"During past few days heavy Communist bombardment has inflicted on our Kinmen garrison forces a number of casualties including the loss of three generals. I trust that the Defense Department must have made detailed report to you on our losses. Apart from artillery bombardment from three directions against the Kinmen complex, Communist jet planes have since August 24 made frequent sorties to strafe our ground positions in Kinmen. Their torpedo boats and gun boats have also attacked in the waters around Kinmen our ships evacuating the wounded resulting in sinking and damaging two vessels. The security of the entire Taiwan Straits is now threatened. Not only may the communication lines between Taiwan and the offshore islands be intercepted and cut any time but also the problem has arisen as to whether the US Seventh Fleet would be able to carry out its duty of insuring the safety of the Taiwan Straits.

"Judging from last few days hostilities, the enemy has already formed a cordon around Kinmen with his ground, naval and air forces. Though no amphibious landing has yet been attempted, one cannot rule out its probability on Kinmen. But there is another possibility that, with a view to undermining the morale of our troops and civilians, the enemy might just force us into a war of long-term attrition by continuing what he has been doing, namely, incessant heavy artillery bombardment from all directions, constant harrassment from the air and the sea around Kinmen area and the cutting off of both our seaborne and airborne supply lines. This Communist tactic aiming at the opponent's natural paralysis and collapse would be even more vicious and dangerous than an all-out military attack. Consequently, if this were allowed to continue un-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2758. Top Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 9:50 a.m.

checked, it would certainly lead to disastrous consequences to our forces. Normally, we would have retaliated in the exercise of our inherent right of self-defense by bombing at once the enemy's air and naval bases along the coast, or at least his gun positions around Kinmen. But I feel that in view of our joint defense agreement and our promise to hold consultations with the United States in such eventuality, we have exercised extreme self-restraint and have withheld our forces from taking proper retaliatory action. I am sure that Your Excellency is aware of the fact that we have never once made any provocative move against the Communists in the Taiwan Straits during the past three years because of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty relationship. This time it is the Communists who have fanatically tried to provoke us into war on Kinmen. Their hostilities have continued even after Secretary Dulles had expressed the United States concern over Communist hostile activities against Kinmen and Matsu. It is thus beyond doubt that the Communists are bent upon invading Kinmen and Matsu or threatening the security of Taiwan Straits.

"The Kinmen complex is a group of small islands now surrounded by Communist batteries on the east, west and north. Should we fail to deal effective blows against enemy bases while we are subjected to his incessant artillery bombardment from three directions in addition to raids from his submarines, torpedo boats and gun boats from the south and continuous strafing and interdiction by his air squadrons, our garrison forces on Kinmen would be like sitting ducks awaiting annihilation. Your Excellency will understand how precarious their position is and how impossible it is to maintain the morale of the troops in the long run. In these circumstances it is necessary to take the following two steps in order to defend Kinmen: (1) To deter the Communists from continuing and enlarging their aggressive action by joint Sino-American demonstrations of military might. (2) To agree to China's separate action in bombing at once Communist naval and air bases and gun positions on the opposite shore so as to destroy the enemy's offensive capability.

"I therefore urge you, my dear friend, to adopt the following measures:

"(1) [Your Excellency will make][1] a declaration in pursuance of the Congressional authorization of January 29, 1955, that the present Communist aggressive action against Kinmen constitutes a threat to the security of Taiwan and Penghu. Should the Communists continue their attack against the Kinmen complex or embark upon any aggressive plan against the Matsus, the United States Government would employ its military force to assist in the defense of these two island groups in order to insure the security of Taiwan and Penghu.

---

[1] The source text indicates an omission here. The bracketed words are taken from a copy of the message as handed to Drumright by Foreign Minister Huang. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Lot 62 F 83)

"(2) The United States Government will declare that, in order to insure the security of the Taiwan Straits, the Seventh Fleet will provide convoy of vessels on sea lanes between Taiwan and Kinmen and Matsu complexes and will make the entire Straits safe for shipping.

"(3) As Kinmen and Matsu are situated on the fringe of the Chinese mainland, our military operations call for instant decisions as the occasion demands. The Commanding Officer of the US Taiwan Defense Command must have appropriate authority to make decisions when the United States and Chinese Governments hold consultations on military operation in pursuance of the exchange of notes following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Otherwise, he would have to request for instructions from Washington at each instance. As Washington is far away from the front line and cannot keep up with the ever-changing war situation, the time-consuming telegraph in exchanges will cause delay which may lead to military disasters. I wish to suggest that Your Excellency direct the departments concerned to formulate concrete instructions on military operations arising from the United States assistance in the defense of Kinmen and Matsu complexes, so that the Commanding Officer of the US Taiwan Defense Command would be authorized to take the necessary steps on the spot in keeping with the developments.

"From the military and political points of view, the Kinmen and Matsu Islands are inseparable from Taiwan itself. This was correctly appraised by Secretary Dulles in a statement made public the other day. While the Communists have started their probing action, we must take adequate measures to deter their invasion attempt so as to stabilize conditions in Kinmen, Matsu and the Taiwan Straits. Whether the enemy will adopt the tactics of long siege and attrition, or launch an all-out invasion soon, the United States Government and Chinese Government must now work out concrete plans for joint action so as to be able to deal a decisive blow to the enemy.

"Furthermore, when our two governments agreed on the evacuation of Tachen Island at the beginning of 1955, Secretary of State Dulles assured the then Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. George Yeh, that following the Tachen evacuation the United States would take steps to consolidate the defense of the remaining Offshore Islands, particularly the Kinmen and Matsu complexes in order to insure greater security of Taiwan and Penghu.[2] For this reason, the withdrawal from Tachen was made known to our military forces and the civilian population including the Chinese overseas as a strategic move. The security of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands is therefore closely related to the destiny of the Republic of China. To fulfill our duty of self-defense and self-preservation, we must fight the fanatical aggressors blow for blow and guard every inch of our territory. For us, there is no other alternative. With your wisdom and experience, you will have no difficulty to understand our basic position.

---

[2] For records of conversations between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh in early 1955, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. XIV, pp. 38–258 *passim.*

"Since the gravity of the present situation in Kinmen, Matsu and in the entire Taiwan Straits far surpasses that on February 1, 1955 when you telegraphed me,[3] I now take the liberty to express to you my candid views. Your kind consideration and early reply will be deeply appreciated. Chiang Kai-shek".

Drumright

---

[3] Reference is to the statement of U.S. policy sent to Taipei on January 31, 1955; for text, see *ibid.*, pp. 181–183.

---

49. Editorial Note

At the 378th meeting of the National Security Council on August 27, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments as follows:

"With respect to the situation in the Taiwan Strait area, Mr. Dulles said Chinese Communist military operations in the Taiwan Straits had entered a new phase with the heavy artillery bombardment of the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists had fired 20,000 rounds on August 23 and about 8,000 rounds per day since then. These figures represented the educated guesses of U.S. observers, and were lower than the Chinese Nationalist estimates. The Chinese Communists also strafed Quemoy with a small number of aircraft, and had sent out fighter patrols in great strength. The Chinese Nationalists claimed that an invasion fleet headed toward one small island was driven off; they were pleased with the Chinese Nationalist Air Force performance. Chinese Nationalist morale is still good, but if the offshore islands are cut off from supplies for any length of time, morale would be a serious problem.

"Mr. Dulles then displayed a map indicating that another airfield opposite Quemoy had been occupied by Chinese Communist jets, and that other fields have been reinforced. Some movement of bombers toward the coast opposite the offshore islands had been detected, but these planes were still too far away for effective action in the Straits. Naval and artillery movements had also been detected. There were now 200 Chinese Communist jet fighters in the general area. The Chinese Communists had asked the USSR to complete its 1958 fuel deliveries to Communist China during October and November. [2 *lines of source text not declassified*] Mr. Dulles concluded that the Chinese Communists were now prepared to do more than merely prevent Chinese Nationalist operations over the mainland, but he did not know how much farther they were prepared to go. He added that Chinese Communist propaganda broadcasts had left the way open for breaking off the Taiwan Straits action. Secretary Herter said Soviet broadcasts had made no mention of the fighting in the Taiwan Straits.

"Mr. Dulles then summarized the conclusions of SNIE 100–9–58 ('Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait Area', a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting).

"Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing on the situation in the Taiwan Strait area by emphasizing the possibility that decisive operations could be undertaken by the Chinese Communists against the offshore islands without much intelligence warning." (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, August 28; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. SNIE 100–9–58 is printed as Document 47.)

---

50. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, August 27, 1958.

SUBJECT

Telephone Conversations Between the Secretary and Mr. Parsons, the Acting Secretary and Mr. Parsons and the Secretary and the Acting Secretary

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Parsons from Presques Iles, Ontario at approximately 2:20 p.m. to inquire about developments in the Taiwan Straits. Mr. Parsons reported that the Chinese Communist bombardment and aerial and naval harrassment of the Chinmen complex had abated considerably from the level of intensity reached over the week end but were still continuing. He mentioned that a personal message from Presi-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2758. Top Secret. Drafted by Lutkins and cleared in draft by Parsons. The documents cited in footnotes 2 and 3 below are in the Supplement.

dent Chiang to President Eisenhower[1] had just been received which depicted the Chinese Communist interdiction threat to the offshore islands in exceedingly serious terms and proposed (1) that we join with the Chinese Nationalists in a joint demonstration of military might and (2) that we authorize the Chinese to undertake retaliatory bombing of mainland artillery emplacements and air and naval bases. Mr. Parsons told the Secretary that our initial impression on reading President Chiang's message was that he was portraying the situation in exaggerated terms and that we should not be stampeded into agreeing to the courses of action recommended by President Chiang but should rather take a hard look at the various possibilities open to us. He continued that we were sending an interim reply to the message and that another high level meeting would be held today or tomorrow to discuss the questions raised by it.

In compliance with the Secretary's request, Mr. Parsons then put through an urgent call to the Acting Secretary, who was at an NSC meeting at the White House, relaying the Secretary's request that the Acting Secretary call him in Ontario without delay. He recapitulated his conversation with the Secretary. He also conveyed to the Acting Secretary FE's suggestions with respect to how President Chiang's message should be dealt with: (1) sending out an interim reply immediately;[2] (2) making an evaluation of the situation in terms of the President's message; (3) seeking a Presidential directive to State and Defense to coordinate in determining graduated courses of action which might be pursued short of use of nuclear weapons to cause the Chinese Communists to desist from further aggression against the islands[3] and (4) calling another top-level meeting as soon as feasible.

The Acting Secretary then called the Secretary in Presques Iles. The Secretary stated that he did not favor sending at this time the proposed telegram to Moscow asking Ambassador Thompson's views regarding the possibility of conveying a warning to the Chinese Communists through the Soviet Government. He added that he was giving serious consideration to the other idea of acting through some other suitable third party. The Under Secretary replied that the Department had examined this possibility as well as that of taking the matter to the Security Council but had found serious disadvantages to both courses of action. The Secretary stated that he was still attracted by the idea of a third country approach, perhaps through India. The Acting Secretary concluded the conversation by saying that he thought the Secretary could safely stay out of touch with the Department for another two days.

---

[1] Document 48.

[2] A message from Eisenhower to Chiang stating that his message was being given urgent consideration was sent in telegram 149 to Taipei, August 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2758)

[3] Parsons recommended this in a memorandum of August 27 to Herter. (*Ibid.*)

---

51. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

Meeting in Pentagon on Offshore Islands Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Cumming, Director, INR
Mr. Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Green, FE
Mr. Lutkins, CA
Mr. Quarles, Acting Secretary of Defense
Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations
Mr. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Defense
General Cabell, Acting Director of CIA
Mr. FitzGerald, CIA

The meeting was called to consider action that should be taken in dealing with President Chiang's message to President Eisenhower and Admiral Smoot's telegram 281105Z August.[1] Commenting on President Chiang's message, Governor Herter expressed concern that the GRC was trying to involve the United States in the hostilities before making all possible efforts on its own to cope with the situation. It was important, therefore, that we have an intelligence evaluation of GRC capability with respect to counterbattery fire.

Mr. Quarles' understanding was that continued bombardment and harassment of the islands by the Chinese Communists would not in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2858. Top Secret. Drafted by Lutkins and approved by John A. Calhoun, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat.

[1] Telegram 281105Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG TAIWAN, August 28, stated that the critical tactical issue was the logistic supply of Kinmen. Its recommendations included (A) the immediate initiation of convoy assistance and (C) that he should be given authority to concur in Nationalist bombardment of selected mainland gun positions as an emergency defensive measure. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38; see Supplement)

themselves be sufficient to constitute an attack on Taiwan within the terms of our existing policy as expressed in the Formosa resolution. If this continued on a very intensive scale, our position might have to be revised. For the time being, however, he proposed that we should not consider the Communist interdiction as justifying full use and involvement of American forces. Their use in defending Taiwan, the Penghus, and the Straits would not be precluded, but they should not operate in mainland coastal waters. He saw a need to examine means to enable the GRC to cope with the Communist interdiction operation and assure resupply of the islands. Admiral Burke observed that our military leaders in the Taiwan area were prepared to escort GRC convoys all the way to the islands and, if so instructed, to defend the islands, using either conventional or nuclear weapons. He said that he had just had a telephone conversation with Admiral Felt regarding Admiral Smoot's telegram. Admiral Felt's view was that only Admiral Smoot's recommendation A be authorized, namely, the initiation of convoy assistance. The probable reasons underlying this recommendation were:

1. The Nationalists could not continue to resupply the islands if they suffered many ship losses, and some losses had already been suffered. If the Communists persisted in an all-out interdiction effort, the Nationalists would probably not be able to maintain resupply by their own efforts. The key question was that of Chinese Communist intent; if the interdiction method was merely continued at the existing level, the Nationalists could probably continue resupplying without assistance.
2. There was reason to suspect that the GRC garrison had not matched the Communist artillery fire because of fear that their ammunition supplies would not be replenished. Assurance by us that adequate ammunition stocks would be supplied would probably result in willingness to increase counterbattery fire.

Mr. Herter wondered if the GRC might not be holding back naval forces in an effort to bring about a commitment of United States forces. Admiral Burke thought that something of this sort might well be involved. Mr. Quarles also expressed concern on this point and felt that it was necessary for us to be very cautious about increasing our involvement.

Admiral Burke said that the first step that should be taken was for the United States forces in the area to take over the defense of Taiwan to enable the GRC forces to engage more actively and fully in the resupply and defense of the islands. If the GRC were then still unable to handle the job by itself, we should provide assistance by naval and air escorting of GRC convoys. United States Navy vessels would first go part way to the islands, then all the way; United States aircraft would similarly go all the way over the islands. We must, of course, expect that some danger would be suffered from Communist torpedo boats unless we were very lucky.

Mr. Quarles said that he would like to establish a preliminary intermediate stage in which escorting would be carried out only up to dark. The local commander could determine whether this should be done half way to the islands or further. He agreed that we should put in a sufficient aerial force to establish an effective defensive umbrella over Taiwan and the Penghus, thus enabling the GRC to handle the offshore islands operation to the maximum extent.

Mr. Quarles inquired how many LSTs and other amphibious craft we could assemble in the area in addition to those already delivered to the GRC. Admiral Burke said that two LCMs and 48 LCVTs were on their way up from Singapore for delivery to the GRC. In addition, three LSTs were being sent out immediately and two more were being sought.

In answer to a question from Mr. Quarles regarding food and ammunition stocks on the islands, Admiral Burke said reports indicated that they were sufficient for at least thirty days. Mr. Quarles commented that with these stocks and the supplies that would be delivered as a result of our escorting up to dark, the Communists would have to commit more naval and air strength than previously in order to prevent resupply. Mr. Herter mentioned that it was necessary to keep in mind the possibility of a simultaneous Communist move against the Matsus.

Mr. Quarles expressed his understanding that if the Communists commenced bombing of the islands with land-based aircraft, GRC planes could engage in hot pursuit and bomb the mainland airfields. He further understood that the GRC had enough planes to do this. Admiral Burke observed that the GRC had a large supply of conventional bombs, but that these would not prove very effective. Moreover, they had a very limited number of planes, and it must be assumed that they would suffer losses in any operations against the mainland.

Mr. Quarles thought it important to preserve the position that so long as the Chinese Communists' action against Quemoy was limited to bombardment and harassment this was a matter for the GRC to handle. If it extended beyond this, we would get into the scrap and go all-out. He believed that we could let it be known where we drew the line and that if the Communists went beyond this in their actions we would come in. We should also let it be known that we were prepared to escort GRC convoys up to a point.

Admiral Burke offered a paper[2] outlining courses of action in what should be considered a Phase A situation. These courses of action were:

1. To escort and protect GRC convoys to the offshore islands.
2. The United States to assume responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, thus releasing GRC forces to defend the offshore islands and provide air cover for convoys.

---

[2] Not found.

3. Supply additional landing craft for supply purposes to the GRC.
4. In the event of Chinese Communist air attack on the offshore islands authorize hot pursuit by Nationalist planes including attack on Communist aircraft at their bases.
5. Urge the GRC to increase counterbattery fire and take steps to provide the garrison with adequate ammunition.
6. Take action necessary to maintain freedom of the sea in the Taiwan Straits.

Mr. Herter inquired about the proposal that the GRC be given eight-inch howitzers for use on Quemoy. Mr. Irwin stated that MAAG had asked for twelve of these guns and this number would be supplied. However, these guns were in the United States and it would take sixty to ninety days to get them to Quemoy. Mr. Quarles asked whether in view of the urgency of the situation it would not be possible to make the guns available from stocks already in the area. He urged that supply of these guns be speeded up as much as possible.

Mr. Parsons commented that the idea seemed to be that our policy of escorting only part way to the islands would be disclosed only to the GRC and that we would try to keep the Communists guessing. Mr. Quarles felt that we should tell only the GRC and our commanders but that the Communists would soon understand. No public announcement was desirable, since we might at any time have to move into a Phase B and it was desirable to maintain as far as possible the principle of our non-involvement. If the Communists came out into the Straits more than a third of the way, we would hit them in the air. Mr. Irwin believed that our Navy air should be employed to cover our ships engaged in escort activity. Admiral Burke stated, however, that our ships could defend themselves up to 20,000 feet and that GRC planes could cover them above that level. He was more concerned with the possibility of attacks by torpedo boats.

Mr. Parsons raised the question of the conditions under which our Navy vessels should undertake escort operations and how far they should go. It was agreed after discussion that the directive to Admiral Smoot should specify that escorting should be undertaken to the extent that it was militarily necessary and that the GRC was unable to carry out the task. With respect to the point to which escort operations should be carried out, Admiral Burke stated that our Navy vessels now operated up to a point within twenty miles of the mainland and offshore islands. This might be an acceptable initial arrangement for the distance up to which we should carry out escort operations. General Cabell doubted the usefulness of escorting under such an arrangement, pointing out that GRC convoy losses to date had occurred in waters closely adjacent to Quemoy. He felt that such an arrangement could only provide a psychological boost and would not effectively deter the Communists for very long. Admiral Burke agreed that the critical area was the waters close to the islands. He commented that the Communists had smelled blood and the Nationalists were scared as a result of their losses from shell fire and torpedo boat attacks. The torpedo boats operated at night. The only effective counter to torpedo boats was good gunfire, and the Nationalists did not have much capability in this respect. He agreed with General Cabell that such an escort arrangement would only be effective for a few days and that we would soon have to extend the degree of our involvement. He approved of the road down which we were proceeding but he wanted to make it clear what the direction was.

Mr. Quarles thought that from the supply point of view the situation was secure for thirty days. However, this did not take into account the question of morale. Admiral Burke agreed that the latter was an important factor. His personal belief was that President Chiang should be told everything as long as he did not go off and act on his own.

Mr. Herter reminded the group that it would be necessary to answer the two specific questions posed in President Chiang's letter to President Eisenhower. Mr. Quarles stated that we would have to reply frankly that the situation was not such as to justify committing our forces. Mr. Herter added that we should tell Chiang that we were taking over the protection of Taiwan and the Penghus. Elaborating on this point, Mr. Quarles said that we were sending our forces into Taiwan. Their mission would be to defend Taiwan and the Penghus, protect our own forces, ensure freedom of the Straits, and by reinforcing the GRC forces help them to handle the local situation on the offshore islands. We should not pass from Phase A to Phase B without another meeting, nor should we be panicked into moving into Phase B by a few bad days in Phase A.

Mr. Herter and Mr. Parsons called attention to the fact that we faced the constant problem of countering Communist propaganda that we were carrying out aggression in the Straits area. Mr. Quarles thought that the intensity of the Chinese Communist fire spoke for itself. He mentioned that the Communist papers in Hong Kong were carrying extras announcing that an attack on Quemoy was imminent; in this situation if the Communists did not actually press the attack, they would lose face. He personally did not believe that an assault was imminent.

With reference to Admiral Smoot's message, Admiral Burke emphasized that the crucial question was the logistical resupply of Quemoy. The island's airfield was knocked out, the supply beaches were interdicted and it was possible to get supplies in only on a limited hit and run basis. The fact that the Nationalist garrison had stocks for thirty days ignored the human factor of the reaction of the garrison to heavy artillery pounding. The GRC was fearful that morale might crack after a few more days of the punishment. Another source, however, described morale as high and saw no danger for fifteen to thirty days. Admiral Felt was recommending that we proceed to secure the sea lane to Quemoy on a shore-to-shore basis by escorting GRC convoys. Commenting on this recommendation, Admiral Burke thought it would be all right to start with escort operations limited to daylight hours. However, it might be necessary to go further in a day or two. With respect to Admiral Smoot's recommendation that the GRC be authorized to carry out napalm attacks on the Communist batteries, Admiral Burke agreed with Admiral Felt's opinion that it was too early to grant such authority.

General Cabell returned to the morale factor, mentioning that there would probably be a feeling on the part of the Nationalists that we were only helping up to the point where the going got tough and then letting them take over in the real danger area. In Admiral Burke's opinion there was not much difference, as far as the danger to our forces were concerned, whether we escorted part way or all the way to the beaches. If we did not escort all the way in, the Communists would certainly attack the Nationalist supply ships in the close-in area. If we should convoy the whole way our ships might be attacked, but they could probably defend themselves successfully. Mr. Quarles observed that if we should send destroyers in they would probably take some damage, in which case there would be a demand that the Navy strike back against the Communists. The fact that we would not fully commit our forces might be tough on President Chiang, but we had told him all along that we would not defend the islands in the event of a limited action.

Mr. Parsons suggested that Phase A be looked at from the point of view of the deterrent effect its new actions might have on the Communists. Several new things were involved:

1. We would be carrying out active escort operations up to a point twenty miles from the mainland in addition to our standard patrol operations. The Communists would certainly note this new United States Navy activity.
2. The Communists would also receive more radar tracks in the general Taiwan area as a result of our increased air activity (Admiral Burke commented that this was not anything very new, inasmuch as there had already been great air activity on our part during the past few days).
3. The fact that we were moving new amphibious equipment from Singapore for delivery to the GRC would become known to the Communists.
4. The GRC and United States posture generally was more aggressive. Mr. Quarles commented that while we could not, of course, know whether these new actions would actually deter the Communists, this was a possibility.

General Cabell noted, however, that the Communists might misinterpret our turn-around at the twenty mile mark and conclude that we were just bluffing, which would encourage them to continue or even step up their attacks on the islands.

Admiral Burke asked whether we might set the turn-around point at ten miles. In Mr. Quarles' view our commander in the area should not be specifically limited on this point. If one of our vessels found a Communist torpedo boat within range at nineteen miles, of course, it could move in. However, we should observe the general plan of avoiding involvement in the coastal fighting. Admiral Burke suggested that we instruct Admiral Smoot to conduct our escort operations in such a way as to remain out of range of the Communists' shore-based artillery.

Mr. Quarles said we wished to avoid creating an impression of hostile action and that for the time being at least we should avoid involvement in the interdiction battle. He wondered if the Nationalists could not handle the escort problem with their own destroyers with additional ones provided by us. He suggested the possibility of offering them another destroyer right away. Admiral Burke pointed out that destroyers could not be given to a foreign government without a special law of Congress and that in any case considerable time would be necessary to break in a Chinese crew.

Mr. Herter felt that possibly escorting only in daylight hours would be safe. Admiral Burke commented that this might be the case, but it was also true that it would be easier for the Communists to observe the resupply vessels and bring them under effective fire in daylight. He emphasized that we must not recognize the twelve-mile limit claimed by the Communists. Any limit set by us on the extent of our escort operations should avoid this figure.

Mr. Parsons emphasized the difficulty we faced in drafting a reply to President Chiang's letter. Our refusal to authorize bombing of the Communists' artillery positions and our action in escorting only part way to the islands would suggest that we were not prepared to defend the islands. We would have to be very careful in the reply to avoid both implying any full commitment to defend the islands and stating our position so negatively that President Chiang might take unilateral action against the mainland. Mr. Herter observed that we were after all giving the GRC a second big package. Mr. Quarles added that it might not make President Chiang completely happy but he would realize that he was getting 75% of what he asked. Mr. Parsons stated that we were already working on drafting a reply to the President's letter and would continue on this the following day.

Mr. Herter considered it important that we try and put the discussions between the two governments back in proper channels. The reply from President Eisenhower would, therefore, say that our Ambassador in Taipei would continue in touch with him. Mr. Parsons suggested that another possibility would be to direct Ambassador Drumright to pass the final package to President Chiang rather than to inform the latter in a letter from President Eisenhower.

Mr. Quarles asked Admiral Burke to check with the Joint Chiefs regarding the proposed Phase A and seek their frank views as to whether the actions envisaged were sufficient or whether they would recommend a more aggressive posture.

---

52. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, August 29, 1958, 9 a.m.

SUMMARY OF MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE TAIWAN STRAITS SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Acting Secretary of State
Acting Secretary of Defense
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
General Twining, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Burke, Chief Naval Operations
General Cabell
General Goodpaster, White House
Mr. John M. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Quarles opened the discussion saying that as background for the actions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, he would like to point out that they were discussed in the present somewhat limited phase of operations, that is to say a period in which no clear attempt to capture Quemoy or Matsu has been made. Later if there were massive attacks on the main Off Shore Islands it might be necessary to move into Phase B which would still envisage avoidance of nuclear weapons and of actions beyond the local tactical area but might well include direct assistance by U.S. forces. However, if the Communists themselves extended the area of attack out in the Straits or on the Penghus or Taiwan, which would be a third phase, it would be necessary to seek further instructions. The President agreed that we should probably hold back on nu-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2958. Top Secret. Drafted by Parsons. The time of the meeting is taken from Goodpaster's memorandum, August 29. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries; see Supplement) clear measures at the outset of Phase B and he hoped that it would not be necessary even under those contingencies. He also confirmed that there would be no difficulty in identifying the type of massive attack which might require more drastic action. It was not his opinion that such an attack would be mounted soon and without more thorough preparation.

Turning to the proposed directive to the Commander Taiwan Defense Command,[1] consideration of paragraph 1(a) on U.S. escort of Chinese Nationalist re-supply vessels was deferred to the last. With respect to paragraph 1(c) on "hot pursuit" by GRC aircraft, the President felt that this was all right but this activity should apply to attacks on the principal islands only. He made certain that these were the only islands we were talking about (as outlined in the meeting of August 25).

With respect to paragraph 1(g) in the revised GRC Directive, the President and those present agreed to the State Department proposal to omit the paragraph as drafted and to substitute therefor the text of the separate instruction to Ambassador Drumright.[2] The President read and initialed this instruction without change.

When Admiral Burke read several supplemental sections of the directive which had not been previously discussed with the State Department, one which related to "atomic strikes if ordered" was deleted as unnecessary in the light of the directive agreed upon at the earlier White House meeting.

The question of adequate artillery for use on Chinmen to silence the Communist batteries enfilading the beach was discussed with the President participating actively. Admiral Burke indicated that very possibly 8 inch howitzers on Okinawa now would be transferred to insure rapid delivery. The President was interested to know what artillery was available on the islands at the present time.

Discussion of paragraph 1(a) on escort and protection of GRC supply ships was extensive. The President remarked that with this provision activated we would in a sense be crossing a bridge but we could base it soundly in the light of Chinese Communist propaganda. He asked if it was proposed to turn escort over to the GRC Navy at dark. Admiral Burke and Governor Herter both pointed up the danger from ChinCom PT boats was greater at dark, that the turn-over would be a difficult operation, that it would leave our vessels to wait around in the Straits for some hours and, more important, would appear as weakness on our part to the Chinese Communists, while to the GRC it might seem that we were going up to the point of danger and then leaving that to the Chinese Nationalists. Admiral Burke said that he greatly favored the State Department alternative proposal which read "escort and protect GRC supply ships en route to Off Shore Islands to extent you feel it militarily necessary and Chinese Navy unable to carry out this task."

---

[1] Not found but see Document 53.

[2] Quoted in full in paragraph 3, Document 53.

General Twining inquired if we should lose a ship or have American casualties, were the American people and the Congress adequately prepared? Was such a contingency covered? The President suggested that in international waters we would be covered. Mr. Quarles pointed out that there was not much likelihood that we would wish to bring our naval vessels into coastal waters where they would be under fire from shore based batteries. There would be no advantage in moving in so far. He therefore suggested that we should define the area of escort activities as "within international waters." The President inquired as to where the batteries were in relation to the beaches and envisaged the possibility that our naval vessels themselves might have to shoot at them. Admiral Burke pointed out that this could be done by massive fire of destroyers passing by at high speed.

The discussion then turned to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, despite our advice, had put such a large proportion of his strength on the Off Shore Islands and now came "whining" to us. It was not clear just what he was doing. Admiral Burke and Governor Herter both indicated that Chiang was seeking to find out if we were really behind him. The President remarked that in effect he had in fact made his soldiers hostages on those islands. Admiral Burke said that this had been done deliberately and in fact made Taiwan virtually a hostage. Mr. Quarles added that Chiang's policy in this respect was designed to put leverage on us.

After discussion as to the location of American naval vessels and their activities in the Straits, the President said he was inclined not to give Chiang additional American escort as such but in Phase I to keep clear as we have been. Admiral Burke pointed out that Chiang only had a couple of destroyers and a couple of destroyer escorts and that his convoy capability was weak. In response to the President's question the Admiral replied that Chiang had a few PT boats but that they were not the answer. It was clear the President wished to find some way of avoiding American close-in escort at this stage, but when Mr. Quarles again spoke of international waters, the President acquiesced in Paragraph 1(a) as amended.

Discussing the crisis in a broader sense, the President remarked that the U.S. was the prime target in the cold war. If we moved in at once on this situation (and attacked the Mainland) we would lend credence to Communist propaganda charging us with aggression. At this stage it should be Chiang Kai-shek who was doing the shooting. The President then raised the question of night supply missions and Admiral Burke pointed out the practical situation with respect thereto. As the beaches were under accurate fire at night, it was necessary to utilize small landing craft which could run in and out quickly and which were being provided. The President expressed the strong view that Chiang's counter battery fire should not be designed to protect the small islands but rather to neutralize the batteries which enfiladed the beach. There followed some discussion of the Chinese Communist propaganda directed against the Chinese Nationalist army and its potential effect. There was also a discussion of Chiang Kai-shek and of mistakes which have been made over the past twenty-one years despite his fine qualities.

Governor Herter pointed out that one purpose of the instruction to Ambassador Drumright was to get the President out of the letter exchanging business with Chiang. The President expressed hearty approval of this objective.

At one stage of the conversation, the President said that Chiang should be sure not to lose those main islands to bombardment alone, and he spoke of the practical possibilities of defense against such bombardment.

Governor Herter said that we in the Department were hoping to meet the propaganda put out by the other side to the effect that we were being provocative and were causing the tension in the Taiwan area. It was most significant that in the Johnson–Wang talks we had raised on 54 occasions the question of renunciation of the use of force in settling the Taiwan matter. Each time we had been turned down. We thought that we could make use of this. The President said that next Wednesday he might have a press conference and he could very well make a statement using this at that time. He also thought that Cabot Lodge in the opening of the General Assembly should make a pretty strong statement too. Several of those present expressed agreement with this thought.

Following the meeting Mr. Irwin and Admiral Burke agreed to send to FE the final text of the military directive just as soon as it was ready. It was further understood that senior officers of both Departments would be available over the Labor Day week-end.

53. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, August 29, 1958, 2:26 p.m.

JCS 947298. From JCS. Ref COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US) msg 281105Z Aug;[1] CINCPAC 282307Z;[2] and CINCPAC 282358Z NOTAL.[3]

1. The following actions are directed supplementing those in JCS 947046 DTG 252147Z:[4]

A. Within international waters, that is, beyond the three-mile limit, give convoy protection and escort to the extent you feel militarily necessary and to the extent GRC Forces cannot fulfill this task.

B. US forces will maintain the principle of "freedom of the sea" in the Taiwan Straits by actions confined to international waters.

C. Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, at his discretion and at a time of his choosing, after consultation with GRC authorities, assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan and Penghus using US forces to extent practicable. GRC Air Forces thus released will be available for defense of Offshore Islands and air cover for convoys.

D. In event ChiComs launch air attack on Kinmens or Matsus and such attacks were met by GRC aircraft, the United States would consider that GRC inherent right of self-defense would include GRC air attacks on ChiCom aircraft conducting the attack and that the right to pursue existed, i.e., GRC aircraft would be justified in following ChiCom aircraft to their bases and attacking aircraft at these bases.

E. ComSeventh Fleet turn over to GRC when requested by CTDC, up to 8 LCMs and 28 LCVPs from US amphibious lift now enroute from SPORE.

F. Make clear to GRC authorities that we do not share the feeling of inevitability of loss of islands through bombardment alone.

2. Ref CINCPAC DTG 282307Z. Tactical CASF XT to include one squadron of F–100 aircraft, sidewinder equipped; one squadron C–130

Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Telegrams), May 26–Sept. 4, 1958. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Noforn. Also sent to COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US). Repeated to CINCAL, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCONAD, USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCSAC, COMUSFJ, COMTAC, USNMR, HICOMRY, COMUSKOREA, CINCSPECOMME.

[1] See footnote 1, Document 51.

[2] Telegram 282307Z from CINCPAC to JCS, August 28, requested additional forces. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38)

[3] Telegram 282358Z from CINCPAC to JCS, August 28, recommended that the escort of Nationalist supply ships to the offshore islands be initiated immediately and that recommendation (C) in Smoot's telegram 281105Z (see footnote 1, Document 51) be approved if Smoot considered it essential. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38; see Supplement)

[4] Document 44.

aircraft; and one-half squadron of KB–50 tanker aircraft being deployed at once.

3. The Ambassador is being furnished following information:

"We met with Defense and JCS yesterday afternoon and evening, followed by a meeting this morning at White House.

"As a result, you may inform Chiang Kai Shek that President Eisenhower has authorized certain actions to help prevent and deter Communist seizure of the Offshore Islands. Details are being sent in an operational message to CINCPAC and CTDC and will be communicated to you by Admiral Smoot. These actions supplement those already known to Chiang as a result of your call on him August 26.

"In addition call his attention to the President's remarks at his press conference August 27[5] and to Department's release August 28 re Peiping radio broadcast.[6] Inform Chiang that in view of fast breaking developments it will not be possible at this time to express definitive views on various measures proposed in his letter. We nevertheless have all his views and proposals under urgent continuous study and will keep in closest touch with him. Tell Chiang that meanwhile you and Admiral Smoot are under instructions to remain at his disposal for the most effective consultation possible."[7]

4. For information:

A. We note the meager counter-battery fire. Request immediate information as to ammunition situation and comment on need for emergency resupply.

B. Shipment of 12 howitzers, 8 inch, with ammunition to Taiwan as additional 1959 MAP is being expedited, including 6 howitzers with conventional ammunition to be furnished by Marines on Okinawa.

C. As background information, for US eyes only, the discussions this morning at governmental level considered the possible actions in three phases:

> (1) Phase I, during which there is absence of evidence that the ChiComs have launched an assault on the principal Offshore Islands to capture them, the United States would furnish material and logistic assistance but not take direct military action other than as specifically set forth above.
>
> (2) Phase II, would be the Phase in which the ChiComs start an assault with evident intent to capture one or more of the principal

---

[5] At his August 27 press conference, the President indicated support of the views in Dulles' letter to Morgan (see footnote 1, Document 40). For a transcript of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 639–650; excerpts are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1144–1145.

[6] For text of the Department's August 28 press release, see *ibid.*, p. 1145. The Chinese broadcast under reference, beamed at the Nationalist forces on Quemoy, declared that the People's Liberation Army was determined to liberate Taiwan and the offshore islands and that a landing on Quemoy was imminent; a translation is printed in *The New York Times*, August 28, 1958.

[7] The quoted message was sent as telegram 157 to Taipei, August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2958)

Offshore Islands. During this Phase, the United States forces, when directed by the JCS, would directly assist in the defense of the Offshore Islands, including attack on enemy artillery positions and on local airfields in the vicinity of the Offshore Islands under attack. During Phase II it is anticipated that atomic weapons would not be used.

(3) Phase III would start when, in the opinion of United States authorities, the ChiComs have extended the battle to the international waters in the vicinity of Taiwan and the Penghus. In this Phase, United States forces would extend action as appropriate.

It was emphasized that during all three Phases, atomic weapons could not be used until after specific authority had been obtained from the President.

5. No objection informing ChiNats of contents of this message except paragraphs 2, 3 and 4C.

---

54. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Elbrick, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Lutkins, Acting Director, CA

The Acting Secretary said he had noted an official statement from London to the effect that the British Government was standing by Eden's Commons statement of February 4, 1955 regarding the problem of the GRC-held offshore islands.[1] The position expressed in this statement

---

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins on September 2 and approved by Herter on September 16.

[1] The statement by then Foreign Minister Anthony Eden is printed in part in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. II, p. 217. For the complete text, see House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, vol. 536, cols. 159–160.

was that the UK recognized the legal right of the Chinese Communist Government to the islands but would deplore any attempt to seize them by force. Lord Hood observed that in addition to Eden's statement the British Government position had been expounded at great length by Prime Minister Churchill in a letter of February 15, 1955 to President Eisenhower.[2] The President in turn had sent a long reply to Mr. Churchill explaining the United States position.[3] Lord Hood confirmed that the UK position regarding the problem remained as set forth at that time by Churchill and Eden. The British Government would greatly deplore a war that developed from an effort to hold the offshore islands. Such hostilities would be most unpopular in the UK and it would be difficult for the Government to defend the United States on the issue.

Mr. Herter emphasized that we had been careful to avoid provocative actions and that the GRC had exercised remarkable restraint in the circumstances in having taken no retaliatory action against Communist airfields or gun emplacements except by counter battery fire. It was a question however how long such restraint could be maintained. So far the Communists had used air power very little in their attack. Communist build-up of their ground and naval forces in the area indicated that an invasion force was not yet being assembled. They were continuing to rely on artillery bombardment supplemented by torpedo boat attacks on Nationalist supply ships. It thus appeared that their strategy was one of continuing to attempt to harass and interdict the islands with a view to wearing down the defenders' morale and ability to resist. He continued that the United States too would not view with enthusiasm the possibility of a general conflict that might develop out of the hostilities in the area. But it was necessary for us to recognize the hard fact that the GRC had committed a substantial proportion of its troop strength to the defense of the islands. According to our information these troops were well dug in and still in pretty good shape; casualties had been relatively light since the initial surprise bombardment and morale was reported to be excellent. Mr. Herter then confirmed Lord Hood's understanding that the GRC was committed to consult with us prior to taking any new retaliatory action against the mainland and pointing out that it had observed this commitment faithfully. However, there was the obvious danger that if aerial combat developed on a large scale Nationalist planes might carry hot pursuit over Communist territory. In this respect, he commented, the Chinese Communists were faced with a Korean War "privileged sanctuary" problem in reverse, since they would find it difficult to pursue Nationalist planes to Taiwan without involving the U.S. The major difficulty which we faced with respect to the offshore islands problem, he continued, was the almost psychopathic frame of mind of the GRC leaders in linking retention of the islands to the fate of Taiwan and the GRC itself. As a result of this attitude and their actions stemming from it, Communist seizure of the islands would entail loss of the GRC's Navy and Air Force and a substantial proportion of its ground forces. Where would this leave Taiwan itself? The US clearly could not view this prospect with equanimity.

---

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 269–272.

[3] For text of Eisenhower's message to Churchill, February 18, 1955, see *ibid.*, pp. 291–294.

Lord Hood then inquired whether the US had decided how it would act in the event of what was clearly an all-out Communist assault on the islands. Commenting that recent Communist broadcasts explicitly linked the islands and Taiwan, Mr. Herter explained that the nature of our response remained under the Formosa Resolution a matter of Presidential determination whether defense of the islands was essential to the defense of Taiwan. This was an extremely difficult and delicate question since it involved political and psychological as well as purely military considerations. The present situation was that the Communists had the Quemoy group largely surrounded by artillery fire and were in a position seriously to hamper Nationalist resupply of the islands. If they were able to cut the supply lines over an extended period, the morale of the defenders could drop rapidly. He observed that our people on Taiwan have recently become more apprehensive about the interdiction threat because of the continuing intensity of the Communist attack. Their view now was that this was not just an attempt to create cold war tension but the first stage of a major effort to seize the islands.

Lord Hood then inquired whether anything could be done to cause the Communists to desist and proceeded to ask whether it would serve any useful purpose if the British were to make an approach to the Soviet Government pointing out the danger that the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands could develop into more wide-spread hostilities and urging that it counsel Peiping to exercise restraint. Mr. Herter replied that an approach which was limited to that phase of the problem on which our two governments were in agreement—namely opposition to the use of force by the Chinese Communists to achieve their objectives—was all to the good. He added that it was important any approach should be made in such a way that the Russians would not receive the impression that the U.S. had inspired the approach. Lord Hood stated that the UK would certainly consider the possibility and would seek the views of its Ambassador in Moscow regarding it. He added that London had also considered the possibility of putting in a word to the Chinese Communists directly in Peiping but had concluded that this would be useless in view of the UK's strained relations with the Chinese Communists.

Lord Hood further inquired whether we had considered raising the offshore island hostilities question in the UN, to which Mr. Herter replied that we had done so but that the past history of UN consideration of the problem was not a happy one. In Lord Hood's view, taking the problem to the UN would be a very tricky operation; it was doubtful that it could bring any constructive results and the most that could probably be hoped for would be that a momentary cooling-off period would be achieved. He said it was his understanding that a Communist attack on one of the offshore islands need not be reported to the Security Council under the provisions of Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty since the islands were not specifically covered by the Treaty. We might choose to do so, but the Treaty did not oblige us to. Mr. Herter confirmed this interpretation.

The conversation shifted to the question of Chinese Communist intentions in undertaking their present attack on the Quemoy group. The Acting Secretary noted that it was still not clear whether their main objective was to take the real estate involved or to utilize the situation to create pressures for their seating in the UN or to achieve some other political end. Until their intentions became more clear, we were following a policy of on the one hand increasing the GRC capabilities to hold the islands by supplying them with additional equipment and on the other hand to reinforce our own military strength in the area. With regard to the latter he reiterated that we were taking care to avoid provocative actions. In the meanwhile, Lord Hood asked, were we avoiding additional commitments to the GRC? Mr. Herter replied in the affirmative. He continued that the Chinese Communists appeared to be probing to see how far we were preparing to go in the situation. If they were to test us to the limit, the results could he extremely serious.

Mr. Herter commented briefly about the manner in which Peiping and Moscow had reported the Quemoy hostilities to date. Peiping had given the subject very limited play in its press and radio broadcasts beyond stating that shelling of Quemoy had been undertaken in retaliation for Nationalist fire against the mainland. Their surrender appeals to the Quemoy defenders had thus far been beamed only to Taiwan and Japan and had not been rebroadcast for the domestic Chinese audience or reported in the Chinese Communist press. Until today Moscow had been virtually silent regarding the Quemoy developments, but we had just received a report indicating that a TASS summary of the President's August 23 [27] press conference interpreted his remarks on the offshore islands situation as a firm commitment by the U.S. to help the GRC hold them.

55. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 31, 1958, 11 a.m.

267. Eyes Only Acting Secretary and Ambassador MacArthur. Department telegram 165.[1] My views are as follows:

1. GRC would welcome cessation of Communist attacks and would not, in my opinion, continue retaliatory firing if Communists ceased attacks. However, it would be difficult to ask GRC to be first to announce it would stop firing. Communists are held here to be aggressors and it would therefore be up to Communists to make first move. GRC would look askance at any such suggestion on our part and might look with suspicion on our motivations. Doubts might be engendered as to whether we would remain firm in our resistance to Communist aggression.

2. Term "cease fire" is anathema both to GRC and Chinese Communists. Some other terminology would have to be invented to cover situation. It is my personal belief neither side would accept formal "cease fire." I likewise fail to see any possibility whatever of reaching any agreed settlement of this civil war situation in foreseeable future. Best we could hope for would be return to status quo ante. GRC would of course strongly oppose attempted solution through US-Chinese Communist talks, through UN, or through summit conference.

3. I fear that proposed Kishi announcement would be taken by Communists as weakening of our determination to resist further Communist aggression. It would perhaps also be so regarded by our free world allies. There may be some validity in speculation that ChiComs may be trying to shoot their way into some international gathering where they could gain their ends without further warfare. Therefore your idea would have to be handled most carefully lest it play into Communist hands.

4. Some inkling of Chinese attitude toward your idea can be gathered from my telegram 266.[2]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3158. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution Outside Department. Repeated to Tokyo.

[1] Telegram 165 to Taipei, August 30, also sent to Tokyo, requested Drumright's and MacArthur's views on the idea of suggesting to Japanese Prime Minister Kishi that he call for a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait for a stated period of time to provide an opportunity for discussions through the Wang–Beam channel or a mutually acceptable intermediary. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/8–3058) MacArthur commented favorably in telegram 496 from Tokyo, August 31. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/8–3158; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 266 from Taipei, August 31, reported that Foreign Minister Huang had urged the Japanese Ambassador that Japan should refrain from taking the Taiwan Strait problem to the United Nations, as a Japanese newspaper editorial had suggested. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3158)

5. To sum up, while a cessation of attacks would be desirable and Communist cessation of attacks would be welcomed here, I fear that your idea would be unwelcome here and I fear it would be misconstrued by Communists as seeking an accommodation by concessions that would in end lead to further disasters.

Drumright

---

56. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, August 31, 1958, 8 p.m.

269. For Acting Secretary. Admiral Smoot informed President Chiang today of additional measures for defense of off-shore islands authorized for transmittal by JCS directive.[1] I was present along with Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff.

Admiral Smoot is transmitting detailed account of President's reactions.[2] Therefore, I will confine myself here to a few observations.

Conversation was dominated by President's deep disappointment at non-receipt of reply to his request of President Eisenhower for concurrence in making retaliatory air attacks against Communist air fields, et cetera. He was not mollified by our position on hot pursuit and spoke of our attitude as being "inhuman" and "unfair" to his soldiers on islands and destructive of public morale. His reaction was the most violent I have seen him exhibit and at one point he called our policy "not that of an allied nation". He said he could not accept our limitation on his right to retaliate in self-defense. However, he still wished not to take action until concurrence had been given and expressed hope consultation could take place here. He said if he had no response within three days he would be unable to maintain morale of his armed forces and people. He specifically requested that his views be passed to Washington.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3158. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

[1] See Document 53.

[2] Telegram 311306Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG TAIWAN to JCS, August 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa, Section 38; see Supplement)

Admiral Smoot and I have discussed situation at length with Secretary Brucker who is to see President tomorrow morning and attempt to pacify him.[3] I hope this will have some effect, but I believe that a personal message of reassurance and support from President Eisenhower to Chiang would be most useful and effective at this critical time. I shall hope to have further comment after talking to Secretary Brucker and Admiral Smoot tomorrow morning.

Drumright

---

[3] Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker visited Taipei August 30–September 1.

---

57. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Honolulu, August 31, 1958, noon.

312200Z. In COMSEVENTHFLT 291558Z pasep,[1] he reports critical situation and expresses opinion that we will have to knock out ChiCom artillery batteries if islands are to survive. Taipei to State 260[2] is Ambassador's assessment of Commie intentions. He is convinced that they intend to occupy the islands and that build-up in Amoy–Fuchow area and subsequent assault on the offshore islands is not merely for the purpose of provocative probing or to cause ChiNat or US counteraction which could brand US as "aggressors". JCS 947298[3] authorized Smoot and me to make clear to ChiNats that we do not share the feeling of inevitable loss of islands through bombardment alone. I submit that this assessment must be reviewed in the light of COMSEVENTHFLT's report. I concur in the Ambassador's assessment that Kinmen defenders can be

---

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CNO, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and COMUSTDC. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3158. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 are in the Supplement.

[1] Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38)

[2] Dated August 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3058)

[3] Document 53.

strangled if we do not take more positive action. I believe we are virtually at the point of phase II as defined in para 4C(2) of JCS 947298. I recommend, therefore, that my authorization be extended to provide escort and air cover into ChiNat territorial waters of Kinmen and up to the east coast beaches. I recommend that I be authorized to insure that supplies are landed. I recommend that the ChiComs be informed that we are taking this action. I would then interpret my orders and issue the necessary instructions to neutralize any ChiCom interference whatsoever in the accomplishment of my mission. As stated in my 282358Z,[4] we are completely within our rights to assist our allies to land supplies on the beaches of their own territory. The right of self-defense cannot be challenged.

---

[4] See footnote 3, Document 53.

---

58. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 1, 1958, noon.

271. For Acting Secretary. Embtel 269.[1]

1. Secretary Brucker had a 30-minute conversation with President Chiang early this morning. He says that Chiang spent most of the time stressing the necessity for his being able to take retaliatory action against Red aggression in offshore area. Brucker urged in reply that GRC take strong action through its Navy to break Communist blockade of Kinmen. (Incidentally, TDC is pressing MND hard on this point.)

2. I was present during last ten minutes of conversation. I found Chiang considerably more at ease and relaxed than day before. He spoke calmly and argued his position rationally. He said he is most happy about our material help and deeply appreciative. What he is worried about, he said, is his inactivity in face of Communist assaults on GRC positions at Kinmen. If this continues as at present for any length of time he will be severely criticized by his armed forces, by Chinese public, by

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–158. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:50 a.m. Repeated niact to CINCPAC.

[1] Document 56.

overseas Chinese and by world public opinion. He is fearful that there will be a public psychological reaction that he will he unable to control. He said that if the situation came to that point it would affect US just as adversely as it would him and Free China. He went on to say there were press reports from Washington that we were "restraining" him from retaliatory action. This sort of thing put him in the role of a puppet in the eyes of Chinese people and is an intolerable situation.

3. President intimated Washington clearly does not understand psychological significance of present situation. He requested that Washington be fully apprised of his attitude toward it. I said I would inform Washington.

4. I had refrained from speaking at yesterday's conference in view of its military character. This morning I spoke to President as follows: There was good reason to believe Communists wanted US to take provocative action which would provide basis for charges against US of aggression. Communists were also seeking to provoke GRC in same way in order to charge GRC with provocation and thus justify their aggression against offshore islands. I said it behooved both GRC and ourselves to exercise greatest caution so as not to be charged with aggression. I argued we should let Communists be clearly shown as aggressors and in this way buttress our position with world opinion. I also argued that when Communists come to comprehend massive assistance we are bringing to bear and our determination to secure offshore islands, there is a good possibility that they will yet be deterred from pressing their present adventure. Therefore we should be patient while we are getting our power into position; we should not in any case retaliate until we are fully ready militarily to do so. I believed none of us wanted to touch off a world war and therefore all of us should act with restraint and prudence in situation before us. There was a possibility that a big war could still be prevented. I supported Secretary Brucker's point that most important steps now are to break Communist blockade of Kinmen and to provide adequate artillery to knock out Communist batteries. I said Admiral Smoot and his staff are ready and willing to give every possible help. I also reviewed in general way help we are in process of sending here since I have feeling President does not comprehend its enormity and significance.

5. President readily admitted it might be wise to be more fully prepared militarily before provoking Communists to intensified action. He also appeared to appreciate need now to break interdiction of Kinmen. Nevertheless, he insisted that psychological predicament in which he finds himself is most important and something needs to be done to solve it in near future. I replied that lifting of Kinmen interdiction would have good effect in this regard and I took opportunity to praise conduct and heroism of Kinman defenders.

6. Secretary Brucker and I feel that President got a good deal of grievance out of his system yesterday and this morning and think frank and almost blunt talk on both sides was beneficial. We consider that relief of Kinmen should be pressed hard now and that if that can be done some of President's anxiety about his prestige can be dissipated. We believe also that early arrival here of concrete US military material and US forces will likewise have salutary effect on President's thinking.

7. I venture to believe we have reached smoother water with President. I hope that actions mentioned above will have salutary effect. But as I indicated in my 269, I think time has come when a warm personal message of support from President Eisenhower would also have very useful psychological effect on Chiang.

Drumright

---

59. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 1, 1958, 1 p.m.

273. For Acting Secretary. Department telegram 169.[1]

1. See my immediately preceding Top Secret message[2] which has an important bearing on questions posed by Department's message.

2. I believe that President was speaking sincerely if with great heat in his August 31 presentation to Admiral Smoot. He truly believes that his prestige and his position as leader of revolution against Communism are being undermined by what he regards as a negative and do-nothing retaliatory policy against Communist assault. Then too he is stung deeply by several press reports from Washington stating that US Government has urged continuing restraint in face Communist aggressive activities. President is extremely sensitive to suggestions that US controls his destiny and keeps him on leash as some kind of puppet. He truly fears that continuation of attitude of passivity to sustained Com-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–158. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:16 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] Telegram 169 to Taipei, August 31, requested Drumright's evaluation of the motivation and sincerity of Chiang's emotional plea at the August 31 meeting reported in Document 56. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–3158; see Supplement)

[2] Document 58.

munist attacks on his Kinmen forces will cause him and his government grave loss of prestige and popular support. He also fears morale of his forces and public will be eroded as time goes by. Indeed, he said as much frankly to Secretary Brucker and me this morning. I think he meant what he said, but I cannot help feeling he laid it on a bit thick and that situation is in nowise as serious to him or his government as he makes out. No doubt a prolonged blockade of Kinmen without most strenuous measures to break it would have very serious psychological and morale consequences, but that time is not here now. I believe that we and GRC are capable of measures needed to break blockade and that when this is done some of President's anxiety will evaporate, although he is likely to return again and again to charge that more active retaliatory action is required. Any assurance we could give President that we understand his "psychological" predicament, and that we are giving earnest thought to devising measures to help lift Communist attack and attempted strangulation of Kinmen would of course have a reassuring effect.

3. I do not regard military situation as desperate and neither does President, in my estimation. In our talks of yesterday and this morning he had little to say of military situation. He was absorbed with psychology of situation, his prestige and personal position and possibility that confidence of troops and public in him might decline and lead to a debacle. Our estimate here is that Kinmen will be able to hold out even under existing interdictions for one or two months. Our information is that material damage has been slight, morale is excellent and General Hu Lien[3] is fighting an excellently conceived defense action. President is satisfied with military support we are providing—though he would like to see it here sooner—and said so both yesterday and today. He was not pressuring us yesterday for further military help, although he naturally would welcome all we may be willing to provide.

4. In my opinion, President will not in near future take military retaliatory action against Mainland without our concurrence. If situation should become desperate—which it is not at present—and he still was without our concurrence, there is a possibility that he might do so. However he wants to keep his commitment with us and knows value of doing so. Only a most desperate situation would cause him to go ahead. I do not believe we should allow ourselves to be pressured into agreeing to retaliatory action until we are satisfied it is fully justified and necessary, although I think we should tell President we are giving question our constant attention.

5. I believe Communists would label GRC retaliation as aggression and play it that way to world. Communists might also use retaliation as justification for further aggressive measures. Communists would of

---

[3] Commanding General, Kinmen Command.

course allege that we were responsible for GRC provocation. However if retaliation was limited and yet effective it might deter Communists and make Communist attacks against Kinmen more difficult and expensive. I do not see that limited retaliation in itself would necessarily spread war beyond local limits. If harassment continues and grows I think we will ultimately be faced with problem of giving concurrence to retaliatory action. But that time is not now in my opinion.

Drumright

---

60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

September 1, 1958, 7:30 p.m.

I reported I was back on the job and that I had just finished an extensive conference with Mr. Herter, Mr. Parsons, and Mr. Marshall Green[1] about the Taiwan Straits situation. I expressed the view that we were not getting adequate reliable information about the position there; for example, whether there was really interdiction of supply. The President seemed to think that we had quite a little information and he expressed some annoyance over what he considered to be Chiang's pressure to get us involved. I said that I would try to get more fully informed about the situation but that certainly on the basis of the briefing reports made to me so far, there seemed to be considerable confusion about some of the vital facts. I indicated it might be useful if I had a chance to talk shortly with the President. The President said he would welcome this and asked if I would want to come tomorrow (Tuesday).[2] I said I thought it would be more useful for me to have a day or two to get up to date on facts. The President said he might be going off on an all-day excursion on Wednesday and tentatively suggested Thursday at 3 p.m. as a good time.

I asked the President if he planned a press conference. He said he had no plans but might have one if there was a real need for such a conference.

JFD

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Secret; Personal and Private. The President was in Newport, Rhode Island; the Secretary had returned that day to Washington.

[1] Mr. Loy Henderson was also present at this meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] September 2.

61. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, September 2, 1958, 9:51 a.m.

020151Z. Following developments could have significant bearing JCS action my 311306Z.[1] In private conference with President which reference break down of barriers I have been trying to hurdle since arrival he asked me to give him frank and honest appraisal of situation as I saw it. Response limited to military matters only and I let him have both barrels. Details will follow and not immediately required JCS consideration in reply to my 311306Z. Fact remains I left behind an enthused and spirited man and on way down the hill passed parade of GRC service chiefs and cabinet members enroute President's house. Simple fact is I am convinced highly centralized control, peculiarity Chinese top level relationships and awe in which they hold their President conspired to keep him ill informed of the military situation and stifles initiative and daring of his subordinates all the way down. My theme revolved around fact that GRC authorities so involved in what US is not doing for them they have overlooked their own ineffective planning and have not exploited the things they can do with what they have. To enlarge my point of departure was current major problem simply that of demonstration to themselves that they can get bullets on the beach so that General Hu Lien who is definitely restricting counter battery until logistic log jam broken can fight like he is capable of fighting so that we can stabilize this situation and thumb our noses at the Communists. That to get bullets on the beach US will help but the Chinese Navy has got to do it. That to date the Chinese Navy has made no effort to even try. All have gotten from Chinese Navy were reasons why it could not be done which I do not go along with at all. I asked him to give me one Chinese admiral with a can-do spirit then let US use a little imagination and a little guts and same tenacity of purpose shown by his Air and Army and we could lick the current problem. Intend pursue present conferences on daily basis now that door is open. Meanwhile am convinced grave implications my 311306Z somewhat ameliorated and drastic action not required from JCS nor expected from GRC. Recommend (a) reply my 311306Z give some promise of a little more advance authority vested in CTDC. (b) That I be given a little more latitude to discuss broad US plans and positions with him alone to bolster his position as a trusted ally and (c) concur with Ambassador a warm

---

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Section 38. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CNO and COMSEVENTHFLT. Received at the Department of the Navy at 12:53 a.m. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–258.

[1] See footnote 2, Document 56.

reply from President to President would have most salutory effect.[2] This dispatch sent to adees in my belief my enthusiasm in this venture might need filtering influence of detached judgment of adees before presentation to JCS. Situation still critical but believe action as above will remove immediate internal explosive attitudes.

---

[2] A message dated September 1 from Eisenhower to Chiang, sent in telegram 170 to Taipei, September 1, assured Chiang of U.S. support for his government's security and international prestige. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–158; see Supplement)

---

62. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 2, 1958, 12:15–1:47 p.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits Situation

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State Dulles
Under Secretary of State Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Henderson
Assistant Secretary Cumming
Mr. Farley, S/AE [1]
Acting Assistant Secretary FE, Mr. Parsons
General Byers, Dept. Defense
General McCaul, Asst. Commandant, Marines
General White, Air Chief of Staff
General Twining, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations
General Taylor, Army Chief of Staff
General Goodpaster, White House

The Secretary inquired what was the supply situation on the offshore islands? General Twining replied that the Nationalists on Kinmen probably had sufficient stocks to last sixty to ninety days. He confirmed that there were indications that the defenders were rationing their use of shells although there was plenty of ammo on the Kinmens and on Taiwan. In this regard General Taylor mentioned that twelve 8-inch howit-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–258. Top Secret. Drafted by Lutkins and approved by Marshall Green and Joseph N. Greene, Jr., all of whom were apparently also present. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Disarmament and Atomic Energy.

zers are being shipped to Kinmen and should add usefully to GRC defensive capabilities. Both sides were well dug in, he added, and could take a lot of pounding; it would be a very difficult job to dig out the gun emplacements on either side with conventional weapons.

The Secretary asked what escort ships our Navy would use. Admiral Burke explained that destroyers would be used, and in answer to a further query from the Secretary stated that while there would be some danger of their being hit it was not very great; as long as they kept moving they would be difficult targets for inexperienced gunners. It was a risk we should accept. He also pointed out that they would not be moving in beyond international waters, which would reduce the danger of their being hit from shore batteries. Regarding the possible danger to the destroyers point was also made that the Chinese Communists did not appear so far to have used their air strength either to attack the islands or to supplement their interdictory operations.

In reply to the Secretary's inquiry what direct sources of information we had on Kinmen Admiral Burke stated that there was an Army Advisory group there [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*]. General Byers commented that while the Advisory Group's communication facilities had been knocked out in the first bombardment they were continuing to transmit messages [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*].

With further reference to the supply situation Admiral Burke called attention to the extremely heavy typhoon which was approaching Taiwan. As a result the seas in the Taiwan Straits would be so heavy that no supplies would be moving across to the islands for the next three days.

The Secretary inquired what indications there were of a further military build-up by the Communists in the coastal area. Admiral Burke stated that there had been no significant change on the naval side, mentioning in particular that no unusual concentrations of junks had been observed although there were thousands in the general area. General Taylor stated that there were indications of an increase by two new artillery divisions which were broadly distributed throughout the coastal area of Fukien.

Responding to the Secretary's inquiry on the subject of morale and casualties on Kinmen, Admiral Burke stated that the morale of the defenders was reported to be excellent—better than in Taipei—and that casualties amounted to 680 of whom 150 had been killed. There were no casualties in the Matsus.

The Secretary noted that the JCS memorandum[2] talked about the problem of relative GRC Navy inactivity. One difficulty, Admiral Burke noted, was that the Navy was lacking in good top-level leadership; it had taken most of its senior officers from the Army and had not received particularly good ones. The Navy was good technically, but due to the lack of a Chinese naval tradition it did not have the urge to get in and scrap. Moreover, the Navy did not have very much in the way of ships and its fear of losses tended to inhibit offensive operations. It did, however, have a good supply of landing craft for supply purposes, and we were providing them with additional lift of this type shortly.

---

[2] Not further identified.

The Secretary observed that it did not appear the situation would become critical in a matter of hours but was rather a question of days or weeks. General Taylor pointed to the possibility of a surprise attack, noting the Communists' ability, as seen during the Korean War, to concentrate a large number of junks rapidly. The Secretary inquired as to the capability of the Chinese Air Force for hitting such junk concentrations. It was noted that the CAF already had authority to strike concentrations presaging invasion but Admiral Burke stated that the GRC, strictly interpreting its commitment not to hit the mainland, had not yet struck at the junks observed in Amoy harbor or elsewhere. President Eisenhower had indicated the other day that he thought the GRC should have that authority. Admiral Burke pointed out that tests carried out by the Navy several years ago had shown the great difficulty of destroying junks except by napalm, which made them very expensive targets to hit. General Twining said that the GRC had napalm, adding that a message had been sent out asking for information on the size of its stocks of napalm as well as of bombs and ammunition.

Admiral Burke expressed the opinion that the principal threat to Kinmen was not from junks which in the event of invasion attempts could be handled by the island's guns, but from the Communist shore batteries. He concurred in the Secretary's supposition that the Communists would not attempt to invade Kinmen until the Nationalist batteries had been silenced, unless the Communists were prepared to take exceedingly heavy losses. The Secretary observed that the Communists could conceivably stage a major assault at any time with a combination of heavy shelling, air bombing, and amphibious landing operations. Mr. Herter asked how many troops would be required for such an operation; would it be 300,000–400,000? General Taylor thought that they would not want to commit this many troops. Admiral Burke stated that the waters around Kinmen were mined and otherwise well defended and that judging by our experience in attacking Japanese-held islands in the Pacific in World War II the 85,000 defenders of Kinmen could put up a determined resistance. The Communists would therefore need a great many troops to take it, suffering heavy casualties.

The Secretary inquired whether the Joint Chiefs expected to get a full daily report on the military situation on the islands in all its aspects.

General Twining replied in the affirmative. Admiral Burke commented that he had authorized a "rough" message the previous day asking for more adequate reporting.[3]

The Secretary asked whether the Joint Chiefs had decided what sort of military actions we would have to take if it were necessary for us to intervene militarily. General Twining's answer was that we would strike at Communist air fields and shore batteries with small atomic weapons. All the studies carried out by Defense indicated that this was the only way to do the job; the use of conventional weapons would mean our involvement in another protracted Korean War-type conflict. Furthermore, he declared, the Joint Chiefs believed that the Chinese Communists should be told that this was our intention. The Secretary noted at this point that he had asked his staff to find out what the President had said publicly in the past regarding the use of nuclear weapons. He also observed that the Joint Chiefs' view regarding the necessity of using nuclear weapons had important implications affecting the government's whole foreign policy.

General Taylor said it was necessary in his view to distinguish in this respect between three different types of targets or situations:

(a) The first possible situation was one in which we would be presented with an "open target", with the Communists attacking in an amphibious operation. Such an attack could be beaten back by the Nationalist defenders with conventional weapon assistance from us. The Secretary asked whether this estimate would hold in the event of a surprise attack. General Taylor replied that, while the Communists might achieve surprise in the initial landing phase, a successful invasion would require continuous back-up operations which we could hit and destroy. The Joint Chiefs agreed that U.S. forces currently in the area were sufficient to cope with an attack of this nature. Admiral Burke and General Taylor emphasized that Kinmen was not going to fall in one day as a result of such an attack. General Taylor thought that it was nevertheless important to determine in advance what our reaction would be in the event of a clear-cut attack. Admiral Burke believed that we would be able to beat off an amphibious attack, even if staged in conjunction with heavy aerial bombing, long enough to refer back to Washington and obtain authorization to use nuclears. General Taylor's view was that it was not necessary to have authority to use nuclears immediately upon the commencement of a major attack since beleaguered military garrisons could hold up for some time under the heavy shelling and bombing, but it would be necessary to use nuclears if the Communists maintained the attack. Admiral Burke continued that the Communists would take heavy losses from our conventional weapons in an initial phase of an amphibious landing, but if they persisted we could not defeat the attack except by the use of nuclears. The Secretary observed that, in other words, it was not necessary to use nuclear weapons right away but it would be necessary to do so ultimately against a determined enemy.

---

[3] Telegram 011717Z from CNO to CINCPAC, September 1, requested information on the supply situation for Kinmen and Matsu. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Telegrams), August 19–September 3, 1958)

(b) The second type of situation we might face would be one in which protracted massive shelling of the islands threatened to result in a breakdown of the morale of GRC defenders. General Taylor explained in this regard that we had found in Korea that while we could severely harass enemy gun emplacements by the use of conventional artillery fire and napalm we could not knock out the positions altogether. Physical elimination of the gun emplacements could be effected only by nuclear fire; the barracks used by the gun crews could of course be destroyed by conventional means. Admiral Burke agreed with this assessment noting moreover that the Communists had more gun positions than guns and moved the latter around regularly.

(c) The third possibility General Taylor envisaged was a heavy and continuing aerial bombardment. In this event, he believed, nuclear weapons would certainly have to be used.

The Secretary asked what would happen if any of our destroyers or our aircraft engaged in convoying GRC supply ships to the islands were to be hit? Admiral Burke said we would, of course, have to conduct rescue operations even if this were to mean entering Chinese Communist coastal waters. General Twining said that if we were to lose a ship or American lives as a result of our convoying action, it would come as a great shock to the American public. The Secretary concurred, adding that this was a political rather than a military question since we were placing American lives and ships in jeopardy. He observed that we did not appear to have given much thought to possible reactions here and abroad. Mr. Herter interjected that awareness of this factor was one of the reasons why the instructions to Admiral Smoot had confined convoying operations to international waters. Admiral Burke said that the matter raised by the Secretary and General Twining was a matter of serious concern, since the American people and Congress did not realize how serious the situation was and were not psychologically prepared for the possible consequences. He stressed that this was not a question just of the loss of some small islands but rather of the possible loss of a whole nation, the GRC. The Secretary stated that he had made mention of the same point at his staff meeting earlier in the day, noting that if it was possible merely to lose the islands no one would mind very much, but that their loss would almost certainly lead to further Chinese Communist aggressive moves and gains. Nothing seems to be worth world war until you look hard at the effect of not standing up to each challenge as it is posed. Admiral Burke responded that the argument that nothing is worth a world war was the reason why the Communists had been winning all along. He emphasized the danger to Southeast Asia and our whole position in the Far East if we were to fail to take a strong stand in meeting Chinese Communist military aggression in this instance. General White voiced the opinion that our firm support of the GRC in this crisis might have a favorable impact on our NATO allies.

The Secretary inquired if we had to use nuclear weapons, what type would be employed against Communist airfields? General Twining replied that we would use 7–10 kiloton airburst bombs. Ground burst bombs would be more effective, but they were too "dirty." The lethal area of the airburst type was 3 to 4 miles, and there was virtually no fall out. The initial attack would be only on five coastal airfields (with one bomb being used per airfield); we would then stop to observe the effect on Communist intentions. The result of these bombs would be to take out aircraft on the fields plus ground facilities, but the runways would not be rendered inoperable; it was not believed that the coastal fields had underground facilities.

The Secretary noted that we had been informed by Ambassador MacArthur that if the U.S. initiated the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the offshore islands, the Japanese Government might be forced to demand withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan & as a minimum, would probably request cessation of U.S. support of any nature, including logistic, from facilities in Japan for operations in the Taiwan Straits. Admiral Burke said that denial of the bases in Japan for operational sorties would present us with no great difficulty but that denial of access to our supplies in Japan would be serious, though surmountable.

The Secretary declared that this matter posed a very basic question with respect to our defense posture in the Far East: namely if anticipated reactions against our use of nuclear weapons were to be so hostile that we would be inhibited from using them except in the NATO theater or in retaliation against a Soviet attack, was our reliance on their use correct and productive? Admiral Burke observed that this was all part of a war of nerves and that the opposition in Japan to our use of nuclear weapons was largely inspired by the Communists in order to deter us from using nuclear weapons. He thought such opposition was to be found mostly among "leftist" labor elements and did not reflect the thinking of the Japanese Government. If the Communists persisted in their attack, he continued, we had two choices: to counter-attack or to let the islands go. The latter course would probably result in the later loss of Taiwan and other free countries one by one. A strong retaliatory action might well result in serious initial public reaction in Japan and elsewhere but the government and informed leaders would come to realize that our action was in their best interests. We must stand and hold firm, he argued, by conventional weapons as long as this was possible but, if the enemy persisted, with nuclear weapons. Otherwise we faced the prospect of losing the whole world in ten years.

General Taylor stated that this problem has often been discussed in the abstract, but now we were dealing with the first specific case, which to his mind vividly pointed up the need of flexibility of forces in the defense planning. General Twining's view was that we simply could not afford to support forces of the sort indicated by General Taylor. The Secretary observed that regardless of the amount of conventional force flexibility we might be able to maintain, it would be no match for the manpower and conventional power of our enemies on the Eurasian land mass. General Taylor thought it was a question of careful orchestration, that we should start with conventional weapons and proceed with a graduated series of deterrent actions, of which the use of nuclears would only be the final stage. General Twining insisted that we could not afford the number of divisions necessary to deal with Communist ground strength on the Eurasian continent, and General White similarly argued that we could not maintain air fleets of the same size that we employed in our World War II strikes. Admiral Burke commented that our naval aircraft was stretched very thin and that if we were to suffer heavy losses we would find it hard to obtain replacements. General Twining added that if we could have used nuclear bombs in the Korean War we could have accomplished in two or three days the damage to enemy positions that required months of saturation with conventional bombs, and probably with considerably less loss of American and enemy lives. He could not understand the public horror at the idea of using nuclear weapons and insisted that we must get used to the idea that such weapons had to be used. We must also face the possibility of their use by the Communists.

The Secretary asserted that if we shrink from using nuclear weapons when military circumstances so require, then we will have to reconsider our whole defense posture. In dealing with this crisis we were facing some tough questions. Admiral Burke thought that if we didn't face up to the problem now there would be tougher situations later on; the other Chiefs agreed.

Mr. Herter expressed the opinion that Phase II of our possible military actions in the Taiwan Straits area, as described in the JCS Directive sent to Admiral Smoot on August 29, was rather fuzzy and asked whether it would not be worth while to have the Joint Chiefs develop their understanding of our possible actions in this phase in a more precise manner. Admiral Burke stated that the distinction between the various phases was in itself a fuzzy one and that it would be difficult to spell things out in a more specific manner. There was agreement on this point by the Joint Chiefs.

The Secretary then returned to a proposed directive to Admiral Smoot[4] asking whether the authority extended to him in it was not too broad. General Twining explained that the intent of the message was to let him know that he already had ample authority within the latitudes that had already been set by Defense and State. There was agreement that Admiral Smoot should be reminded that our convoy operations should be confined to international waters, and that in exercising the latitude granted by the JCS he must operate within this and other basic restrictions.

---

[4] Apparently a draft of JCS telegram 947414, September 2. (*Ibid.*, Offshore Islands (Telegrams), May 26–September 4, 1958; see Supplement)

The Secretary also asked about the meaning of the directive seeking an increase in GRC counter battery fire.[5] General Twining explained that while increasing the fire would not necessarily result in knocking out enemy gun emplacements it would keep them pinned down and would also have a good psychological effect both on the defenders and on the enemy.

---

[5] Included in the telegram cited in footnote 4 above.

---

63. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, September 3, 1958.

SUBJECT

Comments on Summary No. 2 re Quemoy and Matsu[1]

a. The summary does not include what is to my mind a very important factor in any consideration of this matter—the fact that there apparently would be no widespread support for US intervention, even from our closest allies and from two important Far East powers who should feel directly threatened if the main thesis of the summary is correct, Japan and the Philippines.

I think that whether or not nuclear weapons were used, American military intervention will probably not have the endorsement of our main allies and would severely strain our alliances.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Sec saw."

[1] Apparently the paper prepared by the Secretary and discussed and revised at the meeting recorded in Document 64.

b. There is, I believe, a real danger that US intervention may have consequences very similar to those of non-intervention set forth in paragraph 7 of your summary. If we use nuclear weapons, our intervention may force Japan, the Philippines, and other Asian nations further in the direction of neutralism and eventual accommodation with Peiping.

c. You state in paragraph 6 that if the Offshore Islands are lost the present ChiNat government would probably be replaced by a government that would advocate union with Communist China. While it is certainly true that the loss of Quemoy would have a serious impact on Chiang's government, it does not seem necessarily to follow that any successor government would advocate union with Communist China. It is my understanding that the Taiwanese have strong separatist tendencies and a government in which they predominated might well wish to maintain independence and might well seek our continued support to this end.

d. I think the summary should point out the likely *military* consequences of US use of nuclear weapons. The sentence on page 6 "It is not certain, however, that this would do the job and a risk of a possibility of extensive use of nuclear weapons and a risk of general war would have to be accepted" seems to be too light a treatment of this most serious aspect of the matter. NIE 100–7–58,[2] which was especially commissioned by the President, concluded that "if the US used nuclear weapons in meeting Bloc local aggression in the Far East, there would be a grave risk that the Communists would retaliate in kind. Indeed any Far East Communist state, taking into account the possibility of such US action, would be unlikely to launch a local aggression without having received assurances of Soviet support."

Although the Joint Chiefs spoke yesterday only of nuclear strikes against airfields along the coast opposite the Offshore Islands, it is our understanding that their contingency planning for the case of limited hostilities to defend Quemoy and Matsu include, if necessary, the striking of military targets within a 500-mile radius from the islands, including targets in the Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton areas, and on enemy strike bases wherever located in China. If such a bombing program is carried out, the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE 100–7–58][3] concluded that "Peiping and its Soviet ally would probably feel compelled to react with nuclear attacks at least on Taiwan and on the Seventh Fleet." If this happened, we should very probably be faced with a choice between accepting defeat or launching SAC in large-scale nuclear attacks against Communist China. The latter would very probably lead to general war with the USSR.

---

[2] Document 19.

[3] All brackets are in the source text.

e. It seems to me that the summary should treat somewhat more fully the most likely contingency, that is, continued Communist interdiction of the islands without direct assault. Paragraph 10 seems to be the key paragraph and directly related to paragraph 9 which speaks only of US intervention in the event of an assault on Quemoy. It might be well to have a new paragraph 11, indicating the likely situation if the US intervened to break the interdiction in the absence of an assault. [I think we should have a better idea from the JCS of the options available to us in this contingency.]

f. It strikes me that the summary does not do justice to the Max Taylor thesis—that more can be done with conventional force—than some military leaders believe. I urge you to favor this thesis and if we do become militarily and directly involved to urge on the President the importance of the US first making its best effort with conventional forces and only resorting to local use of nuclear weapons as a last resort. In my judgment, extended nuclear strikes beyond the immediate locale of the hostilities cannot be justified in the defense of the Offshore Islands.

g. I think the summary would be improved by some recognition of the fact that the Offshore Islands are not intrinsically of any real military significance. GRC defense of the islands will use up manpower and material that could better be saved for defense of Taiwan.

h. The summary indicates that the ChiComs have put into operation a carefully prepared program to overthrow free world positions in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. I have not yet seen any hard evidence to this effect and incline more to the belief that the ChiComs are hitting at the Offshore Islands as a target of opportunity in the backwash of the US–UK military action in the Middle East.

Gerard C. Smith

64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 3, 1958, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

The Secretary
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Cumming
Mr. Smith
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Greene
Mr. Calhoun

Department of Defense (after 4:30 p.m.)

Secretary McElroy
Deputy Secretary Quarles
General Twining, Chairman JCS

The White House (after 4:30 p.m.)

General Goodpaster

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits

The initial meeting among State officials was devoted entirely to redrafting of the summary paper prepared by the Secretary for his discussions with the President.[1]

After the Defense Department officials joined the meeting Mr. McElroy handed the Secretary a situation paper prepared by the JCS.[2] He and General Twining emphasized that this was merely a summary of facts and ideas as seen by the Joint Chiefs which they felt might be of help to the Secretary and the President. The Secretary perused this paper and commented that it was helpful. General Twining also handed to the Secretary a brief proposed statement of policy, also prepared by the JCS,[3] commenting that this was only put forward as an informal suggestion. The Secretary observed that he did not anticipate decisions by the Presi-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–358. Top Secret. Drafted in S/S. The conversation was held in Secretary Dulles' office.

[1] Apparently the paper discussed in Document 63.

[2] Reference is to a draft on the Taiwan Straits Situation bearing the handwritten notation "JCS paper, 3 Sept. 58," with an appendix dated September 1 and an annex. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous) A copy is in JCS 2118/110, together with the final memorandum, addressed to the Secretary of Defense and dated September 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 37)

[3] Headed "Draft Statement of United States Policy," with the handwritten notation, "(by JCS at meeting with Sec 9/3)." It stated that the United States would not permit the loss of the principal offshore islands to Communist aggression and that if the islands were seriously endangered by major attacks, the United States would concur in Nationalist attacks on appropriate mainland bases, reinforce the Nationalists to the extent necessary to assure the security of the islands, and join in the attack if necessary with atomic weapons. It is attached to an unsigned document headed "Taiwan Straits: Issues Developed in Discussion with JCS", September 2, which is another record of the meeting described in Document 62. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–258; see Supplement)

dent tomorrow and thought that this might be left to a probable meeting with the President Saturday when he returns to Washington briefly.

The Secretary raised the question of how much advance warning of a Chinese Communist assault might be expected. General Twining estimated that it could be less than 24 hours. Mr. Quarles said that Admiral Smoot had reported that the Chicoms do not have sufficient forces for an assault in position now, but that the Navy authorities are of the opinion that such forces can be moved up rapidly. He said there are four field armies in the general area but this scarcely exceeds Chinat forces on the Islands. The Secretary concluded that the Chicom capability was such that we cannot preclude an assault within a three or four day period. General Twining and Mr. McElroy agreed that it would be advisable to play this question on the side of a very short advance warning.

There was brief discussion of the probable intentions of the Chicoms and of morale factors affecting the Chinats. The Secretary observed that it was essential that the Chicoms not be led to believe that we will not intervene, pointing out also the serious effect this would have on Chinat morale. General Twining expressed the opinion that the present type of artillery fire cannot break up the Island defenses. He said however that the Chinat Navy was by no means doing all that it should. Mr. Quarles said it was not established that the Chicoms could, by their present means, maintain interdiction indefinitely.

In this connection, the Secretary emphasized how vitally important it is to know the daily supply situation of the Offshore Islands. General Twining said instructions had been sent out requiring daily reports henceforth. The Secretary said this factor would be the determinant of whether the situation on the Islands could be maintained if open assault were deterred. He observed that the basis for US intervention, and the domestic and foreign support for US intervention, and the domestic and foreign support for such intervention, would be far less if our action were taken only to break the interdiction. Mr. Quarles stated that he agreed with the President's comment at an earlier meeting that if the Islands could hold out for some weeks we would give non-combatant support to the Chinats. Mr. Quarles said that massive assault would justify our joining the battle. The Secretary said that our objective was to deter such assault and that a great danger in this respect lay in our position not being made sufficiently clear. He raised the question however, in relation to what should we make our position clear. [*sic*] Mr. Quarles felt that we could not clarify the situation publicly without helping the Chicoms in doing so by revealing our intentions. The Secretary concluded this discussion by expressing the view that the major Chicom objective at present is internal development and that this present activity is essentially a probing operation, probably agreed upon at the recent meeting between Khrushchev and Mao.

In discussing reactions of our Allies, the Secretary expressed the opinion that as a general rule they will go along with a course of action that we propose to take if they are reasonably sure that we are in fact going to proceed with that course. He mentioned in this connection the communication from the British,[4] the meeting with the SEATO Ambassadors,[5] and the discussion in NATO. He said that the Japanese position was less certain, however.

Mr. McElroy raised the question of a possible communication to the Chicoms through diplomatic or other private channels. The Secretary pointed out that an approach could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He felt that a private ultimatum might not necessarily be so interpreted, but then we must be sure of having both American and Allied opinion strongly behind our position. He suggested that the presentations to the NATO and SEATO countries might well lead to a few of them cautioning Peiping quietly. He said we should look into the use of intermediaries to put pressure on the Chicoms against war-like moves.

The Defense representatives indicated no objections from their point of view to the revised summary paper prepared at the earlier meeting by Department officials. The meeting then considered a draft public statement which might be used by the President following his meeting with the Secretary.[6] There was general agreement that it was a good statement, and a number of drafting suggestions were made.

---

[4] A message from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower, which had arrived that day, expressed concern that the United States and United Kingdom should not be divided or appear to be divided. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204; see Supplement)

[5] The Secretary met with the SEATO Chiefs of Mission to discuss the Taiwan Strait situation on the morning of September 3. (Memorandum of meeting, September 3; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

[6] See Document 66.

65. Memorandum From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Chief of General Staff, Republic of China (Wang)

Taipei, September 4, 1958.

SUBJ

Retaliatory attack against Chinese Communist Air Force

REF

(a) MND ltr No. 236 OPNS–5–016 of 15 Aug 1958 (Secret)[1]

1. This letter is in reply to reference (a), in which you requested U.S. concurrence for Chinese Air Force retaliatory actions against Chinese Communist aircraft at air bases along the southeast China coast in the event that the Communist air force develops invasion actions and conducts bombing and strafing against Kinmen and Matsu.

2. I understand fully your concern for the safety of the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and your appreciation of the threat that the Communist air force poses.

3. I have sought and obtained guidance in respect of your request. This guidance represents the views of the United States Government. These views were communicated orally by Ambassador Drumright to President Chiang, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister and yourself at the meeting held at Ta Chi on August 24, 1958.[2] They are as follows:

a. The letters of December 10, 1954, exchanged between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh have a basic applicability to your request for retaliatory military action against the Mainland.

b. The United States Government does not question the Chinese Government's inherent right of self-defense, but the United States Government would expect the Chinese Government to consult with it concerning any "use of force" against the Chinese Mainland unless attacks were mounted in such magnitude and determination as clearly to require GRC retaliatory action of an emergency character.

c. In any event, since, to quote from the exchange of letters of December 10, 1954, referred to above, "the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other," the United States Government would expect that, regardless of the gravity and emergency nature of the

---

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret; Noforn Except GRC.

[1] This letter from General Wang to Admiral Smoot is filed as an attachment to a September 4 letter from Drumright to Smoot. (*Ibid.*) For Wang's letter to Smoot, see Supplement.

[2] See Document 42.

situation, the GRC would consult the United States Government to the maximum extent feasible before taking retaliatory action against Chinese Communist forces or positions on the Mainland.

4. In addition to the foregoing, I have received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding "hot pursuit," the details of which I passed orally to President Chiang at Yang Ming Shan on August 31, 1958.[3] For your convenience, United States Government views on this subject are as follows:

a. In the event that the Chinese Communists launch air attacks on the Kinmen or Matsu islands, and such attacks are met by GRC aircraft, the Government of the United States would consider that the GRC's inherent right of self-defense would include GRC air attacks on Chinese Communist aircraft conducting such attacks, and that the right to pursue exists. In other words, GRC aircraft would be justified in following Chinese Communist aircraft to their bases and attacking aircraft at those bases.

5. In view of President Chiang's renewed assurances to seek concurrence prior to conducting retaliatory attacks against mainland positions and forces, I am convinced that our two Governments will find it possible to follow a common policy in this most important matter. Both Ambassador Drumright and I will be available for consultation at all times.

6. Implicit in the request contained in your letter is GRC understanding of the basic position of my Government. This is demonstrated by the admirable restraint your Government has shown under the most trying circumstances. May I assure you that the wisdom of your Government's restraint is appreciated by the United States Government and authorities.

R.N. Smoot[4]

---

[3] See Document 56.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

66. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Newport, Rhode Island, September 4, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Mr. Greene
Captain Aurand[1]
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster

The Secretary first gave to the President a memorandum summarizing factors involved in the Taiwan Straits situation, prepared following consultation with State, Defense and intelligence officials.[2] The President edited this statement and commented upon it. Mr. Dulles directed attention to the point regarding atomic weapons, recalling that we have geared our defense to the use of these in case of hostilities of any size, and stating that, if we will not use them when the chips are down because of adverse world opinion, we must revise our defense setup. The memorandum undertook to bring out this point.

The President said one problem on his mind is that if the Chinese Communists were to use fields well back from the coast, following intervention by us, to conduct night bombardment of Formosa, we would be in a difficult spot, somewhat similar to that of the Germans in the last war, who set loose strategic bombardment which was then returned against their rather confined homeland from bases very widely dispersed. However, that is simply an inherent element of the situation.

The Secretary next gave the President a statement proposed to be issued to the public clarifying our view regarding the offshore islands, and having as its object to deter the Chinese Communists from attack which might bring us into the hostilities.[3] He and the President initially started to edit it so that the statement might be made by the President, but after further consideration the President decided to have it put out as a statement by the Secretary, approved by himself. We would then see what the reaction might be, and the President would be in position to follow it up on Saturday, as might seem desirable.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. No classification marking. Prepared by Goodpaster. Dulles' memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President; see Supplement.

[1] Captain E.P. Aurand, USN, Naval Aide to the President.

[2] Document 67.

[3] See Document 68.

Mr. Dulles then showed the President a copy of the Chinese Communist statement made public today on the extent of their coastal waters, the last paragraph of which seemed to soften the Chinese Communist threat against Taiwan.[4] There was agreement that the territorial limit asserted by the Chinese Communists would not be accepted.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

---

[4] A statement issued on September 4 by the PRC Government declared a 12-mile limit for Chinese territorial waters. The final paragraph reads: "The Taiwan and Penghu areas are still occupied by the United States by armed force. This is an unlawful encroachment on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan, Penghu and such other areas are yet to be recovered, and the Government of the People's Republic of China has the right to recover these areas by all suitable means at a suitable time. This is China's internal affair, in which no foreign interference is tolerated." Text is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* p. 1199.

---

67. Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles

Newport, Rhode Island, September 4, 1958.

(This estimate of factors involved in the Taiwan Straits situation has been prepared by the Secretary of State on the basis of consultation with political and intelligence officers of the State Department and with the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is concurred in by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

SUMMARY

Events in the Taiwan Straits indicate that the Chicoms, with Soviet backing, have begun tentatively to put into operation a program, which has been prepared for over the past 3 years, designed initially to liquidate the Chinat positions in Taiwan and the offshore islands, and with probably even more far-reaching purposes.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. The source text incorporates revisions made by the President at the meeting recorded in Document 66. A draft dated September 3 with the President's handwritten revisions is in the Eisenhower Library, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa; see Supplement.

The program has been begun by intense pressure on the weakest and most vulnerable of such positions, namely, the Chinat-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. It seems that the operation is designed to produce a cumulating rollback effect, first on the offshore islands, and then on Taiwan, the "liberation" of which is the announced purpose of the present phase. The "liberation", if it occurred, would have serious repercussions on the Philippines, Japan, and other friendly countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

The first phase of the operation—that involving Quemoy and/or Matsu—would be primarily military; for these initial obstacles cannot be overcome otherwise. The follow-up against Taiwan might be primarily subversive, taking advantage of the blow to the Republic of China involved in the loss of the offshore islands where it has virtually staked its future. However, armed Chicom attack against Taiwan is not to be excluded. This is, indeed, forecast by the current Chinese Communist broadcasts.

The taking over of Taiwan by the Communists would greatly enhance Communist influence and prestige throughout the free Asian world and depreciate that of the US.

The foregoing summary is based upon the following more specific estimates:

1) In the absence of US intervention, the Chicoms, by accepting heavy casualties, could take Quemoy by an amphibious assault supported by artillery and aerial bombardment. Such an assault could be staged with little advance notice. The operation once initiated might take from one to several days depending on the quality of the resistance.

2) If the Chicoms believe the US will not intervene, they can be expected to mount such an assault whenever they believe the defenders have been sufficiently "softened up".

3) If the Chicoms believe the US would actively intervene to throw back an assault, perhaps using nuclear weapons, it is probable there would be no attempt to take Quemoy by assault and the situation might quiet down, as in 1955.

4) It is, however, also possible that if the Chicoms felt that the US would intervene only if there were a major assault, they might keep that assault as an overhanging menace but never an actuality, and meanwhile continue the type of pressures now being exerted, including bombardment and attempted blockade, on the theory that if this were prolonged, the defense would collapse due to deterioration of morale and lack of supply.

5) Under these conditions, and if interdiction were not broken, the morale and defense capability of the defenders would, in fact, deteriorate and might eventually collapse, particularly since the US would find it difficult to find new ways to support that morale. Indeed, the US would find it difficult to maintain in the area its present show of strength for any considerable period of time.

6) If Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this would have serious impact upon the authority and military capability of

the anti-Communist, pro-US, government on Formosa. It would be exposed to subversive and/or military action which would probably bring about a government which would eventually advocate union with Communist China and the elimination of US positions on the island.

7) If the foregoing occurred, it would seriously jeopardize the anti-Communist barrier consisting of the insular and peninsular positions in the Western Pacific; e.g., Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Other governments in Southeast Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence. US positions in this area, perhaps even Okinawa, would probably become untenable, or unusable, and Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit. These events would not happen all at once but would probably occur over a period of a few years. The consequences in the Far East would be even more far-reaching and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union.

8) The impact of these adverse developments in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia would undoubtedly have serious, world-wide effects.

9) If the Communists, acting on the supposition that we will not actively intervene, seek to take Quemoy by assault and become increasingly committed, and if we then do intervene, there might be a period between the beginning of assault and irrevocable commitment when prompt and substantial US intervention with *conventional* weapons might lead the Chicoms to withhold or reverse their assault effort. Otherwise, our intervention would probably not be effective if it were limited to the use of conventional weapons.

10) US destroyers are cooperating with the Chinat sea supply operations within the limits of international waters, i.e., up to within three miles of Quemoy. There is thus a possibility of a deliberate or accidental hit by the Chicoms, which would have potential and unplanned reactions which might involve at least limited retaliation.

11) Once we intervened to save the offshore islands, we could not abandon that result without unacceptable damage to the safety of the free world and our influence in it.

If accomplishment of this result required the use of nuclear weapons, there would be a strong popular revulsion against the US in most of the world. It would be particularly intense in Asia and particularly harmful to us in Japan.

If relatively small detonations were used with only air bursts, so that there would be no appreciable fallout or large civilian casualties, and if the matter were quickly closed, the revulsion might not be long-lived or entail consequences as far-reaching and permanent as though there had occurred the series of political reversals indicated in Point 7 above. It is not certain, however, that the operation could be thus limited in scope or time, and the risk of a more extensive use of nuclear weapons, and even a risk of general war, would have to be accepted.

(References are here made to Quemoy as the most likely Communist target. If Matsu became the initial target, the situation would be substantially the same.)

---

68. White House Press Release

Newport, Rhode Island, September 4, 1958.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have reviewed in detail with the President the serious situation which has resulted from aggressive Chinese Communist military actions in the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits area. The President has authorized me to make the following statement.

1. Neither Taiwan (Formosa) nor the islands of Quemoy and Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists. Since the end of the Second World War, a period of over 13 years, they have continuously been under the authority of Free China, that is, the Republic of China.

2. The United States is bound by treaty to help to defend Taiwan (Formosa) from armed attack and the President is authorized by Joint Resolution of the Congress to employ the armed forces of the United States for the securing and protecting of related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu.

3. Any attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists now to seize these positions or any of them would be a crude violation of the principles upon which world order is based, namely, that no country should use armed force to seize new territory.

4. The Chinese Communists have, for about 2 weeks, been subjecting Quemoy to heavy artillery bombardment and, by artillery fire and use of small naval craft, they have been harassing the regular supply of the civilian and military population of the Quemoys, which totals some 125 thousand persons. The official Peiping radio repeatedly announces

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. No classification marking. Also printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 687–689. Secretary Dulles read the statement at a news conference at 12:22 p.m. and then answered questions on a background basis. A transcript of the news conference is filed with the source text; see Supplement.

the purpose of these military operations to be to take by armed force Taiwan (Formosa), as well as Quemoy and Matsu. In virtually every Peiping broadcast Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands are linked as the objective of what is called the "Chinese Peoples Liberation Army."

5. Despite, however, what the Chinese Communists say, and so far have done, it is not yet certain that their purpose is in fact to make an all-out effort to conquer by force Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands. Neither is it apparent that such efforts as are being made, or may be made, cannot be contained by the courageous, and purely defensive, efforts of the forces of the Republic of China, with such substantial logistical support as the United States is providing.

6. The Joint Resolution of Congress, above referred to, includes a finding to the effect that "the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean." It further authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for the protection not only of Formosa but for "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa." In view of the situation outlined in the preceding paragraph, the President has not yet made any finding under that Resolution that the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States is required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa. The President would not, however, hesitate to make such a finding if he judged that the circumstances made this necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Joint Resolution. In this connection, we have recognized that the securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan (Formosa). This is indeed also recognized by the Chinese Communists. Military dispositions have been made by the United States so that a Presidential determination, if made, would be followed by action both timely and effective.

7. The President and I earnestly hope that the Chinese Communist regime will not again, as in the case of Korea, defy the basic principle upon which world order depends, namely, that armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions. Any such naked use of force would pose an issue far transcending the offshore islands and even the security of Taiwan (Formosa). It would forecast a widespread use of force in the Far East which would endanger vital free world positions and the security of the United States. Acquiescence therein would threaten peace everywhere. We believe that the civilized world community will never condone overt military conquest as a legitimate instrument of policy.

8. The United States has not, however, abandoned hope that Peiping will stop short of defying the will of mankind for peace. This would not require it to abandon its claims, however ill-founded we may deem them to be. I recall that in the extended negotiations which the representatives of the United States and Chinese Communist regime conducted at Geneva between 1955 and 1958, a sustained effort was made by the United States to secure, with particular reference to the Taiwan area, a declaration of mutual and reciprocal renunciation of force, except in self-defense, which, however, would be without prejudice to the pursuit of policies by peaceful means. The Chinese Communists rejected any such declaration. We believe, however, that such a course of conduct constitutes the only civilized and acceptable procedure. The United States intends to follow that course, so far as it is concerned, unless and until the Chinese Communists, by their acts, leave us no choice but to react in defense of the principles to which all peace-loving governments are dedicated.

---

69. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, September 4, 1958.

DEAR HAROLD: The President asked me to thank you for your letter to him of September 3 with reference to the Far East[1] and to reply to it, as you suggested. I dictate this reply en route to Washington after seeing the President at Newport.

You will by now have received through normal channels the statement which the President authorized me to make at Newport following conference with him.[2] That statement in itself goes a considerable distance in answering your letter. However, I should like to add some further thoughts which the President wanted me to convey to you in strict confidence.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles and cleared with the President by telephone and with Elbrick and Robertson. According to a note on the source text, Dulles handed the letter to the British Minister at 6:05 p.m. on September 4.

[1] See footnote 4, Document 64.

[2] Document 68.

It is no doubt regrettable that so much should now seem to hang upon two small islands such as Quemoy and Matsu which are so close to the China mainland that they are not readily defensible. We have in the past made serious efforts to bring about disengagement of the Chinese Nationalists from these islands. We have, however, never pushed these efforts to the point of attempted coercion because we have come up against realization of the hard fact that the ability to keep Formosa in friendly hands has not been separable from the National Government holding on to these Islands. If we forced their surrender, or if we allowed the Chinese Communists to force their surrender, there would, we estimate, be a rapid deterioration of the situation on Formosa.

We have had a very careful study of the situation made by our intelligence community, by the State Department officials, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they are unanimous to the effect that if Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this would have a serious impact upon the authority and military capacity of the present government on Formosa; that it would be exposed to subversive and military action which would probably bring about a government which would eventually advocate union with Communist China; that if this occurred it would seriously jeopardize the anti-Communist barrier, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; that other governments in Southeast Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence; that Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit, and Australia and New Zealand would become strategically isolated.

For example, I have, only today, received a cable from our Ambassador to Vietnam which indicated that opinion there was that if the United States abandoned the offshore islands "confidence in the United States would be shaken, the entire psychological alignment in Asia would alter in favor of Communism, and Peiping's prestige would reach new heights".[3]

It was in the light of all of this that the President authorized the statement which I made today. It does not involve any final commitment but does go far to indicate that the President would probably act if there were an effort to take Quemoy and Matsu which was beyond the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists to resist.

This capacity is by no means negligible. There are 80,000 of the best Chinese Nationalist forces on Quemoy. We are helping them logistically, with equipment and with convoying on the high seas, i.e., up to within 3 miles of Quemoy. They and their artillery are well dug in and to take them would be quite an operation, particularly if there were no serial bombardments. So far the Communists have refrained from using their air bases to bombard the offshore islands, perhaps desiring to avoid retaliatory action against these bases which might in turn involve their retaliating against Formosa bases and thus surely bringing us in. Or perhaps they may merely be holding this back for an unpleasant surprise.

---

[3] Telegram 399 from Saigon, September 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–158)

There is also a question as to whether if we did intervene we could do so effectively without at least some use of atomic weapons; I hope no more than small air bursts without fallout. That is of course an unpleasant prospect but one I think we must face up to because our entire military establishment assumes more and more that the use of nuclear weapons will become normal in the event of hostilities. If this is not to be the case, then we face a very grave situation indeed in the face of the massive manpower of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

I must admit that we are not entirely happy about the world situation. It seems that the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to put strains upon us at many separate places and our various commitments to NATO, in Korea, to individual allies, are spreading our forces too thin for comfort—certainly unless atomic weapons are to be used. Our JCS feel that this spreading of our strength is an integral part of the Communist strategy. They also express anxiety over what the JCS, in a report which the President considered at Newport, called "the apparent apathy or lack of information or understanding on the part of the United States public and allies and the world at large".[4]

The President hopes that the statement which he authorized me to make will help to some degree in this respect. We have also, as you know, reported on the situation to the North Atlantic Council and also to the SEATO Ambassadors in Washington.

The President and I hope very much that you will, as you suggest, be able to steer your public opinion so that if the worst should happen we could be together. Anything different would be a great catastrophe for both of us.

We continue to believe that the firm position we are taking will in fact deter reckless Communist action. But we also recognize that Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung can be reckless and may miscalculate, and that therefore our position does involve serious risks. But as we said in relation to the Near East situation, it is a case where while acting strongly involves serious risks, these risks seemed less serious than the risks of inaction.

---

[4] Reference is to the JCS draft cited in footnote 2, Document 64. Dulles' memorandum of his conversation with the President (cited in the source note, Document 68) states that he showed it to the President.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles[5]

---

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

70. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles

London, undated.

DEAR FOSTER: I am most grateful for your full and informative message.[1] I will try to reciprocate, not to reach conclusions, but to help to clear my own mind.

From your analysis, it is obvious that you do not feel that, as things now are, the position in Quemoy and Matsu can be abandoned without endangering the strategic balance in the Far East which is vital for the defence of the whole free world. At the same time, you do not hide from yourself or from me that we may be on the edge of operations which could be the prelude to a third world war.

As in all these cases, the risks of action and inaction have to be weighed against each other. In estimating these risks, however, I think I must be frank and give you my best thoughts about the present state of opinion in the countries that I know best, and for which, as the leading nation in the Commonwealth, we have a special responsibility.

The new Commonwealth countries—India, Malaya, Ceylon, Ghana etc.—will of course be against any action. I do not attach overwhelming importance to that, because they are always neutralist, but they have a considerable influence on Asiatic opinion at least. So far as Pakistan is concerned, I should think they would hope that the Chinese would not risk war, but would like to see some kind of settlement. In any case, they are not, I am afraid, very strong, either politically, economically, or in general influence.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Enclosed with a note of September 5 from Hood to Dulles.

[1] Document 69.

Now for the old Commonwealth countries. You know the Canadian position well yourself, but I feel sure that they will be cautious at the best. Australia, which is normally robust, will have anxieties about this area. On the one hand, they will be fearful of trouble which might involve them. On the other, they will no doubt be impressed by your analysis of what may happen if the Communists get away with it. Unfortunately, they are just approaching an election. New Zealand, also a robust little country, under Nash's leadership will tend to favour words rather than actions. South Africa will keep aloof. As for this country, as I warned you in my first message,[2] public opinion will not be easy to steer. We are on record in 1955 as having said that Formosa and the Off-shore Islands were in different juridical categories, and Churchill took the line that "a war to keep the coastal islands for Chiang would not be defensible here".[3] This of course was in a private letter to the President but represented fairly the instinctive reaction of the man in the street.

I feel I should let you have this analysis of opinion because these are important factors in the problem. For if we have to face war, we also know from experience that even in the more tolerable contests of the past, something like unanimity of peoples is the only basis on which they can be induced to hold fast under its hardships.

Having said all this, which is not an attempt to do anything but set out the facts as objectively as I can, I agree with you that a Communist triumph by force, or even by the threat of force, might perhaps prove a Munich for the East.

What then are we to do? There is of course the possibility that after the President's statement, the Chinese Communists will avoid direct assault and try, at any rate in the first place, to make the position of the Islands intolerable by ground bombardment and by blockade. I imagine their 12-mile declaration is intended to give some legal cover to the latter, and it might well be that you could enable the defenders to withstand blockade by action that did not in itself lead to anything like the operations envisaged in your message.

This would only follow, presumably, if you had to attack the air bases. But a sort of half-war could not continue indefinitely; there would be the risk at any moment of its enlarging itself in the way that you envisage, perhaps even, as you suggest, the use of atomic weapons.

In this difficult position ought we to seek some means of solution, or at least a better public posture, such as we have had to fall back on in other parts of the world? Is there anything to be done through the Security Council or through the Assembly? I can see that it would be no good using this machinery unless we had a plan, or unless somebody had a plan. In any case, since the Assembly is about to meet, what line are you going to take there, and how are we best to play our part? In your conversations with Lord Hood, which he has reported to me, you made some reference to the possibility of demilitarisation of the Islands if the Communists can be got to consider that either permanently or temporarily.[4] It seems to me that this idea might at any rate give a good public position, whether they accept or not, and would serve, if properly handled, to strengthen us where we are weakest—in the public opinion of all those countries upon which we normally rely. Would it be a good idea, either now or in a few days' time, to launch this suggestion, in the hope that it would be a point round which anti-Communist, and even in the long run neutral, opinion might rally? I am chiefly concerned about rallying robust anti-Communists, the friends we normally rely on; but it is also useful if moderate neutrals can be won over.

---

[2] Of September 3; see footnote 4, Document 64.

[3] In his message of February 15, 1955, to Eisenhower; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. II, pp. 269–272.

Since this thought of yours offers the only line of approach that I can think of, I would be very grateful if you would let me have your thoughts upon how it might be elaborated. I do not see that such a proposal, properly handled, need destroy the value of your firm declarations on which, probably, the best hope lies: that is that the Communists, whether Chinese or Russian, will shrink from pressing the issue. It would only do so if this suggestion appeared to our enemies to be a sign of divergence between us. But if it is one which you could either welcome or accept in principle, then this difficulty would be avoided.

Demilitarisation can be, as I say, put forward publicly. If so, there are different ways in which it could be done: either in the Security Council or in a public statement by the British Government, or by some friendly but uncommitted Government. Alternatively, we could approach the Russians privately.

It is possible that the Russians have privately agreed with the Chinese only to press the issue to a certain point and not to the point of war. In that case, they will have no serious anxieties; but it may be that they are themselves uncertain what will happen, and such a proposal then might be one by which, in one form or another, they would be attracted and press upon their allies. I can hardly believe that they and the Chinese have agreed to want a war. That would be contrary to the general Russian attitude. But, of course, they may think that they can frighten you out of it by the weakness of your allies. It is that that I am determined to avoid if I can. It is in that spirit that I am sending you my personal appreciation of certain factors and the only positive proposal that seems at all practicable.

---

[4] A memorandum by Dulles of his September 4 conversation with Hood states that he "remarked in a very casual way" that "I thought perhaps if there could be obtained assurances which seemed reasonably dependable that the Chinese Communists would not attempt to take these islands by force, then some demilitarization might be accomplished." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation; see Supplement)

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

Harold[5]

---

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

71. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 6, 1958, 1:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT[1]

Secretary Dulles
Secretary Anderson
Secretary McElroy
General Twining
Governor Hoegh
General Cabell
Mr. George Allen
Mr. Harlow
Major Eisenhower
General Goodpaster

The purpose of the meeting was to consider the situation in the Formosa Straits area, and the various actions and positions that had been taken, or should be considered. The statement by Premier Chou En-lai,

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on September 8. The meeting was held during lunch at the White House.

[1] Individuals not previously identified are George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency; Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; and Major John S.D. Eisenhower of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

made public earlier that morning,[2] was the focus of a good deal of the discussion. The Secretary of State showed the President and the group a draft of a possible statement by the President commenting on Chou En-lai's statement.[3] Various of those present suggested modifications and additions. The President in particular said he wanted to add something in the way of a concrete and definite acceptance of Chou En-lai's offer to negotiate—he thought that would have a strong effect in enabling us to take initiative in this matter. Following the luncheon the President met with Secretary Dulles and Mr. Hagerty to put the statement into final shape.[4]

General Twining then handed to the President a copy of a proposal for the President to assign certain authorities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for emergency action in case of attack of Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.[5] The paper as drafted would have given the Chiefs authority to approve U.S. air support, if necessary, of Chinat air forces authorized to strike enemy forces and mainland targets in event of a major landing attack on offshore islands. The President recalled that the Chiefs had estimated such U.S. air support would not be required unless Chicom air forces attack en masse in support of land operations, and that there would be time for his decision in such case. Accordingly, he prescribed that U.S. air attack against mainland targets could be ordered only upon his approval. He approved the provisions of the paper as thus modified.

In the course of the discussion General Twining reported on the plans and orders that had been given for movement of resupply ships under escort to the Quemoys, and as to the logistical situation.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

---

[2] It reads in part as follows: "To make a further effort to safeguard peace, the Chinese Government is prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks between the two countries." Text of the statement, released by the New China News Agency on September 6, is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 179–182.

[3] A copy of the draft statement with the President's handwritten revisions is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President; see Supplement.

[4] The statement released by the White House on September 6 stated in part: "The United States Ambassador at Warsaw stands ready promptly to meet with the Chinese Communist Ambassador there, who has previously acted in this matter." For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1148–1149.

[5] The paper was headed "Discussion Paper." A copy with the President's handwritten revisions is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series; see Supplement. Twining sent a copy of the revised paper to the other Joint Chiefs with a covering memorandum of September 15; see Supplement.

72. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, September 6, 1958.

DEAR HAROLD: I am in Washington today and have read the message which you sent to Foster in reply to the analysis of the Formosa situation which he dispatched at my request.[1] I am delighted that in the basic elements of this situation, as in so many others, we stand together.

One major factor which is not readily understood by those not in direct touch with the situation is Chiang's temperament and purposes. Any proposal that seems to him to imply retreat from his position as head of the only legitimate Chinese Government, any thought of abandoning a single foot of his defense perimeter, is automatically rejected. Indeed, such rejection is so emphatic as to imply that if coercive efforts should be made to override his objection, that would end his capacity to retain Formosa in friendly hands.

Foster will shortly be communicating with you again in greater detail, but I wanted first of all to let you know my appreciation for your helpful exchange of information with us and also to recall this one point which stubbornly stands in the way of what many would consider the reasonable solution.

Since your message and since I have been in Washington, Chou En-lai has made his statement about resuming negotiations in the interest of peace. I hope this means that the immediate crisis will become less acute, at least temporarily. We have just issued a statement on our willingness to resume the Ambassadorial talks.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike[2]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Macmillan–Lloyd Correspondence, 1958. Secret. Drafted by Dulles, approved by the President, and handed to Hood by Dulles at 5:10 p.m.

[1] Documents 70 and 69, respectively.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

73. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, September 7, 1958, 12:05 p.m.

071705Z. Since Communists are not now firing against offshore islands and did not try to interfere with last convoy State considers it particularly important we avoid any action which is provocative or might be made to appear provocative before world opinion. Small incidents or minor events may have great impact on negotiations about to be undertaken between U.S. and ChiComs.

JCS 947298[1] remains in effect but suggest as long as ChiComs withhold fire on offshore islands only one U.S. destroyer be in sight of off loading beaches Kinmen. This one ship could control situation, call for additional U.S. and GRC support if ChiComs renew attack as well as make sure GRC Navy takes proper action.

Other U.S. supporting ships could remain over the horizon. GRC furnish air escort while U.S. aircraft remain in supporting position over Taiwan as your excellent plan provided for first convey. Suggest build up supplies in Kinmen during lull. Report plans.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–758. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Burke. Also sent to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US) and COMSEVENTHFLT.

[1] Document 53.

---

74. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 7, 1958, 9 p.m.

548. Following is text of Khrushchev's September 7 letter addressed to President:[1] "Mr. President: I am addressing myself to you on a ques-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/9–758. Official Use Only; Niact. Transmitted in three sections. Received at 5:59 p.m. Repeated priority to London, Paris, Taipei, and Hong Kong.

[1] Telegram 547 from Moscow, September 7, reported that First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov had given Davis a copy of a letter from Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, calling his attention to the last two paragraphs. (*Ibid.*) For text as transmitted in telegram 548, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1958, pp. 499–503; extracts are in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1149–1152. A somewhat different translation was published in *Soviet News* on September 9; also in *Documents on International Affairs, 1958*, pp. 182–189.

tion of great importance which, we are sure, is now occupying the minds of all to whom the cause of peace is dear.

"As a result of the policy being carried on by the USA in regard to China, and especially of the actions being undertaken at the present time by American Government in the area of the Chinese island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits, a dangerous situation has arisen in the Far East. Humanity has again been put before the direct threat of the beginning of a military conflagration.

"In this responsible moment, the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to turn to the Government of the USA with an appeal to show sense, not to permit steps which could entail irreparable consequences.

"You well know, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union stands firmly on the position of the peaceful coexistence of all states, regardless of their social or state structure, and is in favor of not allowing the beginning of military conflicts, in order to assure conditions for a peaceful life for peoples on the whole globe. I think no one will dispute that the principles of peaceful coexistence have already received broad international recognition, and it can be said that for the overwhelming majority of states, they are the basis of their relations with other countries.

"Nevertheless, in the postwar years, as a result of the policy of the USA, a deeply abnormal situation has been continuously maintained in the Far East, the cause of which is the aggressive policy of the Government of the USA, a policy of war. The main reason for the tense and, it must be directly said, very very dangerous situation which has arisen is that the USA has seized age-old Chinese territory—the island of Taiwan with the Pescadores Islands—by force, is continuing to occupy these territories, cloaking this occupation with references to its support of the traitor of the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek, and is also trying to extend its aggression to the offshore Chinese islands.

"As the Soviet Govt has already stated many times in the Organization of the United Nations, as well as in correspondence with the Govt of the USA and govts of other powers, the situation is also inadmissible that a great state—the Chinese People's Republic—as a result of the position taken by the Govt of the USA, is deprived of the opportunity to participate in the work of the Organization of the United Nations, and is not represented in that Organization, although it has a legitimate right to this.

"You also know as well as I do that the Chinese state is one of the founders of the UN and that by force of that circumstance alone the existing situation is absolutely abnormal and deeply unjust in regard to the Chinese people.

"The situation which has now arisen as a result of the actions of the USA in the area of the island of Taiwan and of the Taiwan Straits seriously disturbs the Soviet Govt and people. Indeed, I think, it will not be an exaggeration to say that it disturbs the whole world, every country, regardless of at what distance it is located from the Taiwan area. If you look squarely at the truth, you must acknowledge that the USA is trying to assume the functions of some sort of world gendarme in this area too. We think that for any state, regardless of how strong and influential it is, to take such a role on itself is an unworthy affair for a civilized state and quite risky.

"The Govt of the USA is carrying out military demonstrations trying to prevent the liberation of Taiwan and to keep this Chinese island as its military base, aimed above all against the Chinese People's Republic, and also to hinder the lawful actions of the CPR directed at the liberation of the offshore islands on which Chiang-Kai-shekists have ensconced themselves.

"In the area of the Taiwan Straits, there is one of the strongest naval units of the American Navy—the Seventh Fleet of the USA. Hasty measures are being taken to strengthen this fleet, and military vessels and aviation are being transferred to the Far East from the USA, the Mediterranean Sea, and other areas. More than that, it has been announced that in the next few days, "joint maneuvers" of the Naval Forces and Marines of the USA and Chiang Kai-shek clique will be carried out in the Taiwan area, and that new contingents of American troops are being transferred to Taiwan on this pretext. The question arises whether such actions in the present situation can be assessed as other than an open provocation. It seems to us that with the most indulgent approach no other evaluation can be given to these actions.

"It must be said that, in general, the practice of urgently transferring naval vessels of the USA from one place to another has become a frequent phenomenon recently. In truth, by the direction of movement of the American Naval Fleet one can now judge almost without error to what place will be directed the spearhead of the next blackmail and provocations.

"Very recently the world was a witness to similar demonstrations of the American Navy in the Mediterranean Sea when the armed intervention of the USA into Lebanon was carried out and when the Sixth Fleet of the USA held the capital of Lebanon, and indeed that whole country, under the muzzles of its guns. When today attempts are being made to rattle the saber and threaten China, then, it seems to us, one should not forget that China is not small Lebanon which recently fell victim to foreign intervention, which has met universal condemnation at the just concluded special session of the UN General Assembly. The great 600 million Chinese people are powerful and unconquerable not only for their inexhaustible resources, but also for their solidarity in support of the govt, and are confidently and firmly moving on the path of the further development and strengthening of their country, the raising of their welfare, at which we, Soviet people, are truly happy and at which all those who wish the Chinese people well cannot but be happy. But I would want to emphasize not only this side of the matter, but also that China is not alone; it has true friends ready to go to its aid at any moment in case of aggression against China, since the interests of the security of People's China are inseparable from the interests of the security of the Soviet Union.

"In connection with the practice of transporting war fleets and air units from one end of the globe to another, for example, the regions of the Near and Middle East, the Far East, Latin America etc. in order to bring pressure to bear here on some, there on other states and to attempt to dictate one's will on them, in general the question arises—isn't it time to finish with such actions which, it goes without saying, can in no way ever be recognized as normal methods in international relations. There arises the legitimate question—ought this not be discussed in the UN and a decision be adopted forbidding powers from employing such movement of its naval and air forces for purposes of blackmail and intimidation and to the effect that these forces would be held within the limits of their national frontiers. At the same time, in connection with the application of this kind of methods in the foreign policy of the USA, I would like to make one more remark.

"Does it not seem to you, Mr. President, that such transferring of military vessels now in one, now in another direction to a significant degree is now deprived of any sense—at least in the relations of states which have modern types of weapons at their disposal? I do not know what your military advisers tell you but it seems to us it must also not be unknown to them that the epoch of the flourishing of the power of surface naval fleets is over, has gone into the past. In the century of nuclear and rocket weapons of hitherto unheard of power and speed of action, these once threatening naval vessels are fit, in essence, only for paying courtesy visits, giving salutes, and can still serve as targets for appropriate types of missiles. Perhaps this will wound the self-esteem of people who are closely connected with fleets but what can you do, it is impossible not to reckon with indisputable facts.

"Nearly every day political and military leaders of the USA come out with threats addressed to People's China. Such and only such a meaning have the repeated statements of USA Secretary of State Dulles about the activities of the USA in the region of the Taiwan Straits and in particular the statement which he made in your and his name on 4 September. This statement cannot but evoke the most decisive condemnation. It represents an open attempt of crude and unceremonious trampling of the sovereign rights of other states. The Govt of the USA having no rights for this permits itself arbitrarily to establish some kind of boundary of its interests and the sphere of operations of its armed forces on the territory of China. Such activities it is impossible to qualify otherwise than as aggressive, which undoubtedly will be condemned by all peoples.

"It is impossible to evaluate differently as well the statement of the Government of the USA of 6 September.

"The inciting statement of Minister of Defense McElroy draws special attention to itself in which are contained frank threats addressed to the Chinese People's Republic, and in which attempts are made to justify the aggressive activities of American Armed Forces in the Far East and in which the Chiang Kai-shek clique is taken under protection. And the Commander of American Armed Forces on Taiwan Vice-Admiral Smoot has let himself go entirely and states the intention of the USA together with the Chiang Kai-shekists to inflict a defeat on Communist China.[2]

"Military leaders in the USA try even, with the tacit agreement of the American Government, to resort to atomic blackmail in relation to China, acting evidently still on inertia under the impression of the moods governing in Washington in that short period in the course of which the USA had at its disposal a monopoly of the atomic weapons. As is known, even at that time the policy of atomic blackmail did not have and could not have any success. Is it necessary to say that in present conditions when the USA has long not been the possessor of a monopoly in the field of atomic armaments, attempts to intimidate other states by atomic weapons are a completely hopeless business.

"I speak about this because, as it seems to me, in the USA there are still people who do not want to part with the policy of threats and atomic blackmail although, it would seem, each day gives no little evidence that such a policy henceforth is doomed to failure.

"One can with full confidence say that threats and blackmail cannot intimidate the Chinese people. This clearly follows also from the statement of the Premier of the State Council of the CPR Chou En-lai of 6 September.

"The Chinese People wants peace and defends peace but it does not fear war. If war will be thrust on China, whose people are full of determination to defend its rightful cause, then we have not the slightest doubt that the Chinese people will give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor.

"The aggressive preparations of the USA in the Far East, judging by everything, are not limited only to the region of the Taiwan Straits. There are facts to the effect that encouraged and instigated by the United States

---

[2] Telegram 183 to Taipei, September 4, referred to a United Press report from Taipei that Admiral Smoot had made the statement "We will lick them" at a news conference. It stressed the importance of exercising utmost care in any public statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–458)

Syngman Rhee again is preparing military provocations and declaring his intention to move 'in a march to the north'. Evidently someone in the US has definite plans once more to turn Korea into a field of bloody battle. It is not because, by the way, the Government of the USA so stubbornly refuses to withdraw its troops from South Korea? But it is impossible to permit a repetition of the Korean tragedy, and the criminal plots of the Syngman Rhee-ites must be stopped. There can be no doubts that if the Syngman Rhee-ites risk a repetition of their 'march', then there awaits them the same fate which befell them when the Korean people and the Chinese people's volunteers inflicted a complete defeat on the aggressor and frustrated his plans. Of course responsibility for the provocations of Syngman Rhee lies entirely on the Government of the USA.

"At the recently concluded special session of the UN General Assembly, you, Mr. President, spoke about indirect aggression allegedly threatening certain Arab States of the Near East on the part of other Arab States, and called for the condemnation of this non-existent indirect aggression.[3] At the same time the United States itself is carrying out in the Far East not only indirect but also direct aggression, by having seized the Chinese island of Taiwan and by supporting the anti-national clique of betrayers of the Chinese people, harbored on this island under the protection of American weapons and making from there bandit sorties against China.

"The dispatch of its armed forces to the region of Taiwan and the waters of the Pacific Ocean adjacent to it the Government of the USA usually seeks to justify with reference to some kind of 'obligations' undertaken by it in relation to the 'defense' of this region. But did the Chinese people ask the American Government to take on itself such an obligation, by referring to which it permits itself to hamper the realization by China of its sovereign rights in relation to Taiwan and other Chinese islands?

"The American people in the past itself had to beat off attempts of foreign powers to interfere in its internal affairs and by force of arms to impose their will on it. It is well known that these attempts ended lamentably for those who undertook them. Would it not be right to draw the appropriate conclusions from this historical experience of the United States and end the policy of interference in the internal affairs of China? Indeed if national independence is dear to the American people, then why should it be less dear to the Chinese people, as well as to any other people?

---

[3] Reference is to Eisenhower's address before the Third Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 13; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 606–616.

"It is possible you will find what I have said above as harsh. But I do not permit myself to agree with this. In this letter to you, as also on other occasions, I simply wish to express myself frankly and to emphasize the whole danger of the situation developing in the region of Taiwan and the Chinese off-shore islands as result of actions of the USA. If we were to hide our thoughts behind outwardly polite diplomatic formulations, then, I think it would be more difficult to understand each other. Moreover, we desire, that you, the Goverment of the USA and the whole American people with whom we wish only good relations and friendship should have a correct idea about those consequences which the present actions of the USA in the Far East might have.

"It would be a serious miscalculation if in the United States the conclusion were drawn that it was possible to deal with China in accordance with the example as it was done by certain powers in the past. Such kind of miscalculation might have serious consequences for the cause of peace in the whole world. Therefore let us introduce into the question full clarity because reservations and misunderstandings in such affairs are most dangerous.

"An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will do everything in order together with People's China to defend the security of both states, the interests of peace in the Far East, the interest of peace in the whole world.

"Nothing would be further from the truth than an attempt to assess this, my message to you, as an intention to exaggerate unnecessarily and even more to utter some kind of threats. We desire only to draw your attention to the situation from which no one can escape—neither you nor we—if in the Far East the fire of war breaks out. We wish to find a common language with you with which to cease the present movement downward on the inclined slope, with which by the common efforts of the USSR, the USA, the Chinese People's Republic and other countries to remove the tension arising in the Far East, with which it might be possible to say that through united efforts a useful contribution (poleznoe delo) was made in the interest of peace in the whole world.

"Of course to decide 'to recognize' or 'not to recognize' the Chinese People's Republic is an affair of Government of the USA itself. In this connection it is possible only to remark that neither the very fact of the existence of the CPR as one of the great powers of the world, nor the role which this government plays in our time in international relations, is changed because of that. But at the present time in view of the policy which the Government of the United States follows in relation to China such a situation has arisen that the question of the relationship of the United States to China obviously extends beyond the framework of purely internal affairs of the United States.

"A situation has arisen which involves the interests of many countries. The tension artificially maintained in view of the policy of the USA in the relations between the United States and China and even more such actions which the United States is undertaking at the present moment in the Far East will lead also to a straining of relations between all great powers—the founders of the UN. It is possible without exaggerating to say that the present policy of the USA in relation to China complicates the solution of many important international questions and in a serious form hampers the normal activity of the UN as an international organization called upon to guard the cause of peace.

"There is one Chinese state and it is located in China and nowhere else and Taiwan and the other Chinese islands where at the moment the Chiang Kai-shekists have ensconced themselves—these are a part of China.

"Only the Government of China—in the capital of China—Peking and to which the many million Chinese people have entrusted the leadership of their country has the right and the real possibility to represent China in international relations. And only the unrealistic position of the Government of the USA which still prefers to close its eyes to the actual state of affairs in China, is a stumbling block, prevents the states members of the UN from taking the only correct decision—to throw out of this organization the political corpse of the Chiang Kai-shekist imposter and to grant the representatives great China their legal place in the UN.

"Who will deny that China is attempting to free its own territory which has been transformed into a military base of a foreign power and which has become a source of continual threat for peaceful life of the Chinese people?

"China has the full legal right to take all necessary measures against the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. It is taking these measures on its own soil and is not sending its armed forces on the territory of other countries. These actions of the Chinese People's Republic represent only legitimate measures of self-defense, foreseen also by the Charter of the United Nations Organization. Quite otherwise acts the Government of the USA which is trying to confer upon itself the right to send its armed forces thousands and thousands of kilometers from the USA for the retention of the Chinese islands seized by it. It is not by accident that even the Allies of the United States in the military blocs quite loudly censure American policy in relation to China as unrealistic and dangerous.

"I think that every person who displays a real anxiety for the fate of peace can not but speak out for having an end put to that abnormal and dangerous situation which has developed as a result of the current political course of the Government of the USA in the Far East. For that, according to the conviction of the Soviet Government, above all it is necessary to give up the narrow and alien-to-all-reality approach to the great historical changes which have taken place in China, it is necessary to recognize the legitimate rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic and once and for all to cease the policy of provocation and blackmail in connection with the Chinese people.

"In the Far East there can not be a stable peace until such time as the American Navy fleet will be withdrawn from the Taiwan Straits, until American soldiers will leave the Chinese island of Taiwan and will go home. We are convinced that such an opinion is shared not only by the Soviet Union and other Socialist states but also by all other countries for whom the cause of peace is dear in the Far East and in the whole world.

"Mr. President, concluding my present message to you, dictated by a sense of the great responsibility which lies upon our countries for the preservation of peace in the whole world, I wish with all force to emphasize that whether peace will reign in the Far East or whether this region will continue to remain a dangerous hotbed of war will depend fully on the further actions of the Government of the USA. I should like to hope that you with the necessary understanding will apprehend the present message to you from the side of the Soviet Government. I permit myself to express also the confidence that this message will be correctly understood by all the American people which—we are convinced of this—like other peoples desire peace and do not desire war.

"If the Government of the USA will take the road of respect for the legitimate sovereign rights of the great Chinese people then this doubtless will be regarded with satisfaction by all peoples as a serious contribution of the people of the United States of America to the cause of strengthening of universal peace.

"Sincerely, N. Khrushchev."

Davis

75. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 8, 1958, 5 p.m.

340. 1. Further to Deptel 197,[1] President Chiang and I had a brief discussion at luncheon he gave today for General LeMay.[2] President's position was largely parallel to statement issued by Foreign Minister last night (Embtel 336).[3] He said he understood our position and would not protest it, but he was convinced further talks with Reds would get nowhere. He said Reds are very cunning and would use talks to seek other opportunities to launch attack on GRC. Echoing Foreign Minister he said public would find it extremely difficult to understand US position. He said he is planning to go to off-shore islands in near future in attempt to explain our position to his troops. President was pleasant and courteous in giving his views, but is plainly unhappy about our decision to resume talks. Press reaction thus far is critical of that part of White House statement.

2. I set forth briefly argument I had voiced to Foreign Minister yesterday, adding that we too can use respite to build up off-shore defenses and that it is essential that we adopt peaceful posture lest Reds make their preposterous charges of US and GRC provocation and aggression ring true. I then took opportunity to urge President to continue his admirable policy of restraint and non-provocation now when Reds are showing some signs of disengagement.

3. Prior to lunch reports came in that 12 CAF fighter planes escorting 2 reconnaissance planes to take photos of Chenghai airfield near Swatow had clashed with more 10 MIGs. Result was said to be that in short air battle, 5 MIGs had been shot down and 2 damaged against loss of one CAF fighter. Admiral Smoot was not informed of this reconnaissance mission in advance and is therefore lodging vigorous verbal protest with Chief of Staff General Wang.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:33 a.m. Passed to CINCPAC.

[1] Dated September 6, telegram 197 to Taipei instructed Drumright to discuss with Chiang the necessity for the statement issued that day and assure him that the United States would not agree to any arrangements which would prejudice GRC rights. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–558) Drumright reported in telegram 331, September 7, that he had passed the substance of telegram 197 to Huang, telling him that "we understood sensitivity of Chinese, but we preferred diplomacy to bullets." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–758) These documents are in the Supplement.

[2] General Curtis E. LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

[3] Dated September 8, telegram 336 from Taiwan transmitted the text of the statement, which declared that Nationalist resistance had prevented the Communists from achieving their objectives, prompting them to "revive their old trick of 'fight and talk; talk and fight'." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858)

4. While having lunch we were given report that at 1:33 p.m. local time today Commies had opened intense bombardment of Big Kinmen, directing their fire mainly against airfield, dock and headquarters areas. Two GRC LSMs had arrived about two hours earlier and were unloading supplies. It is not clear what precipitated Commie fire. GRC promptly started counter battery fire. In any case, lull at Kinmen lasting more than 3 days has been broken and possibility exists Commies are resuming their artillery interdiction.

Drumright

---

76. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 8, 1958, 10:21–11:53 a.m.

SUBJECT

Resumption of Ambassadorial Talks with Chinese Communists

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Marshall Green, Regional Planning Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

Mr. Robertson opened by reviewing the status of our moves to effect a resumption of the talks: Mr. Martin's letter of July 28 to Ambassador Wang,[1] Ambassador Beam's subsequent approaches to the Chinese Communist Embassy in Warsaw on August 4 and August 7 [6],[2] Chou En-lai's reference to resumption of the talks in his August [*September*] 6 statement, and the White House release of the same day.[3] The question

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858. Top Secret. Drafted by Lutkins on September 11 and approved by Parsons for Robertson. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] See footnote 1, Document 18.

[2] Telegram 173 from Warsaw, August 6, reported that Beam had had a call made to the Chinese Embassy on August 4 to request an appointment for him to see Wang on August 7. When a follow-up call was made on August 6, the caller was informed that Wang had referred the matter to his government and would get in touch with Beam when he had a reply. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–658)

[3] See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 71.

now was which side should make the next move. In his opinion we were entitled to a response to our overtures before making any further move. He thought there was a psychological factor involved which might be important with respect to the success of the renewed talks. If the Chinese Communists were to conclude from our actions that we were panting for a resumption of the talks, the result might well be a hardening of their attitude. He expressed the opinion that while we certainly should not let small factors such as our already having approached the Chinese Communists stand in the way of our larger objectives, we might be well advised to delay further action for a while. After consideration of the possibility of an unpublicized phone call inquiring whether Ambassador Wang had received any instructions, the Secretary suggested the idea of Ambassador Beam sending a copy of the White House statement to Wang. He said that it would be very useful if at his press conference the following day he were able to state that a copy of the White House statement had been delivered to Wang. It was agreed that this would be a useful and desirable step, enabling us to sound out Peiping's reactions while still leaving the initiative with them. The Secretary then dictated a telegram to Ambassador Beam instructing him to write Wang enclosing a copy of the White House statement, calling his attention to the fifth paragraph on our readiness to resume the talks, and stating that he would await further word from him.[4]

Mr. Robertson raised the question of what our response should be in the event that the Chinese Communists should propose continuing the talks in Geneva. The Secretary thought that we should go along with such a proposal, silly as it would appear for the two representatives to be traveling from their post of residence to Geneva. Being more complicated and time-consuming than talks in Warsaw, such an arrangement would in fact serve our purpose, which was to string the talks out as much as possible. Mr. Robertson commented that meetings in Geneva would also simplify matters for us inasmuch as our advisor and interpreter were both stationed in Switzerland.

Mr. Kohler speculated in the light of the Khrushchev letter to the President that the Communists regarded resumption of the ambassadorial talks as only an interim move pending a call for something at a higher level. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson agreed, with the former stating that he was quite surprised Peiping hadn't proposed a higher level meeting rather than a resumption of the ambassadorial talks. Mr. Robertson thought the explanation might be the Communists' uneasiness as a result of the firm stand we had taken; their aim was probably to get the ambassadorial talks back on the tracks first and later plug for something higher. Later in the meeting the Secretary expressed the opinion that Peiping would probably try to push the talks hard during the next few weeks. If nothing constructive were to be accomplished, it would then be argued in the General Assembly that the problem must be considered at a higher level.

---

[4] Sent as telegram 220 to Warsaw, September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–858) Telegram 229 to Warsaw, September 8, instructed Beam that when Wang made contact with him, he should propose meeting at the Swiss Embassy to discuss practical arrangements and procedures for the talks. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

The Secretary asserted that there were two problems involved in the situation which were at least partially separable; (1) the question of Nationalist jurisdiction over the offshore islands; he did not see that we had any basis for altering our position on this point in any respect; (2) the question of Nationalist use of the islands as bases for military and subversive activities against the mainland; on this we were not in too good a position in international law. Mr. Becker believed that at one time they had been used as staging areas for subversive operations on the mainland. The Secretary's understanding was that this was much less true now than might have been the case in the past, but he said that an effort should be made to find out on an urgent basis the nature and extent of Nationalist activities undertaken from the islands in recent months which could with justification be regarded by the Communists as provocative. It was agreed that information should be immediately sought from Embassy Taipei, Defense and CIA.[5]

The Secretary said it was his own feeling that we shouldn't really expect the Communists to refrain from attacking the islands if they were being used as bases for hostile activities against the mainland. He wondered if it might be possible to arrive at some sort of modus vivendi whereby Nationalist jurisdiction over the islands would be recognized but there would be some type of demilitarization. He mentioned that the President, among others, had long believed that it was absurd to have a large proportion of the GRC forces tied up as hostages in such a vulnerable position. Stating that he had mentioned the concept of demilitarization in discussing possible solutions with Lord Hood, he commented that Prime Minister Macmillan had seized upon the idea and attached undue weight to it. Mr. Robertson expressed the view that demilitarization would not be a practical solution since it would leave the islands completely exposed to Communist seizure at whatever time they chose to strike. He emphasized that for us to propose such a solution would provoke a tremendous row between the United States and the GRC which would bitterly resist it. However, he thought we were on strong grounds in calling on the Nationalists not to use the islands as bases for provocative operations against the mainland.

The Secretary continued to explore the question, arguing that if we were to conclude a demilitarization agreement with the Communists and they were then to violate the agreement by seizing the islands we would have a strong case in world eyes for retaliating. He realized, however, that President Chiang would not find a proposal along these lines palatable. He agreed with Mr. Robertson that the Communists would never agree to any de facto recognition of Nationalist jurisdiction over the islands in return for demilitarization. In his view this was precisely the reason why such an approach would provide us with a strong negotiating position. We would soon face a strong Communist effort at the United Nations to mobilize world opinion against us, and it was therefore necessary to give careful thought to our public posture. We should, of course, not give an inch on the basic principle involved, namely, rejection of the use of force to pursue territorial ambitions. However, the fact that his slight mention of demilitarization to Lord Hood had been seized on so strongly by Macmillan in reinforcing the latter's argument that such an approach would make British support of the United States easier was an indication that the demilitarization concept might have some merit.[6]

---

[5] Telegram 201 to Taipei, September 8, requested information on this subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–858; see Supplement)

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the GRC attitude with respect to the offshore islands was a strongly emotional one and that they would bitterly oppose any suggestion that these territories be given up. The Secretary stated that he was not suggesting that the islands be given up. Mr. Becker observed that the suggested proviso requiring Chinese Communist de facto recognition of GRC jurisdiction over the islands almost certainly ruled out Peiping acceptance of a demilitarization proposal along these lines. What we were really seeking, therefore, was merely to improve our negotiating posture in the eyes of the world.

The Secretary declared that the essential thing now was to sift out the extraneous elements of the problem and come to grips with the basic questions. The Chinese Communists should not, of course, enjoy the right to employ force to seize territory which had never been under their control. However, their line that the offshore islands were a constant thorn in their side because of GRC use of them to blockade the posts of Amoy and Foochow and harass the mainland was apt to have considerable appeal. He continued that world opinion would not be satisfied if we were to go back to the ambassadorial talks and merely replay an old record, asking the Chinese Communists to accept the formula of renunciation of force. We must get down to realities, though great care must be taken in view of our pledge not to discuss anything affecting the interests of the GRC.[7]

---

[6] In a September 7 telephone conversation with Green, Dulles had requested that the question of demilitarization be considered in connection with drafting Beam's instructions. Green attached a memorandum of the conversation to a memorandum of the same date to Robertson, with an attached paper headed "Demilitarization of the Offshore Islands." (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Misc.) Sept. 1–Sept. 11, 1958; see Supplement)

[7] At a news conference on September 9, Dulles stated, "We hope that out of the talks will come, as a minimum, a modus vivendi which will assure that the issues there will not be resolved by recourse to force." For the transcript of the news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1958, pp. 485–493.

Mr. Green stated we might consider making it the first order of business in the renewed talks to examine means of avoiding provocative actions on both sides. We might suggest that each side prepare a list of the actions of the other side which it regarded as provocative, and that an effort then be made to reach agreement on steps that might be taken to discontinue such actions. Even if this approach proved fruitless, we would at least have gotten on the record evidence that we had made a fresh, positive effort to deal with the situation. The Secretary commented that he was thinking along much the same lines. Our efforts during the past three years to obtain an abstract agreement from the Chinese Communists on renunciation of force had not worked. It might, therefore, be useful to ask them to tell us what actions of ours they regarded as provocative and say that we on our side would put forward certain practical actions of theirs which we considered provocative. We might then consult and see how some of these actions on both sides could be eliminated. Mr. Robertson felt that it would not be possible to make any such approach at the first meeting. For one thing, we must first consult with the GRC if we planned to pursue such a line, and secondly Wang would almost certainly come back and say that the basic provocation on our part was our alleged occupation of Taiwan. The Secretary said he realized that much that might develop from such an approach might serve only to expose the real purpose of the Communists, which in itself would be of some use to us, but that it might also produce something that we could really talk to them about.

---

77. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 10, 1958, 5 p.m.

352. CINCPAC for POLAD. CINCPAC for Admiral Felt. POLAD for Steeves. Reference: Deptel 203.[1]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1058. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

[1] Telegram 203 to Taipei, September 8, instructed Drumright that he and Smoot should discuss with Chiang the importance of "continuing close US–GRC coordination in advance of all operational actions as befits our firm and friendly alliance." (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–858) A similar message was sent to Smoot in CNO telegram 082325Z, September 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 38A) These documents are in the Supplement.

1. President Chiang is at one of his country retreats mulling over situation and is therefore unavailable for next day or two.

2. I discussed all but last paragraph of reftel with George Yeh who came to see me this morning before leaving for Washington where he is due September 12. Since Yeh was seeing Generalissimo for last time this morning, I asked him to discuss this matter in general way with Generalissimo. Yeh said he would do so.

3. I went to see Foreign Minister later today and gave him substance of message with request he pass it to Generalissimo when convenient. He said he would do so.

4. Foreign Minister said GRC is cognizant of considerations advanced in Deptel and is exercising greatest restraint in face of Commie provocations. He accordingly asked my views as to motives behind Deptel. I said that apart from manifest desirability of exercising highest degree of restraint at this critical juncture, I supposed message may have had some reference to a few examples of lack of GRC–US cooperation recently in military operational field. I said I felt this problem is being tackled vigorously by Admiral Smoot and Tiger Wang.

5. George Yeh intimated to me this morning that Generalissimo is restive over our taxing him so persistently with injunctions to observe treaty, exchange of notes, restraint, etc. According to Yeh, Generalissimo feels his honor is being impugned and his prestige lowered among his own officials and public. Yeh therefore suggested that the problem be handled most carefully.

6. Short of a nuclear debacle at Kinmen and provided public opinion can be kept under control, I am convinced Generalissimo will live up to his word to practice utmost restraint. I say this in face of fact that some of his subordinate officers have not wholly practiced same degree of restraint at times and they have failed at times to coordinate with TDC. But I think this situation is improving and is capable of being brought under full control.

7. I suggested to Admiral Smoot this morning that he discuss reftel with Tiger Wang and Defense Minister Yu. I also suggested that next time Admiral sees Generalissimo on military operation matters, he mention substance of reference telegram casually if he could relate it to context of his discussions.

8. I believe foregoing action will be adequate for our purposes now. I believe it would be inadvisable for me to see Generalissimo specifically about matter, and I propose to refrain from doing so unless instructed to contrary.

Drumright

78. Editorial Note

At a conference among President Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense McElroy, and General Goodpaster at 3:15 p.m. on September 11, 1958, there was some discussion of the Taiwan Strait situation. That portion of Goodpaster's memorandum of the conversation, dated September 15, reads as follows:

"The President then asked Mr. McElroy what he thought the views of the Chiefs were regarding the Chinat forces on Quemoy and Matsu, from a military standpoint. Mr. McElroy said it is quite clear that they feel that, from the standpoint of military considerations alone, the islands should be vacated. The President said he agreed that it is a military debit to hold them. Accordingly, he said that in his speech, while stressing that he will not yield them under attack, he was trying not to be intransigent with regard to getting out of them through negotiation. He recognized the difficulties, and realized it is because of them that the Secretary of State tends to take a somewhat stiffer view than he holds. Mr. McElroy said he had been wondering whether, if we cannot persuade Chiang to get off the islands without losing control in Formosa, there isn't someone else who could step into the position. He commented that Chiang's only hope is to provoke a big fight, with the idea of getting back into China during the aftermath. The President said he was trying to find a way in which a strong country can conciliate. It is not adequate simply to say that we will stand on Quemoy and Matsu. We must move beyond that." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

The President was to make a radio-television address on the Taiwan Strait situation at 10 p.m. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pages 694–700.

---

79. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, September 11, 1958, 4:02–6:10 p.m.

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. J.N. Greene, Jr.

1. (General Goodpaster, Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Montgomery were also present.) We discussed draft #5 of the President's Radio-TV

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from Eisenhower's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File) talk[1] and the President incorporated a number of changes, including some that I told him had been suggested by George Allen. In discussing the philosophy of the talk, the President said he wanted to deal effectively with a major dilemma confronting the United States: On the one hand we must show both firmness and courage in our opposition to the use of aggressive force, combined with readiness to negotiate in a spirit of conciliation; on the other hand in the Taiwan Straits situation, we are committed, indeed over committed, to backing up Chiang Kai-shek in a policy of defending Quemoy and Matsu. The President understood that the JCS are now tending to the view that these islands are not defensible and probably not required for the defense of Formosa and Pescadores. The President said he is quite prepared to see the abandonment of Quemoy, but, of course, this cannot be said publicly at the present stage.

2. I told the President in general terms of the activities which the Chinese Nationalists have conducted from the offshore islands as described in Taipei's telegram 357[2] of which I left a copy with General Goodpaster. I suggested that we should gradually try to get such activities stopped. The President agreed, and said that he found unrealistic, even though it might be important to morale on Formosa, Chiang Kai-shek's thesis that he could use Quemoy and Matsu as stepping stones for a return to the mainland. I showed the President Ambassador Drumright's report (Taipei's 363)[3] of the current jitters on Formosa.

3. We discussed the regrettable failure of many of our allies to stand by us publicly in the present situation or indeed in any situation in which they do not see that their immediate interests are directly affected. I suggested that we should be thinking of steps to encourage a greater sense of solidarity with our allies lest the several security systems of which we are a member begin to fall apart.

4. I noted that one of our aircraft over-flying the Chinese mainland pursuant to the President's approval had been detected and that a protest had been publicized.[4] The President was familiar with the episode. I said that the flights had taken place in good weather and had obtained good photographs which would probably suffice for our military for

---

[1] Several drafts by Dulles, including one showing the President's revisions, are *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, President's Statement on Taiwan Straits Situation.

[2] Dated September 10. (Filed with a September 11 covering note from Fisher Howe to Dulles; Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1058; see Supplement)

[3] Dated September 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1158; see Supplement)

[4] A September 10 New China News Agency release charged that a U.S. U–2 plane had intruded into Chinese air space that morning. (*Survey of the China Mainland Press* No. 1853, September 15, 1958, p. 35)

some time. Accordingly, I had recommended to Secretary McElroy and General Twining, and they had agreed, that such flights be suspended.[5]

5. I showed the President an FBIS report of a Peiping statement characterized as the Chinese Communist Government's "Fourth warning" against our convoy activities in waters which the Communist regime has recently proclaimed to be its territorial waters.[6] I said that while we, of course, have every right to conduct convoy operations on the high seas, I thought it might be well to try to find a good reason to ease up on these activities at least for a few days. This should not be done abruptly so as to alarm the Chinese Nationalist Government. The President agreed, noting that our naval activities in this respect seemed inconsistent with the spirit of his forthcoming speech. The President also noted that the third convoy to reach Quemoy had backed off the beach almost as soon as they came under heavy fire; this raised some question whether the risk we were taking was consonant with the determination of the Chinese Nationalists themselves. I said that we would ascertain when the next convoy operation is planned and then arrange to ease off on the operation.

[Here follows brief discussion of Japan.]

8. The President approved the draft of a reply to Khrushchev's letter to him of September 7, with the addition of a final paragraph which he had drafted.

9. The President had a telegram from Cyrus Eaton saying that the Soviet Union is in his view prepared to support the Chinese Communists in the Formosa Straits dispute and that the Soviet people backed the Government in this. The President said this latter point coincided with reports which had reached him from others including Edward Ryerson that they had found the morale of the Soviet people good and that the people are indeed backing the government. I said that even if this be the case in the Soviet Union it is not, according to our information the case in Communist China, where the people's morale is indeed so bad that the regime has just cancelled the visas of all foreign newspapermen and ordered them out of the country, apparently to prevent reports of how bad the situation is.

JFD

---

[5] At a meeting that day recorded in a memorandum by Reinhardt. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation; see Supplement)

[6] The statement was contained in a New China News Agency release of September 11. (*Survey of the China Mainland Press* No. 1854, September 16, 1958, p. 35)

80. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles

London, undated.

DEAR FOSTER: I have just got back from fourteen days' holiday in Spain and have been "reading myself in" on the situation in the Formosan Strait.

2. I hasten to send you my sympathy in the heavy burden of responsibility which you are carrying in these new developments. We await your further reply to Harold's message of the 5th September[1] and I understand that you are to see Harold Caccia tomorrow morning. In the meantime, I felt that I should let you know my own first reactions to the situation.

3. What Churchill, Eden and Harold himself, when Foreign Secretary, stated in 1955 as our position over the off-shore islands is well-known to you. I have myself, whenever questioned, referred back to those statements as representing our views. Had Parliament been sitting now, no doubt I would have had a flood of questions designed to elicit the same answer.

4. Nevertheless, we want, as Harold put it in his message, to steer our public opinion towards an understanding of what is involved and to help and support you in any way that is possible. Your troubles are our troubles. In these days this is a matter of hard fact, not just sentiment. Therefore, I want, so far as is possible having regard to our previous statements, to prevent any open difference of opinion as to how to handle the present situation being revealed between us and to try to work together towards a common position.

5. This message, therefore, is how I would open the conversation were we talking together about the matter.

6. First, I share your views as to the Communist menace in the Far East. I believe in the importance of your containing line, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, South Vietnam, with such support as our position in Malaya and Hong Kong may afford. I believe that there is now beginning to be a wider recognition of the importance of this line than before although I must admit that for the past ten years Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek have been exceedingly unpopular figures in the United Kingdom. Therefore, it should be an object of Western policy to seek to maintain and not to weaken this line until there is a change in the attitude of the Chinese Communists (if ever).

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Filed with a September 11 covering note from British Ambassador Harold Caccia.

[1] Document 70.

7. Secondly, I must say that I feel that this line is weakened not strengthened by Chinese Nationalist retention of Quemoy and Matsu. The supply of their forces on the islands is hazardous, the islands themselves are very vulnerable to harassing fire by the Communists and their defence against attack is difficult. If that defence were to involve the use of even tactical nuclear weapons, then the risks involved for all of us by a process of chain-reaction are obvious. My view is that if a Nationalist withdrawal could be effected in a reasonable manner, it would strengthen not weaken Chiang Kai-shek and the anti-Communist line.

8. But what is a "reasonable manner"? I fully realise that if there is to be a withdrawal the Nationalists must have something to show for it. Perhaps the Warsaw talks (which I refer to below) might open up a prospect you could accept, and conceivably if they do not themselves do so, the United Nations could at that point somehow help. But I do feel that, if a settlement of this kind were not entirely one-sided, its consequences on other countries' confidence in your position and determination in the area need not necessarily be quite so grave as you fear.

9. I know that some will say that withdrawal from any out-post position is a sign of weakness. In a sense it is. It may be the only way to avoid a defeat. If so, it is not weakness. I suppose it is even conceivable that some of your allies in Asia, and many of the uncommitted countries there, would even feel greater faith in your determination to stand on essentials if you and the Nationalists were able to prove together that you were prepared to compromise on an issue which so many people regard as less than vital.

10. I do not think it necessary to consider the longer term position of China. There is a view that if Communist China was within the United Nations it might be more controllable. I do not know. I think the answer is probably 'yes' to a limited extent. But this year we shall vote for the moratorium although I expect it will be a difficult debate.

11. To return to the immediate problem is there any way in which we can help? We have tried to give some support for your position by saying that we fully shared the concern of your government at any attempt to impose territorial changes by the use of force. Suggestions have been made about reference to the Security Council or to the General Assembly. If the matter were to be referred to the Security Council, the Communist Chinese might refuse to take part in any discussion on Article 2(7) grounds and that refusal might help us. There are obvious dangers of the matter going to the General assembly as an item although it is bound to be a subject of discussion in the general debate. We await your views on a demilitarization solution although in their present frame of mind I doubt very much whether the Communists would accept this even if the Nationalists did. In the meantime, the only suggestion I have is that the importance of the Warsaw talks might be stressed, their level perhaps

heightened and the possibility of their being followed by still higher level talks might be hinted at. I am, of course, unaware of what the President will say tonight, but I repeat: is there any way in which we can help? Having regard to our 1955 statements, we are perhaps in a good position to float any idea which you do not want initially to sponsor yourself.

12. Harold has had a long message from Diefenbaker rather on the lines anticipated in his message to you of 5th September. He has sent a non-committal reply.

With every good wish,

Selwyn[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

81. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, September 12, 1958.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter of September seventh.[1] I agree with you that a dangerous situation exists in the Taiwan area. I do not agree with you as to the source of danger in this situation.

The present state of tension in the Taiwan area was created directly by Chinese Communist action, not by that of the Republic of China or by the United States. The fact is that following a long period of relative calm in that area, the Chinese Communists, without provocation, suddenly

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Drafted in the Department of State except the last paragraph, which was added by Eisenhower; see paragraph 8, Document 79. The text was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 420, September 11, and telegram 423, September 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1158 and 793.00/9–1258, respectively) Telegram 587 from Moscow, September 13, reported that Davis had delivered the letter to Kuznetsov. (*Ibid.*, 611.00/9–1358) Text is also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1958, pp. 498–499.

[1] President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles discussed the letter and how to respond to it in a telephone conversation on September 8. According to Phyllis Bernau's notes of the conversation, Dulles said the letter was "a tough letter" calling for a comprehensive presentation by the President of the U.S. position, and the President said the reply "should be clear—a comprehensive reply but not of itself unnecessarily provocative—be the calm silent strong man with a gun on his hip." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations; see Supplement)

initiated a heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and began harassing the regular supply of the civilian and military population of the Quemoys. This intense military activity was begun on August twenty-third—some three weeks after your visit to Peiping. The official Peiping radio had repeatedly been announcing that the purpose of these military operations is to take Taiwan (Formosa) as well as Quemoy and Matsu, by armed force. In virtually every Peiping broadcast, Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands are linked as the objective of what is called the "Chinese Peoples Liberation Army."

The issue, then, is whether the Chinese Communists will seek to achieve their ambitions through the application of force, as they did in Korea, or whether they will accept the vital requisite of world peace and order in a nuclear age and renounce the use of force as the means for satisfying their territorial claims. The territory concerned has never been under the control of Communist China. On the contrary, the Republic of China—despite the characterizations you apply to it for ideological reasons—is recognized by the majority of the sovereign nations of the world and its government has been and is exercising jurisdiction over the territory concerned. United States military forces operate in the Taiwan area in fulfillment of treaty commitments to the Republic of China to assist it in the defense of Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands. They are there to help resist aggression—not to commit aggression. No upside down presentation such as contained in your letter can change this fact.

The United States Government has welcomed the willingness of the Chinese Communists to resume the Ambassadorial talks, which were begun three years ago in Geneva, for the purpose of finding a means of easing tensions in the Taiwan area. In the past, the United States representative at these talks has tried by every reasonable means to persuade the Chinese Communist representative to reach agreement on mutual renunciation of force in the Taiwan area but the latter insistently refused to reach such agreement. The United States hopes that an understanding can be achieved through the renewed talks which will assure that there will be no resort to the use of force in the endeavor to bring about a solution of the issues there.

I regret to say I do not see in your letter any effort to find that common language which could indeed facilitate the removal of the danger existing in the current situation in the Taiwan area. On the contrary, the description of this situation contained in your letter seems designed to serve the ambitions of international Communism rather than to present the facts. I also note that you have addressed no letter to the Chinese Communist leaders urging moderation upon them. If your letter to me is not merely a vehicle for one-sided denunciation of United States actions but is indeed intended to reflect a desire to find a common language for peace, I suggest you urge these leaders to discontinue their military operations and to turn to a policy of peaceful settlement of the Taiwan dispute.

If indeed, for the sake of settling the issues that tend to disturb the peace in the Formosa area, the Chinese Communist leaders can be persuaded to place their trust in negotiation and a readiness to practice conciliation, then I assure you the United States will, on its part, strive in that spirit earnestly to the same end.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

---

82. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 12, 1958, 11:01 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

The Secretary stated that he was working on a reply to Prime Minister Macmillan's message of September 5, which would also be in the nature of a reply to Foreign Minister Lloyd's message of the 10th. He wished to consult the President regarding it, but hoped to be able to get it to Sir Harold later in the day.

The Secretary said that the situation caused by the continuing Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy was certainly a disturbing one, but he did not think that the Communists intended to press the attack to the point of full-scale war. The worst feature of the situation at the present time was their success in preventing Nationalist resupply of the islands.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

In reply to a query from Sir Harold he said that, of course, there was a danger of Nationalist supplies running out if the Communists' interdiction operation were not overcome. The Nationalist garrison had supplies sufficient to last at least a month, but it must be expected that morale would tend to decline if the supplies continued to dwindle and there were no prospect of relief.

The Secretary commented that the Communists were being rather leisurely about resuming the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. According to a Peiping broadcast of the 10th, the Chinese Communist representative was returning to Warsaw after five days' consultation but we did not know whether he had actually reached Warsaw yet. It seemed that the Communists were not in any great hurry; probably this was a war of nerves tactic. The Secretary continued that, as he would be saying in his message to Macmillan, we were not very hopeful that anything constructive would come out of the talks. The Communists would probably lead off by presenting some strong and obviously unacceptable demands, such as calls for us to cease interfering in their attempt to take over the islands and to recognize their proclaimed twelve-mile territorial waters. However, there were some things that might be done. As the President had said the night before, steps might be taken so that the islands would not be a "thorn in the side of peace." The Secretary stated that he had directed an investigation to be made to determine the nature and extent of activities conducted by the GRC from the islands against the mainland. The preliminary report that he had received indicated that the Nationalists had not maintained an effective blockade of Amoy and Foochow nor interfered with Chinese Communist fishing vessels in the area; that small-scale commando-type raids and infiltration of agents on to the mainland had been carried out, but with limited effectiveness; and that there had been loud-speaker propaganda beamed from the islands at the adjacent mainland, although he was inclined to think that this was as much for the purpose of drowning out Communist propaganda as anything. None of these activities were very serious, but they could be regarded as needlessly provocative.

The Secretary continued that if anything approximating a cease-fire were to develop in the area it might be possible to make a new attempt to bring about the withdrawal of GRC forces from the islands. We had, of course, tried and tried in the past to persuade President Chiang to take such a step but he was virtually fanatic in opposing such a step. Chiang's inflexibility and stubborness were, he commented, actually useful in some instances. He mentioned Chiang's rejection in 1938 of Japanese overtures promising to support him as head of a Chinese Government if he would abandon the struggle against Japan. He had, of course, spurned this and similar later inducements from the Japanese and remained firmly on the allied side throughout the war. More recently we had attempted to persuade him not to take an uncompromising position on two occasions, the question of Outer Mongolian admission to the United Nations and the controversy with Japan last spring over the issue of whether or not a prospective Chinese Communist trade mission in Japan should be allowed to fly the Peiping flag. In both instances he had refused to budge and had proved successful in his stand.

Sir Harold referred to the statement in the President's speech to the effect that the United States would not be a party in the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists to any arrangement which would prejudice the rights of the GRC. He asked if in making this statement we were thinking in legal terms or rather in general moral ones. The Secretary pointed out that this language was identical to that used by us in 1955 and also to the White House statement of Sept. 6. It had no very precise meaning, merely being intended to make it clear that we would not in the absence of GRC representation at the talks barter away their rights. He noted that with the arrival of the new Chinese Ambassador,[1] a man with long and detailed knowledge of international problems, our diplomatic contacts and consultation with the GRC on the whole matter should be greatly facilitated.

In the Secretary's view the situation might well develop to a stage where some third party intervention, in the United Nations or otherwise, would be useful. He emphasized that the Chinese Communists were evidently in a very cocky mood and would almost surely present very tough demands. It was important to bear in mind, he thought, that the free world defense line in the Far East was an extremely thin and brittle one. He mentioned the lack of cooperation between various of the free countries of the area such as Japan and Korea and the Philippines and Japan. In the face of massive Communist expansionist pressures it was a hard and delicate task to keep the defense line firm. If there were any breach in it, the whole line might fall apart. He realized that the situation we found ourselves in over the offshore islands was a difficult one to support; the question was how to extricate ourselves from it without pulling the whole house down. Looking at the problem in a broader perspective, the Soviets were assiduously seeking to create the impression that they were militarily dominant and that their threats to intervene militarily had caused the Western powers to back down at Suez, in the Turkish–Syrian episode last year, and most recently in the Lebanon–Iraq crisis. If by our actions we were to give the world the impression that we were afraid of the Communists and were falling back in the face of their threats, the whole free world defense structure in the Far East could collapse. In this connection, the Secretary told Sir Harold, we had received private messages from top officials in various Far East countries urging that we not give in to the Communist show of force. Indeed, he emphasized, we could not do so without suffering a rather disastrous loss of face in the area and the world at large. However, if a formula could be worked out by the United Nations or otherwise which would provide a reasonable quid pro quo, we would probably be able to accept it.

---

[1] George K.C. Yeh.

Sir Harold commented that Foreign Minister Lloyd had sought in his letter to determine what we would regard as a reasonable quid pro quo. The Secretary responded that Chinese Communists might, for example, assume the same attitude toward the islands as the Indians did with respect to Goa—namely, that they regarded the islands as Chinese Communist territory but that they would not use force to take them. If they were willing to adopt such an attitude, it would probably be possible to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement. It would lay the basis for some form of demilitarization and a cessation of provocative activities on both sides. We could not, of course, guarantee that we would be able to put such a solution across without causing a near disaster on Taiwan. In the latter respect we had been informed that the GRC reaction to his press conference of September 9 had been one of panic and despair.

The Secretary confirmed Sir Harold's understanding that we had never been happy about the extent to which the GRC had committed itself to retention of the islands. The President, he observed, had always felt that it was absurd to place an important portion of the GRC forces in a militarily indefensible position as virtual hostages. Our own recommendation conveyed to President Chiang by several high level missions had been that the islands should be held only lightly. We would recognize that in the event of a Communist attack they would not be successfully defended, but the onus would be on the Communists as the aggressor. The Secretary commented that in the light of the military action of the past few weeks the Nationalists probably now realized exactly how vulnerable their position on the islands actually was.

Sir Harold said that there were a number of things he would like to say that he would prefer not to have made a matter of official record. The remainder of the meeting was between the Secretary and Sir Harold alone.[2]

---

[2] According to Dulles' appointment book, Lutkins left at 11:30 a.m. Caccia left with Dulles an assessment of the Taiwan Strait situation by the British Chargé in Peking; Dulles sent an extract to the President with a September 12 covering note. It stressed the dangers of the situation and observed, "I do not think that the Chinese Government can by now back down altogether from their present position; they must have at least a diplomatic victory to show their people." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258; see Supplement)

83. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 12, 1958, 2–2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Resupply of Quemoy: Military and Diplomatic Aspects of Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Mr. Robertson—FE
Mr. Reinhardt—C
Mr. Smith—S/P
Mr. Cumming—INR
Mr. Green—FE

Secretary McElroy
General Twining
Mr. Sprague
Admiral Dennison
Commander Massey

Admiral Dennison described the difficulties and frustrations of the latest convoy to Quemoy. Only one of the three LSM's actually beached, and during its 41 minutes on the beach only 25 tons were unloaded.

General Twining referred to a message the JCS had just received from CINCPAC[1] in which the latter proposed that, if the GRC is incapable of supplying Quemoy, the following alternative courses of action would represent the next step:

1. Authorize the Chinese Air Force to attack Chicom artillery positions.
2. Provide U.S. escort into territorial waters for protection while GRC ships are unloading.

General Twining added that the JCS had replied to CINCPAC that, before any such action is considered, the GRC should demonstrate improved skill and determination in getting supplies ashore.[2] According to General Twining, the GRC defenders of Quemoy have only 30 days' supplies left, and even fewer days supplies of ammo if the GRC engages in effective counterbattery. Mr. Cumming added that the GRC defenders have only 9–10 days of ammo if it is heavily expended.

Secretary Dulles asked how helpful GRC counterbattery would be in assisting resupply.

General Twining said it would help in keeping the Chicoms "heads down," but it wouldn't be too effective. General Twining suggested that

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret. Drafted by Green. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] CINCPAC telegram 111245Z to JCS, September 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)

[2] JCS telegram 947931 to CINCPAC, September 12. (*Ibid.*)

the GRC seems to be trying to get the U.S. involved. That seems to be their main motive.

Mr. McElroy remarked that if the Chiefs are correct about this GRC motive, we must find ways to get the GRC to act; certainly this is not the time to have the U.S. directly involved in beach delivery. We would be bound to suffer casualties and that would have serious repercussions here.

Secretary Dulles questioned whether the GRC was engaging in what he thought would be a "pretty complicated plot" to get the U.S. involved. He considered it more likely that the GRC needed experience and training in resupply operations under fire to beaches where tidal and other considerations were unknown and difficult.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that Warsaw talks would probably start Monday. He did not know what the Chicoms' tactics would be at Warsaw but it was a fair guess that they would insist on our recognition of the 12 mile limit (including the Offshores) and that we pull all our forces out of Taiwan. We would reject these demands. The talks might then break off or we might then get down to realities, although past experience inspires little hope that we will get beyond the old Communist jargon and stonewalling.

The issue is likely to come up in the UN, Secretary Dulles continued, and there may be calls there for cease-fire. The Chinese Reds will probably challenge UN capability to handle this issue in order to dramatize why they should be admitted to the UN. Secretary Dulles thought the Chicoms might prolong the interdiction of Quemoy, avoiding direct assault, with a view to gaining political advantages in the UN. The question arises as to how long we can tolerate this situation dragging out. If the GRC can handle resupply effectively, then there is more time for manoeuvre. Otherwise it will be only two or three weeks before we face a real crisis.

Mr. Robertson asked Admiral Dennison if we had received any estimate of GRC performance from our own men on the scene.

Admiral Dennison said that he had read Admiral Smoot's reports but he was not sure to what extent it was based on U.S. observation at close hand.

Mr. McElroy read aloud the report of the last convoy operation which showed that after the first attempt to land failed, two of the LCM's didn't wait for further attempts but turned about and went back to Makung.

Secretary Dulles remarked that Mr. Cumming had shown him maps showing the range of Chicom shore batteries. The latter could not reach out to more then 2 or 3 miles offshore from central Quemoy. He therefore could not understand why the LCM's didn't lie just outside this range and suddenly run in at the most propitious time.

Admiral Dennison agreed. He said such action could be covered by darkness or smokescreen.

Mr. Sprague cautioned that the Chicoms seemed to have the convoy operation penetrated and/or closely observed.

Commander Massey, at Secretary Dulles' request, then provided a summary briefing using detail maps and charts of the artillery situation and of the beach delivery problem. He pointed out that there are some 227 Chicom batteries with about four gun barrels apiece, about half of them manned. Thus 500 guns of what appear to be 76 mm, 120 mm, 155 mm calibres can be fired simultaneously on the Quemoy complex. He pointed out that the batteries on Ta Teng Tao (an island connected by a causeway to the mainland) posed a particular threat since they alone controlled certain landing beaches of central Quemoy. Commander Massey also described resupply difficulties occasioned by extreme tidal action, rough water, surf, currents, etc.

Mr. McElroy wondered if it would be possible to get Ambassador Drumright to assist in stimulating the GRC to do the resupply job.

Mr. Sprague thought that there should be some way of getting across that the U.S. is *not* going to do the resupply job.

Mr. Robertson said that, if Admiral Smoot confirms that it is in fact true that the GRC is dragging its feet, then the Ambassador and Admiral Smoot should go directly to the Generalissimo with this problem.

Secretary Dulles agreed that we must be on sure grounds before so approaching the Gimo. We must not act just on surmise. For it would appear that first hand information from U.S. sources is lacking on GRC resupply performance. We must also bear in mind that such factors as tidal action and resupply under heavy gunfire are difficult to overcome. GRC inadequacy seems more due to blundering than to any willfulness. According to Secretary Dulles, it was inconceivable that the people on Quemoy would be party to a deliberate plan for sabotaging unloading operations.

General Twining interjected that it was the man in the boat, not on shore, who controlled unloading operations. The LCM which beached during the last convoy could have unloaded one-half its cargo during the 40 minutes ashore.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that since these amphibious craft apparently do not run up on the beach, they remain all during the unloading exposed to tides and surf. He could imagine from his experience with ships what problems this could cause.

Secretary Dulles continued that we must get the GRC to conduct this resupply operation at maximum capacity. Under current conditions the Chicoms will in all probability continue to harass and prolong their interdiction of Quemoy; they probably will not assault the islands or take new military initiatives while the Warsaw talks and UN session are going on.

For the same reason we do not want to take new military initiatives during this period. The vital objective is to sustain at least the status quo. While it is disadvantageous for either side politically to change the present military pattern, it is more serious for us to do so because the Chicoms are already in defiance of the UN.

There was brief discussion of aerial resupply. General Twining pointed out that it offered only limited possibilities and risked enemy aerial counteraction.

Mr. McElroy proposed putting U.S. observers on the LCM's in order to check on GRC performance, to find out precisely what was wrong, and to recommend improvements. He agreed with Secretary Dulles' suggestion that U.S. observation teams on the beach were also desirable.

Admiral Dennison outlined a number of measures that could be taken to improve quick off-loading (amphibious craft on LCM's, small packaging, floating packages ashore or hauling them up on the beach with tractors).

It was concluded that the JCS would immediately instruct COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US) in conformity with the above two paragraphs and in terms of the general sense of the meeting.

---

84. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, September 12, 1958.

DEAR HAROLD: Your letter of September 5[1] was very helpful, with its analysis of the problem. It does not differ greatly from our own. There is general desire for non-involvement coupled with general condemnation of the Communist use of force. The President wrote you, last Saturday,[2] a brief comment on one aspect of the matter; and as he indicated, I shall supplement that.

The President has made his talk of last night, the text of which you have surely seen, that, I think, makes our position clear, although it does of itself not assure a peaceful solution. That depends on others.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1258. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles and cleared with FE. Dulles gave the letter to Caccia at 5:35 p.m.

[1] Document 70.

[2] September 6; see Document 72.

The essence of the matter is that we have not seen how to accomplish any unilateral fallback in the area without consequences which would be extremely serious from the standpoint of the entire Western Pacific position. This is thin and brittle. It has not much capacity to absorb any "breakthrough" at any point.

It is easy for those who merely look at a map to come to conclusions about Quemoy and Matsu. But the Far East line is held, not by geography, but by human wills; and the problem is primarily one of the psychology of the area and the impact of what would look like a retreat before the new, tough and arrogant probing of the Communists. If the United States seems afraid, and loses "face" in any way, the consequences will be far-reaching, extending from Vietnam in the south, to Japan and Korea in the north.

This does not mean that we enjoy or are satisfied with the position we are in. As in the case of Lebanon and Jordan, it seems to be the lesser of two evils. The problem you raise is how to extricate ourselves from the position under conditions which will neither involve a war nor involve a retreat or surrender which would jeopardize much more than the offshore islands.

We believe, indeed have long believed, that the *military* position would be stronger if the Nationalists would re-form their positions, and not gamble so much on the offshore islands. But our efforts in this direction have never succeeded because of the moral significance Chiang attaches to holding some part of China other than Taiwan.

The President used one phrase in his speech last night to which we attach considerable significance, namely, that "there are measures that can be taken to assure that these offshore islands will not be a thorn in the side of peace". Under such a formula a good deal, I suppose, could be done in practical ways to assure that these islands will not be used in any provocative way by the Chinese Nationalists and to alter the character of their presence there. We have been going over the situation in that respect. There has not been much provocation, but there has been some. Also it could be said that the presence there of such large numbers of Nationalist forces is itself a kind of "provocation".

Of course, any steps along these lines will be bitterly resisted by the Nationalists. But I believe that there are measures that could be taken in connection with a cease-fire which, while not palatable to the Nationalists, could be made acceptable.

The Chinese Communists seem to be quite leisurely about resuming the Ambassadorial talks. Wang, I believe, has been in Peiping. Perhaps the delay is part of the war of nerves.

If and when these talks get started, I hope we can quickly get to talking in practical terms rather than in broad generalities as has been the case heretofore. I am, however, skeptical that any positive results will come out of the Ambassadorial talks. I imagine that the Chinese Communist initial demands will be exaggerated and probably will include demands that we withdraw from the Taiwan area and accept their twelve-mile territorial water limit.

I would think that if the bilateral talks collapse, at that point there would be room for intervention by the United Nations. The President indicated this in his talk of last night.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter, we have given further thought to the suggestion made by Lord Hood to Mr. Herter[3] that your Ambassador at Moscow approach the Soviets in a manner calculated to have them urge restraint on the Chinese Communists, making it clear that this was a British initiative. The time is propitious, I believe, for such a move, if it can be made without implying weakness on our part. I leave it to your good judgment as to how and when this should be done and would ask that you let us know if you are going to move.

In the reply the President is sending to Khrushchev's letter to him of September 7, he is suggesting that the Soviets urge on the Chinese Communist leaders that they discontinue their military operations and turn to a policy of peaceful settlement.

The President and I appreciate your and Selwyn's helpful attitude, and the press guidance that you gave today following the President's speech.

I look forward to seeing Selwyn in New York on Tuesday.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles[4]

---

[3] On August 30; see Document 54.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 13, 1958, 5 p.m.

387. For Robertson. Reference my telegram 372.[1] Admiral Smoot and I discussed Kinmen resupply situation yesterday and today. In Smoot's conversations yesterday at Makung with President, Tiger Wang, Defense Minister, Navy Chief of Staff Liang and others arrangements and understandings were reached re convoying which should result in improvements. Operational control of convoy effort is being transferred to Makung personnel, Chinese Marines brought into act, US convoy experts sent to Kinmen to assist in improving beaches, advising in unloading techniques, et cetera. Resort will now be made tonight convoy operations to see if they will prove more effective. Air resupply is being stepped up by CAF handle urgent requirements. Smoot is hopeful these efforts will improve resupply situation, but he is doubtful whether they will adequately solve problem. Communists are clearly zeroed in on all usable beach areas and their surveillance is excellent. They have shown capacity to throw a curtain of fire on beaches whenever craft hit beaches. Considering this capacity, it is remarkable that thus far only one LCM has been lost on beaches. In this situation any resupply effort is bound be highly hazardous and costly. I am gradually coming to view that we shall have to seek another solution if Communists persist in intensive shellings of GRC convoys after Warsaw talks start.

2. If Communists continue shellings despite our efforts at Warsaw and perhaps in UN, I think we should be thinking of taking over convoy responsibility soon. I would advocate daylight movement to Kinmen of all-American convoy with suitable notification to Communists. Convoy would be backed by adequate cruiser strength and air power. Convoy and escort would be authorized to defend if attacked by Communists. In this way onus would be placed on Communists if they attacked American convoy on humanitarian mission to assist beleaguered ally. I believe there is a fair chance Communists would refrain from attack which would pin label of aggression on them and at same time involve them in hostilities with United States.

3. I believe foregoing alternative should be tried before proceeding to more thankless, provocative and highly difficult task of concurring in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:43 a.m.

[1] Dated September 12, telegram 372 from Taipei predicted that if the interdiction problem was not solved within 2 weeks the situation would deteriorate increasingly, with impairment of U.S.–GRC relations and possible unilateral GRC retaliatory action. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–1258; see Supplement)

GRC retaliatory action (which is not likely to prove effective) or of ourselves joining in attacks on Communist artillery positions, lines of communication and air fields.

Drumright

---

86. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 13, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Offshore Islands Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. George Yeh, Chinese Ambassador-designate
Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director for Chinese Affairs

The Chinese Ambassador-designate George Yeh called on the Secretary at the latter's home at 10:30 this morning at his own request. After telling the Secretary that President Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Chen Cheng wished to be remembered to him, Ambassador Yeh set forth President Chiang's views on three matters related to the offshore island crisis.

(1) The Generalissimo is annoyed that the three-mile limit is being observed by United States warships convoying GRC supplies to Quemoy. If the United States regards the waters within the three-mile limit as GRC territory, then the U.S. has the GRC's invitation to go in. If the U.S. regards these waters as Communist territory, then it would have been better not to have said anything about them. Amb. Yeh said that he had explained to the Generalissimo that the three-mile limit was being observed by the U.S. as a practical measure to keep U.S. ships out of gun range.

(2) President Chiang was disturbed by the constant reference to the exchange of notes by the U.S. in its efforts to restrain the GRC. He felt he was losing the respect of the Chinese people because it appeared that his government was not being allowed by the U.S. to hit back when it was being attacked. Amb. Yeh said that he had explained to President Chiang that under the exchange of notes the GRC retained the inherent right of self-defense and therefore had the right to hit back. The question was whether it was militarily advisable to do so. In other words, it was a matter of the GRC's competence and not of being bound by the United States which prevented the GRC from hitting back.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1358. Secret. Drafted by Martin and approved by Robertson.

(3) President Chiang was dissatisfied with the operations of the convoys going to Quemoy. They were not landing the necessary equipment. He wanted 8-inch howitzers to be landed.

Ambassador Yeh asked the Secretary when the Warsaw talks would start. The Secretary indicated that preliminary contacts had been made in Warsaw but no time had been fixed yet. Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese Communists had wanted the first meeting to be held in their Embassy, but we had refused this and had suggested that a joint approach be made to the Swiss Embassy requesting that space be made available there for a meeting. We had not yet had the Chinese Communist reaction to this proposal. Ambassador Yeh felt it would be advantageous to start the talks before the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary agreed but pointed out we couldn't stop the offshore island question coming up in the United Nations. He said he planned to discuss the matter himself there.

The Secretary said that in recent years there had been a trend toward appeasement in the world. While in the four years preceding the Korean War Communist actions in Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Berlin had alerted the world to the danger of Communist aggression, since 1948 there had been a decade of quiet in Europe. Thus the peoples of Western Europe had been lulled and were opposed to taking a strong line in Asia, unlike 1950. Another factor contributing to the trend towards appeasement is the fact that many of the new nations are susceptible to Communist influence. The United States is thus isolated in world opinion on this issue and we must recognize this fact.

Ambassador Yeh said this has been explained to the Generalissimo.

The Secretary continued the same line of thought by pointing out that the New Zealand Prime Minister had proposed a policy of giving up the offshore islands,[1] and it was only with great difficulty that we had persuaded him not to recognize Red China, a step which had actually been pledged by his party's platform. Even Menzies, Australia's Prime Minister was not strong in support of our position in view of the elections coming up in his country.[2] The Secretary recalled that Chamberlain was most popular after Munich. The Secretary said our position on the offshore islands was not popular in the world, and it would take all the

---

[1] Reference is to a September 11 statement by New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash. A copy is attached to a New Zealand aide-mémoire of September 15, which stated that press reports of the statement had been distorted but reiterated New Zealand's view that the offshore islands were not necessary to collective defense in the Pacific and that negotiations leading to a cease-fire offered the best interim solution. (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962))

[2] Australian Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey discussed the Taiwan Strait situation with Dulles on September 9. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–958; see Supplement)

President's influence to keep opinion here at home firm. Therefore it was necessary to move cautiously. It would be extremely difficult to maneuver to save the situation. However, there were no two people more dedicated to saving the situation than Mr. Robertson and himself. He assured Ambassador Yeh there would be no appeasement and no surrender. The Secretary referred to the speculation in the press that he was prepared to surrender the islands in a negotiated settlement and emphasized that these speculations were entirely erroneous. His friends in Taipei should know that he would never consider such a thing.

Ambassador Yeh said that his government had tried to restrain their military people but they were taking a tough beating on Quemoy. Casualties have been greater than the published figures. The Secretary understood there had been about 1,000 casualties, but Ambassador Yeh said there had been about 4,000. The Secretary noted that this figure was not consistent with American intelligence reports.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the first phase of shelling at Quemoy was not as serious as the second phase, which would be pinpointing certain installations. People couldn't stand this kind of shelling very long.

The Secretary said that it had been foolish to put so many troops on the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh replied it was too late now to do anything about that. The Secretary then recalled the visit to Taiwan of Admiral Radford and Mr. Robertson in the spring of 1955 when they had tried to persuade the GRC against such a policy.[3] The Secretary stressed that President Eisenhower was extremely unhappy about the GRC's having committed so much of its armed forces to the offshore islands. As a military man, President Eisenhower felt that it was extremely foolish, utterly mad, military strategy to put the cream of the GRC's forces in positions of this kind. Ambassador Yeh said that Quemoy was not regarded as a base but as an outpost. The Secretary responded that you wouldn't put 40 percent of your forces on an outpost position, and again referred to the extent of the President's preoccupation with this aspect of the offshore island problem.

Mr. Robertson said that even the strongest supporters of the GRC in this country cannot understand or explain the policy of concentrating such forces on the offshore islands. He said that if Quemoy remained an outpost and the GRC had put up a fight and lost, it would have been no disgrace. The Secretary drew a parallel between the GRC action at Quemoy and the French concentration at Dien Bien Phu, which had had disastrous consequences. The Secretary said that of course it was in a sense academic to discuss this now but he had mentioned it because it rankled in the President's mind.

---

[3] For documentation concerning Robertson's and Radford's visit to Taiwan, April 24–27, 1955, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 508–523 *passim*.

The Secretary said that the practical problem facing us right now is the interdiction of supplies by the Communists. Conditions on Quemoy were extremely difficult but our military people think the convoys could run more efficiently and that they will do so when certain corrections are made. For example, when they come under attack the landing ships now return to the Pescadores instead of going just over the horizon and waiting for a lull to make another run in. The Secretary realized the difficulty of this kind of operation, however, and felt that it was a matter of the Chinese getting more experience. He did not believe there was any holding back on the part of the Chinese Navy.

Ambassador Yeh said that he had been interested in the accusation that the Chinese Navy was not taking risks. He had asked Admiral Liang about it. Liang told him that the landing operations were under the command of Hu Lien, the Army commander on Quemoy who had ordered the ships to leave as soon as they came under gunfire. Liang contended that his officers were willing to go ahead but had to take Hu's orders. Mr. Robertson mentioned an instance where during a 41-minute lull there had been no unloading from the landing ships.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that MAAG had not trained the Chinese Navy in landing, loading and unloading operations on the grounds that the training was not needed. The Secretary remarked perhaps MAAG was afraid it would be teaching them to launch an invasion of the mainland. He noted that in fact landing was a highly technical job and it was not surprising that the Chinese Navy had not done well.

Ambassador Yeh again brought up the subject of the Generalissimo's concern at his Government's being made to appear unable to defend itself because of restraints imposed by the United States. Yeh stressed that President Chiang would in fact consult with United States military commanders and take their advice, but he wants to be in a position to say publicly he could take action if he wished. He feels this is essential for the self-respect of himself and his government.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that we have never attempted to interpret the exchange of notes as restricting the right of the GRC to retaliate against an attack from the Communists.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had been behaving very well in his opinion, although he occasionally flared up when discussing the matter of his right to hit back. The Generalissimo felt that our Ambassador had been harking too much on "hsieh ting," i.e., on the agreement . He wanted Ambassador Yeh to tell President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles he would not do anything foolish militarily.

The Secretary suggested that the Generalissimo could say that under the exchange of notes the GRC has the inherent right of self-defense.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Drumright might have gone too far in continuing to remind the Generalissimo of his obligation under the exchange of notes. We certainly entertain no doubts of his good faith. He pointed out also, however, that the Generalissimo is somewhat isolated from the play of public opinion here and that the problem cannot, as far as we are concerned, be looked at as simply a matter of black and white.

The Secretary emphasized that we could not operate without the support of United States public opinion and to some extent of world opinion. Under a democratic system it is necessary to have such support if we are to do what we want. We want to do all we can in connection with the offshore islands, but we must create the right climate of world opinion. While there is no question of the legal right of the GRC to hit back against its attackers, whether this right should be exercised depends on military and public relations factors. But there is no reason why we can't make it clear that the legal right is there. The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists are trying to make us appear as the aggressors. They are even imitating out signals on the mainland in an effort to deceive us into making some move which might make us appear aggressive.

Ambassador Yeh said that he fully understood the problem. The Generalissimo recognizes also that the GRC has gained world sympathy by playing the role of "sitting duck" in the face of Communist attack.

The Secretary pointed out that by exercising restraint the GRC had gained sympathy. On the other hand, the GRC would have gained little, if anything, militarily by lack of restraint.

In closing, the Secretary indicated that it would be best to consult with the GRC on the Warsaw talks here in Washington.[4] He said that military matters could be coordinated best in Taipei. Finally the Secretary cautioned Ambassador Yeh about the importance of maintaining security in connection with our consultation on the offshore islands situation.

Ambassador Yeh said he fully understood the importance of security.

---

[4] Telegram 390 from Taipei, September 13, transmitted the text of an aide-mémoire that Huang had given to Drumright that day expressing regret at the U.S. decision to resume the ambassadorial talks and requesting prior consultation if and when the talks touched on any matter affecting GRC rights and interests. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358) Telegram 229 to Taipei, September 16, instructed Drumright to assure Huang of the U.S. intention to remain in close touch with the GRC regarding the talks and to consult on all aspects affecting GRC rights and interests. (*Ibid.*) These documents are in the Supplement.

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 13, 1958, 1 p.m.

397. At 9:45 a.m. this morning sent First Secretary Johnson to ChiCom Embassy[1] who read following communication to Lai Ya-li who said will be member ChiCom delegation:

"United States representative proposes Ambassador Wang and himself hold preliminary meeting 11 o'clock Monday, September 15, at Swiss Embassy Warsaw. It is suggested both Ambassador Wang and United States representative immediately approach Swiss Embassy to ascertain whether this arrangement would be convenient.

It would be envisaged that first meeting on Monday would be brief and would deal only with procedural matters connected with resumption of discussions. Meeting on substantive matters could be arranged to take place very shortly thereafter."

In reply ChiCom Embassy representative read message from Wang proposing resumption talks at "74th meeting" to be held Monday at 10 a.m. in ChiCom Embassy. Suggested principle of rotation with US Embassy for further meetings.

Johnson insisted on impossibility rotation between Embassies emphasizing Swiss Embassy *most* appropriate and convenient site. Claiming nothing improper in use respective Embassies ChiCom representative said Wang prepared to make alternative proposal both sides approach Polish Government re arrangements for location to be furnished by Poles.

After consulting with me Johnson read further following message:

"United States representative considers it appropriate that talks be held at Swiss Embassy in Warsaw. Swiss Embassy would furnish neutral, extra territorial site for discussions. United States representative hopes Ambassador Wang will be able to accept suggestion. As to possibility of using a building made available by Polish authorities, United States representative would have to receive instructions from his government.

If agreement can be expeditiously reached on location for the talks, United States representative is prepared to have a meeting to resume discussions on Monday September 15 at 3 o'clock."

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:18 a.m.

[1] Telegram 396 from Warsaw, September 12, reported that a Chinese Embassy staff member had telephoned Beam at his home to say that Wang would like to meet with him the next morning at the Chinese Embassy. Beam had replied that they would have to proceed in a different way and that he would send the Embassy a message in the morning. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–1258)

After again proposing respective Embassies ChiCom representative said Wang would not consider Swiss Embassy. He reverted however to previous proposal re approaching Polish Government for site. Did not object to Monday 3 p.m. meeting suggesting in that event "informal get-acquainted meeting desirable in morning." In view local press interest (which admittedly considerable) Wang suggested issuance joint communiqué this afternoon at 4.

Johnson telephoned proposed press announcement unacceptable although we would be willing separately to inform press respective Embassies were in communication with each other with view to fixing early meeting resumption Ambassadorial talks.

ChiCom representative has just telephoned that Wang prefers defer press announcement until site and time fixed. We replied this satisfactory.

Swiss Embassy still definitely excluded and believe Department should consider accepting separate approach to Poles for furnishing location provisionally in order to get talks started. With receipt Deptels 264 and 265[2] and Clough's and Dexter's arrival over weekend believe we can prepare ourselves for Monday afternoon meeting including discussion substantive matters.

Earliest reply requested.[3]

Beam

---

[2] Telegrams 264 and 265 to Warsaw, both September 12, transmitted instructions for Beam's first substantive meeting with Wang. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement) See also Document 88.

[3] Dulles and Robertson discussed Beam's report in a telephone conversation at 12:40 p.m., September 13. According to notes of the conversation by Dulles' personal secretary, Phyllis D. Bernau, Dulles said that he did not think the location of the meeting had much significance and "we would not get much support if the talks broke down because we would not rotate." After further discussion, he said that "he did not see any particular objection to the Polish business. After all, we recognize the Poles." He also expressed concern as to whether Beam had been sufficiently briefed and stated that "Beam should realize the urgency of the talks." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; see Supplement) Telegram 271 to Warsaw, September 13, authorized an approach to the Polish Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358)

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 13, 1958, 9:07 p.m.

272. For Ambassador Beam. Deptel 264 (repeated information Taipei 221)[1] has been revised as follows:

Keynote of your presentation at first substantive meeting with Ambassador Wang should be that world opinion demands immediate effective measures be taken prevent present crisis in Taiwan Straits plunging Far East if not the world into war and to avert further crises arising; therefore it is imperative that first order of business in this 74th meeting of Ambassadorial talks be "cessation of hostilities in Taiwan Straits area."[2] (Avoid implication of acceptance on our own or GRC's behalf of responsibility for critical situation in area.) Following effective implementation of informal cease-fire (which can be carried out without any party being asked to renounce its territorial ambitions), we would then wish turn to questions of terminating provocative activities and of easing tensions in Straits. You should also refer to long record of frustrating meetings previously held at Geneva, to fact we continue deplore Peiping's persistence in dishonoring written pledge given by Wang three years ago to allow all Americans on mainland expeditiously to exercise right of return to US. You should urge strongly that the four remaining imprisoned Americans be released.

FYI: Situation in Taiwan Straits extremely serious due effective Communist interdiction GRC efforts resupply Quemoy. Unless cessation hostilities can be achieved in relatively short time U.S. may be forced into position having to give some kind of ultimatum to Communists if loss of islands is to be avoided. Therefore primary emphasis should be placed upon cessation hostilities.

Within above context FYI section reftel remains valid. End FYI.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Robertson and Martin, cleared by Green, and approved by Martin. Repeated priority to Taipei.

[1] See footnote 2, Document 87.

[2] Secto 2 from USUN, September 14, informed Beam that the use of quotation marks for this phrase in this telegram and telegram 264 to Warsaw was not intended to indicate that this was precise wording to which he should adhere. It stated that the Department was concerned with "the substance and not the exact phraseology used to describe it." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1458)

89. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Embassy in Poland

New York, September 14, 1958, 8 p.m.

Dulte 1. Eyes Only Ambassador from Secretary.

Dear Jake: I send this personal message to express my consciousness of the great importance of the talks you will initiate tomorrow and the President's and my confidence that you will ably conduct them.

Our basic objective is to bring about quickly a cessation of hostilities. Time is running against us in the sense that as matters are now going Communist interdiction fire threatens to create a situation such that Quemoy will soon be in a desperate plight and we shall have to consider drastic measures. ChiComs are presumably aware of this, and I hope do not want these drastic measures to be taken. But they may be indifferent to what would give pause to a more highly developed, less over-populated country.

If there were a cease-fire we assume that it would also involve measures which would end alleged provocations from the island against the mainland. Any measures in this category would be considered by US, in consultation of course with ChiNats. One thing that cannot be entertained is the turnover of the offshore islands to ChiComs.

It is likely that this China matter will come before the General Assembly. Probably there will be a renewed effort to get admission of ChiComs on the theory this would facilitate settlement. We shall vigorously, and I believe successfully, oppose this.

Soviets will probably attack our alleged "aggression" in China just as they did in the case of Korea.

I expect allude briefly to situation in my address now set for Thursday morning, and naturally would be glad to get any impressions you have to guide me. I presently plan only to refer briefly to facts, to bilateral talks in Warsaw and to possibility of our seeking United Nations action if talks seem doomed to fail.

If you feel you need any added personnel assistance, or if you feel that your instructions are obscure or that you do not have adequate discretion, let us know.

Best wishes.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1458. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to the Department as Dulte 1, which is the source text. Dulles was in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly which he was to address on Thursday, September 18.

90. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Taipei, September 14, 1958, 1:22 p.m.

140522Z. Admiral Felt has info other means. Personal for Admiral Burke, Admiral Felt, VAdm Riley,[1] VAdm Beakley.

Believe you need a roundup of picture as I see it here. Critical times are near. Political. To the extent I enter this field which is daily with Defense Minister I follow Ambassador's pitch that GRC has gained respect of US and many Allies in their practice of restraint. That this is vital in any negotiation in any forum. That whether they like negotiations or not the US as a peace loving nation does not want war and since they don't it is of equal interest to GRC not to initiate any provocative act which could start a war and lose the support of their Allies now so firmly established. Minister's invariable reaction is he is strongest proponent of restraint, he doesn't want war, our history of negotiations with Commies is not too hot, US has inched its way in public pronouncements to strong position of support OSI which if done boldly a month ago when he first asked for it would probably have prevented present precarious situation that now while the doctors consult the patient is dying. My reply indicates some of that is speculation that our President must speak in terms of US public opinion and a country's public opinion is not easy to mold that meanwhile let us bend every effort to keep the patient alive within the framework of our allowable joint efforts and capabilities. Add to the foregoing his latest argument which grows in intensity and logic that the US could still stop it by openly announcing the complete assumption of logistic support to Kinmen that the only alternative is war and we come to complete impasse.

Public relations. Matter of growing concern is US and GRC public bickering as to responsibility for failure of convoys. This is wonderful meat for Commies and must stop. Ambassador and I putting all our effort on this here but observations in home papers from responsible citizens does not help. Latest growing attack concerns our convoy operations to effect not only are they doing little good but are stimulating Commies to fire more and propagandize "this for your brave ally". This can be serious.

We are using approach to press that of all military operations amphibious is most complicated. That Chinese have little or no experience and never against opposition. That you don't get this experience over-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–1458. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:50 a.m. on September 15. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMSEVENTHFLT.

[1] Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command.

night that even the simplest of military OPS are a series of action reaction counter action ad infinitum and it took the US Navy two years to perfect its amphibious technique so don't criticize the Chinese military for a few failures over a three week period. There is a limit to the effectiveness of this approach and of course the criticism of the US military all points to the end desire of why don't we really get in there and fight with our Ally. CIB is a big help but it doesn't stop the reporters waiting outside my gate at quarters at night and morning.

Operations. There are really three basic factors here. First that no concept of current situation appears in any planning instrument anywhere. This amazes me. One look at the topography around Kinmen and it screams out loud. Second the peculiar and to us utterly unbelievable sense of command relations possessed by the Chinese. I've covered this somewhat but haven't even begun to scratch the surface. It is an inherited trait of generations and positively the most frustrating thing I've ever had to face. Third and of course the critical issue getting the stuff on the beach. Quite frankly we were misled by Kinmen advisors that only observable beaches were one and two the ones habitually used. With this missapprehension we scurried to get other beaches ready and then found their beaching profiles utterly unreliable when LSM's stopped way short of dry ramp condition. In addition fire now lands accurately on any beach we use day or night. Another factor here is fact that on 2 occasions now ATF's towing empty LCM replacements entered area with no reaction. So they seem to know who is coming and where it is going and give with their all only when the cargo is important in quantity. To meet this we must use deception and mobile loading and are proceeding to do so. Capability will be limited but important thing now is a successful effort and soon. We have the best Chinese operational admiral down in Kaohsiung with Blackburn.[2] We have the best amphibious experts Chinese and American there too and we've given the job to them with the promise that they will not be second guessed by higher ups from remote and sundry places.

Intelligence. Chinese recon flights using cap source of provocative claims by ChiComs and invariably bring out MIGs but pattern has been remarkably defensive in nature. Past recon has been devoted to ChiCom air deployments almost exclusively but now have GRC agreement to cover the coastal areas for naval intel and to limit penetration. All intel agencies [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] trying uncover means by which Commies are getting convoy info. Most ominous to me are growing signs that GRC is planning something big they don't want us to know about. I think MND will consult me but the President is just too calm and too quick to acquiesce to our ideas of working slowly toward getting a successful lift through. There are other signs too vague to analyze piecemeal but in aggregate are alarming. Cannot even guess what objective might be. As a hopeful summary I think we can make a fairly decent breakthrough of that last fifty yards but I don't think it can be sustained in required quantity over the long haul. The Chinese will try but they will take losses. I believe the Kinmen garrison can hold out longer than the GRC top level echelon who will probably cry panic long before panic is a factor. I think the US will have to take over and the matter of when we do will become increasingly critical every day. We are forwarding a capability estimate of interdicting gun positions by air in separate despatch which doesn't look good. Interdiction by Kinmen artillery is faced with hopeless odds even with the eight inch HOWs. This is not as encouraging as I would like it to be but we ain't quitting out here. Regards. Smoot.

---

[2] Rear Admiral P.P. Blackburn, Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force. Blackburn headed the Navy component of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, which had just been established as a Subordinate Unified Command under CINCPAC by ADMINO CINCPAC telegram 110435Z, September 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)

---

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 15, 1958, 7 p.m.

408. USUN for Robertson. Following is text agreed announcement proposed by Wang today's meeting.[1]

"In order to ease and eliminate tension in Taiwan area and safeguard peace in Far East and world, Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of Government of People's Republic of China, and Ambassador Jacob D. Beam, on behalf of Government of USA, agree to announce:

The two parties undertake to settle disputes between the two countries in Taiwan and other areas in Far East through peaceful negotiations without resorting to threat of use of force against each other, and have agreed on the following:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1558. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:35 p.m. Repeated to USUN.

[1] Telegram 398 from Warsaw, September 14, reported that the Polish Government had made available a room in the Mysliwiecki Palace and that arrangements had been made for Beam and Wang to meet at 3 p.m. on September 15. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–1458)

1. Government of People's Republic of China declares that Taiwan and Penghu Islands are China's territories and Quemoy, Matsu and other coastal islands are islands within China's inland waters along mainland, that Government of People's Republic of China has right to liberate these territories of China by all suitable means at suitable time, and that this is China's internal affair which allows no foreign interference.

2. Government of USA undertakes to withdrawal its armed forces from Taiwan, Penghu Islands and Taiwan Straits.

3. Government of People's Republic of China declares that Quemoy, Matsu and such other coastal islands which are occupied by Kuomintang troops and constitute immediate threat to Ports of Amoy and Foochow must be recovered. If Kuomintang troops are willing withdraw from these islands on their own initiative, Government of People's Republic of China will not pursue them.

4. Government of People's Republic of China declares that, after recovering Quemoy, Matsu and the other coastal islands, it will strive to liberate Taiwan and Penghu Islands by peaceful means and will, in a certain period of time, avoid using force to realize liberation of Taiwan and Penghu Islands.

5. Government of People's Republic of China and Government of USA are of agreed opinion that freedom and security of navigation on and flight above high seas in Taiwan Straits must be ensured."

Beam

---

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 15, 1958, 8 p.m.

409. Department pass information niact USUN as two from Warsaw. USUN for Robertson. After preliminary exchange on procedures and precedence, during which Wang pointedly declined my suggestion he speak first, I opened session with prepared statement as follows: "You and I meeting today at critical moment in history. Three weeks ago your armed forces opened assault of unprecedented intensity against territories of GRC. Government to which US bound by ties of friendship and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1558. Confidential; Niact; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in three sections. Received at 4:54 p.m. A notation on the source text reads: "Meeting No. 74." The 73d meeting in the series of ambassadorial talks beginning on August 1, 1955, was held in Geneva on December 12, 1957.

solemn treaty commitments. At same time, your authorities declared it their intention seize, not only territories now under attack, but also islands of Taiwan and Penghu. [garble—This?] sitn constitutes serious threat to peace.

In agreeing arrangements continuing ambassadorial level talks which Ambassador Johnson began with you August 1, 55 our two governments have demonstrated they prefer way of negotiation to military conflict.

The ambassadorial talks have been disappointing to us. Written pledge you gave three years ago to allow all Americans on China mainland expeditiously exercise right to return US has been neither promptly nor fully carried out. Release four remaining imprisoned Americans would be important step toward improving atmosphere for these talks and I strongly urge your authorities take measures promptly to this end.

In many previous meetings Ambassador Johnson emphasized vital importance of reciprocal renunciation force applicable Taiwan area, in order avoid development of situation such as has arisen today. He made it clear that it not necessary for either of us accept other's position with respect Taiwan area in order agree on principle that force will not be used achieve objectives that area. It obvious our views as to situation differ widely and are not easy reconcile. However, for sake of peace of world, imposition of one's own views by armed might can no longer be tolerated.

Your government must realize that Government of US cannot accept view that territorial changes can be effected through use military force. When such force is directed against government, such as GRC with which United States has mutual defense treaty, my government cannot stand idly by. To do so would undermine our vital interests and very principles upon which world order based.

World opinion demands immediate measures be taken prevent present crisis in Taiwan Straits from plunging Far East, if not world, into war and avert occurrence of future crisis. It is therefore imperative that first order of business in this 74th meeting of ambassadorial talks be cessation of hostilities in Taiwan Straits area. I should like discuss with you arrangement of immediate cease-fire. Such cease-fire can be carried out without any party being asked renounce its territorial ambitions.

United States, of course, has no such ambitions. Once cease-fire had been accomplished, we would turn to questions of terminating provocative activities and of easing tensions in Straits. There are undoubtedly number of specific measures which could be agreed upon in order establish atmosphere of security in immediate area where hostilities in progress. However, urgent prerequisite for consideration such measures is cessation of hostilities. I should like to know whether your government is prepared agree to immediate cease-fire in Taiwan Straits area."

Wang replied. We regret results achieved past two years talks. World opinion concerned over outcome present talks. We must try to reach agreement on settlement dispute in Taiwan area of my country. Taiwan is Chinese territory and offshore islands are with [*within*] inland waters Chinese mainland. [People's] Republic China has sacred duty liberate Quemoy, Matsu, and Taiwan by all suitable means. Punitive military operations against troops Chiang clique internal affair. Question of cease-fire between China and US does not exist.

Wang continued. He chronicled and protested alleged provocations US warship and air incursions September 7 and 14. Quemoy, Matsu and other islands of Chinese inland waters used by Chiang clique with support US as advance bases threatening mainland ports. To eliminate threat Government China resolved liberate Quemoy, Matsu and other islands within coastal water, if Kuomintang troops willing to withdraw from coastal islands on own initiative Government China will not pursue them. "I want make frank statement that since Chiang clique lives exclusively on US support why don't you persuade them to withdraw from Quemoy, Matsu and all other coastal islands."

I replied. Picture turned completely about. Government Republic China sovereign state and trusted ally. Claims being made against its territory are being pursued by military action and threat of force. US forces in area for purely defensive purposes in fulfillment treaty obligations. Recited forms ChiCom military aggression in Straits area and said if these cease tension which has been created will immediately abate. Our vessels only in areas permitted by Government Republic China. We do not accept from your or any other authority extension territorial waters to twelve miles. Your demands constitute one-sided insistence US take no action in compliance treaty obligations while you insist on full right take any action you please in area.

First step to end threat to peace is to stop military action. This is nature of our proposal for immediate cease-fire.

Wang replied. Republic of China is nothing more than phantom regime reared and supported by US and does not exist. Chinat reactionary regime repudiated and overthrown just as tyrants in other countries overthrown because they were against the will of their peoples. Chiang clique has no right conclude any treaty with any country. Such treaties unlawful, null and void.

Wang continued. Liberation Taiwan, Penghu Islands and Quemoy and Matsu by whatever means cannot be considered threat to peace and world order. Threat is none other than occupation Chinese territory of Taiwan by armed forces. To bring about relaxation in Taiwan area first step must be cessation of provocative actions on part US Armed Forces in area.

I replied. Provocative actions not from our side but from mainland which attacks sovereign Republic China with whom we have treaty obligations. Your statements serve only to illustrate basic differences between our points view regarding Taiwan area. Urgent need is not to debate these but to take urgent and immediate action to stop hostilities now in progress. As first step and I repeat as first step required that both sides agree that shooting shall stop.

Wang replied. Issue is not cease-fire between us but cessation of provocative action on part US in that area. As soon as provocations cease we believe prospects will be good for relaxation tension in Taiwan area. I agree we should seek specific solution. Request more specific exposé [*exposition*?] your proposal. As I read recent statements of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eisenhower they also make references to measures or solutions relative to relaxation of tension in Taiwan area.

I replied. Best and only way to eliminate provocations of whatever kind is to have cease-fire, whether provocations are real as in case those from mainland or only alleged. We could assume cease-fire could also involve measures which could end alleged provocation against mainland as you see them. These would naturally have to be considered in consultation with our ally Republic of China. Cease-fire best way to end dangerous hostilities now without prejudice to claims parties involved.

"I would like to make solemn appeal that our proposal be conscientiously considered."

At this point Wang insisted on ten minute recess as against our suggestion to work through to conclusion. Returned to read proposal reported Embtel 408.[1]

I replied. Proposal clearly one-sided and involves surrender and actions prejudicial interests our ally. We cannot entertain solution which would mean surrender of territory belonging that ally. Proposal furthermore does not constitute confirmation of renunciation use force. I feel obligated of course to communicate contents proposal to my Government. We come back to basic differences as aggravated by use of force and threats of force against sovereign ally and its territory. Proposal with greatest prospect restore peace is proposal we made for stopping hostilities. This offers possibility further measures for pacification and relief of tension in area pending pursuit policy objectives by peaceful means. Disappointed you have not put forward practical proposals other than one demanding surrender. Had this been otherwise I am sure it would have been possible give them consideration. I am ready explore with you whatever feasible avenues there may be for necessary cessation present grave military danger in Taiwan area.

---

[1] Document 91.

Wang replied. Situation now discussed not one in which Chinese forces occupying San Francisco or Honolulu. We reject US interpretation liberation our territory as threat. Earnestly hope US Government will carefully consider our proposal.

I replied. I asked Ambassador study our proposal, its background, principles involved and transmit to his Government as promptly as possible.

Wang reserved right make further comments at next meeting.

Beam

---

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 15, 1958, 10 p.m.

410. USUN for Robertson. Have following comments on today's meeting.

1. As was to be expected, Wang made no concession whatsoever on fundamental position that Taiwan and offshore islands are Chinese territory and that ChiComs have every right "liberate" them by whatever means they choose, without foreign interference.

2. He was firm in his repeated statement that the "question of a cease-fire does not arise." While following logically from ChiComs basic position, this does not necessarily mean that they may not decide at some point to cease firing. Whether they do or not will presumably depend in large part upon their estimate of the military risks involved in continuing this type of pressure. However, the position they took today probably does mean that they will avoid any express agreement to a cease-fire.

3. Wang appeared genuinely disappointed that, although I indicated specific proposals would be considered after a cease-fire, I did not present them today. He referred to Secretary's press conference September 9 and pressed several times for concrete proposals, only after determining that we were not prepared to present anything further, and following a ten-minute recess at his request, did he bring forward his "agreed announcement."

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:54 p.m. Repeated priority to USUN.

4. "Agreed announcement" is obviously for propaganda purposes. They could not have expected us to accept such a document, even as basis for negotiation. They probably consider when it is made public it will make good impression on neutralists and others inclined accept basis ChiCom position, since it contains elements they can portray as concessions, such as agreement to unopposed GRC withdrawal from offshores, and agreement to "strive for peaceful liberation" of Taiwan and Penghus and refrain from use of force for "certain period of time."

5. Wang's presentation, while doctrinaire and uncompromising, was not threatening or belligerent. He adopted air of aggrieved party, firmly rejecting statements conflicting with ChiCom interpretation of issues, but taking attitude he willing work patiently for solution.

6. Wang's statement that "as soon as provocations cease prospects will be good for relaxation of tension in Taiwan area" seems worth exploring further. It was extemporaneous, rather than part of prepared statement, and may not mean, as it suggests, that if we would refrain from certain actions their pressure on Quemoy would ease. However, it could be probed at next meeting.

7. From manner in which Wang and his staff consulted regarding date of next meeting, it appeared they had reservations about being prepared in time for meeting by Wednesday morning, rather than that they had firm instructions not to meet again before Thursday.

Will telegraph later tactical recommendations for next meeting.[1]

Beam

---

[1] In telegram 411 from Warsaw, September 16. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–1658; see Supplement)

---

94. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during a telephone conversation at 8 a.m. on September 16, 1958. Notes of the conversation by Carolyn J. Proctor (a member of Dulles' staff) read in part as follows:

"The Pres then mentioned an idea of Capt. Aurand's which he thought pretty good—in searching for an idea to appeal to Chiang who is holding these islands in the hope of some day reoccupying the mainland, suppose we said that we would make him really mobile, and out of our stocks give him amphibious ships and some reconditioned destroyers; this would give him activity, training duties, and would make him more mobile than the holding of those two islands. Sec said he wanted parachute training. Pres. said we could do all that training for less than keeping a reinforced 7th fleet there. Pres. said he argues that he must remain mobile to take advantage of any change to reoccupy the mainland; the amphibious boats would make him really mobile. Sec said there are other reasons for his wanting to hold the islands—they are all that are left of what was China and he hates to give up anything. Sec said he wished we had somebody out there of a really high calibre—perhaps we could send Bob Murphy. Pres. said we have to do something; we have to sell someone something or we shall be accused of desertion of ally or bringing war, neither of which is acceptable." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

---

95. Editorial Note

A note to Dulles' Special Assistant Joseph N. Greene from "jm" reports a telephone conversation on September 16, 1958, at 3:16 p.m. with Max V. Krebs, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Herter. It reads in part as follows:

"*Re the Secretary's phone conversation with Governor Herter* regarding several questions:

"Q. How long can the status quo be maintained before pressure from the GRC becomes so great we have to take action beyond what we are now doing?

"A. JCS reports they do not have too much to go on except the two specific indications we have had, i.e. that the Generalissimo estimated about one week and his Minister of Defense estimated about three weeks. On the other hand, General Twining stated it was his feeling the real danger is that the GRC will start some sort of adventure on its own which would have the effect of drawing the U.S. in.

"Q. How long can the supplies on Quemoy hold out assuming there is no cease fire, and resupply continues at the present rate?

"A. JCS estimates food will last indefinitely—ammunition about one month. Further, General Twining wished to stress to us the fact that there has been some improvement in the resupply situation.

"Re alternatives to the actual defense of the Islands—Radford proposal sometime back. Governor Herter took this up with Admiral

Hayward who said that they were actively considering whether there were other types of activity which could be undertaken by the United States and that they would hope to have some definite proposals within 24 hours, however, the JCS would, under no circumstances recommend the Radford idea." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

The "Radford proposal" apparently refers to a proposal put forward by Robertson and Radford during their April 1955 visit to Taiwan; see Document 132.

---

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 16, 1958, 9:07 p.m.

285. Beam–Wang Talks. Following are instructions re line you should take in meeting with Wang on 18th:

State that draft agreed announcement presented by Wang at previous meeting[1] unacceptable to US. Emphasize that US forces are in Taiwan, Penghu and Taiwan Straits for purely defensive purposes in fulfillment of treaty obligations to its ally Government of Republic of China. We cannot agree to their withdrawal at time when GRC territory under attack. You may imply, however, that if attack ceased and there were agreement to avoid use of force, we would be able greatly reduce size of our forces in area. Insist we likewise unable consider surrender of territory belonging to our ally which Communist draft proposes.

Repeat that urgent prerequisite of any peaceful resolution of present crisis is achievement of ceasefire without prejudice to claims and position of any party involved, and submit draft announcement sent Deptel 286.[2] In absence cessation hostilities each day increases danger of expansion of conflict through Chicoms relentless resort violence against Quemoy.

Argue that in maintaining issue not one of arranging cease-fire but of US ceasing provocative actions in area Communists have distorted re-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins; cleared in draft by Robertson, Green, and Martin; and approved by Parsons. Repeated priority to USUN for Robertson and to Taipei.

[1] See Document 91.

[2] Document 97.

alities of situation. Exploration of possible means easing tension in Straits impossible at time Communists continuing press attack on Quemoy. First step must be to arrange cessation hostilities in area; once this accomplished question of avoidance provocative actions by parties involved could be discussed with hope of success. If as anticipated Wang rejects our draft announcement, argue that important thing is achievement of cease-fire, not that it be formalized by public agreement. Informal de facto cessation hostilities would suffice for purpose creating atmosphere conducive to further progress toward easing tension in area.

Re suggestion urtel 410 para 6,[3] considered inadvisable you probe Wang on this point at this stage, since would tend undercut our insistence that effective cease-fire must precede substantive discussion if individual claims and grievances of parties concerned. You should continue press for immediate cessation hostilities.

We feel you have done excellent job of handling first meeting and appreciate your thoughtful suggestions and comments.

For Taipei Ambassador Yeh is being given substance report of first meeting (which being cabled you separately) and of foregoing instructions, which are repeated Taipei for your information only.

Herter

---

[3] Document 93.

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 16, 1958, 9:07 p.m.

286. Beam–Wang Talks. Re Deptel 285.[1]

Verbatim text.

"In order to bring an end to hostilities now occurring on and about the Quemoy islands and the Matsu islands, and thus to help to safeguard peace in the Far East and the world, Ambassador Jacob D. Beam, on behalf of the government of the USA, and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the government of the PRC, without prejudice to the peaceful pursuit by each side of its policies, agree to announce that:

1. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador Jacob D. Beam

a. The government of the PRC renounces the use of force against the Quemoy islands and Matsu islands, except in individual and collective self-defense and, on a basis of reciprocity will insure that the adjacent mainland and other coastal islands will not be used for attack [*attacks*][2] or other provocative actions directed against the named coastal islands.

2. Ambassador Jacob D. Beam informed Amb. Wang Ping-nan:

a. The U.S. renounces the use of force in the area of the Quemoy islands and Matsu islands except in individual and collective self-defense.

b. The U.S. will seek that the Quemoy islands and Matsu islands will not be used for attack [*attacks*] or other provocative action [*actions*] directed against the mainland or other coastal islands.

3. The two Ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible ends [*means*] for a phased reduction of forces and armament in those coastal islands and adjacent areas."

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1658. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Apparently drafted by Dulles and his advisers in New York although the source text shows Robertson as the drafter. Approved by Parsons. Repeated to USUN for Robertson and to Taipei. According to notes by Phyllis Bernau of a telephone conversation at 12:11 p.m. that day between Dulles and Herter, Dulles said that Phleger, Becker, Robertson, and Reinhardt were working on a counterproposal. He said his general feeling was that "we should call for a cease-fire and say steps should be taken to limit the provocations and reduce military forces on the Islands and on the Mainland opposite." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) According to Dulles' appointment book, he met with Phleger, Becker, and Robertson from 6:10–6:45 p.m. to discuss the instructions to Beam; they were joined for part of that time by Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Andrew H. Berding. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] Document 96.

[2] The bracketed corrections here and in paragraphs 2(b) and 3 were transmitted in telegram 289 to Warsaw, September 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1758; see Supplement)

98. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 16, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cambodian Mediation Offer

PARTICIPANTS

H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sihanouk—President of the Council of Ministers of Cambodia
Mr. Son Sann—Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Nong Kimny—Cambodia
Mr. Walter S. Robertson—Assistant Secretary
Mr. James L. O'Sullivan—U.S. Delegation

Mr. Robertson called on Prince Sihanouk at the latter's suite in the Waldorf. After an exchange of amenities Mr. Robertson, with the Prince's acquiescence, spoke of the Cambodian mediation offer which had been made by the Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny yesterday.[1]

Mr. Robertson thanked the Prince personally and on behalf of the Secretary for his offer and said that he wished to speak frankly and to explain the United States position. One of the parties in the dispute—Communist China—regarding the offshore islands is an outlaw state and has been an outlaw state since it established itself in control in 1949. Communist China is not eligible for UN membership because it is not a peace-loving state. Mr. Robertson pointed out this was a very serious time in the history of the UN organization because unless the organization which was designed to protect the peace was able to prevent aggression it could well disintegrate. Mr. Robertson continued that the disintegration of the League of Nations stemmed from its failure to apply sanctions to Mussolini for his invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. When the Mao regime seized control of the Mainland in 1949 it promptly repudiated the international agreements of the Government of China. It had not been in power a year before it seized Tibet by force and invaded south Korea. For its Korean

---

Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962). Secret. Drafted by O'Sullivan and Robertson. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

[1] The Ambassador extended Sihanouk's offer to try to mediate or serve as an intermediary in a conversation with Robertson on September 15. He told Robertson that when Sihanouk visited China in August, he met with Mao, Chou, and Chen Yi and gained the impression that they were determined to obtain control of the offshore islands but that there was room for negotiation. The conversation was recorded in a memorandum for the record by O'Sullivan, September 15. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

action it was condemned by UN resolution[2] as an aggressor. That resolution is still outstanding. It has broken practically every agreement it has entered into since it acquired power. It has violated three of the four major provisions of the Korean armistice.[3] It has flagrantly violated the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Indochina, to which it was a signatory.[4] It moved promptly into north Vietnam after Geneva and trained and equipped Viet-Minh troups increasing the divisions from 7 to 20, and bringing in large quantities of additional artillery—all in violation of the Accords. In Laos its Pathet-Lao puppets refused to abide by the Geneva agreements to turn over the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly to the Royal Government. Instead they continued to occupy these provinces and finally used their refusal to obtain participation in a coalition government and other concessions.

Mr. Robertson pointed out the Communists attempted to drive us out of Western Europe by blockading Berlin. What was at stake there was not the possession of a part of a city but rather whether Western Europe could be kept free of Communist control. What is at stake in the Far East in the offshore islands dispute is not sixty-five square miles of real estate, which is the size of all of the offshore islands together. Rather it is whether the Communists will use force and threaten the world with war as a means of achieving its political objectives. If they can succeed in accomplishing their purposes by force and threats in connection with Taiwan and the offshore islands they will repeat the same technique elsewhere in Asia. Mr. Robertson pointed out that there were many territorial disputes in the world such as Germany, Korea, Vietnam, West New Guinea, Goa, and Kashmir. If force is recognized as a legitimate weapon to settle such disputes, it will be impossible to avoid general war.

The Prince said that his talks with the Chinese leaders including Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en I and Chou En-lai indicated that they are concerned by the fact that the offshore islands are being used to mount Commando attacks on the mainland and to impose a blockade. Mr. Robertson replied that shipping has been moving freely out of Chinese ports for the last two years, and he denied that the islands were used for aggressive purposes. He did say that both sides launched propaganda attacks on the other both from the islands and against the islands.

Prince Sihanouk said that Chinese Communists had said many kind things about the United States during his stay in China, and he thought that they would like to become acceptable members of the international community. Mr. Robertson replied that they must begin to behave like acceptable members of the community before they could be considered as such. He said that for three years and through 54 out of 73 meetings in Geneva we have been trying to get them to renounce the use of force to settle disputes and this they have consistently refused to do. They also have refused to comply with the unequivocal Commitment given on September 10, 1955 to release imprisoned American citizens. He added that one thing the Chinese Communists must understand about the United States is that it will not be intimidated by their threats nor will it negotiate with a pistol at its head. He concluded with the statement that in the talks at Warsaw our purpose is to get the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of force to settle disputes. If this is accomplished perhaps an atmosphere can be created which would help reduce the tension in the Taiwan Straits.

---

[2] Resolution 498 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on February 1, 1951; see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VII, pp. 150–151.

[3] Signed at Panmunjom, July 27, 1953; for text, see 4 UST 234.

[4] The People's Republic of China was a signatory of the Final Declaration on Indochina, signed at Geneva on July 21, 1954; see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XVI, pp. 1540–1542.

---

99. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 100–11–58 Washington, September 16, 1958.

PROBABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST AND SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA[1]

The Problem

To reassess the probable intentions of Communist China and the Soviet Union with respect to the Taiwan Strait area in the light of the most recent evidence.

The Estimate

I. Communist China

1. We believe that the most likely Chinese Communist course of action in the immediate future is to continue military harassment and inter-

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 16 September 1958."

[1] This estimate supplements SNIE 100–9–58: "Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait Area," 26 August 1958. [Footnote in the source text. For SNIE 100–9–58, see Document 47.]

diction of supply of Chinmen. The Chinese Communists probably expect this course to make the island untenable, and thereby to put the next move up to the US. The US has a limited range of choices: it can allow the island to fall by attrition; it can assist the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw from the island; it can agree to Chinese Nationalist attacks on the mainland; it can undertake to maintain resupply of Chinmen by all-American convoys; or it can itself take the military action necessary to assure resupply of the island by the Chinese Nationalists. Any of the latter three courses of action eventually would probably involve US attacks on the mainland, and the US could be charged before world opinion with expanding the scope of armed conflict.

2. In pursuing this course, it is likely that the Chinese Communists are willing to take actions involving considerable risk of major armed conflict with the US. If US ships move close in-shore in the course of escorting Nationalist supply convoys, the Communists will probably not desist from their artillery barrages against unloading operations. If the US attempts to prevent by force the interdiction of supply, US forces so engaged will almost certainly be attacked within the limits of Chinese Communist capabilities. If the US were to announce that it would resupply Chinmen with all-American convoys (supported by appropriate combat strength ready to defend against attack) we believe that the Chinese Communists would probably attack the US force, although there is a chance that they would not. In any event, the Communists will demand that world opinion condemn US aggression and force a political settlement favorable to Communist China.

3. In addition to the continued interdiction of Chinmen, the Chinese Communists might seize, with little or no warning, one or more of the smaller offshore islands. This would be calculated to fall outside the scope of any US commitments to GRC defense and would serve further the Communist objective of eroding the Nationalist position. The effect would be further calculated as not prejudicing the Chinese Communist position of negotiation, but, rather, as increasing the international sense of urgency for a peaceful settlement and, at the same time, placing added political pressure on the US.

4. The Chinese Communists may not maintain a continuous interdiction of supply of the islands. It may be that they will let occasional convoys go through, and will thereby seek to prolong the present crisis rather than bring it to the earliest issue. Such action might be related to the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, or to moves in the General Assembly of the UN. But we believe that such interruptions in the Chinese Communist interdiction would be only a temporary measure.

5. Another Chinese Communist course of action, though we consider it unlikely, is that the Chinese Communists will gradually call off the interdiction of the Chinmens. If they did so, it would be because they

had decided, or had been persuaded by the Soviets, that the dangers inherent in maintaining interdiction were too great, and that another opportunity should be awaited at some future date.

6. Finally we consider it possible, though unlikely, that the Chinese Communists will assault one or more of the major offshore islands. We consider this unlikely because, in their view, (a) it would be almost certain to involve them in major hostilities with the US, (b) it would diminish the political and propaganda advantage they now have, and (c) it would probably be unnecessary because they could get the islands by other means.

II. USSR

7. The Soviet perspective on the Taiwan Strait situation is almost certainly based upon substantial knowledge of Chinese Communist plans and intentions. It is probable that the Soviet leaders, at least since the Mao–Khrushchev talks, have not only been informed but have also generally concurred in Chinese Communist actions in the Strait area. The Soviet public commitment to support the Chinese Communists, accompanied since August 31 by a rising volume of propaganda, is in part intended to deter the US. Moreover, we believe that this commitment was almost certainly made on the basis of calculations that activities in the Taiwan Strait area would fall short of provoking US intervention on such a scale as to call for overt Soviet military participation.

8. The Soviet leaders cannot be greatly concerned with the fate of the offshore islands, and, having less directly at stake than the Chinese Communists, may be inclined to favor a more conservative course. Their principal objectives are political—to discredit the US, to comply with the wishes of their Chinese ally, and to enhance the power and prestige of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. They believe that the opportunity to put the US in the dock under accusations of jeopardizing peace should be utilized to the maximum, and that support for the US would be far less than it was in the Middle East crisis. They also believe that if the US backs down from its position on the offshore islands or acts in defiance of world opinion, they will have inflicted a serious political defeat on the US.

9. While the Soviets probably do not wish to see the scale of hostilities expanded and the risk of their involvement magnified, they will be aware that the US may be led by Chinese Communist actions to engage Chinese Communist forces. If such hostilities are initiated, but limited to conventional weapons and confined to the mainland area adjacent to the Taiwan Strait, the Soviets would probably consider that the Chinese Communists did not require direct military assistance and would provide moral, political, and material assistance. Thus, they would almost certainly not intervene militarily, at least in an overt manner risking a direct confrontation of Soviet and US forces.

10. If hostilities continued for long, or particularly if they were expanded in area and scale, at some point the Soviets would probably feel that they would have to go further in support of Communist China. With respect to Soviet reactions to the US use of nuclear weapons, much would depend upon the scale of the US attacks, the extent of territory over which they would be delivered, and the entire context of events. The Soviets might conclude that more could be gained at less cost and risk by exercising military restraint and leading a political campaign to condemn the US before world opinion. They would have many supporters. On the other hand, the Soviets might conclude that such a challenge could not be passed by without nuclear retaliation. Particularly if the US extended the area of nuclear attack for a considerable distance into mainland China, there would be a better than even chance that the Soviets would provide the Chinese Communists with capabilities for nuclear retaliation under Soviet control. And, at some point high on a scale of increasing damage and danger to the Chinese regime, the Soviets might directly attack US forces engaged in China, including the bases from which such forces were operating, in the face of the attendant risk of general war.

III. The Prospect for Negotiations

11. In each of the contingencies discussed above the USSR will make every effort to exploit the situation politically and at the same time to prevent the spread of hostilities. The Chinese Communists are now engaged in discussions with the US on the Taiwan Strait question in the ambassadorial talks. However, they probably hope that world opinion and the continuing military threat to Chinmen will force the US to agree to higher-level discussions, such as a bilateral foreign ministers conference or a multilateral conference, possibly even at the summit level. They may fear that an attempt at a solution in the UN would solidify opinion in favor of an acceptance of "two Chinas." However, both Moscow and Peiping apparently deem it advantageous to raise the issue in the General Assembly, either to forestall a US initiative or in hopes of furthering their aims of pillorying and isolating the US.

12. Regardless of the forum, it is clear that the Chinese Communists are in no mood for any negotiated settlement which would restore the status quo ante. They will oppose any proposal that smacks of "two Chinas," that commits them to accepting the principle that they have no right to "liberate" the territory held by the GRC, or that grants the US a right to individual or collective self-defense in the Taiwan Strait area. While it is possible that they would permit a temporary cease-fire to develop during the negotiations in order to enhance their propaganda posture, they would be unwilling to commit themselves to an indefinite cease-fire. They would refuse any proposal which seemed to tie their hands more than those of the GRC. They might accept some type of "neu-

tralization" of the offshore islands as an interim move, hoping that the negative effect on GRC morale would be greater than the restriction on Communist activities. However, they almost certainly would not regard this as a permanent solution. Sino-Soviet insistence upon a resolution of the entire Taiwan problem favorable to Communist China will remain strong, and it is likely that they will continue to take a considerable risk in utilizing military pressure as a means of undermining the strength and determination of the Chinese Nationalists.

---

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 17, 1958, 7:19 p.m.

292. Beam–Wang Talks. Deptel 285 repeated information Taipei 231 USUN 236.[1] After GRC Ambassador Yeh was given substance instructions to you contained reftel and text proposed agreed announcement (Deptel 286 repeated information Taipei 232 USUN 237)[2] was read to him last night he requested on his own initiative that your Thursday meeting with Wang be postponed until GRC able give us its views.[3] GRC Foreign Ministry subsequently made identical request through Embassy Taipei. When Acting Secretary informed Yeh today US could not request such postponement, latter asked that we at least postpone presenting proposed Agreed Announcement at meeting.[4]

Yeh said while he had not received full views his Government he convinced it would take US proposal very hard. He alluded particularly to paragraph 2b, which he felt put GRC on same plane as Communists. He argued that since Communists had initiated current hostilities, first essential was for them to stop firing. He hoped that in meeting we would put onus for hostilities squarely on Wang.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1758. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared in draft by Herter and in substance by Robertson, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to USUN for Robertson and niact to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 3–5 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Document 96.

[2] Document 97.

[3] In a meeting with Parsons, recorded in a September 17 memorandum of conversation by Parsons. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1758)

[4] The meeting was recorded in a September 17 memorandum of conversation by Martin. (*Ibid.*)

Acting Secretary indicated we had stressed primary importance of cease-fire in first meeting and would continue to do so. He denied we had ever put GRC on same plane as Communists either publicly or privately.

In your presentation Thursday meeting you should bear in mind GRC reaction to proposed Agreed Announcement and again make clear to Wang fact of Peiping's responsibility for current hostilities and its obligation to bring them to immediate end. We are informing Yeh that you are being given this supplemental guidance[5] (for such use as he may wish to make of it with the GIMO). You should not postpone presentation draft Agreed Announcement at Thursday meeting.

Herter

---

[5] Parsons informed Yeh in a telephone conversation that evening, recorded in a September 17 memorandum of conversation. (*Ibid.*)

---

101. Editorial Note

At the 379th meeting of the National Security Council on September 18, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, September 18, reads as follows:

"With respect to the situation in the Taiwan Strait, General Cabell indicated that word had just been received that morning that the Chinese Communists had employed aircraft and PT boats in an interdiction action against a Chinese Nationalist convoy. The Nationalists have appealed for U.S. assistance and meanwhile have engaged in hostilities with these Chinese Communist aircraft.

"The Chinese Communists, continued General Cabell, have plainly rejected any idea of a cease-fire as a point to be negotiated with the U.S. at the Warsaw meetings.

"Moreover, interdiction of the Offshore Islands was still highly effective. The situation of the islands would become critical in about a month's time unless the situation improved in that interval. General Cabell concluded his discussion of this item by reading from the Conclusions of the Special National Intelligence Estimate No. 100–11–58 on the

Outlook in the Taiwan Strait." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) NIE 100–11–58 is printed as Document 99.

---

102. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 18, 1958, 3 p.m.

435. USUN for Robertson. Beam–Wang Talks. Meeting opened with question by Wang whether I would open discussion. I indicated willingness talk to paper submitted last meeting by his delegate. I then read prepared statement as follows: "Mr. Ambassador, I am instructed say that draft agreed announcement you presented on your government's behalf at Monday's meeting is unacceptable to US. As clearly made known in past and as I should again like emphasize, US forces are in Taiwan, Penghu and Taiwan Straits for purely defensive purposes in fulfillment treaty obligations to our ally, GRC. We naturally cannot agree to withdraw all our forces at time when territory GRC under attack. We unable consider surrender territory belonging our ally which your government's draft proposes.

It could be envisaged that if attacks from mainland ceased and if agreement reached to avoid use of force, US would be able greatly reduce size its forces in area.

Urgent prerequisite to any peaceful resolution of present crisis in Quemoy area is achievement cease-fire. Such cease-fire would be without prejudice to claims and position any party involved. Each day hostilities continue increases danger expansion conflict resulting from your relentless resort to violence against Quemoy.

It is distorting realities of situation to say that urgent problem is not one of arranging cease-fire, but of putting end to so-called 'provocative actions' by US in area. It is clear to all world that present acute crisis and tension arose directly as result of violent attack opened by your forces August 23 in Quemoy island area. Responsibility for commencement

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1858. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in five sections. Received at 3:01 p.m. Repeated niact to USUN and Taipei. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Meeting No. 75." Beam sent a brief summary of the meeting in telegram 432 from Warsaw, September 18. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement) these hostilities rests squarely on your side and it is your side which has obligation to terminate them if peace to be maintained. How can means of easing tension in Taiwan area be explored with any hope success at time when your forces continuing press their attack on Quemoy? Only after cessation hostilities has been accomplished can there be profitable discussion of question avoidance provocative actions by parties involved.

My government has prepared draft agreed announcement which, if accepted by your side, will bring to end current hostilities and provide sound basis for consideration measures aimed at reducing tension in area. I urge your government give our proposal most careful and serious consideration. It does not require either side abandon peaceful pursuit its policies, but would remove grave threat to peace of Far East, which can only become still more grave your authorities continue their present action to enlarge by military force territory under their control."

Then I read text of agreed announcement as forwarded by Department.

Wang replied: At last meeting I pointed out your statement on tension in Taiwan Straits was deliberate distortion true picture of facts. Your opening statement this morning entirely repetition and continuation such distortion facts. At last meeting you advanced absurd proposal for so-called arrangement of cease-fire and I promptly expressed my views in that respect. Proposal for immediate cease-fire has been advanced again this morning in proposed agreed announcement of Ambassador's which you presented. It is our view that such proposal is equally absurd. Fact is quite clear. China and US are not at war at present time and therefore cease-fire is entirely out of question. Your cease-fire proposal is no more than attempt confuse distinction between Sino-American international dispute and purely domestic matter of liberation Taiwan and coastal islands from Chiang Kai-shek rule. It contains at same time wishful thinking that China could be made recognize perpetual seizure Taiwan territory by US. It matter historical knowledge that Taiwan and coastal islands are Chinese territory from time immemorial and fact that such islands as Quemoy and Matsu internal territory even more uncontestable. It is internal matter for China to liberate these territories. This cannot lead to tension just as in past liberation of Hainan, Choushan, Ichiang and other coastal islands did not cause any international tension.

Real source of tension in Taiwan area lies entirely in US armed aggression in Taiwan. In spite repeated proposals for settlement dispute between China and US in Taiwan area by peaceful means without use threats force in area, US still persists in use force in Taiwan area. With respect to what Ambassador said this morning that tension arose from mainland, I can only say that is complete reversal of facts and distortion of true picture. Facts of matter are that even while two of us getting down to talks, your authorities going ahead building up forces in Taiwan Straits and daily making incursions of mainland and Chinese territorial waters. Recent facts I enumerated at last meeting pointed to US military threats and war provocation which are not only being continued but being spread.

In this connection, I once more protest to you in strongest terms and demand your side put end to military and warlike provocations so we can proceed with talks here. As to [garble] military operations taken by Chinese Peoples Republic forces against Chiang Kai-shek, this purely internal Chinese affair. Over period last 8 years Chiang troops have never ceased harassing activities from Quemoy and Matsu and have continued threats in Taiwan Straits. Thus entirely indispensable for Chinese Government carry out punitive action against them. This matter in which nobody has right interfere. What is more, Chinese Government has never abandoned peaceful negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek clique to achieve liberation Quemoy and Matsu.

To get at root problem, it is US armed seizure Taiwan and armed intervention in Taiwan affairs that have prevented solution this domestic problem. Urgent prerequisite for removal grave threat to peace in Taiwan area does therefore not at all lie in so-called cease-fire but in immediate stopping provocation, withdrawing of forces from Straits, and putting end to US intervention in Chinese affairs.

Mr. Ambassador, you and I meeting at momentous hour of grave danger and of historical test. Crisis deliberately created by US in Far East not only threatens peace in Far East but that of whole world. People of world watching closely and following attentively these talks between us and expect us to achieve results out of these negotiations. Any outcome for these talks can absolutely not be obtained by use force on part of US. Neither can outcome be achieved by indulging in empty talk. My government attaches importance to these talks and in this spirit at last meeting we put forward basic proposal for reduction tension in Taiwan area as further contribution to peace. That is proposal which entirely reasonable, practicable and feasible and which fully meets requirements of peoples of world. If this proposal received careful consideration by US and agreement reached on it, not only does question of cease-fire not arise but tension in Far East will immediately be reduced. In this spirit we urge and remind US Government to continue consider proposal. *End Wang statement.*

I replied as follows: Facts situation well-known and I would simply like to restate them briefly. Government of Republic of China is sovereign government and its territory not occupied by US forces. US forces are in area at invitation of Republic of China for purely defensive purposes in fulfillment of treaty.

It true that US forces and forces your side not engaged in conflict at present. However, an exceedingly grave danger exists and if allowed to continue it will lead to risk of conflict since it is directed against territory of an ally.

Because of this situation and implications, it entirely unreal describe it as exclusively internal affair of your government. So-called provocatory actions of US forces arise solely as result attacks [garble] forces which have made necessary certain dispositions of US forces.

Our proposal made today is elaboration concept that following cease-fire there should be reductions of forces and halting of actions by either side which could be considered provocative. Would be generally misunderstood to describe a proposal as absurd while it a first step to peace. It sincerely put forth to stop hostilities which could take exceedingly grave turn. We should again urge that your government give proposals very careful consideration. *End Beam statement.*

Wang replied: Ambassador has referred some well-known facts. What are such well-known facts? One is that US is occupying Chinese territory of Taiwan. This indeed is fact well-known to everybody. No amount rhetoric on part US can turn Taiwan into US territory. Present fact is there is no case of occupation US territory by China. Ambassador has time again referred to so-called sovereign state, so-called Republic China, and its treaty obligation. I can only categorize this as an insult to Chinese people. So-called Republic China is no more than a name which serves as pretext for US occupation of Chinese territory. So-called treaty of alliance is merely undeniable proof of US aggression on Chinese territory and a contract of slavery signed by Chiang-Kai-shek clique. Chiang-Kai-shek regime has long since been overthrown by Chinese people. This took place just in same way as what happened in many countries in international history. Chiang-Kai-shek regime has no right conclude any treaty with any foreign country. So-called invitation of US forces by Chiang-Kai-shek entirely distortion of fact. Without support of US, Chiang-Kai-shek regime cannot hope to live even one day.

Ambassador remarked that grave danger exists situation might lead to greater conflict. We do recognize this.

It entirely within province of internal affairs for country to liberate own territory. Same thing happened in history of US. For that matter, we may cite recent events in Indonesia. All these actions have never caused international tensions or complications. Present danger in Far East does not arise as result determination of Chinese people to liberate own territory, but from US provocative actions and war threats in area. How can anyone possibly present facts in such way as to say that source present danger is not occupation of Chinese territory and interference in China's internal affairs by US but that present danger arises from determination of Chinese people liberate own territory? Therefore problem before us is not to require China to consider cease-fire but rather to require US to end its intervention in China's internal affairs and its provocations against China.

Therefore it is test of sincerity for peace for your side to decide whether it is going to consider basic proposal for reduction and elimination tension in Taiwan area instead of so-called cease-fire that you have advanced. Chinese people resolved to liberate own territory and coastal islands Quemoy and Matsu. This resolve unshakeable. Tension will be immediately reduced as soon as US stops its interference in China's exercises of sovereign rights. It wishful thinking for US hope that determination of Chinese people to liberate own territory can be shaken by war threats or by buildup of American forces in area or by American atomic blackmail. *End Wang statement.*

I replied: In many respects your remarks are beside point. We have not claimed Taiwan as US territory and have no intention doing so. Nor have we accused your side of attacking US territory. Fact is that your forces are attacking territory of an ally which is recognized as sovereign state by majority nations of world. US has every right to enter into collective defense arrangements with this ally and to assist in defending it from attack. It seems futile to continue arguing our basic disagreement as to facts. Urgent need is to halt present fighting and to prevent its spreading.

As to our proposal, we do not insist on any particular form of words. If our draft announcement is unacceptable to you in some respects, we would consider changes. Important thing is not words but to find means removing overhanging threat peace which exists in Quemoy Matsu area. Important thing is that cease-fire occur, not necessarily that it be formalized by written agreement. If in fact fighting were to cease, this would be contribution to further progress in easing of tension. This is spirit in which we have put forward our proposals. *End Beam statement.*

Wang replied: As to repeated reference by Ambassador to so-called "alliance" relationship, I have pointed out on more than one occasion that it is not matter of alliance but of US aggression. Herein lies source of present crisis in Far East. Naturally we have come here to talk with you as to means of arriving at solution problem. Without such common desire and aim, would be meaningless for two of us to hold this talk. Now what are such means? Are they designed to relax and ease tension in Taiwan area, or to maintain and even aggravate such tension? As I see it, cease-fire proposal is not aimed at settlement issues, but is fraud and deception. If Ambassador truly desirous seeking reasonable settlement problem, I am sure proposal I put forward at previous meeting fully meets this. I can envisage no other means than the one I proposed to settle present problem. It in this spirit that we hope USG will give proposal most careful consideration. *End Wang statement.*

I replied: I can assure you we have given it most careful consideration. We have had to reject it because it entails demand for surrender under threat of force. You have used harsh words to describe proposal we put forward to end hostilities. We think that if your delegate and government carefully study our proposal, especially in its latest form and in light my remarks in explanation, you may consider that it contains possibilities for helping meet the problem. It is put forth in conciliatory spirit in order that basic issues can be considered in less tense atmosphere. In meantime fighting would cease. The situation being as it is, we consider that we have responsibilities on each side carefully to examine possibilities put forth in our discussion. I should like to ask that you submit our proposal to your government for careful and deliberate study. *End Beam statement.*

Wang replied: I have on more than one occasion made clear my attitude on cease-fire proposal you have advanced. Can I take it from remarks of Ambassador that US Government will not consider proposal that we put forth at last meeting but has completely rejected it? I expect clarification from Ambassador this regard. *End Wang statement.*

I replied: I am authorized state that proposal as put forth in form presented to us is unacceptable. Basic differences of opinion are involved in your proposal which we think cannot be resolved while hostilities continue. It appears to be common objective to put end to hostilities but terms which you propose for accomplishment this result impossible accept. We feel we have gone quite long way in proposing practical means for ending hostilities without prejudice to peaceful settlement basic issues involved. *End Beam statement.*

Wang replied: As I have said, what we have proposed is most reasonable and it has covered all aspects of issue. If US is to reject proposal without giving it careful consideration, this serves show US not seeking peaceful settlement issue. We again urge US give it further consideration. Regarding cease-fire proposal, as said already, question of cease-fire does not arise between China and US. Overhanging issue before us is that of war threat posed by US against China in building up huge armed forces in Taiwan area. Therefore, basic matter in our deliberations is not that of cease-fire but of immediate stopping all provocation against China by US armed forces. That is source of threat to peace in Far East.

I replied: Question cease-fire does exist because hostilities continuing on very large scale against one our allies. We feel we are getting away from main problem examining practical measures for putting end to conflict which in danger of spreading. What you seem be saying is that if we do not entirely accept your viewpoint, US does not desire peaceful settlement issues. This is unreasonable position. We only asking cessation hostilities, not acceptance by you our point of view.

Wang replied: We naturally want point out situation steadily becoming more serious. This not reduced by fact these deliberations have taken place. It solely due to war threats by US that dangerous situation continues threat toward peace. Proposal we made last meeting covers basic solution this dangerous situation. If we are to speak about urgency measures to relax tension in Taiwan area, we have to raise this matter: US should cease all its provocative incursions into China's territory and waters, withdraw its forces from China's territory, and end interference in China's internal affairs. When this achieved, we sure immediate relaxation tension in Taiwan area will follow.

I replied: We unfortunately agree situation has not been alleviated immediately before or during these talks. Attacks from mainland continue and fighting continues. As regards over-all dispositions, in our proposal we put forth idea that if fighting were to cease, reduction of forces could be urgently considered, which would do great deal to bring about reduction tension and arrangement peaceful solution issues involved. This is basic element first step of our approach.

Wang replied: I shall reiterate: Present tension in area does not in any way arise from such attacks from mainland but from build-up and demonstration force by US Air and Naval forces in area. Cease-fire proposal of US is merely smoke-screen to cover up aggressive acts of US in area. Chinese people will never be taken in by this trick.

I replied: I assure you our proposal certainly not smoke-screen. It put forward in all sincerity and solemnity to seek way to put end to situation that is becoming increasingly dangerous. We think it merits most careful review in light of what has gone on and in light of what happening now. We have indicated we are willing consider changes or de facto results which would bring immediate end to fighting.

Wang replied: Our present talk not one of studying words but rather of studying substance of matter. Under present circumstances of huge build-up American forces in area, our task not that of cease-fire but that of immediate cessation all such provocative actions by US. This playing with fire by US in Taiwan Straits can never bring any profit to US. I reiterate, urgent matter not that of cease-fire but settlement in accord with Chinese proposal.

I replied: I recommend we refer our discussions to our governments for full consideration. We will then be willing get together to see what results might be. I certainly cannot offer or promise, in light of what is taking place, that prospects are particularly good, especially if force continues to be used from your side.

Wang replied: I only want say it not alleged use force by my side which has precipitated present situation. It is US use force which has led to this dangerous situation. To say otherwise is upside down presentation of facts. Cause of anxiety of people of world is not determination

Chinese people liberate their own territory and coastal islands, but war threats and provocations of US. It high time US stopped this playing with fire.

Wang then suggested meeting Monday and I countered with Sunday[1] to which he agreed.

Beam

---

[1] September 21.

---

103. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/14 New York, September 18, 1958, 5 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTEENTH
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 14–20, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

US	*UK*
The Secretary of State	Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd
William Rountree[1]	Mr. Howard Beeley
Frederick Reinhardt	Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

Formosa

Mr. Lloyd expressed interest in the Secretary's reference to elimination of provocations in his speech before the General Assembly.[2] The Secretary explained that as far as the US was concerned we would be willing to see the offshore islands completely demilitarized provided the "naked

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1107. Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers.

[1] Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs William M. Rountree.

[2] In his September 18 address, Dulles stated in part:

"We hope that a peaceful solution can be found. Talks are going on between the United States and Chinese Communist Ambassadors in Warsaw. We seek a prompt cease-fire and equitable conditions which will eliminate provocations and leave for peaceful resolution the different claims and counterclaims that are involved."

For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 122–130.

title", so to speak, remained in Nationalist hands. This would in addition involve the elimination of such intelligence and propaganda activity as had in the past been mounted there against the mainland. One could not make the islands a privileged sanctuary. The problem was, of course, whether the Generalissimo could be induced to agree. The situation on Formosa was highly charged and we were not certain we could sit on the lid.

Mr. Lloyd asked whether we had in mind bombing Communist gun emplacements. The Secretary replied that we did not for the present. The supply situation had been improved somewhat in recent days and had not reached a critical stage. He thought we had at least two weeks time, but if it did become critical, the idea would be for the Chinese Nationalists initially to undertake such an operation and then for us to follow up if necessary.

Concerning a possible reference to the problem of the UN, the Secretary said we might possibly go first to the Security Council as a matter of form but one clearly could not get anything there. In the General Assembly, on the other hand, it might be possible to get some kind of resolution calling for tranquillity in the area and a peaceful settlement. This would, however, presumably have no effect on the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Lloyd asked whether we had thought of raising the level of our conversations with the Chinese Communists since they might conceivably be willing to give more in such talks. The Secretary replied he had been somewhat surprised that the Chinese Communists had not themselves insisted on higher level talks, but he doubted that they would be any more productive. He also was interested in the fact that the Soviets, as far as he was aware, had made no mention of the Warsaw talks and that Gromyko, in his speech today, put all the emphasis on Formosa itself.

The Secretary, referring to the broad aspects of the problem, pointed out that one could not ignore the fact that if we did something in the face of Soviet and Communist Chinese threats that made us appear to be backing down, we would be finished throughout the area. The situation in Asia was so fragile and feeble that we could not afford to do anything that looked like capitulation.

Mr. Lloyd said he had had a long talk with the Japanese Foreign Minister who wanted to exchange views and who seemed quite sound. The Japanese wanted to find some long term means of conditioning the people in the area so that a minor straightening of the line would not have such dangerous repercussions. The Secretary observed that you had to bear in mind what you could do in Taiwan. The situation would be terrible if it blew up in our face. We were having a difficult time there. The Secretary did not mind if the Warsaw talks produced a prolonged back and forth if under their cover some progress could be accomplished.

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 18, 1958, 5 p.m.

437. USUN for Roberts. Beam–Wang Talks. Comments on today's meeting:

1. Not the slightest change in ChiCom's basic positions. Wang merely reiterated standard line over and over in almost identical words used in last meeting.

2. Wang rejected our proposed agreed announcement out of hand. He is obviously under instruction to oppose cease-fire concept, and showed no interest whatsoever in our suggestion of de facto cease-fire without formal agreement.

3. Wang's attitude somewhat tougher and more uncompromising than previous meeting. Language somewhat harsher.

4. Wang made no effort probe regarding any concrete proposals US might have beyond draft re cease-fire which we presented. He appeared to be going through an exercise, restating his position for the record, without expecting any progress to be made in reconciling views of two sides.

5. Although Wang paid lip service to critical nature of situation in off-shore island area and need find urgent solution, he did not in fact appear to be working under any sense of urgency. His proposal next meeting be Monday illustrates his unhurried attitude.

6. Wang gave no hint of desire for early recourse to public press.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1858. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:08 p.m. Repeated niact to USUN and Taipei.

---

105. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Offshore Island Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Ambassador of the Republic of China
Mr. Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958. Secret. Drafted by Bennett on September 19.

Dr. S.Y.Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
Mr. J.W. Bennett, Chinese Affairs

In a courtesy call on Mr. Murphy on September 18 Ambassador Yeh remarked that there was much public misunderstanding of how there came to be so many Chinese forces on the offshore islands. He related the history of the offshore islands, pointing out that in 1949 Quemoy was garrisoned by only some 6,000 troops when it was attacked by the Communists. None of the 14,000 attacking Communist troops returned home, being either killed, wounded or captured. After this the GRC naturally increased the garrison. However, the Chinese did not really dig in on Quemoy until 1955. In September 1955 [*1954*], according to Ambassador Yeh, the Communists unleashed a savage bombardment of Quemoy, causing many casualties. The Government then decided that they really had to build up the defenses of the island permanently. There are now perhaps some five divisions there.

Asked by Mr. Murphy, about casualties in the present bombardment, Ambassador Yeh said that civilian casualties had been very heavy, so heavy that the actual number has been kept secret. Altogether he said about 3,000 civilian casualties had been incurred so far. He ascribed this high rate to the fact that the civilians do not have the shelters and the discipline of the military.

Mr. Murphy inquired about the targets of GRC bombardment of the mainland from Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said that GRC gunners did not shoot at the city of Amoy, although they had fired at the port a few times to test Communist reactions. He said he could not believe the Communist story that Amoy University had been hit. It was within range, but it was not GRC policy to fire at civilian targets.

Mr. Murphy asked Ambassador Yeh how he would describe the military importance of the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh said that they were important as military "outposts," although they had never been considered as stepping stones for an invasion of the mainland. However, their psychological importance far transcended their military significance. To the Communists, Ambassador Yeh said they had military value because of their position off the ports of Amoy and Foochow and the fact that the GRC was able to interdict Communist shipping from them.

Ambassador Yeh said that the Communists were very "conservative" in their military tactics. He referred to their caution in the air and to the fact that they had lost several planes to the CAF. He also said that they were keeping their larger naval vessels away from the area of the offshore islands and had so far made use only of smaller craft.

Ambassador Yeh said that he differed with President Chiang about interpretation of Communist intentions. The Communists do not in Yeh's opinion intend to attack the offshore islands with a full-scale assault. That would be too costly. He said he guessed that Khrushchev went to Peiping because Mao Tse-tung was unhappy about some things, especially his continued exclusion from international meetings and the selection of India to attend the proposed summit conference. At Peiping Mao probably impressed on Khrushchev the need for "doing something" and the two cooked up a scheme to put the pressure on the off-shore islands for the purpose of helping the Soviets out at New York (in the UN) or in some possible international conference resulting from the crisis that would be created. The Warsaw talks were an afterthought. But the Communists have done "that sort of thing" before, as when in 1953 Malik suddenly announced that they were willing to talk peace in Korea. Yeh said he did not look for an all-out attack by the Communists on Quemoy unless as a desperate measure for the purpose of saving face if they could win a concession no other way.

Mr. Murphy asked about the supply situation on Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said that actually it was quite good. There was about three or four months' supply of rice on the island, and the only shortage was in edible oils. The army had some 150,000 rounds of heavy ammunition, which they were using conservatively. (By way of contrast, Yeh said the Communists had shot up all their forward area ammunition supplies. As of early September he said the Communists had fired some 170,000 rounds.) He said that the GRC did badly need the 8 inch howitzers we were giving them and remarked *en passant* that the GRC had first asked for these weapons "three or four years ago." On the naval side, Yeh said the GRC was very short of patrol craft, having a total of only four all told.

Ambassador Yeh said twice that the Communists had not yet used the technique of concentrated fire. He said he hated to think what the consequences might be if they did. So far they have been scattering their shots all over the islands. Not one GRC gun position on Quemoy has yet been hit. Nor has any of the GRC's main dumps. The morale of the troops on Quemoy is excellent. Some 20% of the men are Taiwanese and some of Taiwanese are among the best gunners. Yeh said he did not believe that the Communists would attack the minor Quemoy islands with the purpose of occupying them. He said that GRC gunfire could make them untenable if they tried it.

Mr. Murphy inquired about the feelings of the Taiwanese toward the present situation. Ambassador Yeh replied that stories of differences between Taiwanese and mainlanders were greatly exaggerated. He said the only real excitement he noted in Taiwan was among the wives of the CAF pilots who of course were anxious about their husbands' safe return from missions.

106. Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green)

Washington, September 18, 1958.

TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

1. The Quemoy resupply situation looks bad. Whether new beach delivery techniques will break the stranglehold on Quemoy is open to serious question. Efforts to break the blockade will in any event be very costly.

(a) ChiCom shore batteries maintain highly effective interdictory fire over all of the Quemoys and all waters around the Quemoys. These batteries are zeroed in on all usable beach areas and the two landing strips.

(b) During the period August 23 to September 7, no resupplies reached Quemoy due to ChiCom naval harassment. Since then, there have been 8 convoys, all of them U.S. escorted. The first was unopposed and landed 300 tons. The next two (September 8 and 11) failed to off-load any supplies. The last five (September 13, 14, 16, 17, 18) consisting of amphibious craft loaded aboard LSM's and LST's, have apparently unloaded from 25 to 75 tons on each convoy run.

2. As Secretary Dulles pointed out last Friday at his meeting with Secretary McElroy and the JCS:

"Under current conditions the ChiComs will in all probability continue to harass and prolong this interdiction operation; they will probably not assault the islands while the Warsaw talks and UN sessions are going on. *For the same reason we don't want to take new military initiatives during this period.* The vital objective is to sustain at least the status quo."[1]

3. But can we sustain the status quo for very long without taking the initiative? Import supply requirements for Quemoy average 700 tons daily. During the entire period since August 23 less than one day's supply has reached Quemoy. Stockpiles have been reduced by some 17,000 tons. There are now less than one month's supply of food, ammunition and certain other necessaries on Quemoy. (If the GRC engage in effective counterbattery fire, there is only 10 day's supply of ammo on hand.)

4. We might take the initiative in several ways: notably (a) the U.S. could carry out the resupply mission; (b) the U.S. could take military

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1858. Top Secret. Sent to Acting Secretary Herter with a covering note of September 19 from Acting Assistant Secretary Parsons which reads as follows: "With reference to our meeting in your office yesterday noon, I attach a revised memorandum which Marshall Green took to New York late yesterday afternoon. It reflects views expressed at the meeting, most particularly the feeling that with energetic resupply efforts we may have more time in which to maneuver for a solution."

[1] The quotation is from Document 83.

action such as naval bombardment and/or USAF attacks on ChiCom shore batteries; (c) the U.S. could agree to GRC attacks on ChiCom batteries. However, the ChiCom's numerous batteries are so well emplaced and so heavily revetted that they could not, for the most part, be knocked out by any conventional weapons. Moreover, as SNIE 100–11–58 of September 16, 1958 points out, all of the above courses of action "eventually would probably involve U.S. attacks on the mainland and the U.S. could be charged before world opinion with expanding the scope of the armed conflict."[2]

5. Thus any new effective military measures to relieve Quemoy involves the use sooner or later of atomic weapons. Recourse to atomic weapons would involve a grave risk of Communist retaliation in kind [*document number not declassified*][3] and the United States would be strongly condemned by world opinion, if not by public opinion within the U.S. The U.S. would probably be asked to withdraw all its forces and facilities from Japan, according to Ambassador MacArthur.

6. Meanwhile there are disturbing signs of GRC discontent, resentment and restiveness, of GRC efforts to get the U.S. involved in a nuclear war with Red China [*document number not declassified*][4] of GRC top military echelon's "crying panic long before panic is a factor" (COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan to CNO September 14),[5] and of Taiwanese sentiment becoming hostile to GRC and to U.S. (Taipei's 406 of September 16).[6] If the U.S. resists GRC pressures for new military initiatives, and if the GRC Government begins to lose face with its own people and in the international arena, there may be a dangerous rift in U.S.–GRC relations and/or the GRC may strike out on its own against the mainland. (COMUSTDC reports on September 14 that there are ominous signs that the GRC is "planning something big they don't want us to know about").[7]

7. It must be emphasized, in this connection, that it would be far worse in terms of Asian reactions if any change in the status of the Offshore Islands were to come about as the result of enemy military victory rather than as the result of negotiations. (See INR's I.R. 7794 of September 4, 1958.)[8]

---

[2] Document 99.

[3] [*Footnote not declassified.*]

[4] Document not found.

[5] Document 90.

[6] Telegram 406 from Taipei reported on public opinion in Taiwan concerning the offshore island situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1658)

[7] See Document 90.

[8] "Probable Far Eastern Reaction to a Loss of the Offshore Islands to Communist China." (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1957–58)

8. All of the foregoing emphasizes the need for strong diplomatic and other pressures (a) to bring the Communist Chinese to stop the gunfire and (b) to keep the GRC under control. At the same time, the Communists are unlikely to try to change the present military situation and they are unlikely to make any concessions at Warsaw. If they can stall at Warsaw for just one month without cease-fire conditions, Quemoy may be lost unless we go to war—a nuclear war—to try to save it. That is why it is so urgent that we force the pace and try to get hostilities stopped within the next fortnight.

The following courses of action are accordingly proposed for consideration:

(a) We must not let the Chinese Communists get away with stalling at Warsaw. We should make one more effort at Warsaw this Sunday. At that time we should put forward an explicit proposition along the lines suggested by Warsaw's 411[9] whereby we would undertake to refrain from certain actions considered by the ChiComs as provocative, and in return we could expect them to refrain from military action against us. We would not ask for ChiCom agreement to this effect but would merely inform them that our forces, and we would seek GRC cooperation too, would, beginning at a certain time and for a certain trial period, refrain from certain acts on the expectation that reciprocal moves would be made by the ChiComs. For our part we might undertake (a) cancellation of all U.S. escort activities, (b) no U.S. vessels or planes operating within 20 miles of Chinese coast, (c) seek to persuade GRC that its supply missions would not carry military equipment, but would carry only food, medical supplies and other necessaries.

(b) If, in the face of this entirely reasonable proposal for cease-fire conditions, the ChiComs should refuse to cooperate, we might shortly thereafter concert with the GRC to announce (a) our immediate suspension of all shooting or other military actions, as well as the termination of certain actions which might be considered rightly or wrongly by the ChiComs to be provocative, and (b) that this suspension will continue for as long as it is responded to by suspension of enemy gunfire and other hostile actions.

(c) If these two measures fail to stop the gunfire, then we should bring the issue before the General Assembly exposing the whole record, including the latest Warsaw talks. We should demand condemnation of the Red Chinese aggression; we should demand that the UN go on record as opposing resort to the use of force in resolving this crisis which might otherwise envelop the Far East, if not the world, in a nuclear catastrophe; we should specifically seek a UN resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. During UN debate on this subject, we should not oppose Red Chinese attendance on the same terms they attended the UN in 1950 (?) during the Korean war.

---

[9] See footnote 1, Document 93.

(d) During the debate, we could expect a number of countries to come forward with various types of compromise proposals. The U.S. might consider giving its silent consent to that proposal which was likely to have majority UN support and which, at the same time, provided for terms which we and the GRC could live with. Such terms might include (a) cessation of gunfire and other hostile acts, (b) avoidance of provocative actions such as leaflet raids, interference with shipping, overflights, etc., (c) demilitarization of the Offshore Islands area, (d) continuation of the Warsaw talks with a view to trying to effect settlement of further issues.

(e) The above program should be pressed forward urgently. Meanwhile any success we have in improving the resupply of Quemoy will give us more time in which to operate and will strengthen our bargaining position generally. We must therefore tax U.S./GRC ingenuity, determination and efforts to the limit in improving resupply without attempting any new military initiatives. We must also act to prevent the GRC from making dangerous moves and unwise statements. We should nevertheless prepare—and make no secret or our preparations—for further military action if that unhappy decision is forced upon us by Peiping. If that decision is taken, the record should by then have been made clear before U.S. and world opinion that Peiping was responsible, for it had been adequately warned and had persisted in its aggression in defiance of the majority will in the UN.

---

107. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, September 19, 1958, 5:10 p.m.

190910Z. Personal for Admiral Burke, VAdm Riley, VAdm Beakley. To Admiral Felt locally by hand. Private conference with Vice President late last night brought out significant points with peculiar implication. Details my conversation given Ambassador this morning and relayed to State.[1] Significant points are (a) VP thinks US fiddling while GRC burns

---

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147, Lot 62 F 83, Offshore Islands and Taiwan Straits (1958 Crisis). Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to CNO and COMSEVENTHFLT.

[1] Telegram 439 from Taipei, September 19, reported a conversation between Chen and Smoot at a dinner party the night before. Chen had told Smoot that Kinmen could not hold out indefinitely under constant harassing fire and that if it continued, Nationalist counteraction of some kind was inevitable. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958; see Supplement)

and (b) this first time he has approached me with gravely serious attitude. I can only conclude this GRC maneuver to raise my whipping boy status one notch since Minister Defense not getting through to me so good now on political matters. Highlights VP discourse are (A) US will probably not take bold stand in UN or Moscow [*Warsaw*] talks. (B) Moscow talks doomed for failure. (C) only thing Commies respect is force. (D) ChiNat public and military cannot hold out long under pattern of present submissive punishment. (E) ChiNat combat counteraction inevitable.

He made no requests. He omitted any reference to US combat involvement but implication clear in his opinion US is not facing the issue honestly, squarely and boldly.

New subject. All press hailing increased success convoys. This is true and eight inch How movement went exactly as per plan and well handled. We can expect vigorous reaction from Commies and soon. Ambasador and I talked again on evacuation. My opinion this respect is remote but possible risk ChiComs will bomb Taiwan air bases and convoy staging points. Ambassador much more concerned re possibility internal GRC demonstrations against Americans. I don't know which is greater threat but we agreed hold off a while longer. My purpose this despatch like those preceding keep you informed background developments of military nature. You will note I have eschewed personal opinions which usually become too colored in local atmospere. I can't close this one however without busting out one or two. If we don't tell these so and sos across the pond in no uncertain terms and tell 'em soon that we're going to take no more of their guff we are going to be in a shooting war within two weeks. If we do tell them they will scream aggressor and back down. This is our private fight: the US and Red China. We are going to get no Allies to help us.

If we back down now the least little bit we had better move fast out of Taiwan and we will be the laughingstock of a great part of the world. We've got to draw a line somewhere on losing real estate to the Reds and we've committed ourselves so far now that it looks like Kinmen is it so what are we waiting for. Talk first yes—but talk fast and fierce and hold a gun right between their eyes. Maybe Herb was right and we should have gotten tough with ChiNats —but it's too late now—we are in it but good. We can still get out but not the way we're trying to do it now. I feel better. Regards. Smoot.

108. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 19, 1958, 8 p.m.

443. Reference: Deptel 245.[1]

1. Moderate, clear statement of views and attitudes of GRC leadership toward present crisis will be found in Premier Chen Cheng's report of September 16 to Legislative Yuan. (See Embtel 411[2] for summary and Embassy despatch 133, September 17[3] for full text. See also Embtel 439[4] for Chen's further private comment.) Although he has exercised great restraint thus far under extreme provocation, I would rate President as advocate of more active retaliation policy than Chen.

2. As I have reported GRC has no faith negotiations with Communists will bring results. GRC leaders here are impressed with our military preparations and vigorous military help, but they have no confidence in our diplomacy. They are 100 percent certain Warsaw talks can move ahead only at GRC expense. Therefore, they will breathe sigh of relief if talks fail. GRC leadership is convinced Communists respect military force alone. They felt we had Communists on run until we offered to resume talks. Now they fear US attempts to buy transitory peace at their expense. This belief persists and will have harmful overtones as long as we talk about matters vital to existence of GRC with its sworn enemies.

3. GRC has already given us notice that it will repudiate commitments made by us which adversely affect its vital rights and interests. I believe GRC is firm in its position. It will particularly resist commitments to "freeze" situation, "neutralization", or demilitarization. Such commitments would be regarded as forever barring leadership from sacred commitment to liberate mainland compatriots and put kiss of death to its existence even in Taiwan. I believe, as I have reported elsewhere, GRC would be glad to return to status quo ante and perhaps to agree to some self-denying measures to ease possibility of provocation to other side. But it is not willing to agree to infringements of its sovereignty or to agree

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 10:40 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

[1] Telegram 245 to Taipei, September 18, transmitted an urgent request for the Embassy's appraisal of the mood and intentions of Chiang and the top GRC leadership including the "chances of their taking drastic, unilateral action designed to embroil us in shooting war with Chinese Communists" and their possible reaction if the United States were to press for demilitarization or evacuation of the offshore islands. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–1858; see Supplement)

[2] Dated September 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1658)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 793.21/9–1758)

[4] See footnote 1, Document 107.

to extinguish legally its hopes of going home. In my opinion, there is no possibility GRC would agree to abandon Kinmen. GRC will use every resource in its power to hold islands. I do not believe US efforts at persuasion would be effective. On contrary, I fear our persuasions would be scorned, rejected, and all good will built up over past few years would vanish. All confidence in our professions as an ally would evaporate.

4. If we managed in some way to persuade GRC to abandon islands, and I don't believe it can be done, I think stability of GRC would be seriously impaired. It would no longer command respect of its mainland followers here or of Taiwanese and in these circumstances its lease on life could not be long. Further, its international support would be prejudiced as well as loyalty of overseas Chinese. Loss of sense of mission among dedicated Chinese leadership would be most important of intangible losses. Taiwan has been excellently administered under this leadership and it is doubtful whether suitable replacements could be found.

5. I have yet to find evidence that GRC leadership has sought in this crisis to involve US deliberately in war with Communists. Leadership has instead asked us to establish deterrents that would stop war from spreading. These requests have sought flat statement on our part to defend off shores and movement of US military forces into area as retaliatory threat. GRC leadership has thus far refrained from asking our direct participation in hostilities. Instead, it has sought our concurrence to take retaliatory action in Amoy vicinity which we have not yet seen fit to give. Thus far GRC has not taken retaliatory action in absence of our concurrence. My estimate is that GRC patience is running out but is not yet exhausted. It may feel able to prolong present agony another two or three weeks if it thinks such prolongation should benefit its over-all interests or be convinced by US this effect. But if present conditions continue without appreciable change, GRC will be obliged to take retaliatory action in attempt to relieve Kinmen defenders. It will hope for our concurrence, but will proceed without it whenever situation is regarded as justifiably desperate. GRC has capability alone to launch aerial attacks against mainland and it may have capability to carry out some small commando operations. Neither is likely to be very effective and without our material support GRC air force could not withstand for long numerically greater Communist air force. Smoot believes GRC is planning some military measure it has not revealed to him. Evidence remains fragmentary. Smoot now believes Tiger Wang with whom he is on close terms would let him know in advance of operation if it materializes.

6. Public opinion here hardens as interdiction continues and demands for its lifting are barely under control despite efforts of GRC to limit public and legislative sentiment. If interdiction is not breached, or if retaliatory action is not taken to help Kinmen defenders, we may expect another welling up of protests and demands soon. GRC had already

gauged accurately swing of international opinion and while it has attempted to cultivate world opinion by its restraint, it is concerned mainly by extent to which such opinion affects US attitudes and positions.

7. I believe a strong, unwavering attitude of support to our GRC ally is only policy we can safely follow in this crisis. Concessions to Communists will not be accepted by our ally and our attempts to get such concessions would breach our alliance and destroy our friendship. Concessions would only whet appetite of Communists and put us in more difficult position to resist later. Communists indictment of US as "paper tiger" would ring true to millions of Asians and our prestige and influence out here would soon be nil and policies we have followed through Eisenhower administration would have to go on scrap heap. Taiwan would fall to Communists in 2 or 3 years if we abandoned GRC and before long we would be defending our Pacific coast under great odds.

8. My suggestions of measures we should take now are as follows:

A. Abandon Warsaw talks when we have completed feeling out other side with implication we will meet force with force.

B. If feasible, condemn Communist China in UN for resumption of use of force to get ends.

C. Build up our military posture over Taiwan to needed strength.

D. Release restraints on GRC, provide it with necessary equipment and advice, and let it get to job of attempting to reduce Kinmen interdiction. I believe it would be advisable for us to stay on sidelines (if possible) while we see whether GRC with our massive material help can crack interdiction. I would suggest that we try to abstain from actual participation in hostilities with our forces unless that is deemed only way to save Kinmen and our ally. I believe GRC will give good account of itself if we backstop it adequately and give it our firm support internationally.

Drumright

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 19, 1958, 8:55 p.m.

311. Beam–Wang Talks. Following are instructions for position you should adopt at meeting with Wang on 21st:[1]

You should point out that Wang has set forth in completely uncompromising terms a demand for the surrender of a sovereign government and for the withdrawal of all forces of that government's allies from its sovereign territory. Wang has clearly asked for what he knows is impossible and totally unacceptable as indeed it is.

US on other hand has set forth in its declaration submitted at last meeting a proposition which attempts to meet in as equitable a fashion as possible the conflicting interest of parties concerned. Such a proposition should invite careful consideration. To reject it out of hand would reveal that the Chinese Communists have no constructive interest in holding these talks.

If Wang's remarks mean complete Chinese Communist rejection our proposal it will appear to civilized world Communists place primary reliance on violence including slaughter innocent civilian inhabitants and they will be condemned again before bar world opinion. Reiterate that urgent prerequisite any peaceful resolution of present crisis is cessation hostilities. Each day hostilities continue danger expansion of conflict increases. Since these hostilities result solely from armed attacks Chinese Communists and can cease only when attacks cease responsibility for decision whether or not conflagration will result completely in hands Chinese Communists. Note that Wang says people of world watching talks and add that people of world will hold accountable side which refuses essential first condition of peace, cessation hostilities. World will not accept Wang's contention that question of cease fire "does not arise" when it known to all that present threat world peace created precisely by decision his side use force seize territory.

Counter Wang's charge that US using force in Taiwan area and that tension created by this and US "aggression" in Taiwan. Record of US in foreign affairs too well known require defense against charge aggression. Presence of US military forces in Taiwan area due entirely to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Josiah W. Bennett, Officer in Charge of Political Affairs in the Office of Chinese Affairs, and Green; cleared by Herter and Martin and in draft by Dulles and Robertson; and approved by Parsons. Repeated priority to Taipei.

[1] Telegram 448 from Warsaw, September 20, reported that the meeting had been postponed until September 22 at Chinese request. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–2058)

actions and threats of Chinese Communists and is response to treaty obligations with sovereign ally. US forces have not committed one aggressive act. They however fully prepared discharge defensive responsibilities.

You should make clear we do not accept distinction between "Sino-American international dispute" and "domestic matter" of Taiwan and coastal islands. We do not recognize right Chinese Communists unilaterally declare armed attack a domestic matter by announcing prior claim to territory held by a sovereign government. Attack on coastal islands is far from domestic matter as interest of world, including USSR demonstrates. Failure resolve our differences could have grave consequences for many nations and US for its part welcomes world attention and interest in matter. You should also point out Wang not accurate in statement that Taiwan Chinese territory from "time immemorial". No one disputes fact that Taiwan under Japanese sovereignty for 50 years or that its liberation from Japanese rule largely due US military presence in Far East. It is presumptuous for Chinese Communists now to assert US presence is aggressive meddling.[2]

You should not press for an early next meeting but accept any day proposed by Wang provided it is within one week's time.

FYI. Foregoing subject final review Saturday[3] morning. Will cable any changes Niact.[4] End FYI.

Herter

---

[2] Telegram 312 to Warsaw, September 20, told Beam to delete this sentence. (*Ibid.*)

[3] September 20.

[4] In telegram 449 from Warsaw, September 21, Beam questioned the advisability of disputing at the next meeting Wang's contention that Taiwan had been Chinese territory from "time immemorial", stating that he thought it better for tactical reasons to focus on the cease-fire question. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2158) Telegram 314 to Warsaw, September 21, authorized Beam to use his discretion on this point. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 449 is in the Supplement.

110. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 19, 1958, 8 p.m.

634. Following is text of Khrushchev's reply to President's letter of September 12, which Kuznetsov handed me this afternoon.[1]

"Mr. President, Having received your letter of September 12 and studied it, I was grieved that you, as it seems to me, did not understand the essence of my message to you. The essence of that message was to show the danger which threatens humanity if the USA does not renounce its aggressive policy, which is constantly creating hotbeds of serious conflicts first in one and then in another region of the world and has led to the creation at the present time of an especially tense situation in the Far East.

Recognizing in your answer that in the region of the Island of Taiwan a dangerous situation has been created, you at the same time try to remove from the Government of the USA responsibility for the tension in that area threatening the cause of peace. In this connection the justifications for the aggressive activities of the USA in your message completely distort the actual position of things, drawing a picture which has nothing in common with actuality.

Anyone who soberly evaluates the situation which has arisen, having regard for the real facts, cannot but realize that the single and genuine source of tension in this part of the world is that the USA has seized age-old Chinese territory—Taiwan and a series of other islands, is supporting on it under the protection of its cannon the Chiang Kai-shek clique which has been thrown out by the Chinese people, is encouraging its attacks and provocations against peoples China. The recent events are one of the manifestations of this general aggressive course of the USA in relation to China. Your remark evokes surprise that I, addressing a message to you can not send a letter, as you say, to the Communist leaders of China, in relation to whom and to the Chinese Peoples Republic you repeatedly adopt a scornful and hostile tone in your message. First of all, Mr. President I would like to say to you the following in this connection.

In the whole history of China there has not been a party and its leaders nor a government that has enjoyed such trust and limitless support of

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958. Official Use Only; Niact. Transmitted in five sections. Received at 9:29 p.m. Also sent priority to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated priority to USUN, London, Taipei, Warsaw, and Hong Kong.

[1] Reported in telegram 631 from Moscow, September 19. (*Ibid.*) The Embassy commented on the letter in telegram 644, September 20. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–2058; see Supplement) A translation of the letter differing from this one was published in *Soviet News* on September 22.

the entire Chinese people as does the great Communist party of China and its leaders, and also the Government of the Chinese People's Republic. Yes, really, the leaders of the Communist party are the recognized leaders of the Chinese people, and now they lead not only the Chinese Communist party, but the entire Chinese people, a new, peoples-democratic state—the Chinese People's Republic.

I sent the message on the subject of the events in the area of Taiwan to the President of the USA and not to the government of the CPR for the simple reason that it is not China which is interfering in the internal affairs of the USA, but the USA, defying all the norms of behavior of civilized states, which has grossly interfered in the affairs of China and is trying by force of arms to install in another's home its order, creating thereby a serious threat to the cause of peace in the Far East. How is it, Mr. President, that you summon us, as you do, to exert some kind of influence on the government of the CPR in connection with the events in the area of Taiwan—that means to try to push the Soviet Union into interference in the internal affairs of China. The Soviet Union will never be a party to such a shameful affair, for that would fundamentally contradict its peace-loving foreign policy, would be incompatible with the relations of unbreakable friendship and brotherly cooperation which unite the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

As you found it necessary to note in your letter, I recently was in Peking and had the opportunity to exchange with the leaders of the government of the CPR opinions about all questions in which the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are interested. I can say straightaway and frankly that during our talks in Peking that complete unanimity of the USSR and CPR was confirmed again in the most important thing—that it is necessary also henceforth with all resoluteness to carry out the struggle against aggressive forces and to support the forces defending peace in the whole world. The Chinese people are filled with the urge to develop their economy, to raise their living standards, which is possible only in conditions of peace and security. Therefore, it is natural that the people of China manifest serious alarm in connection with the situation which has developed in the area of the island of Taiwan.

If on the island of Taiwan over a period of years continues to sit a General discarded by the Chinese people, not subordinate to the lawful government of China and holding certain Offshore Islands which are several kilometers from the major centers of the maritime provinces of China, this intolerable position became possible only because the government of the USA, having interfered in the internal affairs of China, took under military protection the corrupt Chiang Kai-shek clique.

Who can deny that without the support from the side of the USA there would long since not have existed either the Chiang Kai-shek clique nor the so-called Taiwan problem, that if it were not for the interference of the USA, the peoples of this region would long since have lived in peace and quiet. It is clear to anyone that the US has unlawfully seized these islands because the preservation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan gives it the possibility of retaining in this area its armed forces and to threaten the CPR with war. Only a traitor and a betrayer of his people such as Chiang Kai-shek could permit a foreign power—the US—to concentrate armed forces against China, against the Chinese people. You try to prove that which cannot be proved, that the Government of the USA has some sort of moral and legal right to keep its armed forces in the area of Taiwan. Each tries to interpret facts according to the way his own morality allows him, but it is impossible to avoid facts. They speak for themselves. The facts are that the Government of the USA, by force, seized islands belonging to the Chinese people, which are separated from the American continent by 10,000 kilometers, and is trying to hold them. Moreover, you want China to disclaim this territory and to reconcile herself to the fact that it is in foreign hands and serves as a base for the spreading of aggression against the CPR and other peace-loving [countries] of Asia.

But isn't it evident, and doesn't the entire experience of the struggle of peoples for national liberation and independence show, that a great world power such as the CPR, never will agree to the cutting off of a part of its territory, and moreover, will not reconcile itself to the fact that on this territory foreign armed forces have been accumulated with the aim of aggression against it?

As is apparent from your letter, it is precisely the preservation of this situation which the Government of the USA is trying to achieve. Otherwise, what sense can there be in your words about the fact that I have not addressed myself to the leaders of the CPR with a letter appealing to them for moderation. If we agreed with your point of view, then in effect we would begin to cooperate in the preparation of war against China—our great friend and ally. It is sufficient to consider this suggestion only for a minute in order for its absurdity to become evident. How is it possible, Mr. President, to expect that we will lull the vigilance of our Chinese friends and cooperate with aggressive forces in the preparation for an attack on the CPR and thereby in the preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union? It is futile to expect this from us.

In your letter you announce that the island of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands never were under the control of Communist China. This declaration is made, apparently, in order to justify the attempt to sever these territories from the CPR. Incidentally, the USA solemnly recognized that these territories belonged to China in the Cairo Declaration of

1943.[2] This was also confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945,[3] which the USA and certain other great powers signed. Under these declarations are the signature of your predecessors in the post of President—Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. But can it be that the aforementioned territories ceased to be Chinese after, in China, as a result of the victories of the peoples revolution, there was created a government which reflects the will of the whole Chinese people and which is governed by the ideas of Communism? Certainly not. To deny this means to interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples, means to take upon oneself the function of a gendarme. Your declaration bears witness to the fact that the Government of the USA, unfortunately, does not intend to renounce interference in the internal affairs of China and an aggressive course in relation to the Chinese People's Republic. And just this is a very dangerous policy which creates a threat of an outbreak of military conflict in the Far East and in other regions. Certainly if you construct your policy proceeding from such conceptions, then England, were she in a position to do so, could, for example, begin war against the USA only on the basis that the US at one time did not exist and that its present territory was a colony of the British Empire.

It is impossible also not to note that, in your letter, the opposing of Taiwan and of the Offshore Islands to all of China is an undisguised attempt to create a situation of "two Chinas". Similar attempts having the aim of dismembering the territory of China are decisively repudiated by the people and the Government of the CPR as well as by all who treat with respect the sovereign rights of peoples and the territorial integrity of states. Until now, Mr. President, you apparently proceed from the premise that Chiang Kai-shek represents something in China. In fact, for 600 million Chinese he is merely a hated shadow of the past, and they wish that this shadow would disappear as soon as possible and forever. In China, there is only one government—the CPR. Not to see this is to base your actions on illusions which, it goes without saying, cannot serve as the basis for the foreign policy of any state.

The allegation in your letter that the armed forces of the USA are acting in the area of Taiwan in pursuance of treaty obligations of the USA to a handful of betrayers of the Chinese people headed by Chiang Kai-shek is groundless. I am not even speaking about that handful of people whom, even in 1949, Acheson, then Secretary of State of the USA, characterized as people who were corrupt and who had lost the trust of their people, who have long represented no one but themselves. At the present time Chiang Kai-shek can assume the capacity of representative of China with no more basis than, for instance, Kerensky the capacity of representative of the Soviet people. And if the logic of your letter is followed, it derives that while Kerensky, who is maintained somewhere within the USA, is alive, and you could also conclude a treaty with him as head of the provisional government of Russia which existed at one time, the US, relying on that treaty as it now relies on its treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, could begin a war against the Soviet Union. Now doesn't this example demonstrate how absurd are references to treaty obligations such as those which the USA has with Chiang Kai-shek? This kind of a treaty is invented and fabricated exclusively for concealment of aggressive aims.

---

[2] For text of the communiqué issued at Cairo on December 1, 1943, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.

[3] For text of the proclamation by President Harry S. Truman, President Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, see *ibid.*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 1474.

You assert in your letter that Chiang Kai-shek, who is supported by the Government of the USA, is recognized by the majority of states. I would not begin to employ such arithmetic, Mr. President, because it can lead to a serious error. However, I should point out that at the present time the CPR is recognized by more than thirty states, whose population comes to more than a billion persons. With regard to the recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek clique by a number of governments you yourself know well what efforts it has cost and costs the US to achieve retention of such recognition. This your State Secretary Dulles also knows well. I do not reveal a secret if I say that the countries retaining relations with the Chiang Kai-shekists are burdened by such recognition, and this recognition is approaching its end. It cannot be doubted that the majority of states which retain diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek under pressure of the USA will be happy when there finally comes to an end the situation which is in open contradiction to common sense and goes contrary to the interests of the peoples of these countries, and when China occupies its just place in international organizations.

It is undoubtedly very well known to you that even those countries which do not dare to recognize the CPR because of the danger of incurring the displeasure of the USA are experiencing serious qualms about the possible results of the present policy of the US in relation to the CPR. This is understandable because the threats of the statesmen of the USA addressed to the CPR and also the concentration of American armed forces and other military preparations of the USA in the area of Taiwan actually create a threat of the eruption of an armed conflict with all of the dangerous consequences deriving therefrom. With regard to the blackmail and threats relating to People's China, it is necessary to say that they have not achieved and cannot achieve their goal.

As I already pointed out in my previous message, some American military figures are even trying to threaten China with atomic weapons. In the press it is revealed that units of the American Air Force equipped with atomic arms are being transferred to Taiwan, that there are being delivered various missiles and guided missiles, in particular the type "Nike Hercules", that sites for their launching are being constructed, and so on. Such activity of the Government of the USA cannot, of course, lead to a reduction of tension in this area, to a relaxation of the situation and to the creation of conditions for the strengthening of trust. On the contrary, these activities are directed toward the exacerbation of the situation and increase danger of the outbreak of war involving use of the most destructive kinds of modern weapons.

I should say to you in all candor, Mr. President, that atomic blackmail with regard to the CPR does not frighten either us or the CPR. Those who nurture plans for an atomic attack on the CPR should not forget that not only the USA but the other side as well possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and also the appropriate means for their delivery, and if such an attack is made on the CPR, the aggressor will immediately receive a proper repulse with these very means.

War against China on the pretext of defense of the so-called interests of security of the USA or on any other such artificial pretext whatever will get the US nowhere. To unleash war against People's China means to send to certain death the sons of the American people and to ignite the conflagration of world war. This means to take on one's self a heavy responsibility before humanity and before history. Responsibility for this, Mr. President, also will lie personally on you.

It is especially necessary to emphasize that such a step of the Government of the USA would be unanimously condemned by the peoples of the entire world, among them I am convinced, also the American people.

I have already stated to you and I consider it necessary to emphasize it once more that an attack on the CPR is an attack on the Soviet Union. With the great friend, ally and neighbor of our country—with People's China—we have concluded a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, corresponding to the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, to the interests of peace and let no one doubt this: We will fulfill completely the obligations we have assumed.

Therefore, I would like once more to turn to you with an appeal not to overheat the atmosphere, not to create conditions which would disturb mankind which is thirsting for peace, to think over and weigh all the circumstances before undertaking any steps which might lead to catastrophic consequences.

The duty of governments and above all of the governments of our countries is to do everything necessary so that the development of international events should go in the direction of strengthening peaceful cooperation, so that trade should be developed among peoples, economic ties, cultural relations, so that all results of labor are directed toward the raising of the welfare of peoples and for the security of further progress.

After your election as President of the USA, Soviet leaders placed great hopes on you. Remembering the good experience of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the US in that period when you were in command of the armed forces of the USA, England and France in the war against fascism, against Hitlerite Germany, we calculated that this cooperation could be realized also after the war, in the present period, in the interest of the preservation and consolidation of peace. However, now the policy which you as President are conducting to a significant degree has undermined these good feelings and is ever more strengthening among us the opinion that Mr. Dulles' "brink of war" policy in essence is not separated from your name, is linked with it. This is very regrettable.

In our time a "position of strength" policy, a policy of balancing "on the brink of war" cannot be successful. In contrast to that period when Hitler unleashed a world war, now the forces of peace are immeasurably strengthened and what is especially important the relation of forces on the international arena has radically changed in their favor. History will grimly judge those state leaders who, not reckoning with common sense and with the interests of the peoples of the whole world, seek to follow the path of military adventures.

It is generally known that the Government of the CPR has repeatedly taken the initiative and come out with proposals directed toward the weakening of tension in the Far East, toward the peaceful settlement of international questions at issue in this region. Despite the assertion contained in your message, in the course of the negotiations between the CPR and USA on the level of Ambassadors in Geneva, the representatives of China repeatedly proposed that both sides on the basis of the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs should come out with declarations of their readiness to settle disputes between the CPR and the USA in the area of Taiwan by means of peaceful negotiations and not to resort to the application of force or to the threat of force. The Chinese-American negotiations in Geneva did not give positive results only because the USA refused to take such a position and as result of which unilaterally broke off the talks.

In your message you, Mr. President, declare that you welcome the renewal of talks between the USA and the CPR. We also welcome the initiative of the CPR and are glad that the efforts of the Government of the CPR in this direction have met a response on the part of the Government of the US.

We would like to hope that in these negotiations the USA will finally adopt a reasonable, realistic position. Reasonableness and realism of position can be expressed only if the Government of the USA will come to an evaluation of the situation which has arisen by taking into account the historical changes which have taken place in China, by ceasing to support the clique of Chiang Kai-shek and by forming the necessary conclusions from the fact that China is the Chinese People's Republic whose government represents the Chinese state, the whole Chinese people.

If one does not conduct a line toward the preparation of war and indeed is guided by ideas of peaceful cooperation, then it is most important to recognize the Government of the CPR.

Such a step by the Government of the USA would at once improve the international situation and would everywhere be welcomed as an extremely valuable contribution to the cause of preserving peace. An approach toward the solution of international problems from the positions of peaceful cooperation dictates also the necessity to cease an obstructionist policy in the UN organization and not to put obstacles in the way of settlement of the pressing question about the restoration of the rights of the CPR in the UN. This undoubtedly would be met by satisfaction by all member states of the UN inasmuch as without the CPR the UN organization cannot be a full-blooded international organ for the support of international peace and security as the UN Charter demands.

It is necessary once and for all to finish with interference in the internal affairs of China. The American Naval fleet must be withdrawn from the Taiwan Straits and American soldiers must leave Taiwan and go home. Without this there cannot be lasting peace in the Far East. If the USA does not do this now, then no other way will be left to People's China except the expulsion of the armed forces hostile to it from its own territory on which a base is being created for an attack on the Chinese People's Republic. We are completely on the side of the Chinese Government, the Chinese people. We have supported and will support their policy.

If the Government of the USA will follow the path of respecting the sovereign rights of the great Chinese people and will base its policy in relation to China on the principles of peaceful coexistence, then one cannot doubt that this not only will permit the elimination of the current tension in the area of Taiwan but also will create the necessary conditions for the reliable strengthening of peace in the Far East and in the whole world.

With respect (signed) N. Khrushchev."

Davis

111. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 20, 1958, 1 p.m.

452. USUN for Secretary and Robertson. Premier Chen Cheng summoned me this morning. Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister S.K. Chow were present. Conversation lasted 1-1/2 hours.

2. Premier said problem at Kinmen is not one of supplies which are adequate till end October but of physical exhaustion of defenders under continuous heavy pounding of Communist artillery. This is gradually affecting forces' morale; there is limit to human endurance under such conditions. Defenders' morale also adversely affected by continued blockade and our decision to resume talks with Communists. This is not understood by forces at front. Military and civilian morale is gradually being affected too. He and Foreign Minister were now compelled to spend great deal of their time in explanations to public bodies and private citizens. He would convoke another large meeting of legislators, Control Yuan and National Assembly members and KMT leaders this afternoon to offer explanations and bring them up to date.

3. Chen recalled that at meeting held on August 24[1] we had urged restraint and had since urged withholding retaliatory blows. But month had now passed and enemy was continuing his attack at high level of intensity. GRC patience and endurance have been stretched to maximum extent. He had told officers and men at onset of bombardment GRC would provide three weeks for cessation of enemy attacks. GRC is near end of rope and cannot wait longer. Communists respect force and talks will have no purpose but to increase their arrogance. Time has come to use force to break blockade of Kinmen. Attacks on Communist artillery emplacements are of doubtful value. Best tactic is to destroy Communist communications and airfields.

4. Chen said that in conducting retaliatory blows GRC would not "at beginning" ask for direct participation of US Armed Forces. It would be unnecessary and undesirable. GRC would, however, appreciate full US logistical, coordinating and back-stopping support. Premier summed up by saying GRC patience and endurance are overstrained, GRC cannot go on as at present and maintain position. Only way to stop Communists was to attack. It is necessary to lift interdiction and exhaust responsibility of gallant defenders of Kinmen.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:36 a.m. Also sent niact to USUN.

[1] See Document 42.

5. Premier stated categorically GRC would not withdraw from Kinmen under any circumstances. GRC would also reject formal "cease-fire", demilitarization, neutralization, et cetera. He did not favor taking Strait crisis into UN as it would have no helpful effect. He doubted if US could carry condemnatory resolution because of vacillating position shown by free world nations. Further talk would only help Communists.

6. I asked Premier if he asking our formal concurrence to retaliatory action. He avoided direct reply by saying he was telling me what GRC intends or proposes to do. I asked if he spoke with concurrence of President Chiang (who is in Makung today). Chen said he was not speaking with specific authority of Chiang, adding by implication President wanted even more speedy action.

7. I asked if Premier proposed to limit retaliatory action to immediate Kinmen area. He said CAF would try to limit actions to that area, but would have to go back some distance to take out railroad. He said GRC purpose is to lift Kinmen stranglehold and indicated GRC would try to limit hostilities.

8. I asked if GRC intended to consult US Commanders about tactics before taking action. He replied GRC would expect to do so.

9. *Comment:* Premier's purpose in talking with me was plainly to serve informal notice that existing situation cannot be continued much longer, that GRC will be obliged to use counter-blows to lift siege, that force is only way to deal with Communists and that GRC is determined to take that action in near future. I would estimate that we have at most a week or ten days before blow may be expected to fall.

Drumright

---

112. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, September 20, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

200930Z. Subj is protection of GRC offshore island airdrop missions. ChiCom reaction at night to CAF airdrops on Kinmen is increasing and

---

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39. Secret; Operational Immediate. Received in Washington at 9:48 a.m. Repeated to JCS, CNO, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 72, CTF 75, CTF 77, CHNAVSEC MAAG TAIWAN, MAG 11, and the Embassy in Taipei.

has been deterred thus far by presence only of US all weather fighter acft in area. This now appears no longer a deterrent. Unodir [*sic*] I am establishing following rules of engagement policy effective immediately. US all weather fighters under control of GCI radar will provide night protection of CAF transport acft flying airdrop missions to Kinmen. Each transport will be considered the center of a vertical cylinder 20 miles in radius. As escort cylinder centers over airdrop target on any offshore island for which convoy escort is approved, that part of the base circle which would normally extend over mainland will be flattened so that any point on its periphery is 1/2 the distance between the GRC offshore island and mainland. Hostiles entering this moving cylinder at any altitude will be attacked. Alternative is to advise GRC that US will not protect airdrop missions. Alternative not acceptable.[1]

---

[1] Telegram 210026Z from ADMINO CINCPAC, September 20, directed Smoot to defer implementation of telegram 200930Z until it could be personally approved by Admiral Felt. (*Ibid.*) JCS telegram 948448, September 23, implicitly disapproved Smoot's proposal; it stated that paragraph one of JCS telegram 947298 (Document 53) remained in effect and concluded: "Desire at this time avoid involvement US forces in direct action with ChiCom forces except in self-defense." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39; see Supplement)

---

113. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 20, 1958, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Strait Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Mr. Herter
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Parsons—FE
Mr. Green

General Twining
Admiral Burke
Mr. Sprague
General Cabell
General Whisenand[1]
Commander Allendorfer

The Secretary spoke of the gravity of the situation. Nothing is likely to come out of the Warsaw talks where U.S. and Red Chinese positions

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret. Drafted by Green. The meeting was held at Secretary Dulles' residence. See also Document 114.

[1] Brigadier General James F. Whisenand, USAF, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

are too opposed for reconciliation. The talks nevertheless serve the purpose of providing a cover under which there might be some de facto easing of the war tension. They also create a basis for our showing up Peiping's aggressive purposes and for making a more effective appeal for the support of U.S. and allied opinion.

The Secretary outlined three possible interpretations of Peiping's aggressive actions in the Strait: (1) They could be shaping up to an open attack on the Offshore Islands and then on Taiwan itself, a variant on this interpretation being an open attack on the offshores followed by a period of waiting until the impact of the loss of the offshores had undermined the GRC permitting a Communist takeover by subversion perhaps accompanied by military efforts; (2) They could be limited to a Berlin Blockade type of operation, using limited but sustained military pressures to exact political and diplomatic gains; or (3) They could follow the 1954/55 pattern when, faced with a strong U.S. counterposition, Peiping gradually reduced its aggressive efforts to a point where there was relative quiesence.

The Secretary asked whether there had been any evidence to date of the latter trend.

General Cabell and General Twining replied that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the existence of any such trend. Admiral Burke nevertheless felt that the Chicoms might be disposed to let up in the artillery barrage for a while at least in order to get out of the caves and gun emplacements for a short respite.

The Secretary said that if the Chicoms do let the tempo of battle die down, we must be sure to reciprocate by holding back one way or another. General Twining agreed this should be done.

The Secretary returned to interpretation (2) above regarding a Berlin Blockade situation. He asked if the Joint Chiefs felt such a blockade could be broken.

General Twining and Admiral Burke pointed out as background that the Quemoy defenders have hoarded a fairly good supply of ammunition; and that the three howitzers landed yesterday at Quemoy would help, largely for psychological reasons. As to Matsu, it is well stocked and more defensible than Quemoy. General Cabell noted that Matsu is not reachable except by long-distance shore batteries at extreme ranges where accuracy is poor.

As to Quemoy's defense capabilities, the Joint Chiefs reckoned it could hold out for at least two more months (two months at a resupply rate of 100 tons per day) but not indefinitely. They nevertheless considered it probable that the resupply rate could be improved to the 300 tons-per-day level necessary to keep the island going for a considerable period of time on an austere basis without build-up. The main problem would be sustaining the morale and preventing the exhaustion of its defenders who are experiencing boredom and crowded conditions underground. In the latter regard, troops cannot be rotated on Quemoy; they can only be replaced as required. The GRC will not order any net withdrawal of forces.

The Secretary then read aloud passages from Taipei's telegram 452 of September 20 in which Ambassador Drumright reported his conversation that day with Premier Chen Cheng. Chen warned that GRC restraint had been taxed to the limit and that the time had come to use force to break the Quemoy blockade. Chen had also denounced any formal cease-fire or any demilitarization solution. He opposed the Warsaw talks and any UN consideration of this issue except a UN condemnation of the Soviet aggression.

The Secretary commented that the GRC apparently fails to appreciate that we have a serious public opinion problem here at home and that we have to keep our alliances together. The position we are taking in Warsaw and toward UN competence in dealing with this issue is precisely that which we took in 1954/55. We are perfectly aware of the futility of trying to reach solutions at Warsaw but it is an exercise we must go through. It is an exercise as much in GRC interests as in our own.

Mr. Robertson expressed full agreement and suggested that it would be helpful if the Secretary would talk to Ambassador Yeh along those lines.

The Secretary turned to interpretation (1) above, inquiring if there were any evidence of an impending assault operation. Admiral Burke said such evidence was lacking. The Chicoms probably realize that this would involve U.S. sea and air action against shore batteries and assault craft, which would defeat the assault. General Twining pointed out in this connection that a special White House paper of September 6, initiated by the President, gives the JCS standing authority to oppose an assault by using conventional weapons against artillery positions and naval targets.[2]

General Cabell was asked by the Secretary to comment on the military implications of the latest Khrushchev letter to the President.[3] General Cabell replied that it was his agency's estimate that the Soviets will not become actively involved in a war in the Taiwan Strait unless U.S./GRC activities extend beyond the Strait area. The Soviets, he noted, are not taking the type of alert measures they took during the recent Middle East crisis. They do not appear to be making any unusual preparations. The very vehemence of their note connotes that they are relying on words rather than contemplated military action.

---

[2] See footnote 4, Document 71.

[3] See Document 110.

The Secretary interposed that the Khrushchev note nevertheless carried the tones of an ultimatum, vowing that unless we withdrew our forces from Taiwan there was no alternative but expulsion of those forces by the Chicoms with USSR support.

General Cabell drew attention to the fact that "support" could mean minimal logistic support; or again, it could be full operational support, but he didn't think that the latter was the Soviet intention at least at present. Admiral. Burke added that the Soviets seem to be saying that their support will be along logistic lines unless we use atomic weapons, against which they will then retaliate in kind.

The Secretary concluded from what the Chiefs and General Cabell had said that the Quemoy situation is tolerable from our standpoint provided (a) we are prepared to oppose an assault, and (b) we can keep Quemoy resupplied on at least an austerity basis. He wondered, however, whether the GRC would tolerate this situation, bearing in mind, moreover, that the GRC may view it as a golden opportunity for recovering the mainland as the outcome of a war between the U.S. and Red China. The Secretary said he did not wish to imply deliberate GRC disloyalty to its U.S. ally, for the Gimo is honorable and loyal and has always shown good faith. However this sentiment pervades the thinking of many people on Taiwan. It is understandable by their lights.

Discussion followed of various measures which might be taken to induce better GRC understanding of the military realities of any war involving Taiwan.

On the question of a GRC air attack on shorebatteries, General Twining stated that this would not knock out the batteries. Furthermore, it would directly invite Chicom air retaliation at least against Quemoy, which in turn would place the GRC and ourselves in a worse position than now.

Note was taken of the superior performance of GRC pilots in their several recent aerial encounters with the Chicoms. General Twining commented that the GRC has an excellent air force and that the GRC, like the Chicoms, has exercised restraint.

Mr. Robertson asked how essential it was from a military viewpoint to continue our convoy escort operations to a point nearer than, say, 20 miles of Quemoy. When the Chicoms see U.S. vessels involved, does that tend, for example, to induce heavier battery fire against the convoy? Admiral Burke replied that our vessels presented the same visual profile and effect on radar as GRC ships, so that the convoy would draw the same fire whether or not the escort ships were U.S. He thought U.S. escort ships were essential.

Mr. Robertson inquired about a report that airdrop missions are limited due to a shortage of parachutes. Admiral Burke denied this report. He added that aerial resupply, though limited, had done pretty well. No planes had been lost in the air, and air dropped supplies had been recovered without destruction by artillery fire.

At Admiral Burke's request, Commander Allendorfer described LVT operations. We have 153 LVT's, he said, each capable of carrying between 2 and 3 tons. Since an LST carries 17 LVT's, it can carry about 43 tons when LVT-loaded. These LVT's are effective in this operation because they are not stopped by the beach profile of Quemoy and are elusive.

Admiral Burke remarked that the Navy was gaining good experience in this crisis but it was costing the U.S. Navy about 3 million dollars above normal.

Mr. Sprague said that he had just reported to Mr. Dillon and General Goodpaster that the 50 million dollar NDAP program for the GRC this year would have to be raised to 200 million dollars. He agreed with Mr. Dulles, however, that this was inconsequential in terms of the political issues involved.

The Secretary asked if it didn't emerge from this discussion that this is essentially a Berlin Blockade type of operation, in which we must exert maximum efforts to keep Quemoy going, while at the same time (a) being ready to act against a Chicom assault and (b) continuing to urge the Chinats to act within the present ground rules, for any extension of the rules could bring about a net worsening of the situation as far as the U.S./GRC is concerned.

General Twining agreed, but Admiral Burke thought we might consider all-U.S.-manned convoy operations. He spoke of the difficulties involved in U.S.–GRC convoy command arrangements.

The Secretary said he thought there were two angles to be covered in talking with the GRC: (1) to ask for restraint and (2) to explain that any talks at Warsaw or in the UN are not designed to give anything away. We have not the remotest idea of success at Warsaw but we must take a posture which will elicit the support and understanding of our allies for whatever we may have to do. Sentiment in the UN is running against us. 90 percent of the representatives there feel that these offshore islands amount to nothing except trouble for us and provocation of the Communists. They say we and the GRC should disengage and defend from Taiwan.

In a sense they are right, but there are other elements in the equation. There is, for example, no way to bring about a withdrawal from the offshores without engendering a collapse of the GRC and a take-over of Taiwan by subversion possibly combined with subsequent attack. We would end up by losing Taiwan just as surely as if we had handed it over to the Communists.

General Cabell, in agreeing, cited further factors in the equation—the effect on overseas Chinese communities and on Southeast Asia.

There was general agreement that the latest Khrushchev letter to the President was a pressure effort employing an obvious threat. If we succumbed to this kind of threat, our prestige would plummet in free Asia where so many stand with us because we are strong. It would start a chain of events we couldn't stop, leading to the withdrawal of the U.S. defense line more than half way across the Pacific to Alaska–Honolulu.

Mr. Sprague questioned the wisdom of our taking this issue to the UN as proposed in the President's TV address. He thought we would find little support there. He said it would be helpful to the Pentagon to have a clearer picture of how the State Department proposed to handle this issue in the diplomatic field.

The Secretary said he would anticipate that the Warsaw talks would drag on almost indefinitely, except that the meetings would be more spaced out than at present. Possibly the Chicoms would issue an ultimatum over continuing the talks, but he and Mr. Robertson were inclined to anticipate the talks getting into the same old ruts we saw at Geneva. The Secretary estimated that the Chicoms are not bent on a military showdown, for they asked for talks which would be nothing but a liability to them if they pursued new military initiatives.

As far as the UN is concerned, the Secretary pointed out it is not a question of our proposing that the issue be raised or not raised in that forum. The issue is bound to be raised by someone; in fact there are plenty of resolutions already circulating on that subject. However, the matter probably won't come up for debate on an actual resolution for a month or so unless the Warsaw talks break off. When the issue is raised in the UN we would want to get in a resolution asking for a ceasefire, the renunciation of the use of force and an examination of measures to tranquilize the situation. The Chinese Communists would not accept such a resolution in all likelihood. They would say this is a civil war and that they would not come to the UN to discuss any resolution other than one condemning U.S. "aggression" and "intervention" in the area and U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan. The Secretary therefore concluded that he didn't anticipate any solution emanating from the UN, although conceivably we could gain the necessary support for passage of a resolution the Chicoms would not accept.

UN consideration of the issue poses a further dilemma in that the GRC takes a similar view that this is a civil war, and the Chinats seek to have Soviet aggression in this affair condemned by the UN.

General Twining said that his staff had prepared a paper[4] opposing UN consideration of the issue. He subsequently read the paper aloud.

---

[4] Not further identified.

The Secretary reiterated that the issue simply cannot be debarred from UN consideration. Moreover, it would be consistent with the position which President Eisenhower took in 1955 to welcome UN consideration of this Offshore Islands issue. We are committed to that proposition. Of course, it would put the GRC in a difficult position if it refused to accept UN jurisdiction.

We are aware that a resolution introduced in the UN calling for a UN Trusteeship over Taiwan and the seating of Red China would be responsive to the real feelings of some ninety percent of the UN membership. It is pressure by the US that prevents that view from prevailing. Obviously there are dangers in UN consideration, but we can't keep it out. It is just a question of whether it is better for us or for someone else to take the initiative.

---

114. Editorial Note

The meeting at the Secretary's residence recorded in Document 113 continued after the departure of General Twining and Admiral Burke. A note dated September 21, 1958, from Duty Officer James Carson to Executive Secretariat Director Fisher Howe briefly summarizes the first portion of the meeting and continues as follows:

"After Twining and Burke departed, the Secretary brought out a draft press release he had prepared on Khrushchev's September 19 letter. It was substantially the same as the second press release issued by the White House in Newport later Saturday afternoon and drew attention to the upside down language of the Communists in applying one standard for their side and another standard to ours.

"Mr. Murphy then suggested that we reject the letter rather than reply to it. The group, with the Secretary participating, then drafted what became the first release from Newport. The Secretary conferred twice with the President and issuance of the statements rejecting Khrushchev's letter was agreed on." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

Secretary Dulles discussed this with the President and other officials in a series of telephone conversations the afternoon of September 20. Notes by Mildred Asbjornson of the Secretary's staff of a conversation between Dulles and Assistant Secretary Elbrick reads in part as follows: "The Sec. said the President decided on the rejection. He put to him the pros and cons and at first he was inclined to reply. Then he called back and said he thought it better to reject it." Her notes also record that Dulles had spoken to General Twining, had told him that the President had decided to reject Khrushchev's note, and "had reported to Twining what the President had said, namely, that we had better stand by for possible trouble." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; see Supplement)

A statement issued on September 20 by the White House at Newport reads as follows:

> "President Eisenhower received this morning from the United States Embassy in Moscow text of a lengthy communication from Chairman Khrushchev regarding the Far Eastern situation. This communication is replete with false accusations; it is couched in language that is abusive and intemperate; it indulges in personalities; it contains inadmissible threats. All of this renders the communication unacceptable under established international practice. Accordingly, it has been rejected and the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow has been instructed to return the communication to the Soviet Government."

The text of a second statement that discusses the letter at more length is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* page 1163.

Telegram 462 to Moscow, September 20, instructed the Embassy to return the letter to the Foreign Ministry by messenger. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058) Telegram 646 from Moscow, September 21, reported that it had been returned with a covering note to Kuznetsov stating that it was being returned as unacceptable. (*Ibid.,* 793.00/9–2158)

115. Memorandum of Conversation

Newport, Rhode Island, September 21, 1958.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT, SELWYN LLOYD, FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND SIR HAROLD CACCIA, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

The President arrived at his Fort Adams quarters at Newport at 12:25. Mr. Lloyd and Sir Harold were already there and were visiting on the sun porch with Mrs. Eisenhower. The President joined this informal and light discussion for five minutes, and then asked Mr. Lloyd, Sir Harold and myself to step into living room.

At the start of the conversation the President thanked Mr. Lloyd for the support that the United Kingdom had been giving the United States on the Far Eastern situation and asked Mr. Lloyd to personally extend his thanks to Harold Macmillan.

Mr. Lloyd then asked the President if he thought there were any immediate crisis in the Taiwan area. The President replied that he did not think so and that he would be very happy indeed if the United States could make some arrangement with Chiang Kai-shek which would not lose face for him but which would get his troops off the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Lloyd said that his government fully supported the position of the United States—that these matters could not be settled by force but must be settled through negotiation. He said that if it were settled by force, then the free world would be the loser and that the free world would not know when the next territory would be occupied and taken by force. He added that his government was wondering about the outcome of the Warsaw talks and what would happen if those Warsaw talks were to fail. He asked the direct question: What would be the next move?

The President replied that he could not be sure what the next move would be but that the United States was hoping that some good could come from the Warsaw talks although frankly, we were not optimistic about it.

Mr. Lloyd then said that public opinion in his country was in favor of continuing such talks at a higher level should the Ambassadorial talks fail. By that, he explained, he did not mean Heads of Government, but possibly Foreign Ministers.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Hagerty. A copy bearing the notation "Sec saw" is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2158.

The President replied that that was a difficult decision for the United States to make, because our public opinion, he was confident, would not fully support our Secretary of State sitting down at the same table with Chou En-lai. He added, however, that it was something that should be considered.

Mr.Lloyd then said that his government was concerned about what would happen if the Chinese Nationalists and the United States were forced into a "counter battery" position. He also asked that if this situation were to develop, how soon would it become a nuclear situation.

The President did not answer this directly but merely said that the United States was taking this step by step, that we were opposed to the use of force and that we were trying to settle it through negotiation. However, he said that if the Chinese Communists were to start any attack on our fleet, that would be different.

He said that it was a dismaying thing to him that the orientals—both Nationalists and Communists—were creating a situation built around force and that it was hard for the United States to get out of this situation or to keep it from spreading.

Mr. Lloyd responded that in Indo China the free world got out of the situation without a loss of face.

The President responded that the free world got out pretty well but that he did not completely agree with Mr. Lloyd's statement that no loss of face was suffered.

The President responded that probably what was needed were discussions among ourselves—the United States and the United Kingdom—on just what Khrushchev was up to.

Mr. Lloyd said that his government believed that it was a matter of personal vanity on Khrushchev's part. He said his government believed that Khrushchev was angry that there had not been a Summit Meeting and that he was angry that Mr. Macmillan had not returned the visit that Khrushchev and Bulganin made to London several years ago.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Mr. Lloyd then returned to the Formosa Straits problem and said the immediate problem as far as his government was concerned was the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and asked flatly what the United States was going to do about those islands.

The President responded that he could not go beyond the public statements that the United States had been making, but that he would add one thing, and that was that the United States was not going to be kicked out of that area by force. He said that it was essential that the free world keep control of the island of Formosa and that if Formosa were lost, then a hole would result in the very middle of the island chain of defense. Should the Reds eventually control Formosa, that, in the President's opinion, would be a real Munich.

Mr. Lloyd said that his government agreed very much that a loss of Formosa to the Reds would be devastating but he raised the question of whether or not Formosa could be neutralized with an independent Formosa government, not a Nationalist China government.

The President responded that the trouble with that suggestion was who was going to neutralize it, and who was going to keep it neutralized. That would be a job, he said, that would have to be done by the United States and should we get out of the area, no other nation was strong enough to assure this neutralization. The President added that he thought the United States and the United Kingdom should explore every possible solution to the problem in an attempt to find something that was logical and sensible and that the whole world could accept.

Mr. Lloyd then came back to his former thesis that if the Warsaw talks did break down, it would be a good idea, in order to get public opinion in the world on our side, to suggest some other means of negotiation. In this instance he said that Nehru could be of great help. He said he had talked to Dulles on this suggestion, namely, that it might not be a bad idea for the United States to propose a five-power conference on this subject, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Communist China and India.

The President said that we would have a great difficulty here in the United States in getting public acceptance to go into a conference with Red China on that basis. He said that the feeling of the American people against Red China was so strong that it would be almost impossible to have such a meeting. The President reiterated his previous statement that the United States and the United Kingdom should talk together, get down to basics—to fundamentals—and see what we could come up with in the way of a solution.

The President said this was not just a question of Quemoy and Matsu. It was not just a question of China. It was fundamentally a question of what Russia feels she has to do for Red China. He said what would have to be determined was whether the Communists—both Russia and China—were determined to throw the West out of the Far East.

Mr. Lloyd agreed with this and said that if that were the case, it would be quite probable that the Communists' ultimate aim was to throw the West or the Western influence out of Japan, the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam and all the other countries. Mr. Lloyd said he had a good talk with the Japanese Delegate at the United Nations and that this Delegate was worried about Quemoy and Matsu. He said he had talked with Mr. Dulles about this conversation.

The President said that in connection with Quemoy and Matsu, it was important that a solution be worked out which would be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. He pointed out that if Chiang Kai-shek were to quit and Formosa went to the Reds, then the overseas Chinese would have no place to go except to the Communist camp.

Mr. Lloyd said that was true and that was one of the reasons why his government was supporting the United States on its position of trying to work out a peaceful solution through negotiation, rather than resort to force. Mr. Lloyd added that the British government and its people had a frightful dilemma over the question of the use of nuclear weapons. He said that there would be no doubt that if the United States used nuclear weapons in that area, then there was "going to be hell to pay".

The President responded that in his opinion, if nuclear weapons were going to be used, it would have to be an all-out effort rather than a local effort. He said that he did not plan to use nuclear weapons in any local situation at the present time.

Mr. Lloyd responded that he was relieved to hear the President say that.

The President continued that he believed nuclear weapons were not a police weapon but that you use nuclear weapons only when you wanted to destroy the enemy's will to resist.

At that point Mr. Lloyd said he was sorry that he had kept the President longer than he expected to do, thanked him for seeing him, and started to leave.

It was unanimously agreed that I merely say that Mr. Lloyd and Sir Harold were in Newport for the races, that they had paid a courtesy call on the President, and that naturally the Far Eastern situation had come up in their talks.

James C. Hagerty

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, September 21, 1958, 3:32 p.m.

255. Following is summary of remarks made by Assistant Secretary Robertson to Ambassador Yeh regarding offshore island problem afternoon Sept. 20: We entirely aware of difficult morale problem confronting GRC in present situation. However, Secretary Dulles wants President Chiang be aware of very difficult public relations problem which United States government faces. We cannot pursue policy here which does not have support public opinion. Much of United States public sees offshore island situation solely in terms two very small islands long way off which not worth atomic war. People of United States not willing support war-like effort by United States government in this situation unless convinced all reasonable steps taken try avoid war.

United States has no idea giving away any territory at Warsaw talks. We had already said we would make no commitments which would prejudice GRC rights or interests. There not slightest possibility of our making any commitments at Warsaw for GRC.

We do not wish be responsible for breaking off Warsaw talks. Chinese Communists have taken very tough negotiating position. Perhaps they will give some ultimatum and break off talks. Khrushchev's latest note to President abusive and violent. It is important that people realize that it is Communists and not United States who threaten war. If United States is to continue support GRC and free world position in Asia, it important get idea across to GRC leaders that they must work with us. It will be ten times harder for Republic of China maintain its position if it loses United States support.

Has been reported that there some thinking in Taipei it would help United States position at Warsaw if GRC appeared tough. As matter of fact it would do irreparable damage if it appeared GRC wanted war. It would not help our position at Warsaw have GRC appear in this light. Important to show up Soviet Union and Chinese Communists as warlike.

While talks at Geneva did not produce any cease-fire agreement, Chinese Communist firing did die down during talks. After all their boasting it might be difficult for Chinese Communists now make cease-fire pledge, but they might put into effect de facto cease-fire. If this happened, it would be important that GRC not upset it. Must be empha-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2158. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared in draft by Parsons, and approved by Martin.

sized repeatedly we do not want go to war if there is any way avoid doing so honorably and without jeopardizing essential positions.

There apparently some suspicions on Taiwan we would take actions affecting GRC interests without consultation. We had assured GRC we would not take actions prejudicial to them. By same token, we here must feel that GRC will not go ahead and take actions without coordinating with United States.

Recently some progress made in getting supplies into Kinmen. Despite early pessimism Berlin airlift had solved supply problem when Berlin blockaded. We intend make greatest effort get in supplies in spirit of Berlin airlift. Any effort bomb Chinese Communists would likely be step which would start trouble. (Retaliatory bombings Communists on Kinmen would make position of its defenders vastly more difficult.) We were not ready take such step until all peaceful means had been exhausted.

Republic of China has important role play in world today as alternative for Chinese people to Communist regime. It must continue play that role and prepare itself for day when Communist regime will no longer be able survive. It is of utmost importance that very existence of GRC not be jeopardized by precipitate or premature action which would not have support of public opinion here or abroad.

FYI. Above is for your information and for such use as you may wish to make in conversations with GRC leaders. End FYI.

Dulles

---

117. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

Taipei, September 22, 1958, 9:01 a.m.

220101Z. T 34. So-called world opinion is made of many national views which are reflections of own self interests. Sometimes these interests are long-range and at other times they represent pressures of the moment. World opinion in SEA is based on cold assessment of actual danger to national existence. Leaders in that part of the world see the death of freedom in their countries if the United States backs down from her position of number 1 world power. As stated in my 260843Z Aug,[1] the offshore islands are symbolic and this part of the world is waiting to see whether the United States will retreat. SEA leaders pray that we will not. We are their salvation. But they see in our willingness to talk at Warsaw and at the UN a first step towards abandonment of our principles. They are critical and say that Russia has once more shot her way to the conference tables where only the Communists can win.

---

[1] Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CNO, CINCPAC CP SMITH, and COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US). Received at 8:40 a.m. A copy is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Tels), Sept. 5–Dec. 30, 1958. Admiral Felt was in Taipei as a part of a trip in which he also visited Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

On the other hand, I read in the Taipei newspaper this morning that Lloyd and Fujiyama[2] are running for cover. I earnestly hope that when world opinion is assayed that pure gold can be distinguished from wooden nickels. The free Chinese will not evacuate the offshore islands. They have passed the critical point on the frustration curve concerned with material resupply. They are approaching the flash point on the morale curve but at resupply they are getting better. They are accepting American technical advice and have adopted a command responsibility which recognizes the stature of VAdm Ni in immediate command of convoy operations and who has CTF–72 constantly at his side. They are getting results with help of USN Beach Jumper unit, Beach Master and an advisor for ChiNat underwater demolition team. This is good but not cause for elation. The season of stormy weather and rough crossings is approaching. Deception to get boats the last mile into a beach is not of much use if they are swamped by heavy seas farther out. CTDC is keeping you informed on ideas involving Army barcs, fishing junks and we are exploring several means of increasing air drop capacity—and are prepared to defend it.

As to morale, I believe the Chinese cannot tolerate the present situation indefinitely. On Kinmen, soldiers are abandoning cave life at night and are sleeping out in the open taking their chances with artillery fire. Despite concern about morale of troops on islands, general consensus is that tinderbox is public opinion on Taiwan. There is no doubt in any American mind here that ChiNats will kick over the traces and attack the mainland when the point of criticality is reached. Attack could be by either air bombardment or commando raid. I believe they will notify us but that the time will come when they can no longer exercise the restraint being urged upon them.

I recommend that the following letter be delivered by me to Gen Wang prior my departure from Taipei:

---

[1] Document 46.

[2] Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama.

"Dear General Wang: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction and admiration the soldierly restraint and reserve which you are exercising in these trying times.

They have asked me to tell you they understand fully how difficult the problem is and to express their appreciation for the calm and cool judgment you consistently demonstrate. In the heat of conflict, there are always differing opinions and advice. In the midst of these differences, your firm and measured adherence to the restrictions in current actions is most praiseworthy. I am privileged and pleased to transmit these views of my Chiefs to you and to add to them my esteem. Sincerely yours,".[3]

In respect to future eventualities, I still believe that the Commies do not want war with United States. I think it is probable that they will not fire on United States ships or aircraft in the territorial waters of Kinmen if we announce in advance that we are going to use these waters. If they do fire on our ships or aircraft, the other side will be labeled aggressors in the eyes of the world and the world would then approve action of our forces in taking appropriate measures in their self-defense.

---

[3] The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the draft letter to Wang in JCS 948430, September 23. (JCS 2118/121; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40)

---

118. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 22, 1958, 8:45 a.m.

The Secretary
General Cabell
Mr. Bissell[1]

General Cabell said that weather conditions were at the moment propitious for an aerial inspection along the China coast designed to disclose particularly the Communist naval dispositions and to confirm the presumed movement of troops from the interior.

I said I felt that in the light of the very tense situation and the possibility that it might come up in the United Nations, we should not engage

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

[1] Richard M. Bissell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency.

in what admittedly would be a violation of the air space of Communist China. I said that if he wished I would discuss this with the President on Tuesday.[2]

General Cabell said he was not sure the weather would hold another day and that he would therefore hold the request in abeyance pending what might be another propitious day.

JFD

---

[2] September 23.

---

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 22, 1958, 5 p.m.

453. USUN For Robertson. Beam–Wang Talks. Wang presented at today's meeting following draft agreed announcement.

Draft agreed announcement of Governments of PRC and USA on easing and eliminating tension in Taiwan Straits area.

In order ease and eliminate tension in Taiwan Straits area and help safeguard peace in Far East and world, Ambassador Wang Ping-Nan, on behalf of Government of PRC and Ambassador Jacob D. Beam, on behalf of Government of USA, agree to announce:

1. Government of PRC and Government of USA undertake jointly, without prejudice to principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each others internal affairs, to settle disputes between the two countries in Taiwan area and other areas in Far East through peaceful negotiations without resorting to threat or use of force against each other.
2. Government of USA declares that, in order eliminate provocations, it undertakes withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan, Penghu Islands and Taiwan Straits area.
3. Ambassadors of the two countries will continue their talks on specific matters concerning above two paragraphs of present agreed announcement.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2258. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:23 p.m. Repeated niact to USUN and Taipei.

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 22, 1958, 8 p.m.

456. For Robertson. Beam–Wang Talks. Wang opened discussion as follows: We have re-examined proposal your side put forth at last meeting. I can not but tell you proposal absurd and absolutely unacceptable. I am authorized state government PRC categorically and absolutely rejects proposal. It is proposal for violent intervention in China's internal affairs. It demands Chinese people renounce exercise sovereign rights over own territory. Demands Chinese people recognize US claim to Chinese territory. Proposal your side designed expand aggression against China. Through this proposal US attempts extend field its aggression against China to coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu and Chinese territorial waters. That not all. US further insolently attempts making Chinese people renounce their sovereignty over areas adjacent Quemoy and Matsu so as to further US aggression against Chinese mainland.

Proposal not only cannot ease tension Taiwan area but can only push war crisis nearer. Chinese people absolutely can not tolerate such proposal designed extend aggression and prepare for war.

You asserted at last meeting that US forces present in Taiwan and Taiwan Straits purely for defensive purposes for fulfillment obligations under so-called Treaty of Defense. That is turning rights and wrongs upside down and deserves no serious consideration. Whole world knows so-called Republic China Government long ago in 1949 superseded by Chinese Peoples Republic and Chiang Kai-shek clique nothing but puppet propped up by American bayonets. You Americans created puppet and told it sign treaty. Treaty fundamentally illegal and is null and void. You claim your forces sent to Taiwan to fulfill treaty obligations. You probably forgotten that you sent your forces in Taiwan June 27, 1950, whereas date of treaty is December 2, 1954. You first sent your troops and subsequently created treaty in attempt legalize intervention. Now your side further intends use treaty to expand aggression against China. This is extremely absurd. Relationship between US and Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan is relationship between master and slave. If any evidence required proposal your side may serve as best evidence. Your proposal says US will seek that Quemoy Matsu Islands will not be used for attack against mainland. If relationship between US and Chiang Kai-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2258. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in five sections. Received at 5:03 p.m. Repeated niact to USUN and Taipei. A notation on the source text reads: "Meeting No. 76." Beam transmitted a brief summary of the meeting in telegram 454 and commented in telegram 455, both September 22. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement) shek clique were not one between master and slave this plan could not be accepted and carried out. This also serves prove that attacks and provocations Chiang Kai-shek clique have throughout been carried out under US instigation.

Your proposal ostensibly talks about potential expansion hostilities in Quemoy Matsu Islands. Real object is solely to enlarge US aggression and war preparations against China. Quemoy Matsu are islands in inland waters of Chinese mainland in immediate approaches to Amoy and Foochow and have always been intergral part Fukien Province. These islands we could have liberated at any time but have waited for considerable length time for peaceful withdrawal Chiang Kai-shek troops from islands. However, contrary our expectations Chiang Kai-shek clique have never ceased use islands for harassing attacks against Chinese mainland. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek clique took advantage this situation and concentrated one-third its forces on islands, thus constituting them as base for their attacks on mainland. War provocations Chiang Kai-shek clique have recently become more and more unbridled. Was when these attacks reached peak that we began carry out punitive attacks against them. To do so is entirely internal matter and entirely proper. It can not lead to any international crisis.

On the pretext that exercises sovereignty by my country is "aggression" and that liberation of territories "conquest" our own, US has concentrated armed forces on China's territory and is intervening in China's internal affairs in demanding that Chinese people renounce sovereignty Quemoy Matsu. This proves that present tension in area has been exclusively and deliberately created by US.

Your proposal demands that China recognize US right to individual and collective defense. This claim suffices expose fully US intention enlarging aggression against China.

During previous talks in Geneva your side demanded that China recognize US right to collective and individual defense in Taiwan area. Your proposals constitute absurd demand that China recognize legality US occupation Taiwan and Islands. This something Chinese Government absolutely can never agree to.

Now your side puts further step forward in demanding China recognize right US collective and individual defense in Taiwan and Quemoy Matsu areas. Isn't this tantamount to saying that US wants enlarge its aggression to include Quemoy Matsu Islands and demanding China recognize as legal this enlarged aggression?

Although so far US President does not dare say so outright to American people, proposal your side shows that US Government bent on using force occupy Quemoy Matsu and other islands under pretext individual and collective defense. I should like tell you explicitly and definitely that Chinese people determined to recover Quemoy Matsu and likewise determined recover Taiwan and Penghus.

Chinese people will absolutely not recognize legalization American invasion and occupation Taiwan and Penghus. Even less can they allow US to extend its aggression to Quemoy Matsu.

Since you attempting bring Quemoy Matsu directly under US military control, our [*your*] design obviously not confined Quemoy Matsu. Your intention is to go further and use Quemoy Matsu as springboard for further attack against Chinese mainland.

Your proposal, while demanding we recognize US right carry out individual and collective defense on Quemoy Matsu, also demands our side reduce our forces on mainland areas adjacent to Quemoy Matsu. Thus whole notion US comes to open. First step invasion and occupation Taiwan and Penghus. Next step invasion occupation Quemoy Matsu. Third step invasion Chinese mainland itself. While you attempting invade Quemoy Matsu, you already making preparations for invasion Chinese mainland. Your proposal therefore not only proposal enlarge aggression against China but is also preparation for war. Such proposal would make possible for US start war at any moment. In point fact, US actually making constant and uninterrupted preparations for war and increasingly carrying out military preparations against my country. US openly massing large forces in Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area. According your official announcements in the US, you have sent to Taiwan Straits area more than (number uncertain) Naval vessels and more than (number uncertain) aircraft. You have also despatched additional guided missiles to Taiwan, set up unified command on Taiwan, and are speeding up supply military equipment to Chiang Kai-shek clique.

If such activities not preparations for war, what else can they be? That is not all. Many officials and responsible generals of your country have been making all sorts outcries for war. Secretary Army Brucker publicly declared American forces ready fight big war or local one. Your Defense Secretary McElroy has also been making threats armed intervention in Quemoy Matsu area against Chinese people. With your encouragement and prompting Chiang Kai-shek clique on its part raving like madmen for bombing Chinese mainland. While massing large forces US at same time has started series military provocations. In defiance repeated warnings my government you have continued send warships and aircraft to area. Your objective is to create pretext for starting war you have already prepared in advance. In light this, situation indeed extremely dangerous. If such provocations of US are to continue, obvious war could break out any moment. Since you are contemplating start war, obvious pretext can be fabricated at will. You should correctly understand what I have said. I have pointed out danger of your actions. You must not think you can cow us with war preparations, plus a few soldiers which dollars can buy. You must know you will never succeed. Our Foreign Minister has made solemn declaration on behalf government and people, if despite rejected warnings Chinese people, US aggression should impose war on Chinese people, our 600 million people will spare no sacrifice and under banner their fatherland fight as one man to save their land and peace world.[1] No war threats on your part can cow us. The facts are very clear. Military operations presently undertaken by Chinese Government against Chiang Kai-shek clique on Quemoy Matsu just as other military operations taken by Chinese people against Chiang Kai-shek clique during civil war are exclusively internal affair and can cause no international tension at all. It is precisely armed invasion and occupation Taiwan and massing large forces by US in Taiwan area to carry out military threats and warlike pressures that have given rise to tension and war threats in Taiwan area. Whole world has witnessed actions US in igniting fire in Taiwan area. No amount sophistry can cover up this fact. Only if US immediately stops military provocations and invasion threats against China and pulls out its forces from Taiwan area, can tension in Taiwan area be eradicated.

With this in view, I am putting forth following proposal on part my government. I hope your side will give it full consideration. (*End Wang statement*) (See my telegram 453[2] for text draft agreed announcement.)

After ten-minute recess to consider reply to proposal, I replied: Mr. Ambassador, I deny solemnly and categorically that US has occupied Taiwan or that it intends occupy Quemoy Matsu in preparation for invading mainland. Your own statements belie this accusation. You have specified military dispositions which US has made in last few weeks since your forces began their attacks on August 23. Are these types dispositions aimed at invading Chinese mainland? You will have hard time convincing people world that US intends invade Chinese mainland with warships and aircraft. It obvious to everyone that type forces we have despatched to area are defensive forces and that bulk them were sent after your side began their attacks not before. You now trying pretend that your actions are in response to ours. Everyone knows falsity this charge. Facts are that Government Republic China is sovereign government recognized by majority countries world. It has every right conclude treaties and defensive alliances with other countries, including US and reasons for its desire do so are now the more obvious. Your side knows very well actions taken by USG on June 27, 1950 resulted directly from unprovoked aggression by Communist forces against Republic Korea. Ridiculous call action carried out and taken with full agreement

---

[1] Reference is to a statement on September 20 by Foreign Minister Ch'en I; for text, see *Peking Review,* September 23, 1958, pp. 5–6.

[2] Document 119.

Republic China invasion or aggression. It impossible for your side produce objective observer who has been to Taiwan who will testify island is occupied by US forces. It clear to anyone who has been there government island sovereign and independent. It has continously been under threats and grave danger from your side.

I have examined proposed agreed announcement which you have just presented. On face of it, it clearly unsatisfactory as solution problem which we have come here resolve. It contains demand US withdraw forces it has been assembling to assist our ally to defend itself from attack. This is obviously unacceptable at time territory this ally under attack. Further, it contains no provision for cease-fire, which is fundamental and urgent requirement if present dangerous drift in area to be reversed.

I continued from prepared statement; in our three meetings and particularly in your two proposed agreed announcements, you have set forth in completely uncompromising terms demand for surrender of sovereign government and for withdrawal all forces that governments allies from its sovereign territory. You have asked for what both you and your side must know is impossible and totally unacceptable to US.

US, on other hand in draft agreed announcement presented last meeting, set forth proposition which attempted meet in as equitable fashion as possible conflicting interests of parties concerned. It is proposition which deserves careful consideration. Your side's flat rejection our proposal seems to indicate you have no constructive interest in these talks.

In rejecting again your charges that US is using force in Taiwan area and that tension that area arises from so-called "US occupation Taiwan", I have only to point out record of US in foreign affairs too well known to require defense against charge of aggression. Presence of US military forces in Taiwan area due entirely to actions and threats your side and is in response our treaty obligations to sovereign ally. US forces have not committed one aggressive act. They are, however, fully prepared discharge their defensive responsibilities.

We do not accept distinction you make between what you can [*call*] Sino-American international dispute and domestic matter of Taiwan and offshore islands. We do not recognize your right unilaterally to declare armed attack domestic matter by announcing prior claim to territory held by sovereign government. Your attack on coastal islands is far from being domestic matter, as interest of world including Soviet Union demonstrates. Failure resolve our differences could have grave consequences, and US for its part welcomes world attention and interest in matter.

If remarks you have made mean complete rejection by your side of our proposal, it will appear to civilized world that your side places primary reliance on violence, including slaughter innocent civilians. If your side holds to this position, it will be condemned again before bar of world opinion. As I have said repeatedly, urgent prerequisite to any peaceful resoltuion of present crisis is cessation of hostilities. As you yourself have declared, people of world are watching these talks. People of world will hold accountable side which refuses essential first condition of peace: cessation of hostilities. World will not accept your contention question of cease-fire "does not arise" when it is known to all that present threat to world peace was created precisely by decision your side seize territory by force. Each day these hostilities continue danger of expansion of conflict increases. These hostilities result solely from armed attacks directed by your side and can cease only when these attacks cease. Therefore, responsibility for decision whether or not broadening of conflict will result lies completely in hands your side.

Wang replies: I very dissatisfied with your remarks after carefully listening to them. Although in my opening statement I refuted false and mistaken statements your side, you have repeated all these positions. You have again referred to Chiang Kai-shek clique as so-called Government Republic China and referred to it as sovereign and independent government having right conclude treaties with foreign countries. I have refuted all such assertions and have pointed out repeatedly so-called Republic of China Government is no more than puppet and US support this regime source tension in Taiwan area. Must certainly reject all assertions referring to Chiang Kai-shek clique as sovereign government with right conclude treaties with foreign countries. All such assertions entirely unacceptable to us. In referring to Korean war of 1950 your remarks slandering Korean Democratic Peoples Republic are also absurd. No amount such remarks can cover up American aggression Korea. You have alleged US has not occupied Taiwan and that US armed forces in Taiwan Straits were not sent there in preparation for war, but such denials can not change true facts which are that US is carrying out aggression and dangerous provocation in Far East. No matter how hard you try, you cannot convince anybody of absurdity that it is aggression for Chinese people exercise right to liberate own territory while it proper for US invade and occupy Chinese territory.

Nobody can ever deny fact, which is that it not China which has sent warships and military aircraft to US coastal waters to carry out war threats but on contrary it is US which is assembling large military forces in Taiwan Straits to carry out armed provocations against China.

Present grave danger in Far East does not arise as result of intention Chinese people to liberate own territory but as result open and outrageous intervention of US in Chinese affairs. Peoples of world know full well there is no question aggression when Chinese people liberate own territory. Can anyone say that when people liberate own territory it is aggression? Can anyone say one can carry out aggression against oneself? It well known grave danger in Far East and anxiety peoples world are all created by war provocations US at very doorstep of China. What people of world demand is not that China renounce liberation her territory but that US immediately cease intervention in China's internal affairs. People of world demand immediately withdrawal large US forces assembled at doorstep China. I must frankly tell Ambassador that if US intends settle dispute only in terms its own interests and advantages, it cannot hope succeed in doing so.

Ambassador has alluded to 11 [*attention*?] of world on our talks. World will condemn US war risks in Far East. It will not deny Chinese people right liberate own territories. World peoples opinion is anxious because US in trying invade and occupy Quemoy and Matsu is creating threat of terrible war and leading world on path death and destruction. We feel anxiety world public opinion is entirely justified.

I replied: You again come back to our basic differences regarding our relations with the Government China and nature that Government. Prolongation this type discussion unlikely lead to solution present critical situation. First step in that direction must be cessation hostilities now going on. As we have indicated, once hostilities have been halted, we hopeful means can be found eliminate activities which either side might consider provocation. This is intent our proposal of last meeting which I again would like urge your side reconsider.

Wang replied: We have already studied and examined what your side called first step—the cease-fire proposal. We see this proposal an enormous plot. We cannot give any consideration to it. We have repeatedly indicated first step is not so-called cease-fire but withdrawal all US forces from Taiwan area, which is contained in our proposal today. We urge Ambassador carefully consider proposal our side. If you not in position give reply this proposal today, we expect you will be able do so next meeting.

I replied: I am not in position give favorable consideration your proposal. As I have said, it insists US withdraw forces which we have assembled to help ally defend territory now under attack. Furthermore, it does not lead us out of present situation by envisaging immediate cease-fire. As to our position, I have nothing more to add at present time.

Wang replied: As we have made our position very clear already, source Far East tension is presence US forces in Taiwan Straits area to carry out war preparations against China and to intervene against China. As long these forces not withdrawn, there will be no easing tension in Far East.

Wang then proposed next meeting September 25, 3 p.m. which I accepted.

Beam

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 23, 1958, 2 p.m.

465. Admiral Felt, Admiral Smoot and I had more than an hour's conversation this morning with President Chiang. Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff were also present. Conversation centered mainly on military matters affecting offshore islands. Admirals Felt and Smoot will be reporting military aspects in detail.[1]

Chiang stressed need to solve convoy problem satisfactorily within next two weeks. Otherwise Kinmen supply situation would deteriorate progressively. Citing letter from Kinmen defense commander dated yesterday, Chiang spent some time describing perilous state of defenders of two Tan Islands. Drinking water situation was reported as serious and resupply efforts and living conditions were described as extremely difficult. Chiang appeared to believe amphibious assault on Tan Islands is likely. He said categorically such an attack would be met by all Chinese resources. Chiang suggested indirectly would appreciate direct US airlift to Kinmen along lines Berlin Airlift. Morale of Kinmen defenders was discussed at some length. Discussion brought out that morale is naturally suffering most on Tan Island and Small Kinmen and is relatively good on Big Kinmen. However, Chiang felt it would be useful step if US advisors at Kinmen could be instructed to reassure Chinese commanders US would support defense if Kinmen attacked by Communists.

Chiang stated that if Kinmen is attacked by Communist air force he will have no option but to retaliate. He attempted to draw out admirals on what US would do if Chinese Communist Air Force attacks Kinmen.

Both Chiang and Premier spoke on difficulties with public opinion on Taiwan. Premier stressed need to solve convoy problem quickly. He also urged need for full understanding between US and GRC. President assured me we would have GRC's full cooperation. I spoke of difficulties we are having with American public opinion along lines Deptel 255[2] and said we needed more time to explore all avenues toward peaceful settlement. Chiang said he understood our position and indicated his willingness to be helpful although he had no confidence talking with Communists would achieve useful results.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2358. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:56 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

[1] Telegrams 231403Z from CINCPAC to JCS, and 231448Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US) to CINCPAC, both September 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40, and Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2358, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Document 116.

Toward end of conversation Premier produced copy of Yeh's account of conversation with Robertson last Saturday.[3] Premier said Yeh's report indicated US Government might not have full appreciation of situation and GRC attitude. At this point Premier showed passage in Yeh's telegram to Chiang who apparently had not seen message previously. After reading passage President said he would prefer to withhold comment until he had studied message. I said in reply to Premier's observation that if there was any misunderstanding in Washington it must be owing to some omission on my part since I have tried to report fully and accurately.

Comment: I draw conclusion from this conversation that pressure to resort to general retaliation as set forth in Premier's talk with me last Saturday is for moment somewhat abated. Essence of Chinese position this morning was that assaults on any or all offshore island would invite GRC retaliation. Same would be true in case of any appreciable bombing of offshore islands. Fact that conversation centered to considerable extent on convoy operations is encouraging. If convoy operations can be stepped up within next two or three weeks to 300–400 tons per day, perhaps we will have more time in which to seek peaceful solution.

Drumright

---

[3] See Document 116.

---

122. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 23, 1958, 12:30 p.m.

The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

(6) Referring to the situation in the Taiwan Straits, I said that our latest reports from Ambassador Beam do not encourage the hope of positive outcome in his talks with the Chinese Communist Ambassador.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Greene.

I said that as recently as last Saturday I had been informed by the Navy that the supply situation in respect of Quemoy seemed brighter and that the supply operation could be expected to continue more or less indefinitely. Then this morning I had been told that six-foot waves in the Straits mean that the whole supply operation must be held up. This sort of conflicting information, I said, is only too typical. The President noted the virtual impossibility of the Chinats and our military position in the Straits; we discussed the countervailing and great psychological and political importance to Chiang Kai-chek and his government of holding on to the islands. The President expressed regret that there seemed to be no way to persuade Chiang to re-direct the focus of his leadership, in a way which would enable him to re-group his military forces into more sensible positions. I also noted the increasing difficulty we are having, and must expect to have, in restraining Chiang from initiating offensive military action from his present positions.

The President expressed some concern that as much as two-thirds of the world, and 50% of US, opinion opposes the course which we have been following. I said that I thought, particularly among the governments of the Far East and of Western Europe, our policy is understood and supported. I felt that if we stand firm against the Communists, the outcome will be in our favor, unless by attrition the Communists can grind down the Quemoys' abilities to survive; on the other hand, if the supply operations can continue successfully, the military action against the islands may gradually subside.

JFD

---

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 23, 1958, 10:02 p.m.

329. Beam–Wang Talks. Following are instructions for line you should take at meeting with Wang 25th:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins and Martin, cleared in substance by Dulles and with OSD/ISA, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and priority to Taipei.

Begin by pointing out unacceptable nature of new Chinese Communist draft agreed announcement and proceed to rebut Wang's charges. Statement in first paragraph Wang's suggested draft announcement that Chinese Communists prepared to resolve present crisis in Taiwan area through peaceful negotiation without resort to force nullified by Communist use of force against Quemoy and moreover does not affect use of force against GRC and its territory which is crux of matter.

US rejects categorically implication in second paragraph of draft announcement that presence of its armed forces in Taiwan area in present circumstances constitutes provocation against Communist China. Reiterate that their presence and operations in area defensive in nature, made necessary under terms of Mutual Defense Treaty with our ally Republic of China to counter unprovoked, unjustified, and wanton armed aggression against its territory and threats to its existence by Chinese Communists. Point out Wang's regime itself has mutual security treaty with Soviet Union, and relied upon that treaty in its aggression in Korea and now relies upon it in its resort to force in Taiwan Straits. Wang's charge that US attempting to invade and occupy offshores as stepping stone to invasion of mainland is patently absurd, belied by well-known US defensive posture throughout world and by defensive character of military measures and preparations taken by it in Taiwan area. Statements by US leaders cited by Wang have all made clear that our aims are defensive, in marked contrast to expressions of aggressive warlike intent which have proceeded from Peiping officials in recent weeks. Emphasize that US forces will remain disposed as necessary to fulfill its treaty obligations.

State that no amount of repetition by Wang to contrary can undo fact that Republic of China is sovereign government recognized by respectable part of world community. As such it has full right in protection its security and interests to conclude alliances and defense treaties with other countries including US. You should forcefully refute Wang's argument that language of our draft agreed announcement demonstrated master-slave relationship. Emphasize that draft said US would seek that offshores not be used for attack against mainland. This demonstrates precisely opposite of what Wang arguing, namely that GRC is sovereign ally which US must and will at all times consult before making any commitment affecting its rights and interests.

Conversations in first three meetings have revealed basic differences between US and Chinese Communists as to cause of present hostilities in Taiwan Straits and means of resolving crisis. Prolonged reiteration of established positions on these basic points can only result in sterile discussion and disappoint ardent world hope that hostilities in area be terminated and peaceful solution sought. This situation clearly demands immediate cessation of hostilities as prerequisite to further exploration of means to bridge gap between divergent positions. If Chinese Communists continue to reject call for ceasefire and expansion of conflict should occur, they will bear full responsibility in eyes of world. Accomplishment of ceasefire and elimination of provocative actions on other hand would create atmosphere in which phased reduction of forces and armament in coastal islands and adjacent areas could be discussed with some hope of reaching mutually acceptable arrangements.

FYI. Suggestion for revision our draft announcement contained urtel 458[1] being considered and expect have revised draft ready for presentation at meeting subsequent to next one. End FYI.[2]

Dulles

---

[1] Beam's proposed draft was transmitted in telegram 458 from Warsaw, September 23. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 333 to Warsaw, September 24, authorized Beam to inform Wang that revisions to the U.S. draft announcement were under consideration and he expected to present them at the next meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1458)

---

124. Editorial Note

At the 380th meeting of the National Security Council on September 25, 1958, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Charles P. Cabell discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, September 25, reads as follows:

"General Cabell pointed out that the Chinese Communist harassment of the Offshore Islands has reached a point where there was no longer a safe spot on any of the Quemoy Group. Some of the ammunition being used by the Chinese Communists is of Soviet manufacture. The Chinese Communists likewise continue to assert that they are determined to sieze the offshore Islands. They have now issued their twelfth warning against alleged U.S. provocations. Heavy pressure is also being exerted by the Chinese Communists on Hong Kong and the United Kingdom sees the possibility of a clash with the Chinese Communists. There was also the possibility of internal strife in Hong Kong on the 1st and 10th of October when the Nationalist and the Communist Chinese celebrate their national anniversaries. We have had our first evidence that the Chinese Communists have some realization of the dangers inherent in a nuclear conflict with the United States.

"Meanwhile, Moscow's reaction to the U.S. refusal to accept Khrushchev's recent letter to President Eisenhower has been very mild and actually there has been no official response to this U.S. action. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow has not yet observed any signs of popular apprehension in Moscow despite the official tone of belligerency. Foreign diplomats in Moscow likewise do not expect war.

"General Cabell expressed the opinion that the danger of Chinese Nationalist unilateral action against the Mainland continues. The Nationalists have waged a considerable propaganda campaign in the U.S. against the Warsaw negotiations. Likewise Nationalist air operations against the Communists have become heavier and more aggressive. These were likely to provoke Chinese Communist retaliatory action. Moreover, the Nationalists have launched these attacks in violation of their pledged word to us. Thus far Chinese Communist pilots had been restricted to defensive action against attacking Nationalist aircraft. It is thought that the Chinese Communists may now have Soviet MIG–19's." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 25, 1958, 6 p.m.

475. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Today's meeting one hour 45 minutes.[1] Wang asked lead off to which I agreed and he read statement covering same familiar ground he covered last meeting, adamantly rejecting ceasefire, accusing US of ulterior motives and insisting on US withdrawal forces from area could relieve tension, no significant alternative tone or language from that adopted last meeting. I responded with brief rebuttal several specific points, then read prepared statement based Department's 329.[2] Wang made vigorous rebuttal but said nothing new. Brief further exchange brought meeting to close. I did not mention we would present new draft next meeting as there seemed no necessity tip

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2558. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 12:42 p.m. Repeated priority to USUN and niact Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 477 from Warsaw, September 25. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

[2] Document 123.

our hand. Wang proposed Monday afternoon. I countered with Monday morning as more convenient and we agreed on Tuesday September 30, 10 a.m.

Beam

---

126. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 25, 1958, 7 p.m.

476. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Comments today's meeting:

1. Wang's position continues hard and unyielding. He shows no disposition make concessions to US viewpoint which would be required if real negotiation to result.

2. Wang gave impression of man marking time. His presentation was a strong but routine recapitulation ChiCom position. Not only produced nothing new himself but made no effort probe US intentions. Neither did he accuse US of stalling or otherwise attempt pressure US to come up with new proposals. In response our expression preference for morning meeting time he preferred Tuesday to Monday.

3. Wang's reference to US press not supporting government's position may be significant. Although could be merely convenient debating point might also mean ChiCom's are confident opposition to US military intervention both within US and among allies may effectively prevent such intervention.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2558. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:26 p.m. Repeated priority to USUN and niact to Taipei.

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 25, 1958, 5:23 p.m.

3089. For Ambassador from Secretary. Your 1715.[1] Following summary of talking paper for my meeting with Lloyd[2] may be helpful to you in your conversation with Prime Minister:

1. There are three possible general interpretations of Peiping's aggressive actions against Quemoy: (a) They will lead to an open assault against the offshores, possibly followed by an assault against Taiwan; (b) They will be limited to a Berlin blockade type of operation; (c) They will follow 1954/55 pattern when Chicoms, faced with strong U.S. counteraction, let tempo of battle gradually die down to a state of quiescence.

2. Interpretation (b) above seems most likely at present though it might give way to interpretation (c) if we were as successful in a Quemoy sealift as we were in Berlin airlift. We therefore determined to strive to keep Quemoy alive.

3. Our JCS estimate that Quemoy can hold out until November 15 at a resupply rate of 100 tons per day. Barring unusually bad weather and unforeseen obstacles, the JCS consider it possible that current resupply rate of about 125 tons daily can be improved by new delivery techniques to 300 tons per day level necessary to keep Quemoy going indefinitely on an austerity basis. Main problem will be morale, which is nevertheless good at present.

4. We are prepared to oppose a direct assault on islands.

5. We do not, however, propose take any new military initiatives and believe that Chicoms will likewise be disposed, especially during Warsaw talks, to avoid initiatives that would brand them before world opinion as responsible for broadening conflict.

6. We will continue to urge GRC to act within present ground rules, for any real extension of those rules would almost certainly bring about net worsening of situation for GRC. Latter nevertheless under strong provocation to aerial bombard shore batteries pounding Quemoy. So far

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2458. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Green; cleared with S/S, EUR, and FE; and approved by Dulles.

[1] In telegram 1715 from London, September 24, Ambassador John Hay Whitney reported that he would be with Prime Minister Eden on September 26 and could convey any thoughts which the Secretary wished him to relay. He commented that Eden was under very heavy domestic pressure on the subject of the offshore islands, which would probably be the main topic on his mind. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Reference is to a memorandum of September 24 from Robertson to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/9–2458) Dulles met with Lloyd on September 25 and 26 in New York; see Document 130.

the GRC has exercised reasonable restraint and we are striving to ensure this restraint continues.

7. We anticipate no "solution" emanating from Warsaw talks where we are pressing for a cease-fire, followed by agreement on conditions to eliminate provocations and to demilitarize offshore islands area. Chicoms are obdurately insisting on total withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan and other islands. Though seemingly futile, talks do serve purpose of providing a cover under which there might be some de facto easing of war tensions. They also create basis for showing up Peiping's aggressive purposes. We may shortly wish to make clear record of those talks.

8. Issue is bound to come up sooner or later for active consideration in UN—sooner if Warsaw talks appear to be failure. When issue is raised in UN we would want to have a resolution proposed asking for a cease-fire, the renunciation of use of force and an examination of measures to tranquilize situation.

9. However, there is apt to be a strong tide in the UN calling for more comprehensive measures to cope with this offshore islands issue.[3] We would hope that GRC could be induced not to reject some reasonable proposal commanding general UN support and providing for GRC's essential interests.

10. Meanwhile, though acting to avoid war, we do not discount danger of war. Moscow's role in affair is dangerous. But we are persuaded that a firm, resolute but non-aggressive posture is more likely to avert war than a course of retreat. We also believe that to succumb in face of enemy attack would touch off chain of events that might lead to collapse of our entire position in Far East.

11. In addition, believe text my speech tonight in New York[4] may be helpful to you.

Dulles

---

[3] Delga 37 from USUN, September 24, which transmitted Lodge's comments on the U.N. debate on Chinese representation, commented that many friendly countries were preoccupied with the possibility of war resulting from the offshore island situation, and that this had made it much more difficult to maintain the U.S. position on the Chinese representation issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–258) For text, see vol. II, pp. 62–65. A U.S. resolution to postpone discussion of Chinese representation was adopted by the General Assembly on September 23 by a vote of 44–28 with 9 abstentions.

[4] Dulles commented on the situation in the Taiwan Strait in an address that evening before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., in New York. He declared that the United States was "not prepared to retreat in the face of armed force," but that "our position is otherwise flexible." He stated that "we would find acceptable any arrangement which, on the one hand, did not involve surrender to force or the threat of force and, on the other hand, eliminated from the situation features that could reasonably be regarded as provocative or which, to use President Eisenhower's words, were a 'thorn in the side of peace.'" For text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 13, 1958, pp. 561–566.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, September 25, 1958, 5:38 p.m.

270. Your 452.[1] We are fully aware of grave threat posed to Kinmen garrison by continuing Chinese Communist bombardment and strangulation tactics and of strong pressures on GRC from legislators and public opinion to take effective action to break siege. However, we do not accept view that situation so critical as to require, at least within next few days or weeks, kind of military action proposed by Premier Chen, which would be strongly condemned by US and world opinion and could lead to large-scale, possibly nuclear conflict, whose catastrophic impact on Taiwan is perhaps inadequately comprehended by GRC leaders and population. Joint Chiefs believe resupply operation can be even further improved and are exerting further efforts in that direction. Success of such an operation would have desirable impact on friend and foe alike.

In meantime opposition of world opinion, including large segment US opinion, to idea of war resulting from effort to hold islands makes it imperative that US and GRC demonstrate willingness and determination seek peaceful solution. We already have a serious public problem here in trying to develop support for the limited measures so far taken. You should emphasize to GRC leaders that it would be fatal to their own interests if they should appear to world to want and actively to be seeking an expansion of hostilities. Such an attitude would seriously jeopardize support for GRC in this country, while GRC's position in UN would be undermined if not destroyed. Moreover if conflict were extended as result GRC actions there would be minimum of support and strong world opposition.

We are under no illusions about chances of reaching any settlement through the Warsaw talks, but it is an exercise we must go through. Talks serve purpose of providing cover under which there conceivably might be some de facto easing of war tensions. They also provide means for showing up Peiping's aggressive purposes and for making more effective appeal for support of US and allied opinion. If we are to hope for any success in attempt to place onus on Chinese Communists for failure reach peaceful solution, it is important that GRC refrain from public denunciation of concept of negotiations and that it continue to exercise restraint in military operations. This may be hard to endure; but it is essential in terms of many factors involved.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins, Martin, and Green; cleared in draft with OSD/ISA; and approved by Robertson.

[1] Document 111.

As far as UN is concerned, it is not question of choice whether or not to raise issue in that forum. Issue is bound to be raised by someone; in fact plenty of resolutions are already circulating on subject; though matter probably will not come up for actual debate for while yet. When issue is raised, we would want to have resolution submitted asking for ceasefire, renunciation of use of force, and an examination of measures to tranquilize situation. Chicoms will almost certainly oppose any UN recommendations of type which would command necessary majority support. However Communist persistence in use of force in face of UN condemnation of such force and of UN recommendations for peaceful solution would serve to prepare US and allied opinion for whatever further measures we would then have to take. Again, as in case of Warsaw talks, it is highly desirable that Chinese Reds, in contrast to GRC, be revealed as opposing peaceful solutions.

Herter

---

129. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Mission to the United Nations (Barco) to Secretary of State Dulles

New York, September 25, 1958.

SUBJECT

Offshore Islands

Ambassador Lodge has asked me to provide you with a summary of the developments regarding the Norwegian proposal for an initiative on this subject, about which he spoke to you on Tuesday, September 23rd.[1]

You will recall that the Norwegian Ambassador, Nielsen, spoke to us on Tuesday morning at Foreign Minister Lange's request. They felt that the dangers in the present situation in the Offshore Islands might be alleviated if the Secretary-General were asked to step into the situation and if the UN were to undertake a neutralization of the Offshore Islands.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2558. Secret. Sent through James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Representative to the United Nations. Drafted by Charles D. Cook, Deputy Counselor of the Mission to the United Nations.

[1] In a telephone conversation, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

They thought the present talks in Warsaw were hampered because both sides could not get down to business so long as the military situation was in its present aggravated state. Moreover, the Norwegians did not believe an initiative in the UN by the U.S., a development they believed might be forthcoming, could contribute to a relaxation of tension in the area.

Ambassador Lodge informed you of Norway's intention, in view of the above considerations, to propose in Mr. Lange's General Debate speech, provided the U.S. were agreeable, that the Secretary-General take steps to obtain a neutralization of the Offshore Islands. In response, you indicated that you had long thought the Secretary-General was the best bet and that at some stage we might call on him ourselves. You suggested that it would be satisfactory for the Norwegians to express the hope that Hammarskjold would interest himself in the situation to see whether a mutually acceptable solution could be found to stop the fighting. You expressed the view that both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists would find "neutralization" unacceptable and suggested that the Norwegians stop short of suggesting it.

That afternoon Ambassador Lodge informed Ambassador Nielsen of your reaction in the precise terms he had received it from you.

Ambassador Nielsen then discussed the subject with the Secretary-General, with whom they had not consulted prior to speaking with us. Hammarskjold said if this turned into simply another effort to try to get a cease-fire, it would not work. However, if it were proposed, he would not shirk his responsibilities. Hammarskjold then said he felt that if both the U.S. and the Chinese Communists "wanted a catalyst", and thereby demonstrated a common ground of mutual interest, in that both regarded the present situation as unsatisfactory, Hammarskjold would be "available and interested". Hammarskjold and Lange discussed and discarded the possibility of using a group of three nations or an individual nation as alternatives to the office of the Secretary-General. The choice of nations to compose a group would present too many difficulties; India had somewhat preempted the field as a single nation and would not be desirable because they were too partial in the controversy. As his terms of reference, Hammarskjold suggested he be asked "to see whether ways could be found to ease the immediate tension."

Ambassador Nielsen informed Ambassador Lodge of the talk with the Secretary-General. Ambassador Lodge said that while he could not be sure exactly what Hammarskjold meant by "catalyst", he felt it should be clear from his conversations that the U.S. was anxious to see the Secretary-General "interest himself" in the present situation. Saying that he took this as the kind of positive response that the Secretary-General wanted, Ambassador Nielsen then discussed with Ambassador Lodge the best way of ascertaining the views of the other side. He said Mr.

Lange felt it would be desirable to raise this with Gromyko in the first instance. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that one never got a clear-cut answer to a hypothetical question from the Soviets. He said a direct approach by the Norwegians to the Chinese Communists would be better. In any event, he urged that the Norwegians not condition their intention to proceed with their proposal on a positive response from the Communists. They might well be brought around, regardless of an initial negative reaction, if public opinion pressures were developed by such a proposal as the Norwegians had in mind.

Yesterday Ambassador Nielsen informed us they had decided to make the initial approach to the Chinese Communists and had taken the matter up in Oslo with Peking's Ambassador. They expected a reply by Friday, the 26th. Last night they intended to broach the subject in general terms to Gromyko, leaving it to him to infer that Norway had raised this with the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Nielsen also informed us that they agreed with us as to the desirability of proceeding with this initiative regardless of the Peking or Moscow reaction. They intend to do this in Lange's general debate speech next Tuesday, September 30. They were slightly troubled by the fact that Lange would be seeing you in Washington on Monday and that this fact might be related to his subsequent proposal. They are prepared however to discount any disadvantages this might have.

This noon, Ambassador Nielsen informed us that they had received a very cold reaction from Gromyko last night. The subject of the Offshore Islands was raised by Mr. Lange with Gromyko after dinner in the presence of Krishna Menon and the Icelandic Foreign Minister, but only in a general way. Gromyko took the standard, hard line that what is involved is a civil war. "There must be no distinctions between the Offshore Islands and Formosa and the Pescadores. This is an internal Chinese problem."

Mr. Lange decided that, although the conversational tone was friendly, the Soviet line was so rigid he would not pursue it further. Consequently, he never got to the point of broaching the possibility of the Secretary-General undertaking any steps in this connection. Ambassador Nielsen said this did not by any means foreclose the possibility of Norway's taking an initiative. They agreed that the Russians were bound to show no softness and provide no opening, if only to maintain the position they have publicly taken and show no fear from their side. Ambassador Nielsen said he concluded that the Russians assume the United States is not happy with the development of the situation in the Offshore Islands and might be anxious to find ways of disengaging. This would account for the uncompromising attitude of Gromyko. Ambassador Nielsen said that when they had received Peking's reaction, and he now expected to have it by Sunday night, they would inform us. The only factor which might impel them not to take their proposed initiative would be Hammarskjold's own unwillingness, in the light of Peking's reaction, to become involved. Ambassador Nielsen said the most that could be expected from Peking was a conditional "yes" which at the same time restated Peking's position regarding the Offshore Islands and Formosa. He said that a negative answer on the substance which nevertheless indicated a willingness to talk to Hammarskjold would be enough for them to make the proposal in Mr. Lange's speech, provided the Secretary-General agreed.

---

130. Memorandum of Conversation

MC–5 New York, September 26, 1958, 10 a.m.

SECRETARY'S TRIP TO NEW YORK

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Mr. Rountree	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Greene	Sir Harold Caccia
	Mr. Anthony Moore
	Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

Far East

The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd resumed their discussion of the previous evening on the Far East.[1] The Secretary said that if the United States introduces a new paper in the Warsaw talks next Tuesday, it will go as far as possible without, however, implying any Chinat renunciation of title to the offshore islands.

Mr. Lloyd read further details from the report of the British Embassy in Peiping of what the Indians there had told them about a conversation with "one of the highest Chinese authorities."[2] According to this report,

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1123. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

[1] Recorded in a September 25 memorandum of conversation by Greene. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] According to Greene's memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 1 above, Lloyd told Dulles the previous evening of a report from the British Chargé in Peking on a conversation with an Indian Embassy officer in which there appeared to be "a hint that the Indians might undertake mediation between the Chicoms and the United States."

the ChiComs are most concerned about a build-up on the offshore islands and will not accept any cease-fire arrangement that would permit continuation of the build-up. While they insist in this context on withdrawal from the islands they are willing not to push their claims to Taiwan. Moreover, the ChiComs want to keep the Warsaw talks going but have been alarmed by the President's and the Secretary's statements and regard as preposterous the United States proposal for thinning out of forces on the mainland adjacent to the offshore islands. Finally there is in the report the hint of Indian mediation.

Mr. Lloyd and the Secretary agreed that this report reflects a complete misunderstanding of the United States position, which the Secretary thought might be calculated simply to fool the Indians. On the other hand, if it were bona fide, it might, as Mr. Lloyd had suggested, be a hopeful development. Mr. Lloyd added that Krishna Menon[3] had told him here in New York, that he, Menon, is certain that the ChiComs will not push for Taiwan now.

On the other side of the coin, Mr. Lloyd said, are Khrushchev's belligerent attitudes and the attitude Gromyko took in the conversation he had had with him Tuesday evening. The first hour of this had been a "sullen refrain" that the Americans must leave the Taiwan area and that there is "no risk of war" in the present Communist posture. Gromyko had also refused to "deliver lectures in Peiping" about the risk of war. Finally, however, after more than an hour of this he had seemed to give a little, to the extent of admitting that there might be risks in the present situation and of reflecting cautious interest in some accommodation. He had asked Lloyd whether the Americans might be willing to separate the issues of the offshore islands and of Taiwan.

Mr. Lloyd asked about the long-term prospects. He recalled that the Japanese Foreign Minister had expressed to him his concern over the effect in the Western Pacific if Chiang Kai-shek's position were to be undermined or overthrown. Mr. Lloyd said that for himself he was more concerned with the problem of the overseas Chinese in South East Asia if Chiang Kai-shek's Government went under. Mr. Lloyd recalled that in his conversation at Newport with the President, the latter had agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom should examine the long-term aspects of the present situation.

The Secretary suggested, and it was agreed after some discussion, that such an examination should be begun by the intelligence people on both sides working together. The Secretary agreed that Sir Harold Caccia might approach Allen Dulles to get this started and that thereafter it might prove desirable to have Sir Robert Scott[4] visit Washington to advance the assessment.

---

[3] V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Representative to the United Nations.

[4] British Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Lloyd asked what would be done if either side breaks off the Warsaw talks. The Secretary said that the matter would then have to come to the United Nations, but we had not yet decided whether to take it to the Security Council or to the General Assembly; a Soviet veto would have to be expected in the Security Council. As to substance, he felt a resolution condemning the use of force and encouraging peaceful settlement, somewhat along the lines of the New Zealand resolution in 1955, could be envisaged.

In response to Mr. Lloyd's inquiry, the Secretary flatly denied the truth of a rumor Mr. Lloyd said was circulating to the effect that present hostilities had been started, not by the Chinese Communists, but by the Chinats in an attack shortly before August 23. The Secretary pointed out that the present Chinese Communists' operation had been planned and built up long in advance. The Secretary also assured Mr. Lloyd that there is no truth in a recent story put out by someone in the Pentagon about a leaflet raid over the mainland by the Chinese Nationalist aircraft. There had, in fact, been no such raid, and the story had been intended as a cover for United States reconnaissance flights. In this context the Secretary summarized Chinat operations from the islands against the mainland, characterizing them as largely negligible and ineffectual.

There ensued considerable discussion of the possibilities of mediation by someone having both the qualifications and the confidence of both sides. The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed that while Secretary General Hammarskjold (whom the Norwegians had suggested) is skilled in such matters, he is now so deeply and essentially engrossed in the Middle East question that it would not be practicable or desirable to divert him from that to get into the Far East problem. Mr. Lloyd was disposed to press the idea of sounding out Nehru as to whether he would undertake the task in relation to the Far East, and indicated that he might speak to Krishna Menon, as a way of communicating with Nehru but certainly not with a view to getting Menon himself into the act. The Secretary expressed some doubt that Nehru's concern for the analogy of Goa would enable him to develop a solution to the offshore islands question that would be acceptable to the Chinese Nationalists. He pointed out that the Nationalists would never agree to turn the islands over to the Communists and only under the strongest pressure might they accept their demilitarization. Nonetheless, if Nehru could figure out some way to solve the present issue of the islands without disastrous repercussions in Taiwan and throughout the Western Pacific, that would be fine by the Secretary. Mr. Lloyd thought that Nehru may be sufficiently concerned at the growing power of the Chinese Communists that he would not automatically take their side.

Mr. Lloyd said further that he had told a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations earlier in the week that the British Government would not do anything in this matter unless asked to do so by the United States Government. The Secretary responded that we have no objection to the United Kingdom, but doubt that their mediation would be plausible or effective; it would suggest in the United States that the United Kingdom is neutral; and the Communists would undoubtedly not accept them as neutral. In any event there is need of an intermediary and we will welcome any suggestions the British may have. The operation could be undertaken quietly and behind the scenes—as it was by Nehru in 1954 and 1955—and in the Secretary's view a de facto let up in shooting, to which we would respond if the Chinese initiated it, is a more likely prospect than a written agreement for a cease-fire. Continuation of the Ambassadorial talks might well provide a cover for such a détente as it had in 1955.

Mr. Lloyd asked for the Secretary's long-term view of the Chinese representation issue, saying that he thought it would be harder next year to get the moratorium formula accepted, than it had been this year. The Secretary observed that we have not yet used all the arguments against Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations. In answer to Mr. Lloyd's further question, he did not think we could keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations forever, but in his view they have to be excluded until they shall have demonstrated good behavior and acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter for a reasonable time. This period is not to be judged simply by the calendar but must be adequate to show a basic and sincere change from the Chinese Communists' present attitude; if they were to get into the United Nations in their present mood it would mark the end of the United Nations as we know it, might mark the end of United States support of the United Nations, and it would give encouragement to all members of the United Nations who do not believe in its principles. The Secretary added that he was not certain that the Chinese representation issue is solely a question of credentials.

131. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, September 26, 1958, 6:21 p.m.

262341Z. Adm Felt and VAdm Smoot from Burke. Re final paragraph CTDC 250812Z.[1]

Agree your approach. So does State. Obviously utmost importance that ChiNat response to any type ChiCom attack on Tatan and/or Ehrtan not be of such nature as to invite aerial counterattacks on Big and Little Quemoy with resulting net worsening of GRC position there. You may also wish consult with Ambassador Drumright and recommend circumstances and manner whereby information contained State Department telegram 138 August 25 to Embassy Taipei[2] is communicated to appropriate GRC authorities.

You are correct in that we must leave no false impressions that United States would militarily support ChiNat resistance against an isolated ChiCom assault on Tatan or Ehrtan. If ChiCom assault against Tatan and/or Ehrtan were part of assault against Quemoy and/or Little Quemoy then United States military involvement, of course, would be matter for Presidential determination.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2658. Top Secret; Routine. Sent to CINCPACFLT and COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US). Drafted by Burke.

[1] The last paragraph of this telegram from Smoot, September 25, stated that he had initiated a combined staff study on the problem of defending the Tan Islands which he hoped would show Nationalist staff planners the futility of attacking the mainland for that purpose. It said that Smoot was taking care to imply neither that the United States would assist in the defense of the Tans nor that it would recommend their abandonment. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] See footnote 1, Document 43.

---

132. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, September 26, 1958.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On 16 September 1958 Under Secretary of State Herter, in a telephone conversation with Rear Admiral Hayward,

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2658. Top Secret.

USN, Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, requested thoughts on alternative courses to continuing the present support of the GRC with respect to the off-shore islands. I am enclosing a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, with which the Department of Defense concurs.

The resupply of Kinmen appears gradually to be improving. Recognizing that improved resupply is in itself an incomplete solution, we are seeking alternative courses which will improve the US–GRC position, and which will anticipate new developments. We shall, of course, consult with the Department of State on appropriate courses as they develop.

Sincerely yours,

John N. Irwin, II

[Enclosure][1]

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT

Taiwan (U)

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 16 September 1958 between Under Secretary of State Herter and Rear Admiral Heyward, USN, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Mr. Herter requested some thoughts on what alternative courses there might be to continuing the present support of the GRC in occupation of the off-shore islands. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to affirm their belief in the ability of the GRC and the United States to continue the present system of resupply of Kinmen. As the GRC personnel become more adept in the resupply effort, it is believed that an increasing amount of supplies can be delivered.

2. Any modifications to the degree of support now being furnished the GRC involve increasing U.S. participation in the conduct of supply operations and increased U.S. protection of these operations. This latter alternative cannot be limited with any degree of assurance since the extent of U.S. involvement would necessarily be dependent upon ChiCom reaction.

---

[1] Top Secret. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 19 and sent forward to the Secretary of Defense with a covering note of September 20 from Twining. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)

3. With respect to the Radford–Robertson–Chiang Kai-shek conversations of 1955, the considerations concerning a naval blockade (interdiction) of the China coast opposing Taiwan is no longer valid. The purpose of the blockade was to prevent the seaborne movement of POL and other military supplies to that area, which at that time could not be supplied by land. Completion of the railroad to Amoy has removed the ChiCom's dependence on seaborne supply.

---

133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 27, 1958, 2 p.m.

493. 1. Foreign Minister asked me to call this morning. He said President had inquired of him this morning whether any reply had been received to his request for direct US participation in Kinmen airdrop.[1] Foreign Minister replied negatively, whereupon President directed that matter be brought to my attention again. Foreign Minister said President stressed morale aspect of US participation. Foreign Minister said that he had told President of my belief that US would be reluctant to participate in airdrop at this time.

2. I pointed out to Foreign Minister that current instruction prevented us from participating directly in actions on or over offshore islands, and reiterated my belief that US Government would find it difficult to change that position now.[2] I then recounted to Foreign Minister numerous actions we have taken and are in process of taking to improve SEA and airlift capabilities. I said we were confident that with backstopping we are now receiving from Washington, and assuming comparable effort on part of GRC, we will be able to surmount our convoy problem and land adequate supplies to enable Kinmen defenders to hold out indefinitely. I said fact that US supplies would reach Kinmen in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2758. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:28 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

[1] Telegram 472 from Taipei, September 24, reported this request, which Huang had conveyed to Drumright the previous evening. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–2458; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 272 to Taipei, September 26, instructed Drumright to inform Huang that after consideration of Chiang's request, the U.S. view remained that "direct U.S. participation in airlift not necessary or desirable at this time." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2458) Telegram 495 from Taipei, September 27, reported that telegram 272 had arrived that afternoon and that Drumright had communicated its substance to Huang. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–2758) Telegram 272 is in the Supplement.

mounting quantities and in American equipment would be tangible evidence of US support. I said that we would also be sending an American General officer to Kinmen within next few days for morale boosting purposes. This, too, would be tangible evidence of US support. I then took opportunity to indicate to Minister our belief that more energetic effort is called for on part of GRC to make convoy efforts definite success. I said we had reports of apathy at Kachsiung and on Kinmen. Admiral Smoot and I believe more vigorous Chinese effort is needed to match our own effort. I said that Admiral Smoot would be speaking to this point with Tiger Wang and Defense Minister.

3. I also took opportunity to describe to Foreign Minister domestic and foreign public opinion difficulties confronting US Government in reference to Strait crisis. Foreign Minister replied he has received several reports from George Yeh on this subject and appreciated our position. I then explained that we may need considerable time in which to explore various possibilities for peaceful settlement. I said I was confident that GRC would understand our position this regard and would accommodate itself to this fact. I expressed personal belief that Strait situation may be prolonged for some time to come and might become endurance contest between Kinmen defenders and Communist attackers. I said that it seemed to me GRC might be well-advised to accommodate itself to this sort of situation. Foreign Minister said he agreed Strait situation may turn into prolonged struggle. He said he personally believed, granted adequate resupply, that Kinmen could hold out indefinitely. He also expressed belief that public opinion on Taiwan could be held in check and recounted some of steps he and Prime Minister have taken during past two weeks to mold and channel public opinion.

4. I had long talk this morning with Admiral Smoot on convoy and related problems. We came to conclusion that with back stopping now promised and with energetic effort on part of Chinese, adequate supplies can be sent to Kinmen to maintain defense. Probably minimum of about 400 tons daily will be needed. Smoot is working on Chinese to step up their efforts and he will in his talks with Chinese military authorities endeavor to condition them to idea that test of endurance may develop in regard to holding offshore islands.

5. *Comment:* I am confident that convoy problem can be solved. I am also confident that Kinmen defenders can be conditioned to fight on indefinitely, even though they are at disadvantage. American encouragement will, of course, be most important in this regard. I am confident also that GRC has it within its capability to control public opinion here and condition it to long pull. President Chiang will be impatient, will try to involve us more directly, and will protest and tell us of his difficulties from time to time, but it is my belief that he understands necessity of keeping in step with us and will do so.

Drumright

134. Memorandum of Conversation

MC–14 New York, September 27, 1958, 12:50 p.m.

SECRETARY'S TRIP TO NEW YORK

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*United Nations*
The Secretary Mr. Greene	Secretary General Hammarskjold

SUBJECT

Various

The Secretary explained that he wanted to continue his discussion with the Secretary General on the possibility of the United Nations in some way helping to act as a cushion in the present Far East crisis, so as to diminish the risk of general war.[1]

The Secretary described in detail why, although it could not be said publicly, the political and psychological significance of Quemoy far transcends its military significance to the survival of Chiang Kai-shek's Government on Taiwan. He and the Secretary General agreed that Chiang Kai-shek is a dedicated and determined man and that this is as much a fact to be taken into account in the present situation as is geography. The Secretary said that if it were possible to work out a cease fire that would not cost Chiang Kai-shek his position and authority, that would be most agreeable to the United States; complete surrender of the offshore islands is in no event acceptable.

Discussing the possibility of compromise, the Secretary General thought that if the Chicoms' position is only that they will never give up their claims to the offshore islands, there may be just enough room for compromise. If however, they are committed to the principle of using force to get them, there is no room at all. He wondered how firm they really are in their professions of intent to seize the islands.

The Secretary reviewed the present military and supply situations, which suggested to him the conclusion that the Chicoms are not yet committed to an all out effort to seize the islands; hence the situation may gradually die down without an outbreak of general war. Since neither

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1123. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.

[1] The Secretary had raised the subject with the Secretary-General in a brief conversation the previous evening, recorded in a September 26 memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations)

the Chicoms nor the Chinats will abandon their claims to the islands, perhaps sanitization of the latter is the answer.

The Secretary thought the Soviets are no more anxious to have a general war break out than are we. But there still may be a need to find a third element to intervene in the present situation.

Discussing the possibilities of a "third factor" the Secretary and the Secretary General agreed that the United Nations, even in the person of the Secretary General, might be palatable to neither side. India is unacceptable; the Secretary General thought Finland would be acceptable, but probably would not risk it. By a process of elimination one comes back to the United Nations as almost the only hope. Here, the trick will be to find a form or formula that will skirt the conflicts of principle. The Secretary General described the formula under which the Chicoms accepted his intercession last time, and thought it might possibly work again; the heart of this formula is that, while the Chicoms cannot accept an outside intervention in an "internal" matter, they did accept such intervention in what was delineated as an "international" issue.

The Secretary General said he would think about the matter over the weekend and be back in touch with the Secretary.

The Secretary emphasized that we may be near a critical point and as far as the United States is concerned, if no written formula can be found, it is enough if hostilities just subside into a de facto truce.

The Secretary General also discussed in some detail the organizational problems in the United Nations during the General Assembly. These, in his view, would have to be resolved before he could feel available for a role in the affair. He seemed to think that if it could be worked out as a "crash" project that would require not more than a fortnight of his time, he could afford to be absent from headquarters between mid-October and mid-November but probably not before and certainly not after.

135. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, September 27, 1958, 5:45 p.m.

270945Z. Conference with Minister Defense disclosed his growing interest in public opinion in the United States. He seemed satisfied that our present organization and efforts were directed toward that end and instructed his own PIO RAdm Liu[1] to cooperate closely with our CIB.

In briefing from MND on Ta Tan and Erh Tan these points were made clear.

(a) that it is MNDs determination to use every means possible to keep supplies going into Kinmen in general and to satellite islands in particular.

(b) that if either fails or does not produce effective results there is no alternative, but to bomb the mainland.

One of the primary assumptions which form a point of departure for the whole briefing was the GRC position that these satellite islands will never be abandoned voluntarily.

The briefing was quite thorough covering all aspects of the situation and I left with the feeling that the military analysis does not disclose such an imminent serious situation as is being presented through the political factions. The MND briefing discloses a capability to holdout with present supplies for a minimum of 20 more days. In later private conference with Tiger [Wang] many indirect inferences lead me to conclude that Tiger recognizes the completely untenable position of these 2 islands that secretly he would like to evacuate but that he must follow his government's directive to keep up the morale to maintain their combat effectiveness and to increase the resupply effort. He asked me a direct question. Do you think the islands are impossible to defend? I told him nothing is impossible. It just takes a little longer more effort and more imagination. He has many good ideas to increase the effectiveness of resupply and seemed receptive to my ideas of slowly reducing the Tan garrison to a strong versatile group and then developing a program of rotation by small units, of increasing supply effectiveness by delivery precooked food, solid fuels and water purifiers in continuous nite ops in rubber boats. The Tiger again assured me they will take no overt offensive action without prior consultation. He ended up by saying that next

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2758. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to JCS, CNO, and COMSEVENTHFLT. Received at the Department of the Navy at 8:40 p.m.

[1] Rear Admiral Liu Ho-tu, Chief of the Office of Information in the Ministry of National Defense.

to mine his job was the worst in Free China. Comment. I believe Chinats will continue pressure me by threat of bombing mainland to relieve Tan Island garrisons but I believe they will use restraint up to situation desperate. I believe however if they were sure US would enter fight immediately to combat Commie air reaction they would initiate assault on mainland tomorrow. I believe they hope US will enter if Commies initiate massive bombing Kinmen complex but aren't sure and even if they were sure are desperately concerned that the need for Presidential approval will introduce time delay of fatal proportions. I think there is grave doubts in their ranks that US takes serious view of Tan Island situation. I believe General Hu Lien could make more effective deployment his defensive and offensive forces if he knew US would repulse assault on southern beaches (the resupply area) of Big Kinmen. I know the answers I must give to these questions now and can handle situation on broad non commital basis and can gradually convince them this is long campaign with only solution being successful resupply.

Ambassador advises on basis his visits with Foreign Minister that thinking parts GRC appreciate

(a) world at large is by no means all behind US in defending OSI.
(b) US is certainly not unanimously behind it.
(c) course we are taking is only one which will win for GRC. Any other means loss of US support and defeat.

This is tack I will take to relieve pressures of Minister Yu who as you know I believe is not in ruling clique but who serves effectively as American whip.

136. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower

New York, September 27, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I spoke with Jack McCloy about going to Taipei[1] and after thinking about it for twenty-four hours he brought me the enclosed memorandum[2] which I think will interest you.

With reference to the second paragraph,[3] I explained to Jack that as far as concessions respecting Quemoy and Matsu were concerned the limiting factor was not our views but the views of Chiang and how much we could bring him to accept without the reaction which would collapse the situation on Formosa. This, however, did not change his views on the basic question of his going.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret.

[1] John J. McCloy was Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank. According to unsigned notes made in the White House of a September 26 telephone conversation between the President and the Secretary, Dulles told the President that he had talked to McCloy the previous evening about the Quemoy–Matsu situation and "was going to put up to Mr. McCloy idea that he go along with Secretary McElroy on his trip to Formosa and try to talk Chiang into giving up the Islands." (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

[2] The memorandum from McCloy to Dulles, September 27, stated that he felt he could not undertake the mission for several reasons. (*Ibid.*, Dulles–Herter Series; see Supplement)

[3] The second numbered paragraph reads:

"Second: I really fear that my inclinations would go further in the way of concessions respecting Quemoy and Matsu than the Department or you feel it is wise to go. Under these circumstances I feel I would be a poor emissary. Moreover, I do not really know yet how far you want him to go in view of the somewhat uneasy position he holds on Taiwan."

137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

Ta-tan and Erh-tan Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. S.C. Hsu, Chinese Minister
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

During the course of a conversation with Amb. Yeh on another subject, the question of Ta-tan and Ehr-tan islands came up. Mr. Robertson recalled[1] seeing a report that Pres. Chiang desired to put the defense of Ta-tan and Erh-tan in the same category as the defense of Big and Little Quemoy. Mr. Robertson emphasized that this would be a great mistake. The people of the U.S. could not possibly support U.S. involvement in the defense of these two tiny and exposed positions.

Amb. Yeh said that he fully agreed. In fact he had already recommended that his government abandon these islands and blow them up. Amb. Yeh felt that it would be a good thing to expand the "no man's land" between Communist and Nationalist positions.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2858. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin.

[1] Robertson had called on Yeh to inform him of the instructions which were to be sent to Beam for the next Warsaw meeting (see Documents 138 ff.); the memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2858; see Supplement.

---

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 28, 1958, 10:49 p.m.

351. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for next meeting:

It is important that U.S. posture at Warsaw talks continue to be one of seeking peaceful settlement current hostilities in Taiwan Straits, and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared in substance by Dulles, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

our emphasis in talks should continue be on constructive efforts this end. However opportunities should be taken expose Chinese Communist record of aggression and fact its present attack on offshore islands is simply new phase of long-established policy of resort to force. In next meeting therefore you should begin with hard-hitting attack on Chinese Communists' record. Point out that civilized nations of world cannot tolerate resort to war to enforce claims against disputed territories; e.g. Goa, Kashmir, Antarctica, West New Guinea, or to bring about unification of divided countries; e.g. Germany, Korea, Viet-Nam. If in these cases, parties involved were to resort to force in pursuance their conflicting objectives, each with possible outside backing, there would be an end to peace and security of all nations and all peoples everywhere. U.S. has found it necessary in past and will not hesitate now or in future to defend principle that claims of nations be adjusted by peaceful means.

When Chinese Communist Prime Minister agreed to resumption these talks, there was great relief felt in world because it seemed as though Chinese Communists were accepting principle of settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation in accordance with practice of peace-loving and civilized nations. World has been profoundly disappointed that Chinese Communists have continued their attacks, and flatly rejected U.S. proposals for a ceasefire. Moreover, Chinese Communists have failed to make any sincere attempt to negotiate but have instead insisted on our side's 100 per cent compliance their demands while totally rejecting U.S. proposals. This is not negotiation.

In last meeting Wang posed series six questions designed as springboard for spurious attack on U.S. However, questions in which world is really interested are: 1) Will shooting in Taiwan Straits area be stopped immediately? and 2) Will steps be taken avert likelihood of recurrence such hostilities? World demands affirmative answer both questions.

In this light U.S. has drawn up following revised agreed announcement (Deptel 352)[1] to which trust Wang's side will give its prompt agreement.

Re your 480.[2] If Wang calls for higher level conference, you should not categorically reject it but ask him what such conference could accomplish that you and he could not. Point out failure so far reach agreement wholly due unwillingness his side either make serious proposal or give serious consideration U.S. proposal which embodies honest effort make first step toward equitable resolution differences between two sides. U.S. believes all that needed is serious purpose negotiate settlement without use or threat of force. Failing this, higher level conference would only be cruel deception of world hoping for peaceful settlement.

---

[1] Document 139.

[2] In telegram 480 from Warsaw, September 27, Beam made recommendations for the next meeting and requested contingency guidance in case Wang called for a higher-level conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2758; see Supplement)

FYI. An important purpose our revised agreed announcement is to express fact that current dispute in Taiwan Straits area is an international dispute rather than purely domestic affair as alleged by Communists. For this reason first three paragraphs of statement by each Ambassador recites facts as to dispute which exists in the area among the named countries. Quotations in paragraph 2 re Soviet position taken from rejected Khrushchev letter to President Eisenhower,[3] on which in your discretion you may wish elaborate.

Note that Communist undertaking to suspend hostilities is contingent on concurrent reciprocal suspension hostilities by other side. This eliminates need for U.S. giving such undertaking specifically and gets around difficulty of U.S. "seeking that" GRC take such action. End FYI.

For Taipei: Copy our revised agreed announcement given Ambassador Yeh who has also been informed substance above instructions.

Herter

---

[3] See Document 110.

---

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, September 28, 1958, 10:49 p.m.

352. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is text proposed agreed announcement which you should submit to Wang at next meeting:

Verbatim text. "Ambassador Beam on behalf of the Government of the U.S. and Ambassador Wang on behalf of the Government of the PRC agree to announce that:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles, cleared in draft by Becker, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

"Ambassador Beam, on behalf of the Government of the U.S., has noted:

"1. That the PRC claim that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands are territory of the PRC of which they are determined to possess themselves, if need be, by force. The Government of the PRC has in fact begun to take forcible measures to take possession of the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands. To that end, the Government of the PRC has demanded that the Government of the U.S. forthwith withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan area.

"2. That the Government of the USSR supports the claims and actions of the PRC. It has a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the PRC and has declared if the U.S. does not withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, 'no other way will be left to the PRC except the expulsion of the armed forces hostile to it from its own territory' and that the Government of the Soviet Union 'will support their (PRC) policy' and 'will fulfill completely the obligations we (USSR) have assumed'.

"3. That the Government of the U.S. declares (a) that it disputes the above claim of the PRC, (b) that, by treaty with the Republic of China, it is committed to the collective defense, with the Republic of China, of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and (c) that the Government of the USA will fulfill completely the obligations it has assumed and that the President of the United States is authorized and prepared to use armed forces of the U.S. for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and also of related positions, such as the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, if he judges their defense to be appropriate for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

"4. There is thus an international dispute and threat of force which endangers international peace and security and which ought to be resolved by renunciation of force in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

"Accordingly, Ambassador Beam, on behalf of the Government of the U.S.,

"1. Proposes that the Government of the PRC will promptly suspend hostilities now being directed against the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, such suspension to be contingent on a concurrent reciprocal suspension of hostilities in defense of the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands.

"2. The Government of the U.S. declares that it is prepared to seek a solution of the above-mentioned dispute by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement and notes that the Government of the PRC reciprocates this declaration.

"3. Proposes that pending such peaceful solution, provisional measures will be promptly taken by the Government of the PRC, to assure that, so far as they are concerned, there will be no harassments or provocations as between the mainland and island positions held by the Government of the PRC, and the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, such measures to be contingent on concurrent reciprocal measures of restraint from harassment and provocations from the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands. Such measures may include reduction of forces and armaments.

"Ambassador Wang, on behalf of the Government of the PRC, has noted:

"1. That the PRC claims that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands are territory of the PRC of which they are determined to possess themselves, if need be, by force. The Government of the PRC has in fact begun to take forcible measures to take possession of the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands. To that end, the Government of the PRC has demanded that the Government of the U.S. forthwith withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan area.

"2. That the Government of the USSR supports the claims and actions of the PRC. It has a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the PRC and has declared if the U.S. does not withdraw its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, 'no other way will be left to the PRC except the expulsion of the armed forces hostile to it from its own territory' and that the Government of the Soviet Union 'will support their (PRC) policy' and 'will fulfill completely the obligations we (USSR) have assumed.'

"3. That the Government of the U.S. has declared (a) that it disputes the above claim of the PRC, (b) that, by treaty with the Republic of China, it is committed to the collective defense, with the Republic of China, of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and (c) that the Government of the USA will fulfill completely the obligations it has assumed and that the President of the United States is authorized and prepared to use armed forces of the U.S. for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus and also of related positions, such as the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, if he judges their defense to be appropriate for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

"4. There is thus an international dispute and threat of force which endangers international peace and security and which ought to be resolved by renunciation of force in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered.

"Accordingly, Ambassador Wang, on behalf of the Government of the PRC,

"1. Declares that the Government of the PRC will promptly suspend hostilities now being directed against the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, such suspension to be contingent on a concurrent reciprocal suspension of hostilities in defense of the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands.

"2. Takes note of the declaration made on behalf of the Government of the U.S. that it is prepared to seek a solution of the above-mentioned dispute by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement and declares that it reciprocates this declaration.

"3. Declares that pending such peaceful solution, provisional measures will be promptly taken by the Government of the PRC, to assure that, so far as they are concerned, there will be no harassments or provocations as between the mainland and island positions held by the Government of the PRC and the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands, such measures to be contingent on concurrent reciprocal measures of restraint from harassment and provocations from the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands. Such measures may include reduction of forces and armaments.

"Ambassador Wang, on behalf of the Government of the PRC, and Ambassador Beam, on behalf of the Government of the USA, will continue conversations with a view to implementing the foregoing."

Herter

---

140. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, September 29, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining reported that the Chiefs believe that they have the supply crisis "broken" in the offshore island area, and are no longer so concerned about it. They are being pressed to provide airlift; they agree that the capability should exist in Formosa, but feel it should not be used unless critically necessary, because of expense.[1]

The President said that something must be done to make Chiang more flexible in his approach. He said he did not like to wage a fight on the ground of someone else's choosing, and this is the case in Quemoy and Matsu where we are at a great disadvantage in terms of world opinion. On the other hand we have no choice but to take a firm stand in the present circumstances. The President thought that something might be done by offering amphibious lift to Chiang so that he could take advantage of any weakening on the continent, and so that the only way the Chinese Communists could attack his control of Formosa would be bound to bring us to their defense. General Twining said there has been concern that Chiang might do something rash, but General Kuter,[2] who has just visited him, feels that this is not likely. General Twining raised the ques-

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on September 30.

[1] According to a memorandum by Dulles of a meeting between himself and the President at 11 a.m. that day, the President indicated that Twining had spoken of "the heavy cost of the Formosa operation and his hope that it would not have to continue indefinitely." (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President; see Supplement)

[2] General Laurence S. Kuter, USAF, Commander, Pacific Air Forces.

tion whether Chiang really believes he can ever go back. The President said he must of course keep his people thinking that there is some possibility of doing so. General Twining said he would get some thinking started in the Pentagon as to what could be done with Chiang to get him out of the offshore islands. The President asked that this be done.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

---

141. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 29, 1958, 3:03–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Lange Discussion: Formosa and Offshore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Halvard Lange—Norwegian Foreign Minister
Paul Koht—Norwegian Ambassador
William Kerrigan—EUR:BNA

Mr. Lange inquired whether the UN could play any useful role in reducing tension in the offshore island situation. This might be possible through the UN machinery, a small group of member nations, or the SYG. The Norwegian Government had made an attempt through the Chicom Ambassador in Oslo to determine whether any accommodation could be reached. No reply has been received, which may be encouraging. On the other hand, the Russians are not likely to be helpful, as he (Lange) found in a recent talk with Gromyko. At the same time, however, Sobolev[1] told Norwegian Ambassador Nielsen that they saw the need to separate the problem of the offshore islands from Formosa. Mr. Lange observed that they had not yet reconciled the discrepancies in the two

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2958. Secret. Drafted by Kerrigan. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] Soviet Representative to the United Nations Arkady A. Sobolev.

Russian positions. He mentioned that he was speaking in the UN on Tuesday (Sept. 30) and inquired whether it would be useful if he were to suggest, in guarded terms, that if the present Warsaw talks don't achieve their purpose, the UN could be helpful in reaching some accommodation.

The Secretary responded that he saw no objection to a statement to that effect, couched in guarded terms. However, he would be grateful if no suggestion were made to carry the talks on at a higher level. We do not think such talks will work. We would be agreeable to any reasonable settlement that can be reached about the offshore islands, and do not consider them as anything but outpost positions, to be lightly held. The President has always regarded them in that light. In fact, we have made strenuous efforts to persuade the Formosa Chinese to keep the manning of the islands at a low level. Although we do not regard the offshore islands as of fundamental importance, we want very much to keep Formosa because of its great strategic importance. Additionally, the loss of Formosa would probably result in the loss of the Philippines, and would have serious results elsewhere in Asia.

Mr. Lange inquired whether the natives of Taiwan would share the feelings of the mainland (Nationalist) Chinese about the importance of the offshore islands. The Secretary responded that the Taiwanese are not organized politically and there is no way of making their wishes felt, but probably they would prefer to be independent of the mainland and mainland influences. In view of the lack of political organization and political maturity of the Taiwanese, we see no way of bringing them into the present Government at this time. Mr. Lange inquired whether UN Trusteeship to develop the Taiwanese in the direction of political maturity—after the death of Chiang—would be feasible.

The Secretary responded that the long term development of the Island seemed to be in that direction, and cited the growing percentage of Taiwanese in the Nationalist army, which development will gradually create an army more loyal to the Island than to the mainland.

Mr. Lange observed that even the mainlanders on Formosa appear to be giving up the idea of successful return to the mainland, to which the Secretary agreed, observing that even Chiang had given up hope of return, in the absence of a revolution on the mainland.

In response to Ambassador Koht's question, the Secretary observed that Chiang attaches so much importance to these islands because they are the last remnant of mainland territory he holds, since we persuaded him to abandon the Tachens in 1955.

We are very anxious to get the troops out of these offshore islands; their mere presence there is regarded as in a sense provocative, although the Nationalists do very little harassing from the islands.

As to the solution of the problem (the offshore islands), the Secretary indicated that if the UN were to enter the picture, the situation could most usefully be handled by the SYG. He went on to say that he placed his greatest hope of a solution to the problem, not in the development of a formula, but in a de facto agreement that doesn't require anyone to do anything or sign anything. In such a situation a third party, who can go from one side to the other and work out a practical position useful to both sides, is of great assistance. The Secretary pointed out that he was fearful of mentioning high level talks because while Ambassadors could talk for 2 or 3 years, it would be another thing entirely for Foreign Ministers, who would have to reach an agreement promptly. It was also undesirable to go into such talks at the higher level unless the earlier spade work indicated they had a good chance of success.

---

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, September 30, 1958, 4 p.m.

510. 1. Substance Deptel 270[1] as amended by Deptel 274[2] conveyed Premier and Foreign Minister at conference today. Vice Foreign Minister Chow and Admiral Smoot also present.

2. Premier accepted representations calmly and with equanimity. He spoke of need for our two governments to have full mutual understanding. He granted importance of public opinion but believed governments should not be led by it; instead governments should lead public opinion not only through speech making but through private discussions with opinion moulders. Premier found latter most effective.

3. Premier said he would not be honest if he denied GRC desire to overthrow Reds. However GRC does not seek to do so by war. It hopes

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–3058. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:29 a.m.

[1] Document 128.

[2] Telegram 274 to Taipei, September 26, authorized Drumright to give the substance of telegram 270 to the Premier and Foreign Minister, except that with respect to the second sentence, he was to convey U.S. views on the undesirability of the military actions proposed by Chen without mentioning any time period. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2658) A copy of the paraphrase of telegram 270 which Drumright gave to Chen and Huang is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147.

instead to see Reds overthrown by internal revolts. It is most important therefore for GRC to engage in political rather than military measures to help with overthrow. In view of continuous and expanded Red oppression, mainland people are dissatisfied and want to know when they will be liberated and what will be policy of GRC. It is up to GRC to use political measures to inform and win over mainland people. It is Communists who are desperate and want war; it is they who are faced with many problems and who want to create military crisis.

4. Although GRC does not want war, it does not fear war. Fear only encourages aggressors. Premier said he had had more than 30 years' experience as soldier. He knew horror of war and would try to avoid it. He had spoken as he had on September 20 because Kinmen resupply situation very serious. Fortunately, it is better now. If they can solve resupply problem, it may be unnecessary to resort to retaliatory attacks. GRC's limit of endurance is gauged by two factors: (1) resupply problem; (2) attempted Communist amphibious landing. If supply problem cannot be solved or if off-shores are assaulted amphibiously, GRC will be compelled to act.

5. Premier said GRC still is opposed to Warsaw talks for simple reason they will accomplish nothing. He indicated some disturbance over presentation Beam is to make today based on an incomplete and confused telegram (in Chinese) from George Yeh. He said any agreement to reduce troops and equipment would be dangerous. He then instructed Foreign Minister to discuss this matter with me. He also justified GRC action in putting so many troops on Kinmen and said Communist aggression had justified GRC decision in this regard.

6. Admiral Smoot took opportunity of meeting to discuss GRC–US cooperation in convoy operations, to point out shortcomings and to ask Premier's assistance in overcoming them. Premier said he would be glad to help and invited Admiral to consult him at any time.

Drumright

143. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles commented extensively on the Taiwan Strait crisis at a news conference on September 30, 1958. In response to a question whether the United States expected the Nationalists to return someday to the mainland either by force or otherwise, he replied that this was "a highly hypothetical matter." He did not think that "just by their own steam they are going to get there" but he did not want to exclude the possibility of unrest and revolt on the mainland like the 1956 revolt in Hungary.

When asked whether the United States had agreed to the buildup of Nationalist forces on the offshore islands, he replied that the United States "did not feel that it was sound" to make such a major commitment of forces to those areas but that it had acquiesced and had not attempted to veto it. In response to a question of whether it would be sound to work out some arrangement for the withdrawal of Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu, he answered:

> "It all depends upon the circumstances under which they would be withdrawn. I think to withdraw as a retreat under fire would not be a wise step to take because of the probable impact of that upon other peoples, other countries, and upon the morale, indeed, on Formosa itself."

To a follow-up question as to the circumstances under which such a withdrawal might be possible, he replied:

> "If there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands. We thought that it was rather foolish to put them there, and, as I say, if there were a cease-fire it would be our judgment, military judgment even, that it would not be wise or prudent to keep them there."

Later he was asked whether a cease-fire could be a de facto one with no written agreement. He answered, "I think it could be de facto." For the complete transcript of the news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin,* October 20, 1958, pages 597–604.

144. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 30, 1958, 5:55–6:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	Prime Minister Walter Nash of New Zealand[1]
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs	Mr. Lloyd White, Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., New Zealand Embassy
Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs	Mr. A.D. McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs of New Zealand

The Prime Minister said he had been disturbed at the Secretary's reactions to his statement in Parliament on the Taiwan Straits situation.[2] He said he had been "hurt" when he received the report of the Secretary's comments, and that the press had not reported correctly his statements. He had therefore sent a full text of it to the Embassy to pass to the Department. The Secretary said that he has had considerable experience with the press, and has been misquoted so often that he tends to take a charitable view of what others are quoted as saying.

The Secretary said that the Taiwan Straits situation is a very difficult one. We take a broad view of the problem and do not consider it a small issue of a couple of islands. The Soviet Union, or at least Khrushchev, appears to be developing delusions of grandeur because of their developments in the nuclear energy field and are beginning to believe that they can rule the world. They hold that it was their stand that kept the British and French from going ahead in the Suez crisis; that their stand prevented the United States and Turkey from proceeding with a planned attack against Syria; and that they also prevented an attack against Iraq which, they state, was our intention when we landed troops in Lebanon. It is not clear whether Khrushchev actually believes all this or whether he is a prisoner of a myth which he himself has created. We do not know what happened in Peiping when Khrushchev met with Mao but it is not unlikely that Khrushchev boasted about the strength and position of the

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–3058. Secret. Drafted by Mein on October 6. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[1] Nash was in Washington for a meeting of the ANZUS Council held on October 1.

[2] Reference is to his statement of September 11; see footnote 1, Document 86. Dulles commented on the statement, as reported in the press, in a conversation of September 11 with New Zealand Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1158; see Supplement)

Soviet Union and that Mao pressed him for action. The Khrushchev letter to the President, which was returned, is an illuminating document in that it called for the United States to get out of Taiwan and withdraw its fleet from the area, threatening to expel us by force if we did not do so.

The Secretary continued that we do not like the present position of having to defend the offshore islands. The Chinese Nationalists, however, consider these islands as sacred soil which they have been holding onto since 1949. At the time they gave up the Tachen Islands, and since then, we have tried to get them to hold Quemoy and Matsu only as outposts which would not be strongly defended in case of an attack. Notwithstanding our efforts, they have placed large forces on those islands. Although we could of course break the back of the GRC, we cannot see our way clear as to how it can be done without at the same time losing Taiwan. The loss of Taiwan would of course not be by military action but rather as a result of a break in the morale of the government and the people.

The Secretary added that the only thing we are interested in is Taiwan, not the offshore islands. We have, however, not seen our way clear as to how we can settle the offshore island problem without losing Taiwan. We have also made some soundings in the area and have found that our prestige would suffer a severe blow if we pulled back under threat of force. There would be a feeling in other countries in the area in such a case that we were pulling out and that this might be the beginning of the end.

The Secretary said that we have been restraining the GRC. We feel that we can find a way to meet the problem of interdiction. The situation might be like that in Berlin in 1948 when we kept the city supplied by an airlift, that after the Chinese Communists find they cannot take the islands, they will let the situation subside. The Chinese Communists have not brought all their power to bear. They could use bombers but this would result in the GRC retaliating by attacking the airfields from which the bombers originated, which in turn would begin a chain of events which in itself would be indicative that the Chinese intend to go to war. The situation, however, might subside rather than having something like this develop. If it should subside, we would make strenuous efforts to eliminate any source of harassment by the Chinese Nationalists. We want to bring about a demilitarization of the islands but cannot do so under fire.

The Prime Minister said that he was concerned with two things: (1) the menace to trade in and out of Amoy and in the Fukien area in general, which gave the Chinese Communists a better case; he said he could not see how the Chinese Communists could let such a situation continue especially in view of the number of troops reported stationed in Quemoy; and (2) a statement allegedly made by Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Nationalists could go it without the Americans.

The Secretary said that there had been no interference with commercial traffic in and out of Amoy, at least over the period of the last two years. Mr. Nash said that the Chinese Communists might wonder about the build-up in the area and that this might in itself constitute an irritation. The Prime Minister mentioned that an incident which recently occurred during the visit of a Communist Chinese trade mission to New Zealand might be of interest. During the discussions, when they had reached the point as to what might be bought and sold, the Communist Chinese, without any forewarning, broke off the talks and departed without any explanation. The Prime Minister said he speculated as to possible reasons for such action, pointing out at the time that something must be brewing in Communist China. This took place several days prior to the beginning of the bombing of Quemoy and Matsu. He emphasized that this was pure speculation because he didn't know whether the Chinese Communists actually knew what was planned. The Secretary commented that they probably did know since they have a very good intelligence service, as evidenced by the fact that they apparently know everything that is going on in Taiwan.

The Prime Minister said that just before his departure from New Zealand he had discussed the Taiwan Straits situation with the Committee on Foreign Relations. He had pointed out to the Committee that New Zealand does not want to do anything that will hurt our position in the area. He had reviewed the entire problem for the Committee, including disposition to be made of Quemoy and Matsu. He said he thought that Formosa should be given to the Taiwanese and that the islands should be demilitarized. The Prime Minister said that in his opinion it was necessary to protect the Chinese on Taiwan but that the solution might be to let the Chinese stay there as individuals but not occupy the dominating position.

(The Prime Minister had to depart at this point as he was to be the guest of honor at a reception at the New Zealand Embassy.)

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 30, 1958, 7 p.m.

494. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Report 78th meeting.[1]

Wang asked open discussion but agreed my opening when I said I would prefer do so. Then read following prepared statement:

In our meetings here you have repeated baseless charge my government has used force to occupy Chinese territory. There is no truth in this assertion. Wherever US forces stationed, they are present only with consent of duly constituted government. Record of US in this respect is clear. We have not occupied territory by force of arms and we are determined oppose attempts by others to do so. US forces are present in Taiwan area with full consent of GRC. Close and cordial relations between US and GRC are matter of historical record, both before and since 1949. US forces are present in Taiwan area today to assist that government in defending its territory against hostile armed attack. No amount playing with words can obscure fact that mission of US forces in Taiwan area is purely defensive.

Who is attacking today in vicinity Quemoy Islands and Matsu Islands, and who is threatening take Taiwan and Penghu by force? It is certainly not forces of US nor those of Republic of China. It is forces of your side which are on the offensive.

This is not first time leaders your side have chosen resort to force as means achieving their objectives. It was by force they first seized power on China mainland. Not long thereafter your armies invaded and conquered Tibet. Then, in 1950, with material and moral support of Soviet Union, your forces took part in attempt conquer Republic of Korea. This assault upon neighboring people and upon UN forces which had come to their defense shocked world and your government was rightly condemned by UN as aggressor. Today your forces are again on offensive. Their attack on Quemoy Islands and Matsu Islands is simply new phase in your side's long-established policy of resort to force.

But civilized nations of world today, cannot tolerate resort to war to enforce claims against disputed territories or to bring about unification of divided countries. There are many areas where territory in dispute, such as Goa, Kashmir, Antarctica and West New Guinea. There

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–3058. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in eight sections. Received at 6 p.m. Repeated to USUN and niact to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a summary report of the meeting in telegram 492 from Warsaw and his comments in telegram 493, both September 30. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

are also divided countries such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam. If in each these cases parties involved were to resort to force in pursuance their conflicting objectives, each with possible outside backing, there would be end to peace and security of all nations and all peoples everywhere. US has found it necessary in past and will not hesitate now or in future to defend principle that claims of nations be adjusted by peaceful means.

When Chou En-lai agreed to resumption these talks, great relief was felt in world because it seemed as though your side had accepted principle of settlement disputes by peaceful negotiation, in accordance with practice of peace-loving and civilized nations. World has been profoundly disappointed your side has continued its attacks and flatly rejected US proposals for cease-fire. Moreover, you have failed make any sincere attempt negotiate. Instead you have insisted upon our total compliance with your demands while completely rejecting our proposals. This is not negotiation.

At last meeting you posed six questions designed as points of departure for spurious attack upon US. These are not the questions in which world really interested. Questions in which world really interested are (1) will shooting in Taiwan Straits be stopped immediately? and (2) will steps be taken to avert likelihood of recurrence such hostilities? World demands affirmative answer both questions.

In light these considerations, US has drawn up revised draft agreed announcement. This proposal takes account of views of both sides. It is honest effort to take first step toward equitable resolution our differences. We commend it to your serious attention in hope early agreement can be reached. (Handed over text agreed announcement, Deptel 352.)[2]

After reading announcement Wang took 20 minute recess then made following statement:

At previous meetings I repeatedly expressed firm and unequivocal stand my country against proposal your side which is aimed at interference in internal affairs my country and preparation for war. Think your side should no longer entertain any illusions about your cease-fire scheme. However during meetings you still insist on this deceitful proposal of yours which can never be realized. Proposal which you just put forth is instance this stand your side.

We carefully examined draft proposal you put forth just now. Although this document is a bit longer than previous ones, we fail find anything new in these proposals. You have not only not considered our side's reasonable request but have further exposed your attitude in this new proposal. You still insisting on arbitrary occupation China's territory Taiwan and intervention China's internal affairs.

---

[2] Document 139.

It even more absurd include clause concerning Soviet Union in this paper. Soviet Union great ally China and always sympathetic to reasonable aspirations all peoples. Soviet Union never interferes in sovereign right and territorial integrity of other people. Stand Soviet Union has nothing in common with stand US. It utterly absurd for you to include in this proposal clause concerning Soviet Union.

Can thus be seen proposal you put forth is substantially continuation and development your previous proposals. It still retains its basic character of plan to prepare for war and aggression. Such proposals as I have very clearly repeated cannot be considered or accepted your [*our*] side.

During previous meetings and today you also attempted justify your occupation China's territory Taiwan as well as your further interference with recovery such coastal islands Quemoy and Matsu by Chinese people. You tried justify these actions with so-called treaty alliance with so-called Republic of China. It obvious these efforts can only be futile.

Whole world knows that as result of protracted revolutionary struggle Chinese people in 49 overthrew rule of traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique and founded PRC. Your so-called GRC was long ago replaced by PRC. It quite normal in history various countries for people of a country to overthrow old reactionary regime and found new revolutionary government. World has seen many such instances. For example, only recently Iraqi people overthrew reactionary monarchy and founded new republic and even your government was obliged to recognize new Iraqi Government.

Replacement GRC by PRC was precisely instance of such inevitable historical development. Yet US insists on dealing with traitorous Chiang Kai-shek troops and uses puppets to accomplish aim invading and occupying Chinese territory. Your so-called GRC does not represent Chinese people. Small remnant of traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique which drawing last breath under protection your Seventh Fleet is nothing but political corpse. At last meeting you went so far as to say this political corpse is recognized by respectable part of world. That indeed mockery of facts by your government, in fact, no matter how many countries you may be able to press-gang to support this political corpse you cannot succeed in preserving its political status. As long as there are 600 million people on one side, whatever signboard you put up it will still be illegal. For Chiang Kai-shek clique represents nobody.

In White Paper published 1949 entitled "US Foreign Relations With China"[3] even your State Department had to admit Chiang Kai-shek clique had been repudiated by Chinese people. Liquidation traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique and accomplishment liberation whole country by Government PRC are realization aspirations entire 600 million people and is China's domestic affair.

Here would like refer again to fact your government and you have been trying evade, namely, in January 1950 acknowledgment of President Harry S. Truman that liberation of Taiwan by Chinese people is China's internal affair. He declared publicly "US has no desire obtain special rights or privileges or establish military bases on Formosa nor does it have any intention of intervening with its armed forces in present situation. US will not pursue course which will involve itself in civil conflict in China".[4]

In fact it is only because your government violated its own pledge and dispatched armed forces to Taiwan on June 27, 1950 scarcely half year after issuance Truman statement, that Chiang Kai-shek clique which has been repudiated by 600 million people, can prolong its moribund existence to present. At last meeting I pointed out relation between your country and Chiang Kai-shek clique is master-slave relation just like relation between Japanese militarists and Pu Yi.[5] You tried deny at last meeting but in fact it perfectly clear to everyone that as US removes Seventh Fleet, so-called Chiang Kai-shek clique will fade away with wind. Any treaty which US has concluded with puppet shielded at bayonet point is null and void. Japanese militarists also counted on treaty with Pu Yi. But are these so-called treaties of any value. What is more, at time your country invaded and occupied Taiwan your country did not even have single treaty.

You have repeatedly stated here, and proposal you put forth today also says, your aggression against Chinese territory and your attempt at further extending aggression are for purpose fulfilling your treaty alliance and for individual and collective self-defense. That is out and out fraud designed to deceive others as well as yourself.

You also refer to UN Charter and in his recent public speeches your Secretary of State also slanderously charged my nation with violating UN Charter. Struggle China's people to exercise sovereign rights, liberate own territory, and defend security their own country justified and in keeping with all principles international law and UN Charter. It actually your nation which is violating UN Charter and trampling on international law. UN Charter explicitly provides that UN members should refrain in international relations from threats or use force against territorial integrity or political independence any other state. It precisely US that has invaded and occupied Chinese territory Taiwan by force, violated China's territorial integrity and further attempted extend its territory by force. Liberation by Chinese people of own territory Taiwan and recovery their inland water islands Quemoy and Matsu entirely China's domestic affair. UN Charter in explicit terms opposes all intervention in matters within domestic jurisdiction any state. It precisely US which has violated UN Charter by arbitrarily intervening in China's internal affairs. It utterly preposterous for US attempt abuse principle peaceful settlement international issues for purpose intervening in China's internal affairs. This attempt constitutes brazen violation UN Charter.

---

[3] Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).

[4] Reference is to President Truman's statement of January 5, 1950; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 11.

[5] P'u Yi, who abdicated as emperor of China in 1912, was emperor of the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945.

Armed struggle Chinese people against traitorous Chiang Kai-shek has never been international dispute. Recovery by Chinese people of Quemoy Matsu and liberation Taiwan can in no way endanger international peace and security. On contrary it precisely US which is endangering international peace and security. All these acts of US are violation UN Charter.

In your opening statement this afternoon you again uttered charges against my country which are deliberate distortion facts. These charges cannot be accepted. In your statement you mentioned several existing international disputes such as questions of Kashmir and Goa and you even cited artificial division some nations. These disputes do exist but source these disputes has been intervention in international affairs these countries by outside forces which were not entitled intervene in first place. All these disputes would soon be settled if all countries concerned observed provisions UN Charter which explicitly provides against intervention any foreign country in matters within domestic jurisdiction of a state. No amount such examples Ambassador may cite can justify US aggressive acts against China.

You have made number deliberate distortions in your remarks concerning relations between China and US. Fact is that at same time US launched its war aggression against Korea it invaded and occupied China's territory Taiwan and intensified its intervention in international affairs Vietnam. US intervention entirely unjustified. Your purpose was to strangle young PRC from three fronts. It was only after you invaded and occupied Taiwan and were pushing your forces in Korea to banks of Yalu River that Chinese people could bear it no longer and dispatched volunteers to Korea to aid Korean people. It was entirely righteous of Chinese people to join Korean people resisting aggression. No amount illegal resolutions insulting PRC that you might have railroaded through UN or repetition by your Secretary of State of his old stock of worn out slanders against PRC can change fact of occupation China's territory.

You termed Chinese people's liberation own territory an aggression. In your opening statement this afternoon you even went so far as characterize liberation of Chinese province Tibet as conquest. This demonstrates utter ignorance history your part. If that may be called aggression then would it not have been aggression for your countryman George Washington to lead your people in opposing Britain liberating own territory? Would it not have been aggression for Abraham Lincoln to have waged American Civil War to unify US? That is matter of common sense. Just as American people cannot possibly carry out aggression against themselves, Chinese people cannot carry out aggression against themselves. It is aggression only when you Americans invade and occupy territory of another country and interfere with internal affairs another country. You call American aggression against China defense but it may be asked what justification you have in dispatching American forces to Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area, which are situated 10,000 kilometers from US, to carry out defense? If you can find any justification to carry out defense on China's Taiwan Quemoy Matsu, cannot China carry out defense of Hawaii and Santa Catalina? It may be asked whether your country would permit occupation these islands by another country under pretext defense.

You indulged in talk about renunciation force, yet in practice US has been using threats and armed force against other countries. Since your country has invaded and occupied our territory Taiwan by force, logically speaking therefore you have long been disqualified speak about renunciation force by my country. Notwithstanding this, however, we are still willing sit down and negotiate with you in attempt settle by peaceful negotiation problem arising from your intervention and occupation Taiwan. During Geneva Ambassadorial talks we put forth serious proposals for settlement Sino-American disputes without resorting force. You insisted, however, that we should recognize US claim to so-called right individual and collective self-defense in China's territory Taiwan. That would be tantamount to recognizing legality your occupation Taiwan and is entirely out of question. That is why Geneva talks were dragged out so long without any result being achieved on this subject. You not only referred to renunciation use force in Taiwan area but even sought expand area of aggression to mainland. As I stated last meeting, since beginning this year when you suspended Geneva talks unilaterally, you simultaneously instigated Chiang Kai-shek to intensify outrageous acts of provocation and sabotage against mainland. Your intrigue has been to let Chiang clique use coastal islands to provoke incidents which you will use as pretexts for carrying out further aggression and provoking war. You attempted deny this true state of affairs but in so doing you unwittingly revealed your true colors even more. You said, and I quote, "Steps have had to be taken to strengthen defense of Ally." Doesn't this precisely show that sending reinforcements by Chiang to Quemoy Matsu was entirely instigated by US? Had you not harbored intention provoking aggression why should you have instigated Chiang clique to concentrate its forces at Quemoy Matsu at immediate approaches to Amoy and Foochow?

At present you making much noise about cease-fire. Proposal you put forth today also talks about cease-fire. Your purpose is to extend aggression and prepare for war. Reason you put forth so-called cease-fire proposal is that you know full well we will not agree to use [*US*?] unreasonable demand. You envision distortion campaign to confuse world public opinion. Not a few such confusing remarks have been made by you in these meetings. If ever we should accept that preposterous proposal of your side you would, in first place, gain so-called individual collective self-defense. That is right you have never claimed before in Quemoy Matsu. It would thus enable you push perimeter your aggression from Taiwan Straits to Chinese mainland at Quemoy Matsu. According to both your preposterous proposals we would have to reduce forces in mainland area adjacent to Quemoy Matsu. This would be tantamount to asking us bite off hands and await further aggression.

We Chinese people have not forgotten there existed something similar to cease-fire between Manchukuo and rest of China, but Chinese people know such appeasement aggression can only invite further catastrophes. You want to follow Japanese aggressors, but will never succeed. Last meeting you said cease-fire is generally accepted method stopping hostilities and ending war. That entirely irrelevant and pointless remark. It obvious to all that military operations taken by Chinese people against Chiang forces on Quemoy Matsu cannot remotely cause international tension. It only when US insists on intervening and carries out military provocations that grave danger war arises. At present issue is not one of cease-fire but of US playing with fire. In order carry out aggression against Quemoy Matsu you would not scruple to push world toward war. Such a policy of yours is being increasingly condemned by people of world, who accuse you of being war monger. You are in fact engaging in war mongering.

In this connection I wish mention in particular you have not only not ceased your incursions in our inland waters but have encouraged Chiang's aircraft to make incursions into China's air space. The Sidewinder guided missile provided by your forces has even been put into use. That is extremely serious matter. We will not tolerate it. We will certainly deal Chiang's air force punitive counter-blows. Question now is very obvious. US must immediately stop its military provocations and war threats and pull out all its armed forces from Taiwan and Taiwan

Straits. That is most urgent demand of present situation and fundamental solution of problem.

I replied: I have rarely heard such extreme arguments in defense of your untenable position. It certainly surprising to receive lecture on UN Charter from party who has violated Charter. It also surprising to be accused warmongering and war preparations when it is our side which is trying put stop to hostilities. You accuse US of using force when actually it is your side which started use of force and is continuing use of force against territory of Ally. Our forces are long way from their own territory in support of principle of collective individual self-defense. This necessary for maintenance of peace. If use force against free people is permitted to take place without resistance soon no people will be safe from aggression. You continue to mention alleged violations by US forces of Chinese territorial waters and air space. We have made it amply clear you are not entitled to extend your territorial waters to extent you have. That in itself is attempt to seize territory illegally.

What we are seeking most urgently is means preventing expansion hostilities by putting end to fighting now going on. You are continuing make many false accusations against US. I have refuted them in past. I believe it does not serve any useful purpose to repeat them in form of statements you are making. You mention our side is carrying on campaign distortion with object, in event of cease-fire, of planning further aggression. Complete contrary is case. Your description our proposal as one designed for war purposes can hardly be based on careful study our proposal.

You will note that it proposes first cessation of hostilities, second termination of provocation or harassing acts, third provision for possibility of reductions of forces, fourth resort to negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement.

These steps can hardly be regarded as justification for your argument that our plan is cover for aggressive action. No reasonable man could pretend they are such. They are intended help put an end to fighting and prevent recurrence of possibility further fighting.

Wang replied: In detailed statement I made this afternoon I explicitly explained stand our side with regard unreasonable position you have taken. Our arguments not, as you have alleged, irrelevant to discussion but are basic issues in dispute now before us. Whole world knows and it is obvious to them present tension in Taiwan Straits area arises solely as result US intervention and occupation Chinese territory Taiwan. They cannot believe peaceful professions by US while US making intensive preparations for war. A matter which is particularly important and serious is that US has lately made available to Chiang a number of modern weapons such as Sidewinder guided missile which used recently. This constitutes very grave provocation indeed and US should bear responsibility all consequences that may arise from this. I have already made my comments on proposal you put forth this afternoon. It would be impossible for any reasonable person to agree solution should be based on recognition US so-called right of individual and collective self-defense on territory of another country. I will reserve further comments this respect until later meetings.

I replied: You have mentioned new weapon which we call Side-winder and claim its introduction into present hostilities has in some way rendered situation more grave. We find it hard to follow your reasoning. This missile is used only to fire at aircraft. How can one say that several such missiles fired at aircraft makes situation more serious? It is rather thousands of heavy artillery shells which your armed forces have been firing at Quemoy Matsu which makes situation serious. The shells have killed both soldiers and innocent civilians and done far more damage than missiles you referred to. It is these daily heavy bombardments which must be halted if situation is to improve, best way of improving situation both on land and in air is to put immediate stop to fighting.

I regret you refused accept our latest proposal in conciliatory spirit with which it was offered. I am disappointed find your side apparently believes these talks are not for purpose of true negotiation but for purpose of making extreme accusations against US. You furthermore have been demanding under threats of force that US abandon its Ally, withdraw from Taiwan and permit territory its Ally to be seized by force. I hope you will make it clear to your government that US Government cannot agree to this demand. No matter how often they may be repeated my government cannot accept them.

Wang replied: Equally I should like say it is impossible for us to try to get through these war proposals under cloak of cease-fire. I have raised matter of US supplying new weapons to Chiang forces, such weapons including Sidewinder guided missiles, and I pointed out this is serious case of provocation and demonstrates utter falsity peaceful professions of US and demonstrates US is trying expand war under cover its peaceful professions. If US is not ready to eradicate evil sources of tension in accord with a proposal we have made by withdrawing all its armed forces from Taiwan Straits; if US continues to insist on its cease-fire demands in these talks it will demonstrate US is not willing to arrive at solution of problem.

I replied: I think we made in our proposal honest attempt set forth case fairly. We believe it contains fair statement of facts. It recognizes dispute between parties involved and all aspects of dispute. It then tries set forth logical step whereby dispute can be rendered less dangerous and perhaps eventually settled after hostilities have ceased. It envisages mutual measures of prevention provocation which might be claimed by either party. It envisages possible reduction forces both sides to relieve tension once fighting has stopped. Furthermore it suggests choice broad range of means of settling or pacifying dispute. We should be interested in knowing eventually if you reject our proposal in part or in all its elements. We feel it does offer many possibilities of progress which can be achieved after fighting stopped.

Wang replied: If US really interested in reducing danger in Taiwan Straits and is sincerely seeking solution why not withdraw its forces from this area. This is source all problems this area. If US continues maintain its forces Taiwan area it is showing no sincerity, no interest in reducing danger in area and in achieving settlement.

I replied: I think we have made it clear why we cannot withdraw our forces in present situation. That has been purpose my explanation. It affects basic issue of maintaining peace.

Wang replied: I don't see how stationing military forces on territory of another country could be for maintaining peace. Maybe peace as conceived by US is entirely different thing from peace as we know it.

I replied: US forces are in many places at request friends and Allies and are there to assist in defense these Allies in pursuit collective security. Alternative would be that many countries would be subject to threats and dangers of loss independence through use force and threats of force.

Wang replied: Attack by force actually comes from US. It is US that is trying deprive other countries their freedom through use of force. Securing military bases by use violence on territory others cannot be described pursuit peaceful purposes. Can only be described as naked aggression. To characterize such armed aggressive acts as maintenance or defense peace could be equal to characterizing day as night. Such distorting remarks cannot and will not convince anybody.

I replied: If our treaties for mutual security and overseas bases were set up by use force I believe our Senate and our people would have heard about it and would have objected. I cannot accept implications that these arrangements are made for any other but defensive purposes.

Wang replied: US stationed its armed forces everywhere in world has already caused opposition of people everywhere. I am sure you have already noticed this fact.

I replied: I have nothing further to say.

Wang then proposed that we meet Saturday, October 4 at 3 p.m., to which I agreed.

Beam

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 1, 1958, 10:04 p.m.

290. Personal for Ambassador from Secretary. I have your October 1 message with reference to my press conference of yesterday.[1]

Let me say first of all that there is no conscious change in my position. From the beginning of this affair both the President and I have made clear that we were not willing to retreat in the face of force, that we demanded a cessation of the Communist attack, and that if this occurred we would be willing to consider, without prejudice to the rights of our allies, the possibility of preventing the offshore islands being a source of irritation to the peace.

The press, much to my distress, has played up the press conference of yesterday as indicative of a significant change. That is primarily because most of the reporters want to see a change. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of correspondents at Washington dealing with this problem are strongly hostile to our support of the Republic of China and the fact that we are on this account in danger of what could be a major war and great disaster.

I am conscious of the fact that the Generalissimo does not want to appear before his people as a "puppet" of the US. I quite understand and take no offense whatever at his statements designed to assert independence.

He should equally realize that we are up against the charge that we are being dragged into a world war by Chiang, that we have put the destinies of the American people at his disposal, and that we have no flexibility in our position because Chiang is stubborn and will not agree because he feels that his only real hope is to precipitate world war.

We cannot continue our policy of close and sympathetic understanding and support of GRC unless we have some flexibility to dissipate this impression created by much of the press and shared by a considerable part of Congress, both Democratic and to some extent Republican, and also by most of our allies.

I do not go one inch further in this matter than seems to be necessary in order to prevent our whole China policy from being swept overboard.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Dulles and cleared by Robertson and with S/S.

[1] Telegram 520 from Taipei, October 1, transmitted a message from Drumright to Dulles that his remarks at his press conference the day before (see Document 143) were causing "uncertainty, uneasiness, and unsettlement" in Taipei. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158; see Supplement)

I would hope that as much attention could be given in Taiwan to such a speech as I made in New York on September 25[2] as to isolated remarks drawn out by inquiries by press correspondents who are trying to ask most awkward questions in order to embarrass the Administration in its China policy.

You may, if you wish, discreetly convey my above views to high officials.

Dulles

---

[2] See footnote 4, Document 127.

---

147. Letter From the British Ambassador (Caccia) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 1, 1958.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As I told you this morning, the Foreign Secretary has asked me to let you have [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] what the Chinese have been saying to the Indians. This I enclose. Part of it Selwyn Lloyd read to you when he last saw you in New York on the 26th September.[1] [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] But I thought that you might yourself wish to glance through it before you leave Washington for the weekend.

Two points arise. The first is that the Chinese are giving the Indians, as well no doubt as others, a garbled account of your position and of the Warsaw talks. Selwyn Lloyd thought that you might therefore like to consider whether it would be worth putting the record straight with the Indians, even if there is no genuine misunderstanding in Peking.

[*4 lines of source text not declassified*] for what it is worth you may like to know that our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking considers that there is little doubt that the Chinese are genuinely trying to use the Indians as media-

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Correspondence with Secy Dulles/Herter. Secret; Personal. The source text bears the notation by Phyllis D. Bernau: "Sec saw. PDB."

[1] See Document 130.

tors. Meanwhile we have had a separate message from Malcolm Macdonald that Parthasarathi, the Indian Ambassador in Peking whom he knows well, is entirely reliable. That is to say, he would not willfully be misleading and would report accurately what was said to him.

Most sincerely,

Harold Caccia

[Enclosure][2]

SUMMARY OF CHINESE VIEWS AS EXPRESSED TO THE INDIAN EMBASSY, PEKING

[2-1/2 *pages of source text not declassified*] The British Embassy in Peking has [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] learned the following from the Indian Embassy there. The Chinese had described the United States proposals at Warsaw as quite unacceptable. The Indians were given to understand that these proposals involved a ceasefire under which the United States could continue to reinforce the offshore islands. They were told that nothing less than the evacuation of the offshore islands would be acceptable to the Chinese. Although the situation was so serious the Chinese would try to keep the Warsaw talks going.

The Indian Embassy in Peking apparently interpreted recent Chinese demands for United States withdrawal from the entire Taiwan area simply as a hardening of the Chinese bargaining position in response to what they alleged to be United States intransigence.

In a later discussion the British Embassy in Peking learned from the Indians that the Peoples Daily Editorial of September 28 on the question of a ceasefire represented the personal views of Chou En-lai. Chou specifically separated the question of the offshore islands from that of Taiwan. The latter, he said, could be discussed with the United States as soon as the former question was settled or after an interval of five years. As regards the Warsaw talks, it was, in the Chinese view, up to the United States to make the next substantial move.

---

[2] Secret.

148. Editorial Note

At the 381st meeting of the National Security Council on October 2, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, dated October 3, reads as follows:

"With respect to developments in the Taiwan Strait, Mr. Allen Dulles described the highlights of the conversation between [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and Chou En-lai, [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. Allegedly, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese Communists would not be satisfied with anything less than the complete evacuation of the Offshore Islands. However, he is reported to have said that Taiwan was a separate issue which could be discussed subsequently with the U.S. Certain statements by Chou [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] prove that certain threats made by Chou En-lai on September 21 had proved to be false. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] Secretary Dulles said that he knew of the conversation between [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and the Chinese Premier. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Foreign Minister Lloyd had mentioned the conversation to Secretary Dulles three or four days ago in New York and Secretary Dulles thought that the conversation was a 'plant'. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that if it was not a plant, the interview had been undertaken for propaganda purposes.

"Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the supply situation on the Offshore Islands had improved in the course of the last week but the daily average of supplies landed on the Islands was still below the minimum requirements of the garrison. Moreover, bad weather had forced the cancellation of three convoys last week. Mr. Dulles said that the Chinese Communists had not yet undertaken to tighten their blockade still further although they might do so if the supply situation of the Nationalist forces on the Islands continued to improve. In any event, they had the capability of tightening their blockade by a variety of means.

"[*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that these bombers might have been brought to this base to serve as a decoy to induce the Chinese Nationalists to attack mainland Chinese airbases.

"General Twining informed the Council that he had talked with Admiral Felt earlier this morning with respect to the supply situation on the Offshore Islands. Felt expressed the view that Nationalist morale was quite high and the the Nationalist forces could hold out on the Offshore Islands for a very considerable period of time." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

149. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 2, 1958, 10:45–10:53 a.m.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

---

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 2, 1958, 11 p.m.

534. For the Secretary.

1. President Chiang summoned me late today. He had just returned from south Taiwan where he had entertained General Pate[1] and Admirals Smoot and Kivette at lunch. Smoot told me on his return that President had been most pleasant and had confined discussion to military subjects.

2. I found President in highly tense and disturbed state of mind. With him were Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Secretary General Chang Chun. As is usual with President, he started conversation by asking if I had any information from Washington. Fortunately, I had received your 290,[2] so I proceeded to give him substance.

3. Speaking with unusual emphasis and force, President said he realized difficult circumstances confronting you and President Eisenhower. But his people and soldiers would not understand. They had been shaken when in your statement at Newport[3] you had offered to resume negotiations with Communists. Now, after hearing report of your latest press conference, President had sent special emissary to Kinmen to calm forces. Emissary had reported today your remarks had caused bewilder-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:33 p.m.

[1] General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

[2] Document 146.

[3] Document 68.

ment and dismay at front. Although US Government had said it would help defend off-shore islands if attacked, your suggestion that GRC troops be withdrawn has had most unsettling effect and is highly damaging to their morale.

4. President said he considered Communists had scored psychological victory when we agreed to resume talks. Talk of withdrawal of GRC forces would confirm Communists' belief they proceeding correctly to obtain objectives. They would become more intransigent and demanding if they perceived US position to be weakening. If this sort of thing continued, it would pave way for Communists to seize islands. Remarks attributed to Under Secretary about "pathological attachment" to off-shore islands and their unessentiality to defense of Taiwan also were harmful. They could serve only to undermine morale and fighting spirit of defenders of Taiwan and free world. Such remarks hasten collapse of resistance; they invite Communists to invade Kinmen and of course make it certain Communists will not agree to cease hostilities.

5. President said his press conference of September 29 was designed to help US authorities. He had realized US difficulties with public opinion. He had had in mind President Eisenhower's phrase "removal of thorn in side of peace"[4] when he made his point that off-shores would not be used as springboard to attack mainlands. He had also made clear he would not ask that US ground forces be used in assisting defense of off-shore islands, for he knew US people would be unwilling to see this happen. He had risked his own prestige in making foregoing remarks. Your answer to his effort to be helpful was suggestions that off-shore islands be evacuated. This adds immensely to GRC difficulties. Morale factor cannot be over emphasized.

6. President then said ill-fated Marshall mission[5] with its attempt to negotiate cease-fires, et cetera, is being recreated in minds of Chinese people. He feared some sorry spectacle might be re-enacted on Taiwan. Accordingly, it is incumbent on US Government if it does not want mainland tragedy re-enacted here, to assure Chinese people of US unfailing and steady support on a no-compromise basis. Otherwise government might not be able to keep situation under control for long. He then made plea for US Government to help keep up morale and not let it fall to ground. For his part, President would do his best to help you meet your problems with US public and allies. He only asked that you approach his problems in same spirit.

---

[4] Eisenhower used this phrase in his September 11 address; see footnote 1, Document 79.

[5] For documentation concerning General of the Army George C. Marshall's mission to China, December 1945–January 1947, see *Foreign Relations,* 1945, vol. VII, pp. 745–828, and 1946, vol. IX, and vol. X, pp. 1–723.

7. Referring to two points made in paragraph 5 above, President said these represented his "maximum concessions" to US position. He could not go further in accommodations to Communists in off-shore areas. If even a small number of troops were to be withdrawn from off-shores it would be just as well to withdraw all. It would be tantamount in end to giving up Taiwan. He then said with great emphasis that nothing would get his troops out of Kinmen.[6]

8. Premier then spoke up saying your recent remarks and others of like import could only encourage Communists to step up war activities. He believed Matsu would certainly come under fire soon and Communists might be emboldened to launch major assaults on off-shores. GRC had no choice but to fight for every inch of territory. No further retreat could be tolerated lest morale collapse. Chen then said in making public statements officials would be well advised to direct them to mainland Chinese who are looking desperately for deliverance, as well as to Chinese on Taiwan and overseas. Any words that could comfort mainland Chinese would have great importance.

9. I said as strongly as I could that there had been no change in our policy of helping to repel forceful seizure of islands and I was convinced there would be none. Chiang's rebuttal was that public and forces do not understand and therefore serious morale problem is created.

10. I grant that there is a morale problem, but I do not agree that it is likely to get out of control so long as we continue helping GRC militarily as we are doing now and so long as we do not pressure GRC to make concessions which they regard as touching their vital interests. I agree with Chiang that statements implying withdrawal from off-shores or suggesting their indefensibility or unessentiality will lead Communists to think we are weakening, and thus increase their intransigence and lead them to further adventures. Such statements also discourage mainlanders hoping for liberation and make it easier for Communists to maintain their controls. Respectfully suggest these points be taken into account in framing public utterances.

Drumright

---

[6] A record of the meeting prepared by Chiang's secretary, James Shen, transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 172 from Taipei, October 6, states that Chiang "asked the Ambassador to convey to U.S. government that no external pressure, nor any weapons, including atomic bombs, could ever force the Chinese Government to evacuate a single soldier from the offshore islands. Chinese troops would keep on fighting on the offshore islands till the last drop of their blood." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–658; see Supplement)

151. Letter From the Counselor of the British Embassy (de la Mare) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Martin)

Washington, October 2, 1958.

DEAR ED: My Ambassador wrote yesterday to Mr. Dulles enclosing a summary of Chinese views on the present crisis as expressed to the Indian Embassy in Peking.[1]

Since this summary was written we have heard further from our High Commission in New Delhi that, according to information given them by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Chou En-lai also told the Indian Ambassador in Peking, possibly during the same conversation, that an attack on the Chinese mainland or the use of tactical nuclear weapons would result in a general war.

The Indian official who gave this information to our High Commission added that the Indian authorities did not attach any special significance to this: the remark did not go any further than public Russian statements to the same effect.

The Indian view may very well be the right one but my Ambassador thought that the State Department should nevertheless be aware of Chou's statement and he asked me to pass it on to you.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur de la Mare

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–258. Secret.

[1] See Document 147.

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 3, 1958, 12:53 p.m.

372. Beam–Wang Talks. Your 503, paragraph 4,[1] repeated information Taipei 23. Following reflects our basic conception:

(1) We believe that developments within next two or three weeks will demonstrate that Chinese Communists will be unable to take Quemoy by starving out garrison through interdiction fire from shore batteries and harassment of small naval craft.

(2) If and as Chicoms realize foregoing, then they will be faced by alternative of either changing character of war, as by using bombers against Quemoy, or allowing hostilities to subside into some form of de facto or formalized cease-fire. Probably latter is more likely.

(3) Fact that Chicoms have not yet used all their capabilities, notably air power, to take islands or attempted an amphibious assault indicates they are hesitant about taking action which would be apt to involve US in a fighting role. This would probably be case if they used bombers because then Chinats from Formosa would surely attack Chicom airfields on mainland and Chicoms would probably feel it necessary retaliate against Formosa airfields. This would be direct attack on Formosa which would involve US.

(4) We are desirous of keeping Warsaw talks going, at least through this period, as their existence may provide some sort of cover or excuse for Chicoms not raising level of their offensive operations.

(5) If they do raise level of operations, then we should want very rapidly and before US response went beyond conventional weapons to seek cease-fire call from UN and perhaps have some intermediary called in. Our Warsaw record would then be made public. We are giving much thought to how this operation could best be conducted if it became necessary.

(6) The Secretary's last press conference[2] had result, if not purpose, of giving an impression of flexibility which would enable us to get increased support at UN should this be necessary. It was in essence along

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles, cleared with CA and S/S, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Taipei. Dulles dictated the message on October 2; a copy of his draft is attached to a memorandum of that date from Greene to Robertson. (*Ibid.*, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Ambassadorial Discussions with the Chinese Communists; see Supplement)

[1] Beam commented on the talks in telegram 503, October 1. In paragraph 4, he requested guidance on the Department's mid-term or long-term strategy for the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158; see Supplement)

[2] Of September 30; see Document 143.

lines of statements you have been authorized to make. It may have suggested to Chicoms that if fighting died down they could expect de facto cessation of harassments from offshore islands and probably considerable troop reductions.[3]

Herter

---

[3] In an October 2 letter to Senator Theodore Francis Green, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, President Eisenhower stated: "I am striving to the best of my ability to avoid hostilities; to achieve a cease-fire, and a reasonable adjustment of the situation." For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1170–1172. Green's September 29 letter, to which Eisenhower was replying, and Dulles' draft of the reply are filed with a memorandum by Dulles of an October 2 meeting with Eisenhower in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. For text of Green's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin,* October 20, 1958, pp. 606–607.

---

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 3, 1958, 4:24 p.m.

375. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for next meeting:

You should concentrate on making forceful follow-up on our draft announcement presented last meeting,[1] with view demonstrating that it offers reasonable, hopeful means of peacefully resolving Taiwan Straits crisis. Effort should be made put Wang on defensive and place on record unmistakable picture of extreme nature Chinese Communist demands and of their intransigent attitude. You should take up our draft announcement paragraph by paragraph, reading Wang each paragraph and pointing out in which respects it coincides with Chinese Communist or Soviet positions and public statements. Demand that Wang state clearly just what there is in each paragraph he finds unacceptable.

Emphasize our draft announcement represents positive and constructive new move to accomplish peaceful settlement. Chinese Communist rejection of it shows they more interested in maintaining crisis

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–358. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins and Martin; cleared by Parsons, Reinhardt, by Becker in draft, and with S/S; and approved by Herter. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and priority to Taipei. The telegram reflects instructions by Dulles which were conveyed to Robertson in Greene's memorandum of October 1; see the source note, Document 152.

[1] For text, see Document 139.

than in resolving it and are using talks as screen behind which to push their aggressive designs on offshores and Taiwan. Peace-loving and civilized nations of world have accepted principle of settlement of disputes by peaceful negotiation. If Chinese Communists prepared to accept this principle they should give serious consideration to US proposal.

According Section 5 urtel 494[2] Wang seems to be making assertion that during Geneva talks we confined our proposal for renunciation of force except for inherent right of individual and collective self-defense to Taiwan and did not have in mind its extension to offshore islands. Thus Wang says "you would in first place gain so-called individual collective self-defense. That is right you have never claimed before in Quemoy and Matsu". You should endeavor find out whether this is in fact position Wang is adopting. If so you should point out that in Geneva talks US always spoke of "Taiwan area" which means not simply Taiwan and Penghu but offshore islands as well. This is still our position; our present proposal represents no change in this respect.

Re paragraph 6 urtel 503[3] if Wang makes point again in next or later meeting, point out forcefully that Communist aggression in Korea completely altered situation and required US take steps to meet threat of force against Taiwan. In his statement of June 27, 1950 directing Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan, President Truman declared: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied orders of Security Council of UN issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances occupation of Taiwan by Communist forces would be a direct threat to security of Pacific area." You may also note that if Chinese Communists consider Mr. Truman's views as authoritative they should consider article by him in *New York Times* September 14; pertinent excerpts this article sent by Deptel 376.[4]

Pick up Wang suggestion (Section 8) that peace as conceived by US entirely different from peace as Chinese Communists know it. This most assuredly case. As made amply clear by Soviet and Chinese Communists' actions in past, peace to them means condition which would prevail after surrender by world to Communist force or threat of force. Even in these negotiations Wang's minimum demands involve unconditional surrender of our ally GRC and its territories to Chinese Communists' threat and use of force. Chinese Communists' minimum demands as stated in talks to date are that (1) US forces be withdrawn from Taiwan and Taiwan area; and (2) US not interfere with Chinese Communists' takeover from our ally GRC by force if necessary of Quemoy Islands, Matsu Islands, Penghus and Taiwan. Much less than agreeing to renounce use of force, Chinese Communists do not even seriously consider our proposal for ceasefire in order to permit negotiations in peaceful atmosphere. This is not negotiation but demand for unconditional surrender to threats of force by Chinese Communists echoed by Soviet Union. As demonstrated by proposals it has tabled US stands ready as always to negotiate in good faith but will not surrender to demands such as these. US awaits Chinese Communist response.

---

[2] Document 145.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 152.

[4] Dated October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–358)

FYI. Re guidance requested paragraph 4 urtel 503 Deptel 372 rptd info 392 Taipei[5] contains our basic conception of object of continuing Warsaw talks. Additionally you may find helpful Secretary's message to Ambassador Drumright (Deptel 290 to Taipei, repeated to Warsaw as 377)[6] and Secretary's September 30 press conference.

Herter

---

[5] Document 152.

[6] Document 146. Telegram 377 to Warsaw was dated October 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158)

---

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly

Washington, October 3, 1958, 9:25 p.m.

Gadel 33. For Lodge. Re your conversations with Menon re Taiwan Straits (Delga 57 and USUN 374).[1] Department believes Menon should not be encouraged re any possible role for him or India as mediator in present Taiwan Straits crisis. As is evidenced by your report and other

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–158. Top Secret. Drafted by Joseph J. Sisco, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; cleared in draft by Robertson, Martin, and Green and with SOA and S/S; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox. Repeated to New Delhi and Taipei.

[1] Delga 57 from USUN, September 29, and telegram 374 from USUN, October 1. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/9–2958 and 793.00/10–158; see Supplement)

information we have, Menon's views not likely be helpful to us. We believe you should avoid getting into substance Taiwan Straits question to degree possible with Menon since he is apt to use what you have to say as means inject himself as third party. Following points are transmitted for your guidance and use in next conversation with Menon:

1. You should inform Menon that you have reported his views to Department and Department has expressed its appreciation of his interest and his desire to be helpful.

2. You will continue be available as normal to hear his views on this matter as on other matters of mutual interest between US and India.

3. As Menon is aware, views of Chi-Coms being communicated to US directly through Beam–Wang channel. We believe for time being at least this best channel to discuss this matter with Chi-Coms.

4. Re Menon's statement that GRC started fighting, and that GRC trying involve US in war,[2] you should give Menon substance of Taipei's 530 repeated USUN 11.[3]

FYI. [2 *lines of source text not declassified*] Evident from this information that Chi-Coms giving Indians distorted picture US position. Department therefore considering whether and how US position can be made clear to India. While no definite decision taken, we believe Bunker[4] approach to Nehru might help set record straight. End FYI.

Herter

---

[2] Delga 57 from USUN reported that Menon had said, inter alia, that the Nationalists had started the current fighting by transporting fresh troops to Quemoy on August 19.

[3] Telegram 530 from Taipei, October 2, stated that the only troop movements to Quemoy for more than 2 years had consisted of the normal rotation of forces. The last significant movement of troops had occurred early in July, when an infantry division on Taiwan replaced one on Quemoy. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–258; see Supplement)

[4] Ambassador to India Ellsworth Bunker.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, October 4, 1958, 7 p.m.

525. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks.

79th meeting two hours and thirty minutes.[1] Wang led off with categorical rejection US draft agreed announcement[2] charging it was merely cover for US aggressive activities and intended legalize US "occupation of Taiwan" and permit realization of "US plot for two Chinas." He followed with strong attack on US in harsh terms covering usual ground. I then proceeded to read and analyze our draft announcement by paragraphs. Wang refused to be drawn into discussion of text rejecting whole proposal outright as unacceptable basis for discussion. I nevertheless persisted with my presentation of proposal placing on record our effort enter into meaningful negotiation and contrasting our attitude with Communist demand for total surrender. I said we regretted flat rejection our proposal which appeared contradict PRC's assertion its willingness negotiate peaceful settlement. Wang simply reiterated previous arguments and demand that US withdraw forces from Taiwan.

Wang proposed next meeting Tuesday.[3] I countered with Friday, October 10, 3 p.m. which Wang accepted.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–458. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 526 from Warsaw, October 4. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] Presented on September 30; for text, see Document 139.

[3] October 7.

156. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 5, 1958, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Suspension of U.S. Convoy Escorting During Chicom Cease-fire

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Allen Dulles
Admiral Burke
Mr. J.G. Parsons
Mr. Marshall Green

Mr. Parsons handed the Acting Secretary a draft message (copy attached)[1] the substance of which he suggested might be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs to COMTAIWANDEFCOM ordering the suspension of U.S. convoy escort activities if and for as long as the Chicoms suspended bombardment of Quemoy (as announced for the week of October 6–13 in the Chicom Defmin's broadcast of October 5)[2] and if and for as long as the Chicoms did not interfere with resupply operations. Obviously a cease-fire situation obviated the military need for convoy escorts.

The Acting Secretary subsequently expressed agreement with the message with two exceptions: (1) we should make it clear that we did not yet know whether or not the Chicoms had inaugurated a cease-fire, (2) we should make no announcement at this time of our suspension of convoy activity. On the latter score, he agreed with Mr. Parson's suggestions that he (Mr. Parsons) discuss the matter that evening with Ambassador Yeh.[3]

Admiral Burke ventured the thought that the Chicom cease-fire announcement was based on Chicom need for a respite and that it was timed to coincide with a period of anticipated bad weather in the Straits when resupply would be difficult even under cease-fire conditions.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5411/10–558. Secret. Drafted by Green on October 8. The conversation was held at Secretary Herter's residence.

[1] Not printed.

[2] A message from People's Republic of China Defense Minister Peng Te-huai to "compatriots in Taiwan" was broadcast to Taiwan at 12:40 a.m. on October 6 (16:50 GMT, October 5). Text of the message, as broadcast immediately afterward in English, reads in part as follows: "Out of humanitarian considerations, I have ordered the bombardment to be suspended on the Fukien front for seven days starting from Oct. 6. Within this period, you will be fully free to ship in supplies on condition that there be no American escort." (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 6, 1958, pp. AAA1–2; see Supplement) A somewhat different text was published in *Peking Review* (No. 32) Supplement, October 7, 1958; extracts are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1172–1173.

[3] Parsons' memorandum of his meeting with Yeh that evening is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–558.

Mr. Dulles disagreed on the weather factor. He produced a copy of an intelligence report [*report number and date not declassified*] which in effect strongly suggested that the Chicoms had planned this move well in advance of the availability of any accurate weather forecasts bearing on the October 6–13 period.

Admiral Burke concurred with the Acting Secretary that there was no need for U.S. convoy escort if and for as long as the Chicoms suspended gunfire and attacks on resupply operations. The Admiral proceeded to draft a message to Admiral Smoot which he then read aloud. The message stated in effect that Admiral Smoot should suspend all U.S. convoy escort activities under the above-mentioned conditions. It further directed maximum resupply during the cease-fire period, the avoidance of GRC and U.S. provocative actions and a complete survey of the situation on each island of the Quemoy group.[4]

The Acting Secretary believed that a parallel message should be sent by State to Ambassador Drumright and he asked Mr. Parsons to have such a message sent right away.[5]

---

[4] Telegram 060045Z from CNO to CINCPAC, COMTAIWANDEFCOM, and COMSEVENTHFLT, October 5, reads in part: "Consult with GRC and unless strenuous objections raised by GRC do not use U.S. ships or aircraft to escort convoys to offshore islands during this period as long as ChiCommies do not fire on islands or otherwise attack." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Section 40) The change was agreed upon in a telephone conversation between Herter and Burke, recorded in a memorandum for the record, October 6, by Burke. (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator's File; both documents are in the Supplement)

[5] Telegram 301 to Taipei, October 5, informed the Embassy of the message to Smoot and stressed the importance of avoiding all provocative actions while hostilities were suspended. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–558; see Supplement)

---

157. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 6, 1958, noon.

545. CINCPAC for Admiral Felt. For Secretary or Acting Secretary. Department telegram 300.[1]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:14 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] Dated October 5, telegram 300 to Taipei instructed the Embassy to report reactions to the Peng broadcast. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–558)

1. Admiral Smoot and I agreed this morning we should not recommend any change in our convoying pending discussions with GRC to ascertain its attitude toward Peng letter. It so happens we have four destroyers and one LSD near Kinmen on escort and cargo unloading duty today in conjunction with specially large resupply effort which started at one o'clock this morning. We hope to get about 2,000 tons ashore. Cessation of Communist bombardment at midnight is facilitating unloading operation.

2. Shortly after our discussion Smoot was summoned by President. He told Smoot Peng's action is another example of calculated Communist treachery designed to split US and GRC. He would ignore Communist proffer and he requested Smoot to continue convoying as usual. Smoot described President's attitude as most grim and determined. Any attempt on our part now to withdraw from normal convoying in response to Peng offer would meet with violent reaction from President and might provide wedge which Communists are attempting to insert between US and GRC. Viewing situation from here as of now I would recommend against deviation from established pattern.

3. Communist offer was foreshadowed by letters received by Foreign Minister and Chiang Ching-kuo in past few days from one Tsao Chu-jen in Hong Kong. Knowledge of these letters has been closely held here to few high Chinese officials and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Tsao is unquestionably a Communist emissary; he served as emissary in a similar capacity in 1956 when he sent several letters to Chiang Ching-kuo proposing a settlement. At that time, after Tsao's proposals were leaked in Hong Kong, Chiang Ching-kuo issued a public statement denying negotiations, etc.

4. A cursory study of Tsao's proposals reveals conditions which, while some appear tempting on surface, would relegate Taiwan to status as appendage of Communist China. Apart from fact President is determined to hold no direct negotiations or discussions with Communist Chinese, these terms would be wholly unacceptable to him. I find it hard to believe Communists seriously think GRC would accept such terms as Tsao's letters envisage. I therefore conclude this is an exercise on part of Communists to present posture of compromise and willingness to negotiate peaceful settlement of Strait crisis and Taiwan problem. It also represents an effort to shunt US aside.

Drumright

158. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 6, 1958, 6 p.m.

548.1. Foreign Minister asked me to call this morning. He said he had been present at interview President had granted Admiral Smoot earlier in morning which I have referred to in previous telegram.[1] Minister said he had been directed by President to inform me of President's attitude toward most recent development in strait crisis: "As far as GRC and people concerned, we will disregard Commie broadcast completely and will continue our plans and actions as usual. We hope US will continue its plans and convoy activities as usual. We hope US will give no serious consideration to Peng's or other similar Commie utterances or threats. Unless Commies formally announce or declare renunciation of use of force in offshore area, US should not consider any change in its military actions". Minister said President had asked Admiral Smoot to relay foregoing message to JCS on his behalf and that of Chinese people.

2. Minister said after Smoot left President directed he make following additional points to me:

(A) He hopes US will tighten its vigilance in wake of Peng broadcast. He fears those Americans opposing administration policy will advocate acceptance of Peng's offer and even use it as pretext to suggest withdrawal or reduction of GRC garrisons from offshores. He hopes US Government will do everything possible to prevent such development which would do great damage to US and GRC.

(B) He hopes US Government will not propose or talk about withdrawal of offshore garrisons. He suggests US Government attempt to explain to US people it impossible to defend Taiwan and Penghu if GRC should withdraw or reduce garrisons on offshores. He fears if US pressed such withdrawal, armed forces and people might adopt anti-American attitude; this is source of concern and worry to him.

(C) If some Americans ask US Government to persuade GRC to withdraw or reduce offshore garrisons, he hopes US Government will firmly declare it cannot interfere with sovereign rights of ally defending its own territory. US cannot well suggest doing something opposite will of people and armed forces to resist aggression, et cetera.

3. Minister and Vice Minister Shen who also present then proceeded to analyze Peng message as follows: Message issued in name Defense Minister and not Chou En-lai. Not addressed to GRC or officials but to "compatriots in Taiwan". Judging from content it amounts to "peace offensive". Commies know GRC leadership will ignore

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–658. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 10:17 a.m. Repeated niact to CINCPAC.

[1] Document 157.

message. It is directed at people and armed forces and is designed to slacken vigilance and divide people and government. Even in this regard Commies know they can influence only certain sections of people—those uninformed or who have not had experience with Commies. Commies were probing deep when they brought up Secretary's press conference remarks which they sensed had caused disquiet and apprehension here. But Peng message is more addressed to US and European public opinion. This opinion does not know Commies as Chinese here do and may be misled. Peng's message indicates no basic change in Commie policy. It calls for abolition of US–GRC defense treaty, it maintains offshores and Taiwan are internal problem. Charge of US aggression remains and its purpose of Warsaw talks. There is no reference to cease fire or renunciation of force, but merely halt of bombardment for seven days to reach "peaceful settlement", terms of which are not spelled out. Recall Commie broadcast of August 27[2] threatened invasion of Kinmen. That is more accurate statement of Commie intentions; Peng statement more likely designed to slacken vigilance. Peng broadcast marks beginning of second stage of Commie drive which will be more aggressive than first stage. Message marks open effort to extend anti-US movement to Taiwan. Conditions in regard US convoy are attempts to sow trouble either if convoy maintained or withdrawn. If US withdraws convoy on Commie terms, equivalent to saying they set terms and US accepted. If US refused withdraw convoy, Commies will say US not interested in lifting provocations.

4. Minister argued US decision to withdraw escort operations would put GRC in almost impossible position. It would imply US acceptance of Peng proposal and would indicate to many ill-informed people GRC prepared to negotiate on basis Peng message. This preposterous and utterly impossible. GRC has had enough experience negotiating with Commies and will not do so again. If US withdraws convoy it will do so over strongest objections of GRC. GRC would be obliged to disclose step taken without its concurrence. This would signal split between GRC and US which Commies seeking and our position would be weakened. This open division would have harmful effect on public opinion and in armed forces. It would revive press criticism of US.

5. I told Minister I fully understand his position, viewed Peng message an example of Commie tactical trickery. I said I regarded it as largely intended for non-Chinese public consumption and as intended to embarrass United States. I had no doubt Commies would still try to take offshores by hook or crook. With Deptel 301[3] in mind, but without saying I had instructions, I said US Government might be disposed to call off con-

---

[2] See footnote 6, Document 53.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 156.

voy operations so long as they not needed. I also said it appeared desirable for GRC to refrain from all provocative actions so long as Commies do likewise. Minister said it would be great mistake to fall into Commie trap re convoys, but GRC would refrain from retaliatory attacks as long as Commies refrain from attacks.

6. Minister said Foreign Ministry had no alternative but to issue press statement for tomorrow's newspapers. He said he would keep it as restrained as possible. Statement would call on people for redoubled vigilance against Commie machinations which may be expected to lead to renewed and expanded attacks. Statement would exhort US and GRC to stand firm in face of new divisive tactics of Commies. Statement would in effect reject Commie overtures which would be branded as propaganda gesture and not worthy of any formal reply.

7. I continue to doubt advisability of our recognizing Peng statement to extent of abandoning our convoys which are peaceful and have thus far occasioned no engagement. If necessary, I would prefer to reduce number of our escorting ships and perhaps keep them a bit further to sea. In view of determination of GRC to ignore Peng message, and I think it a wise decision from GRC point of view, I believe it would be highly undesirable for us to dignify it by withdrawing our convoy. In face President's adamant objections and explanations given by Foreign Minister, our withdrawal from convoy operations will harm our relations and create further doubt as to our basic intentions. Commies will have thus succeeded in aim of driving wedge between us. Moreover, whole import of Peng broadcast is utterly hostile to US and reflects no change whatever in ultimate aims. For these reasons alone, I would advise that we disregard Peng message and continue at Warsaw to seek cessation of attacks.

Drumright

159. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

Conversation with the President

After I visited the President this morning with the Italian Ambassador,[1] I stayed over to discuss with him a possible statement with regard to the Chinese Communist broadcast announcing the seven-day suspension of fire on Quemoy. At the time, I did not have a draft in front of me since this had been delayed slightly in the Department and was being read over the phone to General Goodpaster's office.

We discussed the general lines such a statement should take and I told the President the draft, which would be forthcoming shortly, would, I thought, follow those lines pretty closely. I asked him if he would be good enough to review the final text, as I felt this was a matter of sufficient importance to warrant his examining the exact wording. He at first felt it would not be necessary for him to do so but later agreed that he would, as a result of which the attached statement was issued at 1:15 today.[2]

During the course of the discussion it was clear that the President was worried about the entire picture, and at one time commented that as things now stood we were trying to maintain an illogical position. He referred to several letters he had received which disturbed him and at one point spoke with considerable heat about continuing to have to do what Chiang Kai-shek wanted us to do. He then said he was just about ready to tell Chiang Kai-shek where he (Chiang Kai-shek) got off.

In approving the draft statement attached, the President requested me to insert the sentence near the end which reads, "It should be pointed out that U.S. escorts for these convoys in the offshore island area have been limited strictly to international waters."

C.A.H.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Herter. A notation on the source text by Phyllis D. Bernau reads: "Sec saw. PDB."

[1] The President's appointment diary indicates that Herter and the Italian Ambassador were there from 10:18 to 10:42 a.m. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File)

[2] The attached statement, issued that day by Herter, is not printed here; it expressed the hope that the Chinese Communist statement foreshadowed a permanent cessation of their attack on the offshore islands and that, should this prove to be the case, "there would seem to be no further necessity for the convoy of supply shipments to the offshore island positions." For the complete text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1172–1173.

160. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, October 6, 1958, 2:51 p.m.

061951Z. CTDC 061230Z.[1] Realize CTDC in coordination with Ambassador is doing everything possible to meet objectives my 060045Z.[2] There is concern here about future moves of Communists and interpretations that news correspondents (especially those riding convoys) put on GRC and U.S. activities during present cease fire which will affect worldwide support for our two governments' position. On the one hand we must be particularly careful not to let any sort of schism appear between U.S. and GRC. No wedge should be permitted between our two nations.

On other hand it is equally important not to give the ChiCommies any basis at all for any future allegations or propaganda that U.S. is deliberately provoking hostile actions and would not respond to their cease fire offer by insisting on convoying when ChiCommies in effect have made U.S. escort of convoys unnecessary.

It is to advantage of both our nations for U.S. ships to cease escorting after present convoy returns. Therefore direct all U.S. ships now escorting to resume normal operations in Taiwan Straits ready to resume escort of convoys if ChiCommies resume bombardment or make other types of attack. Unless and until ChiCommies do resume their aggressive actions escort of convoys is not necessary. In view of great interest here request reports in detail of action taken and proposed plans.

Consult with Ambassador as to method of convincing GRC.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Burke. Also sent to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US) and repeated to COMSEVENTHFLT and CINCPACFLT. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–658.

[1] Telegram 061230Z from Smoot, October 6, stated that he was continuing escort activity after taking steps to ensure "discreet employment" of escort ships and aircraft. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

[2] See footnote 4, Document 156.

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 6, 1958, 7:50 p.m.

306. For Ambassador from Robertson. Your 548.[1] JCS 947298 of August 29 to CINCPAC and COMTAIWANDEFCOM[2] directed that "within international waters, that is beyond the three mile limit, give convoy protection and escort to the extent you feel militarily necessary and to the extent GRC forces cannot fulfill this task". In accordance paragraph 5 of this JCS directive, we assume GRC informed of above groundrules for US participation convoy activity.

Citing this background you should inform GRC authorities that, while we are fully aware of absurdity of charges made in Peng's statement and while we have no doubt that it was intended to split GRC and US, fact remains that if Chicoms suspend shooting and attacks on resupply operations there is no need for US escort activities. If GRC wishes to continue convoys during suspended hostilities, that is their decision. Suspension of US escort activities need not be explained in terms of reaction to Peng's proposal, but simply as logical consequence of Communist suspension of aggressive armed attacks on islands and resupply operations. Failure to reciprocate would place US in highly disadvantageous position before US and world opinion, and leave US Government in completely untenable position in terms of its repeated insistence on cease-fire as first objective.

Even more serious is distinct possibility that if US persists in convoy activities it will force Chicoms to resume hostilities, perhaps on even broader scale. We must, of course, leave no stone unturned in our efforts to find a peaceful solution safeguarding US and GRC interests. If it becomes public knowledge that during Chicom suspension of gunfire US continuing escort activities at insistence of GRC, result could be most damaging to US–GRC relations and objective of Peng's statement would have been realized.

Finally you should stress that suspension of Chicom gunfire and other hostile acts provides golden opportunity for GRC to undertake removal of wounded, build-up of supplies, repair airfields, roads and other facilities and take other measures for preparing Quemoy islands against eventuality of resumed hostilities. From every consideration of GRC self-interest it would be folly to nullify this opportunity by such actions as unnecessary US escort activities or GRC provocations.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–658. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Green; cleared by Martin, Parsons, and Robertson and with S/S; and approved by Herter.

[1] Document 158.

[2] Document 53.

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 6, 1958, 7:56 p.m.

304. Text of Acting Secretary's statement re Peng statement sent you by Deptel 302[1] was drafted after very careful consideration at highest level and after consultation with Ambassador Yeh. You should immediately pass text this statement to President Chiang, pointing out that it in no way commits GRC but indicates US in close consultation with GRC, and leaves open subsequent US course of action. You should also assure him in strong terms of continued US support his Government. In your discretion you may inform President that Communist move was not discussed in Warsaw talks and US had no advance knowledge thereof. In last Warsaw meeting Communists remained as intransigent as ever in their rejection of US ceasefire proposal.

You should emphasize that it is of utmost importance that US Government marshal public, and especially congressional, opinion to support of its policies. This is particularly true when questions of war and peace are involved. Since President and Secretary have repeatedly stressed importance of cessation of hostilities by Communists in offshore island area as prerequisite to restoration of peace there, it imperative that US make positive response to present Communist move in this direction, regardless of Communist motive and even though such move may be temporary. Failure to do so would seem to belie sincerity US call for ceasefire and would not be understood by Congress and other public opinion leaders.

You should note with approval statement by spokesman of Ministry of National Defense indicating GRC had not in past taken initiative in hostilities and would not do so now.[2] As US has frequently indicated in past it is important that onus for any hostilities remain with Communists and GRC should continue refrain provocative actions. US fully understands importance of not letting down our guard. There is no weakening in US intention of refusing to give way to threat of force and resumption of hostilities by Chinese Communists would find US no less determined to come to assistance of GRC than in past. In fact if Chinese Communists

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–658. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared by Parsons and Robertson and with S/S, and approved by Herter.

[1] Telegram 302 to Taipei, October 6, transmitted the text of Herter's statement that day (see footnote 2, Document 159). (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–658)

[2] In a statement released by the Government Information Office on October 6 commenting on Peng's statement; text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 551 from Taipei, October 6. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–658)

resume hostilities following positive US response to their temporary cessation of hostilities US action in aid GRC would have stronger support in domestic and world opinion than previously.[3]

Herter

---

[3] Drumright reported in telegram 555 from Taipei, October 7, that he had sent Herter's statement to Huang, who had informed Chiang. Drumright had subsequently met with Huang, informed him of the substance of this telegram and telegram 306 (Document 161), and told him that Smoot had withdrawn convoy escorts. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758; see Supplement)

---

163. Memorandum for the Files

New York, October 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

Offshore Islands

Sunday[1] afternoon, after lunch, Foreign Minister Lange, in the presence of Mr. Holmes (Canada) and Mr. Murray (Secretariat) mentioned to Mr. Barco and Mr. Cook that they had received a response from the Chinese communist Ambassador in Oslo. Mr. Lange referred in this connection to a report Mr. Lange had received from Fred Kuh, correspondent of the *Chicago Sun Times*, in which the latter had demonstrated he had been informed of the Norwegian discussion with the United States prior to Mr. Lange's proposal in his General Debate speech as well as other facets of this idea. It was clear that Mr. Kuh's source had been the Indians who had told him on Friday, October 3 that the Chinese communists had responded to the Norwegian initiative and that this answer was a clear-cut negative. Mr. Lange said that in their view, the response, which they had only received on 4 October, was not a total negative, but in fact left the door ajar.

This afternoon, I met with Ambassador Nielsen and Mr. Naevdal to obtain from them an elucidation of Mr. Lange's remarks of Sunday.

Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962). Secret. Prepared by Charles D. Cook.

[1] October 5.

Ambassador Nielsen showed me a rough English translation of the cable they had received from Hans Engen,[2] reporting the response of the Chinese communist Ambassador. According to Mr. Engen's cable, Peking's Ambassador had expressed appreciation for Norway's spirit of good will and understanding in having approached them on this subject and in seeking to lessen the present tension. He had rehearsed the standard arguments of the communist position. He referred to the U.S. proposal for an armistice (i.e. cease fire), saying this would only secure the position of the U.S. forces close to the mainland. He charged that the U.S. was increasing its supplying of modern weapons, missiles, etc., in the area. They therefore doubted that the U.S. was sincere in its negotiations in Warsaw. They felt only the U.S. had the power to lessen tensions, and to do this by withdrawing its forces from the "Taiwan territories." In response to Mr. Engen's query, the Chinese communist Ambassador stated definitely that it was their intention to continue the Warsaw talks.

The Ambassador then stated that Peking had noted with interest the Norwegian proposal for the SYG's mediation. The Chinese communists felt that in view of the "unacceptable" situation regarding China in the UN, it would be "inappropriate for the Secretary-General to take any initiative." Mr. Engen asked whether a settlement of the Chinese representation issue (i.e. in the communists' favor) was a prerequisite to their accepting the assistance of the Secretary-General in this matter. The answer was in the affirmative.

Subsequently, Mr. Engen asked whether Peking would respond in the same sense to the other proposal in Mr. Lange's speech, namely that there be a small balanced group of nations to offer good offices. The Peking Ambassador said he was without instructions on this point but personally assumed that such group would be of use if this group's first task was "to try to influence the U.S. such that it would cease the military operation close to the Chinese coast line and over Chinese air territory."

In the immediate assessment of this conversation made by Engen and Krogh Hansen, the Norwegian Ambassador to Peking who was also present, while the reaction had been negative, the Chinese communists definitely did not close the door on mediatory efforts. In fact, the Chinese communist Ambassador invited Mr. Engen and Ambassador Hansen to dine with him on Monday evening, October 6, to "continue their conversation". A further report is expected regarding this matter therefore at a later date.

Engen and Krogh felt it was clear that the Chinese communists wanted no contact with the UN until it could be on a basis of equality. They nevertheless wished to keep the door open in Warsaw, and perhaps in Oslo and New Delhi also. Engen felt this all fitted in with the delivery by Soviet Ambassador Gubanov on October 3, of a memorandum on the same subject. This Soviet memo stated that both Peking and Moscow strongly opposed a UN debate regarding Taiwan and the offshore islands situation. Engen thought it significant that the Soviets had not previously indicated so clearly their own opposition to a UN discussion on this. The memo asked Norway (and the other governments to whom it was addressed) to instruct their GA delegations to vote against inscription of the Taiwan matter and to "raise their voice" against US activities in the area. The Soviets said this memo, and the fact of the various approaches made, were not being divulged, and they asked that it not be made public.

---

[2] Norwegian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

In response to my question, Ambassador Nielsen said they had discussed this report with Secretary-General Hammarskjold. He had taken a "rather optimistic" line, implying that there would have to be a few more probing approaches made to the Chinese communists before they would accept outside intervention. He expected that they would eventually come around to it, according to Ambassador Nielsen.

Ambassador Nielsen agreed with following assessment of the Chinese communist position at this stage: There are two aspects to the present situation in the Taiwan Straits and Offshore Islands area. There is the matter of the alleged aggression of the US against China. That is under consideration, in the communist view, in the Warsaw talks. The second aspect is the so-called internal Chinese dispute, i.e., between the Peking regime and the Chinese Nationalists. That is a matter on which now Peking's Defense Minister has proposed discussions between the two Chinese parties. From the Chinese communist way of looking at this, the Norwegian suggestion for the Secretary-General's mediation falls between these two aspects which in their mind are separate though perhaps related problems.

In conclusion, Ambassador Nielsen stated that they had now made their proposal in Mr. Lange's speech; they had put the matter to Peking, and they had received a reply from Peking. Except for any further elucidation which might develop as result of that evening's dinner in Oslo, the Norwegians did not intend to push the matter further for the time being. He did express the wish that they be informed of any significant trends or developments in the Warsaw talks which might have a bearing on any further conversations they might have with the Chinese communists, presumably at the latter's initiative. Such information, if they were to receive it, would go no further, he said, and, he added it went without saying they would take no further steps without consultation with and approval by us.

164. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Taipei, October 7, 1958, 6:05 p.m.

071005Z. Your 061951Z.[1] Accordance your instruction have directed US ships resume normal patrol operations in Taiwan Straits. Ambassador is passing information contained in SecState 304 to GRC.[2] This constitutes notification to GRC of action in re escort of convoy.

Separately however have reached agreement with Chinese Navy that our normal patrols in Straits can be arranged as to provide adequate protection for emergencies during this period of lull. Tiger [Wang and] Minister Yu Ta Wei not informed of foregoing by any US official as yet. Ambassador suggests that since Chinese Navy concurs as indicated above the better policy would be to allow the information reach Tiger and Minister Yu Ta Wei through their own channels.

New subject. In conference with Tiger was informed MND is making maximum effort get critical items on Kinmen redistribute forces regroup and recoup offshore island defenses using LSTs LSMs landing on beaches, objective is about 4 to 5 thousand tons a day including 8 inch Hows 155s ammunition food oil clothing. This is distinct change from President's firm position that convoy plans would proceed using mobile loading as though ChiCom cease-fire had never occurred. Tiger did ask for use of LSD to transfer LCUs and LCMs to Kinmen for inter-island services. Unless otherwise directed therefore plan to have LSD make 1 night trip to within 12 miles discharge LCUs LCMs and return immediately. LSD will probably have to make 1 additional trip toward end of period to return these mobile craft to Taiwan under same conditions.

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 63 D 76, ComTaiwan Telegrams. Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 7:39 a.m. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to COMSEVENTHFLT and CINCPACFLT.

[1] Document 160.

[2] Document 162.

165. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

Offshore Island Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Shao-Chang Hsu, Minister, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Mr. Robertson told Ambassador Yeh that he had asked him to come in for a chat about the situation resulting from the Chinese Communist announcement of a temporary cease-fire. Mr. Robertson said that if the Communists succeeded in causing a misunderstanding between the United States and the GRC then they would have succeeded in one of their objectives. He thought that the Chinese Communist cease-fire move represented a plus for our side. It gave the GRC an opportunity to replenish supplies on Quemoy, to repair bomb damage, to remove wounded, etc.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the United States had begun convoying GRC supply operations because of the Communist attack. There was no purpose in continuing to convoy when the attacks stopped. There was no further military reason for it. Moreover, the U.S. had been working for a cease-fire and now that the Communists had stopped their attacks, the U.S. should not give them any excuses for resuming them. United States public opinion would not understand any failure of the U.S. Government to respond to the cease-fire.

Ambassador Yeh felt that the psychological object of the Communists' cease-fire would be to soften American public opinion. The Communists could see that U.S. public opinion did not support the U.S. Government's policy 100%. They could also see a slight difference between the U.S. and the GRC on this matter. He mentioned Secretary Dulles' press conference and the Secretary's use of the word "foolish".[1]

Mr. Robertson explained that what the Secretary had in mind was simply that it was militarily unwise for the GRC to station so many troops on the offshore islands. The Secretary had been very much upset by the interpretations which the newspapers had given to his remarks—that there had been a change in U.S. policy. Of course, the public didn't know that the U.S. had tried to get a reduction of GRC forces on Quemoy.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 13 and initialed by Robertson.

[1] Reference is to the Secretary's September 30 press conference; see Document 143.

But this was "old hat" to Mr. Dulles; he did not think of it in terms of something that would be regarded as new. Some newspapers would twist anything that was said because they were against the Government's policy.

Ambassador Yeh expressed the fear of his government that the Chinese Communists' offer of cease-fire would so impress U.S. public opinion, that if the Communists were to press new demands as a condition for continuing the cease-fire, there would be public pressure here to consider such demands. Another worry of his government was that the Chinese Communists simply needed a week to build themselves up and then they would renew their attacks. GRC acquisition of 8" howitzers might have required the Communists to shift their gun positions. According to GRC intelligence, the Communists were feverishly supplying their forward positions. Possibly they were getting ready to issue a military ultimatum.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Communist bombardment of GRC positions had been far heavier than GRC bombardment of Communist positions. It didn't seem as though the Communists would need a cease-fire to resupply their positions. In any case, stopping U.S. convoys would not in any way help the Communists resupply their positions. The circumstances under which the decision to convoy was made no longer existed. The cease-fire, on the other hand, gives our side an opportunity to repair the damage and resupply the offshore islands. Therefore, it seemed to be a sign of weakness on the side of the Communists. We would gain in terms of world opinion by allowing the cease-fire to take place. We should take advantage of it.

Ambassador Yeh mentioned the statement by the Government spokesman which had been put out in Taipei and which had included the assertion that the GRC had not initiated firing and would not do so in the future. This had been inserted on his recommendation.

Mr. Robertson said it would be advantageous for the U.S. to issue an announcement that we had stopped convoying since there was no longer a military necessity for it. In response to Ambassador Yeh's question whether we would include in such an announcement the statement that if firing recommenced we would begin convoying again, Mr. Robertson replied that of course we would; there has been no change in our policy. He asked Ambassador Yeh to assure the Generalissimo that there has been no change.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had accepted almost everything he had recommended. Yeh had emphasized in his messages to Taipei that the GRC could not afford to go against world and U.S. public opinion, especially Congressional opinion. However, the Generalissimo's personal pride had been hurt by some of the expressions used in recent public statements such as Mr. Herter's use of the word "pathological" and Mr. Dulles' use of the word "foolish". Ambassador Yeh said that his government could not accept the Communist declaration but would go along with the de facto cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that we would be in a much stronger position with the American people if we responded to the cease-fire. If the Communists then started firing again, we would be in a stronger position to support GRC defense. Ambassador Yeh felt that the public would want the GRC to retreat a step if the Communists started firing again. Mr. Robertson said we were trying to rally public opinion and that Congressional opinion was especially important.

Ambassador Yeh asked if we would not issue a public statement on convoying. Mr. Robertson stressed that it would be helpful if we did issue such a statement. We would explain that we had convoyed because of the bombardment and that if it stopped convoys would no longer be necessary. However, if firing resumed, we would resume convoys. Ambassador Yeh wondered whether the statement issued yesterday did not go far enough. Mr. Robertson suggested that Ambassador Yeh tell the Generalissimo that such a statement (re convoys) would be helpful in rallying public opinion here. There was great pressure for such an announcement and it would be helpful to make it. He assured Ambassador Yeh that we would include in such an announcement the statement that renewal of firing by the Communists would mean we would start escorting again. Ambassador Yeh could tell the Generalissimo this.[2]

---

[2] For text of a statement issued by the Department of State on October 8, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1174.

166. Memorandum From President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 7, 1958.

You will recall that from Newport I telephoned you concerning an idea that had to do with the offshore islands in the Formosa Straits.[1] My thought was that Chiang might be sold on the proposition that he would be in a better position to realize his purpose of retaining a capability for return to the mainland in the event of internal disorder, if he should acquire from the United States a strong amphibious lift and simultaneously remove all or nearly all his garrison from the offshore islands. Of course this would have to be a plan voluntarily adopted by him, during a period when there was no hostile action. Otherwise he would be acting under duress and this would be, of course, unacceptable.

I mentioned this same idea to George Yeh when he called on me recently. The Ambassador seemed to be receptive to the idea but, we agreed, it would be necessary to have a cease fire so that the Nationalists would not seem to be retreating under fire.

Now it occurs to me that the current cease fire might give an opportunity during which this idea could be skillfully presented to Chiang, preferably by one of his own people—possibly Ambassador Yeh.

As I suggested to you, this would restore a great mobility and flexibility to Chiang's force. It would remove the danger of getting involved in a severe battle under unfavorable conditions near the Chinese coastline. It would much improve Chiang's opportunity for intervention on the mainland if and when such a situation should arise. Furthermore, it would certainly give him and ourselves a better position before world opinion. Consequently our defensive alliance would be the stronger because of a unified public opinion at home.

Incidentally, I believe that we have a sufficient amount of unused amphibious equipment, including some escort vessels, that the transfer to Chiang of a number of them would have no harmful effects on our own position. Of course nothing formal can be suggested, but I do think

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758. Personal and Confidential. Attached to the source text are copies of an October 7 memorandum from Robertson to Dulles concerning steps which had been or might be taken to increase the mobility of Nationalist forces and an October 8 memorandum from Greene to Robertson transmitting a copy of the President's memorandum with a request for thorough study of the idea. The signed copies are *ibid.*, 793.5/10–758; see Supplement.

[1] Reference is apparently to a conversation of September 16; see Document 94. The President also mentioned the idea in telephone conversations with Dulles on September 22 and October 2, both of which are recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) The September 22 note is in the Supplement.

it is the kind of thing that might appeal to Chiang, and if it did, it would offer great advantages to both of us.

I have no reason, naturally, for believing that Chiang would now be more receptive to this idea than he has been to similar ones suggested to him during recent years. However, it is possible that he may feel that conditions are changed and that if he had an amphibious capability that could lift in one load fifteen or twenty thousand troops, that he could sell both himself and his people on the proposition that by this action he would have increased his strength and his position in the area.

D.E.

---

167. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 7, 1958, 8 p.m.

383. For the Secretary. Re: Offshore Islands. Further to mytel 379[1] Nielsen (Norway) read us contents of cable from Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow (Gundersen) reporting on conversation October 7 with Peking's Ambassador in Moscow.

ChiCom Ambassador said cease-fire had been announced for duration of seven days in first instance. He "had reason to believe" it could be prolonged, provided American Forces did not come within ChiCom 12-mile limit. He went on to say "it ought now be possible for Warsaw talks to continue and lead to satisfactory result." ChiComs, he said, were interested in peaceful solution of their difficulties with US. ChiCom Ambassador emphasized their main objective was to achieve evacuation of the Nationalist forces from Quemoy and Matsu.

Norwegian Ambassador asked ChiCom Ambassador whether it was conceivable that Taiwan problem could be solved through plebescite under UN supervision if ChiComs had become members UN. He replied "for reasons of principle they had to maintain Taiwan belonged to China." ChiComs "would on other hand raise no demands in relation to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 10:20 p.m.

[1] Dated October 7. (*Ibid.*)

Taiwan as condition for cease-fire and negotiations with US regarding immediate problems." Nielsen said FonMin Lange had asked him to say he was fortified by this report in his view, reported earlier, that Chinese Nationalists should, during cease-fire, be urged to begin withdraw troops from offshore islands.

Lodge

---

168. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, October 8, 1958, 1:40 p.m.

080540Z. Your 062137Z[1] provides excellent background for my current actions and orders. All actions indicated were directed yesterday in conference herewith COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 72 and COMATF 13(P). I am referring press to Washington on all items pertaining to convoy activity. Have requested discontinuance air drops. High winds in Straits today expected to interfere with operations. This morning I received a dramatically encouraging report from Chief Army Section, MAAG, General Bork, who, with staff, visited Kinmen yesterday and made a thorough inspection. Complete report will follow. However, commanders there indicate no problem whatsoever in supply. Bork amazed by small damage of 430 thou rounds except in immediate area China [T?] batteries. Casualties low. Spectacular improvement in beach organization reported. Junk operation extremely successful and perishables such as flour to be sent hereafter only by junks. Morale as indicated by activity, alertness and appearance of ChiNat soldiers and officers far better than before 23 August. Advisers' morale high and all in good health. General Hu undertaking reduction Tan Island garrison which, according to report, is in excellent shape and in contact by boat nightly with Kinmen, despite fire they have received. General Hu's artillery

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–858. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to JCS, CNO, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMSEVENTHFLT. Received at the Department of the Navy at 6:13 a.m.

[1] CINCPAC telegram 062137Z to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US), October 7; a copy is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83, FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147; see Supplement.

commander considered highly competent and making excellent preparations for receipt of 155 and 8 inch guns. Damage to guns by ChiCom counter battery minor. Parachute recovery system progressing satisfactorily. Energetic beach preparations underway in anticipation use of barcs, junks, sampans and in preparation for renewal intensive ChiCom fire. My report tonight will be full of details which may be useful to demonstrate what, to me, is US/GRC complete success in resupplying Kinmen despite ChiCom fire and all troubles we have had since 23 August.

---

169. Record of Meeting

Washington, October 8, 1958, 4:35–6:04 p.m.

SUBJECT

Highlights of Discussion in Secretary's Office October 8 on Future Moves in the Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Herter
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Smith
Mr. Becker
Mr. Macomber
Mr. Parsons—FE
Mr. Martin—FE
Mr. Green—FE

The Secretary said the meeting had been called to discuss future moves in the Taiwan Straits, proceeding on the assumption that the one-week cease fire stipulated by the ChiComs would continue for at least a while longer, although common prudence naturally required that we take full advantage of the present situation to build up the islands' defensive positions in the event hostilities are resumed. He didn't feel there was anything that could be usefully done in the next three days, however, on the diplomatic front. He asked Mr. Smith if he had any ideas on what might be done.

Mr. Smith agreed that nothing could be really accomplished in the next several days, but we cannot let the situation drift on and on without

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–858. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Green. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers) tackling basic issues. In fact, Mr. Smith added, the ChiComs probably want things to drift on. It might suit their very purposes if we were to go back to the status quo ante, for they may feel that the current situation, kept tense and shaken up from time to time by the ChiComs, will induce further shifts in world opinion in the direction of favoring turning over the offshore islands to Peiping.

The Secretary questioned this estimate. He did not agree that the ChiComs would favor any GRC retention of the islands. Their acquisition by Peiping would be a great victory for Peiping.

Mr. Smith replied that, if the ChiNats lost the offshore islands, it would strengthen the concept of a two-China policy which is abhorrent to Peiping. By allowing the islands to remain at least temporarily in GRC hands, Peiping is provided further opportunities to "shake them up" and deepen free world fissures over our China policy.

Mr. Herter and Mr. Becker thought that the present situation provided a heaven-sent opportunity to persuade the GRC to evacuate Tatan and Ehrtan. This would permit a generally welcome change in the status quo in the direction of demilitarization.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Ambassador Yeh had spoken to him the other day about using the present lull to evaluate forces from the Tan islets preparatory to blowing them up and rendering them useless to the ChiComs.[1] However we could expect no political mileage from that action.

The Secretary was disturbed that it might be played up as a retreat which would be damaging to the GRC. Perhaps it could be done, however, as a straight military measure devoid of political implications. The dilemma we're in is that while we might wish to make a withdrawal from the Tans appear as a retreat or concession for political purposes, the GRC cannot afford to allow that.

Returning to Mr. Smith's thesis, the Secretary repeated his objections. He added that he had had that day separate talks with three Foreign Ministers and one Ambassador;[2] and all of them had hailed the cease-fire as a great success for our policy.

There followed a discussion of our past efforts to induce the ChiNats to withdraw forces from the offshore islands. It was pointed out that divisional strength on the islands had remained constant since 1950 or thereabouts although there had been an increase of ten to twenty thousand in 1954 in actual numbers, due to the impending ChiCom assault on the Tachens. The over-all ratio between troops on the offshores and troops on Taiwan had remained fairly constant over the past 9 years.[3]

---

[1] No discussion of the Tans is recorded in Document 165, but see Document 137.

[2] Records of Dulles' conversations that day with the Belgian and Philippine Foreign Ministers are in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–858. Memoranda of his conversations with the Panamanian Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador are *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

Mr. Murphy wondered why we hadn't tried during the past three years to get the forces on Quemoy and Matsu reduced.

The Secretary and Mr. Robertson referred to the adamancy of GRC refusal to cut down the forces in 1955. There was no reason to expect a GRC change of opinion in the past three years.

However, the Secretary continued, it could be pointed out now to the GRC that it is a military liability to have so many troops on these islands which are hard to resupply and are directly under the enemy's guns; that their defense is better staged from the air and sea rather than from the islands themselves.

Mr. Robertson questioned our ability to induce the GRC to withdraw troops from the islands. The arguments just cited by the Secretary had been used back in 1954–55 to no avail. What leverage do we have?

The Secretary replied that we had "quite a little." It must be pointed out to the GRC that if we now get a respite from hostilities in the Straits and we do nothing but allow the situation to drag on, and if a year from now the ChiComs renew their attacks on Quemoy or Matsu, it will be extremely difficult to get any U.S. support for defending those islands. Chiang must realize, or be made to realize, that he has just had a narrow escape. We have had to strain our relations with Congress and with foreign governments to almost the breaking point to save him this time.

Mr. Robertson maintained that if the islands were evacuated as proposed by Mr. Smith, they would be lost to the Communists. As far as reducing the size of the garrison is concerned, it makes no difference to the ChiComs whether the garrison is 80,000 or 40,000.

The Secretary countered that it is not the ChiComs we would be trying to impress through garrison reductions, but public opinion in this country and elsewhere. We are trying to keep opinion supporting our policy in this situation. It was agonizing enough in 1955; it has been even worse the past few weeks. We cannot allow this crisis situation to confront us again—if indeed we are out of the present crisis.

The Secretary continued: Perhaps we should contemplate some theoretical goal such as a ChiCom renunciation of force to take the islands, the withdrawal of all GRC forces from the islands, which would nevertheless remain as part of free China, and a sanction backing up this agreement in the form of its being underwritten by a group of countries now recognizing Peiping which would sever relations were the agreement broken by Peiping. Perhaps there could be economic sanctions as well.

---

[3] A memorandum on this subject from Robertson to Dulles, October 6, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/10–858; see Supplement.

Mr. Smith questioned this proposition on the grounds that the islands, stripped of their garrison, would be easy prey for a quiet take-over from within by subversion. He preferred giving the inhabitants a choice between staying there or going to Taiwan. Undoubtedly almost all would choose Taiwan. This would be good propaganda for our side.

Mr. Robertson interjected that there is no place on Taiwan to accommodate 47,000 evacuees.

The Secretary considered it "impractical" to hand the islands over to the Communists as Mr. Smith had suggested. Perhaps to avoid a take-over by subversion, his (the Secretary's) plan would have to be amended to allow for policing of the islands. There is no reason why subversion couldn't be prevented.

Mr. Becker and Mr. Robertson strongly doubted that the ChiComs would ever accept the plan outlined by the Secretary.

The Secretary suggested that the plan might be put forward unilaterally. We could say to the ChiComs that since you have stopped the fighting, we are accordingly removing the troops and we have agreements with countries X, Y and Z to support the continuation of this situation through threat of employing sanctions if you violate the GRC demilitarized islands.

Mr. Robertson wondered what "stalwarts" could be found to make such a pledge of support for the offshore islands.

The Secretary accepted this objection as particularly valid but he repeated his contention that something must be done to dispose of this thorny problem.

Mr. Robertson said that we and our allies must come to realize that we get nowhere by appeasement. Our own people seem to overlook completely the fact that the ChiComs and Soviets are demanding our total withdrawal from the Taiwan area, that Peiping is trying to get rid of a rival government, the fall of which, from our viewpoint, would have disastrous results. These are the issues in dispute; not the offshore islands.

Mr. Murphy suggested that, rather than start out with a general course of policy action at this time, we might more profitably contemplate limited objectives, as, for example, an evaluation of the Tans.

Mr. Robertson was opposed to our trying to do this. Ambassador Yeh might try to influence his government. But, even if he succeeded, it would have little to do with the over-all situation. Mr. Robertson subsequently observed that it might be profitable to discuss this general problem with Yeh who is realistic and who is persuasive with his government.

The Secretary asked Mr. Smith if he would care to express any further thoughts on what should be done.

Mr. Smith replied that nothing could probably be done right now, but later on the prospect could be opened up of a withdrawal from the offshore islands, counterbalanced by some international guarantee and by our strengthening the GRC's defenses through the stationing of forces there, possibly the siting of ballistic missiles on Taiwan and a show of permanent American interest in the island.

The Secretary questioned this proposition on the grounds that it tended to the 2-China concept—a concept repudiated by the GRC. At least it is a concept *now* unacceptable to Taipei, although it is something which seems destined to happen some day when the Chinese army is essentially a Taiwanese army. The Secretary then read two pages of Embassy Taipei's telegram 521 of October 1[4] which spoke of the Taiwanese people's opposition to the GRC's offshore islands policy and of their tendency to a 2-China concept.

Mr. Herter stated that, with a cease-fire situation in effect, we are obliged at this moment to consider the question of removing sources of provocation.

The Secretary asked whether Beam had ever asked Wang just what provocations and harassments the ChiComs would seek to have removed. Informed that no such explicit question had been put to Wang, the Secretary suggested that we try to pin the ChiComs down on that point. This should be incorporated in the latest instructions being prepared for Beam.[5]

The Secretary then asked Mr. Robertson to look into the question of the Tan islets, particularly in view of the fact, reported by Mr. Robertson, that Admiral Smoot had just recommended to the GRC that it build these islets' defenses up during the current cease-fire.

In closing, the Secretary remarked that this had been a profitable discussion. He hoped that we would all keep this problem prominently in mind and take it up for discussion later.

---

[4] Telegram 521 from Taiwan reported on major trends and developments in public opinion on Taiwan during the previous 2 weeks. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–158)

[5] See Document 170.

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 8, 1958, 9:18 p.m.

414. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for 80th meeting:

Communists' temporary suspension hostilities and statement[1] that GRC "fully free" to resupply offshore islands for seven days provided no US escort has changed negotiating picture for time being at least. Your emphasis next meeting should be on effort to get Chinese Communists extend ceasefire indefinitely. While unlikely Wang will give explicit agreement such extension, we might gain de facto extension by stressing themes: (a) US escort of GRC shipping has in fact been suspended and (b) opprobrium of world will descend on Chinese Communists if they renew attacks.

Begin your presentation as follows: There is one encouraging development since last meeting. We understand that there is de facto ceasefire in the Taiwan area. At the last meeting we pointed out Chinese Communists refusal negotiate by reason unyielding demand for unconditional surrender our side, involving giving up faithful ally to conquest by force of arms.

Now appears failure to negotiate attributable to fact Wang not communicating here real position his own government. To what end do we talk here if ceasefire which US has demanded from beginning, even if only a temporary one, is accomplished through newspapers or radio from Peiping. How can we now be assured that positions Wang takes here really reflect views his side. At last meeting he said: "I am authorized state Chinese side completely and categorically rejects your proposals." Now we understand that firing has in fact ceased. Cessation of firing was a primary objective of US proposal and was stated in US agreed announcement. Would appreciate Wang's answer to plain question: Is he now prepared to negotiate? We are interested in various aspects of Peng's statement. Has Wang been advised of its meaning? For example, when Peng demands that US quit Western Pacific does that mean also abandoning our other allies in Asia such as the Philippines? Does Wang wish postponement in order to obtain information and accurate instructions?

Pass on to reference in Peng's statement to "humanitarian considerations" and ask him what humanitarian considerations motivated

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–858. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin and Becker; cleared in draft by Dulles, Becker, Reinhardt, Parsons, and with OSD; and approved by Robertson. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and to Taipei.

[1] Of October 5; see footnote 2, Document 156.

murderous August 23 attack and those that followed. What humanitarian considerations led Chinese Communists to drop over half million rounds on Quemoy Islands with multiple civilian casualties. Beginning next Monday[2] must more innocent lives be sacrificed for purposes territorial aggrandizement Chinese Communists.

We hope that "humanitarian" considerations will lead Chinese side to continue ceasefire beyond week so that meaningful negotiations can be carried on. Unless tranquillity assured on more than week to week or day to day basic adjustment to peaceful conditions cannot realistically be made. Whole world cheered by ceasefire and consequent relaxing tensions and will expect continuance in interest world peace. All peace loving peoples believe it will be better for his side to begin genuine negotiations rather than to threaten the peace of the world. We sincerely hope announced suspension attacks foreshadows intention his side begin genuine negotiations. Whole civilized world joins us in this hope.

US position on providing escort illustrates its peaceful intentions, which have continued despite provocations. From beginning US has ordered escort only when that action necessary by reason Chinese Communist aggressive activities. Upon announcement suspension such aggressive activity, escort of GRC shipping suspended because no longer necessary. Must be emphasized that if ceasefire terminated and Chinese Communists aggression renewed, US escort of GRC shipping will also be renewed. Although US of course has full right send forces anywhere within international and friendly waters, US orders do not contemplate escort GRC supply ships so long as Communists continue to desist from attacks.

Best way Wang's side could show sincere purpose to seek peaceful solution our differences would be for him begin serious discussion our draft agreed announcement.[3] At last meeting he simply reiterated demand that US surrender to his demands and abandon its ally to his side's unprovoked attacks. Ask him whether he now prepared say just what unacceptable to his side in each paragraph.

Agree you should challenge Wang's sweeping statements as noted (A), (B) and (C) paragraph 3 your 527.[4] Also believe you should bear down hard on Wang's claim that August 23 shelling provoked by concentration of GRC forces offshores and buildup US force Taiwan area.

---

[2] October 13.

[3] Presented at the September 30 meeting; see Document 139.

[4] Telegram 527 from Taipei, October 5, transmitted Beam's comments on the October 4 meeting and recommendations for the next meeting. Paragraph 3 suggested challenging such statements as "(A) US proposal demands PRC agree to seizure Chinese territory, (B) US proposal constitutes preparation for war, (C) US proposal demands PRC recognition legality GRC." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–558; see Supplement)

Actually there has been no recent buildup of GRC forces on Quemoy and the US increase of forces occurred only after the Communist attack. (FYI. There have been on Quemoy 6 Infantry Divisions since September 1954. On that date the total strength was 79,000. As a result of reorganization and increase of support elements the number was 85,000 on October 1956, 87,000 September 1957 and 86,000 in August 1958. End FYI.) As against this there has been a steady and major progressive buildup of Chinese Communist strength opposite Quemoy. (Particularly important that facts unprovoked and calculated nature Chinese Communists attacks be firmly fixed in record.) Simple fact Communist military and propaganda buildup during weeks preceding August 23 give lie his statements. As in Korea world cannot be deceived by claiming victim of aggression guilty of aggression because he defends himself.

Note fact that Wang in 77th meeting[5] referred to "sabotage" and "harassment" against mainland. Ask for a specification of particular activities to which he referred. We have indicated that when ceasefire attained meaningful negotiations could be undertaken with the view of eliminating provocative activities both sides. Let us identify the activities that create tension in the area.

In case Chinese Communists accuse US of continuing escort of GRC shipping after Chinese Communists ceased fire you may note US escorted one GRC resupply mission after suspension hostilities. This operation was mounted and nearly completed even before Peng announcement.

Dulles

---

[5] On September 25. According to telegram 477 from Warsaw (see footnote 1, Document 125), Wang said in his opening statement: "Over many years you have constantly been conniving and instigating Chiang Kai-shek clique under your control to use our inland waters to carry out sabotage and harassment against mainland."

171. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 9, 1958, 3:44–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

China Problem

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
His Excellency Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

The British Ambassador raised several aspects of the China problem. He first referred to his recent letter with which he transmitted information given the Indians by the Chinese Communists in Peiping, and which raised the question of possibility of using this channel to reach Peiping.[1] The Secretary expressed appreciation for the letter. Sir Harold then said that our Embassy in London might already have informed us but in any event he had a message asking him also to tell us that the Norwegians on October 6 had informed the British that they had sought the reaction of the Chinese Communists to the possibility of exercising the good offices of Mr. Hammarskjold. Sir Harold gave the Secretary a brief excerpt which indicated that the Chinese Communists felt that in view of their exclusion from the UN, intervention by Mr. Hammarskjold would not be appropriate.[2] The Secretary expressed doubt that an intermediary could be useful in the present situation.

Discussing the question in more general terms the Secretary questioned the thesis that we could arrive at a formalized agreement through intermediaries and negotiations. The cessation of bombardment was not arrived at in Warsaw through negotiation but came about with a unilateral statement. Warsaw, of course, might have had some influence in Peiping's deliberations but the action was taken independently. It was possible that each side might move further on more or less parallel lines without any expressed agreement and that progress would be made in this way. The Chinese Communists said they wished us to stop convoys. We did so and publicized it, whereupon they took some credit for obtaining this result. Nevertheless, there has been progress. If the shooting continues to be suspended, there might be more. For instance, we have instructed Beam to try to get the Chinese Communists to be more precise

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–958. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Parsons. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] Document 147.

[2] Not printed.

in regard to what they mean in their references to harassments and provocative actions.

The Ambassador said that if the Nationalists were using the offshore islands to blockade the mainland it would be easier to understand their recent actions. The Secretary replied that the Chinese Nationalists have not so used the islands to any great extent, at least not lately; nevertheless, the potentiality to do so presumably had some significance. Continuing, the Secretary said that there would be great difficulty in getting the Communists or the Nationalists to accept an intermediary. Probably we could do as much as anyone in this situation although we do not know if it will be enough. He had thought that if fighting was resumed and there was no progress at Warsaw, the possibility of resorting to an intermediary might be considered. The Secretary then described the nature of the discussions between Wang and Beam, particularly the constant, categorical, immediate rejection of our proposals by the Communists and the endless repetition by them of their charges.

The British Ambassador mentioned that there was perhaps one other use which a resort to Indian or Norwegian intermediaries might have. We could at least make sure that the Chinese Communists felt certain they knew what our position actually was. The Secretary replied he thought they knew pretty well although he acknowledged that some of our military had from time to time made statements which might be confusing in this respect.

172. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 10, 1958, 11:36 a.m.–12:08 p.m.

SUBJECT

Future Moves Regarding Offshore Island Situation

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

The Secretary told Ambassador Yeh that he had invited him in for a chat so that they might look into the future. He said that of course if the fighting were to resume in the offshore island area, the situation would revert to that which had existed before the Communists stopped firing, i.e., to United States escort of GRC convoys, etc. The Secretary noted that the present resupply situation seemed to be in good shape. In this connection he mentioned an encouraging report which had just been received from Taipei.

The Secretary said the Communists now faced the situation which he foresaw as occurring if we were able to prevent them from gaining the full results of their interdiction of GRC resupply by artillery fire. They were faced with the alternatives of letting their military effort gradually die or of raising the level of this effort, which would have increased the danger of the conflict's spreading. Maybe the Communists had suspended the hostilities for a week to consider the problem which confronted them. There seemed to be a fair chance that they would decide that it was too hard a nut to crack and they would therefore attempt to gain their ends by political means both in the area and outside of it.

The Secretary noted that the situation which the GRC faced with regard to the outside world was not satisfactory. The Communists wished to spread the idea that there was dissension between the GRC and the United States Governments and were attempting to create sentiment against President Chiang and his Government in the United States.

Ambassador Yeh asked, when the Secretary said the situation did not look good for the GRC, did he refer to the fact that the initiative had been taken by the Communists?

The Secretary replied no—he had not meant this. He had meant that only with the greatest difficulty was the United States holding back some

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1058. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Martin. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers) of its friends from recognizing Communist China and from agreeing to its admission to the UN. In this connection he mentioned specifically Canada, Belgium, France and New Zealand. It was only by our exerting the strongest efforts that we could prevent these countries from adopting such policies. We almost had to say to them that we would regard such actions as unfriendly to us.

The Secretary said that these feelings were present even before the flare-up on the offshore islands. Governments like to have relations with the source of power, whether this power is good or evil. Some of these governments felt that it would be better for Communist China to be in the UN than to be out of it. They feel that power demands recognition, although this does not mean that they like the power. Therefore the Secretary saw difficult times ahead. He said that the "two of us in the room" are almost alone in wanting to carry on our policy. A great many of our friends feel that we can't expect the Chinese Communists indefinitely to put up with having on their doorstep a revolutionary government. Moreover, they are worried about United States involvement and the Soviet Union's involvement with the consequent danger of another war. All this presents problems that we need to think about. The Secretary said that he did not have the answers but we cannot be blind to the problems. It won't do us any good to bury our heads in the sand and go ahead on the assumption that the positions which we occupy will be valid for the next year or two. We should try to meet the situation together.

The Secretary stressed that there was no disposition on the part of the United States Government to change its basic policy, which could be summed up as recognition of the Republic of China and the extension to it of military and economic assistance; non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and its continued exclusion from the UN. The problem was how can we make this policy succeed. The Secretary said he had no formulas.

The Secretary said that he wished to discuss this possibility: that after we see what happens on Sunday (October 12) and after reflection, he would be willing to come out to Taipei to talk to President Chiang about the problem of making our policy more palatable to the people of the United States and our allies. The Secretary pointed out that there was a rising tide of opinion against our policy. There was even a change in the United States. Two or three years ago this was a bipartisan matter. Now it is no longer the case. We must face up to bitter opposition and to the feeling that people don't want another world war. Before World War II a similar feeling in England was summed up in the phrase "Don't die for Danzig." Now people are saying "Why die for Quemoy." There is a trend in Europe toward pacifism. There is a tendency there to sacrifice Asia reminiscent of the feeling there when the Lytton Commission went to Manchuria in the early '30's.

However, the Secretary felt that actually the situation was better than it appeared to be publicly. The British Government had stood by us very well. Recently the Netherlands had taken a very strong line of protest against the Chinese Communists' use of force. The German Ambassador had recently made a good statement. The Secretary had spoken to the German Ambassador, who said the Germans did not like the analogy that the Secretary had made between Berlin and Quemoy.[1] The Secretary said the Germans did not like the analogy because it was true. It was a question of the spirit in which we approached these crises. A spirit which would lead the United States to quit in Quemoy would also lead us to quit in Berlin. One can always rationalize retreat. If the United States is in the mood to rationalize retreat we might as well write off Berlin.

The Secretary emphasized that it is now time to think about and to do something with regard to the offshore island situation in order to get the support we need for our policy. It is important that the initiative come from Ambassador Yeh's government. It is important for their prestige and their position in the world. The Secretary asked that Ambassador Yeh convey to President Chiang this thinking and the fact that the Secretary was willing to go out to Taipei to talk with him directly.

The Secretary realized that President Chiang had his problems. We of course have ours. Our problem is the terrific pressure by our allies and our own public opinion. We must have the support of our own country and our allies. Sometimes it has been necessary (as in his last press conference) to say some things which would gain the support we need. What would help President Chiang in his problem would not necessarily help us with our problems. The important thing was to try to get a convergence of GRC and United States lines on some course that would give our policy the best chance of success. We must take some course which will stem the mounting tide of opposition from such countries as Canada, France, and New Zealand and which will keep them with us.

The Secretary had recently talked with Canadian Ambassador Robertson and asked him to bear in mind that the United States had the main responsibility for the security of the free world in the western Pacific.[2] Canadians should not allow local pressures for a little business with Red China to undermine our ability to discharge these responsibilities. The Secretary said that only by such pressures as these were we able to hold allies such as Canada in line.

---

[1] Reference is to the conversation cited in footnote 2, Document 169.

[2] Reference is apparently to a conversation on October 8; a memorandum of the portion of the conversation on the subject of the "Chinese Situation" is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

In response to a question by Ambassador Yeh regarding the position of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the Secretary said that Mr. Diefenbaker was strongly influenced by his close friend, the editor of the "Toronto Globe and Mail", who had taken a trip to Communist China.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that only as a result of the talks with the Secretary and the President[3] had Mr. Diefenbaker held back. He mentioned also the powerful influence of the Secretary's talks with Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand.

The Secretary said that his talks with Nash[4] had prevented the latter from plunging right into the recognition of Communist China, which had actually been a plank in the platform of his political party. Mr. Robertson pointed out that only these personal discussions with the Secretary had been able to make Nash see things more clearly.

The Secretary also referred to a recent speech by Spaak[5] in which he talked about seeing things more clearly regarding the relationship between the security of Europe and security in the whole world. The Secretary said you can't draw a line around Europe.

As he was about to leave, Ambassador Yeh reverted to the Secretary's mention of Sunday. He had not been quite clear as to the significance of that date.

The Secretary said that Sunday was presumably the last day of the cease-fire and we would know after that whether hostilities are resumed or whether there would perhaps be a fairly prolonged breathing spell. If it were to be such a breathing spell then he thought it might be useful to discuss these problems with President Chiang, but he would want a little more time to get his own ideas formulated.

---

[3] On July 8; see Document 17.

[4] See Document 144.

[5] NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak.

173. Record of Meeting

Washington, October 10, 1958, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Defense

Secretary Quarles
General Twining, JCS
General Taylor, JCS
Adm. Burke, JCS
General White, JCS
Lt. Gen. McCaul,
Lt. Gen. Picher
Lt. Gen. Moore
Vice Adm. Dennison
Maj. General Carraway
Lt. Gen. Gerhart
Maj. Gen. Roberts
Brig. Gen. Hillyard
Capt. Cobb
Rear Adm. Triebel
Maj. Gen. Terrill

State

The Secretary
Mr. Herter, Under Secretary
Mr. Murphy, Dep. Under Secretary
Mr. Robertson, Asst. Secretary, FE
Mr. Becker, Legal Advisor
Mr. Reinhardt, Counselor
Mr. Smith, S/P
Mr. Parsons, FE
Mr. Martin, CA

CIA

Mr. Allen Dulles

SUBJECT

Offshore Island Situation

At the Secretary's request General Twining outlined the JCS thinking on the future course of our offshore island policy. He said there were several courses we could adopt. One would be to maintain the status quo. We could carry this on indefinitely. We should by no means pull back while under Communist pressure.

Another course would be to withdraw part of the GRC forces from the offshore islands. The idea would be to make them outposts with about one-third of their present troop strength. This would mean about two divisions on Quemoy and less than one on Matsu.

A third possible course would be for Chiang to renounce force as a means of returning to the mainland but not his right to return if there were a revolution there and he was invited back.

The fourth alternative would be complete evacuation by the GRC and establishment of a UN mandate.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1058. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 14. The conversation was held at the Pentagon.

Turning to ways in which the GRC might be compensated for changing its policy re the offshore islands, General Twining listed the following:

1. Offer of United States protection for evacuation of GRC forces;
2. Modernization of GRC forces beyond that now visualized;
3. Measures which would enable the GRC to resupply the offshore islands in the event of attack and give it much more flexibility. These would include:
    (a) Improvement of GRC Air Force by provision of more advanced planes;
    (b) Strengthening the Navy by provision of some heavier destroyers;
    (c) Increasing GRC's amphibious lift capacity to 25,000 or 30,000 troops.
4. Increase the scale of economic aid to the GRC; specifically, provide it with some merchant shipping;
5. Provide continued United States military support to Taiwan and Penghus;
6. Continue United States efforts to prevent the Chinese Communists from being seated in the UN.

General Twining remarked that the foregoing was a good-sized and expensive package to offer President Chiang. It would put him in a better military position than he now occupies.

General Taylor said that there were two aspects which impressed him: First, it must not appear that we are retreating under Communist threats or that the Communists are gaining anything. Secondly, when the right moment comes (when there would be no appearance of retreat), it would be a definite advantage to cut down on the size of the forces in the offshore islands. They would still have good capability in military terms. Reallocation of forces on a sound military basis would represent a more effective use of the forces available.

Admiral Burke said that except for psychological reasons it did not make much difference how many troops were on the offshore islands. However, when the islands are under attack it made a difference in the amount of military supplies that had to be brought in.

General Taylor said that there should be enough troops on the offshore islands a) to prevent infiltration by the Communists; b) to cope with a surprise attack mounted on junks; and c) to delay an all-out attack long enough to permit reinforcements to arrive.

General White said that he presumed our short-term objective was to obtain military stability in the Taiwan area and our long-term objective was destruction of the Chinese Communist regime. It was necessary in the short term to give something to both the Nationalists and Chinese Communists—to save face all around. It was necessary to prevent a defeat for the GRC and to deny victory to the Communists. He had tried to evaluate certain courses of action in terms of plus or minus from the viewpoint of the GRC and the Chinese Communists: 1) Chiang Kai-shek would go before the United Nations and renounce the use of force as a means of returning to the mainland but would confirm his will to return by peaceful means when called. This would present Chiang as a statesman. It would be a plus for the GRC; it would also be a plus for the Communists; 2) Reduction of GRC forces on the offshore islands would represent a minus for the GRC, a plus for the Communists; 3) United States protection for evacuation would be a stand-off; 4) Increased military aid for the GRC would be a plus for the Nationalists but not a minus for the Communists; 5) Increased economic aid for the GRC would be a plus for the Nationalists but not a minus for the Communists; 6) Continued support of the defense of Taiwan and Penghus would be neither a plus nor a minus for either side; 7) Seeking Chinese Communists' renunciation of force would be a minus for the Communists; 8) United States guarantee of the integrity of the offshore islands would be a minus for the Communists; 9) Continued status quo in the UN would be neither a plus nor a minus.

The Secretary noted that General White had added to the courses of action mentioned by General Twining, a United States guarantee of the offshore islands. He inquired about this.

General Taylor said that this idea had been kicked around, also the idea of a UN guarantee.

The Secretary asserted that everyone agreed that we should make no attempt to change the situation under Communist fire. We should have a suspension of hostilities of sufficient duration as a prerequisite to any moves on our part.

The Secretary asked what effect reduction of GRC forces on the offshore islands would have on GRC ability to defend them against a renewed Communist attack. General Taylor replied that he thought that a garrison of 25,000 would be adequate.

The Secretary asked about the possibility of improving the defensive weapons which GRC forces on the islands had so that they could be given more defensive power with a smaller number of men. General Taylor pointed out that we were now embarked on a program of giving these forces more modern equipment. The new weapons, however, demanded the same number of men. He pointed out there were two kinds of weapons—1) short-range, and b) heavy artillery (such as the 8″ howitzers now being furnished). Possibly there were not yet enough of the heavy artillery pieces on the isles, but there were plenty of short-range weapons.

The Secretary then inquired about the ability of the Communists to keep up their intense bombardment. How much did it cost them per round? General Taylor estimated about 50 dollars per round. The Secretary noted this would mean a cost of about 25 million dollars for the approximately half-million rounds fired at Quemoy. It was agreed that it might not cost the Chinese Communists this much in cash, but that in any case, shelling represented a major effort for the Communists. The Secretary understood that these artillery shells came from the Soviet Union and that the Russians made the Chinese Communists pay for them. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists had been using old equipment, but there is some indication that in recent days they had used more modern shells with delayed fuses. General Taylor noted that delayed fuses were not new.

The Secretary said he had not been thinking in terms of big howitzers, but of smaller automatic weapons, when he had asked about giving the GRC forces more modern equipment. General Taylor replied that GRC forces were well supplied with such weapons, and noted again that we were engaged in modernizing the seven divisions on the offshore islands.

General White expressed the opinion there would be a major air battle if the Communists renewed hostilities. In reply to the Secretary's question whether there would be an airborne attack, General White said possibly but in any case there would be a very big air battle.

Secretary Quarles expressed the view that the Communists would not invade the offshore islands without attacking Taiwan bases. General White said that he wouldn't go that far.

General Taylor pointed out that the Communists could attack without any air cover if they used lots of junks in the dark of night. Secretary Quarles said that unless the Communists pursued the tactics just mentioned by General Taylor they would be facing a Yalu situation in reverse. He didn't think, therefore, that they would take on an invasion of the offshores without bombing Taiwan.

The Secretary asked if the GRC could defend the islands as well if their forces were reduced. General Taylor replied that if they only had one-third of their present forces they would not do as well as with the full number. However, they should be strong enough to stave off a first wave of attack until reinforcements arrived from Taiwan.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that an advantage of reducing forces on the offshores would be that GRC could remove Taiwanese troops.

The Secretary recalled that General Twining had suggested giving the GRC an amphibious lift capacity of 25 to 30 thousand men. General Taylor said that this would be for reinforcement, rotation, and replacement of troops on the offshores.

The Secretary said if there were a more complete demilitarization there would be a need for some form of guarantee of the integrity of the islands. He assumed also that they would still need forces for internal security. General Twining agreed. The Secretary asked if the forces could be reduced below the figures previously given and still provide for the need for internal security. General Taylor said that if the Communists took parallel action, forces could be reduced to a constabulary.

Mr. Murphy asked what would happen if there were a total evacuation. Admiral Burke commented that the military fights with its heart. If you give up part of the objective, they will ask why they should fight.

The Secretary said that it is the spirit which counts. Defeat can always be rationalized. We can't have the appearance of retreating without endangering morale. We must look for something which will strengthen the situation as a whole. The President feels that we should treat the islands as outposts, prevent them from becoming Dienbienphus upon which everything depends.

The Secretary then asked about air and sea mobility. What would the amphibious lift involve? Admiral Burke indicated it would involve providing the GRC the following additional ships: 3 DD or DE, 10 LST, 8 LSM, 8 LCU, 11 LCVP, 3 APD, 2 APA, 2 LSMR, 2 LSD. This program would cost about $35 million. It could be rationalized as increasing the GRC's ability to reinforce the offshore islands under attack.

The Secretary said that the GRC could play an active role if and when there was a revolution on the mainland. He said that if there had been a free Hungarian government at the time of the Hungarian revolution, there might have been a different outcome. Forces in Formosa might have a decisive effect in a case like this. He wouldn't be surprised if this happened in the next ten years.

He said that the Chinese people, who are individualists, don't like the Communist system but they are now bowed down under it. It was unnecessary to assume that there will be no ups and downs or that there will not be situations similar to those in Eastern Europe. He recalled the uprisings in East Berlin, in Hungary, in Poland. He assumed that if such an event occurred on the China mainland, Quemoy and Matsu would not be much help. Quemoy, for example, was encircled by strongly-held Communist positions. What the GRC needed was greater mobility, both sea and air.

The Secretary recalled that the Generalissimo had talked about paratroops and wondered if the JCS had gone into that. General Twining replied in the negative. General Taylor did not think that from a military standpoint large numbers of paratroops would be useful against the mainland. The Secretary said that he was thinking of their use only in conjunction with other elements. General Taylor indicated that there was no justification for a major contribution to paratroop units. The Secretary said he thought a study had been made. Governor Herter recalled that when he was in Taiwan, President Chiang had spoken to him about paratroop training, and there were then 10,000 to be trained. President Chiang wanted 30,000. General Taylor said that paratroop training was good training and you could put the paratroops back into the airborne units.

Secretary Quarles expressed concern that provision of amphibious lift to the Chinese Nationalists would not square with our disavowal of support for the return of the GRC to the mainland. He thought it might also worry the Philippines or Japan. He thought we might have a private understanding with Chiang Kai-shek to keep the vessels in our hands. Mr. Robertson said there are other factors in favor of providing an amphibious lift to the Chinese Nationalists. For example, if the Chinese Communists started something in Korea, we might like to have forces on Taiwan ready to turn loose on the mainland and Southeast Asia. General Taylor recalled that Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei was sold on this idea. Admiral Burke agreed with Mr. Robertson.

The Secretary showed General Twining the President's memorandum.[1] General Twining said that he had not previously seen it but that the President had talked to him about it. There was a brief discussion of Hainan, the Secretary recalling that an operation had been under consideration when he was working on the Japanese peace treaty.

The Secretary asked whether reduction of forces was acceptable from a military standpoint if it was all right politically. General Twining said yes so long as it would not appear that it was being carried out under military threat. The Secretary said this was the premise upon which all our thinking was based and he read a pertinent extract from the President's memorandum.

General Twining said that Chiang Kai-shek might think we can now supply him indefinitely, he doesn't realize how hard the job is. The Secretary said he thought that Chiang had had a practical lesson, and would realize the virtue of the position we had taken at the time of the Radford–Robertson talks. On the other hand, he might be frozen in his position more strongly than ever.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of how long a cease-fire would have to be, to be considered long enough for our purposes. General Twining said a couple of weeks if everything was quiet. General Taylor said it might depend on the Warsaw talks.

The Secretary pointed out that there were really no negotiations at Warsaw. These talks serve two purposes: 1) As a kind of excuse for the Communists to let their military action subside as they did in 1955. It was good then for three years. It is an interesting fact, though perhaps a coincidence, that the Communist attacks resumed when the talks had been in temporary suspension. 2) While we get no response from the Communists in Warsaw, they get some feel of our intentions and attitudes. What the Communists do is revealed in Peiping—not at Warsaw. There is no give and take at the Warsaw talks.

---

[1] Apparently Document 166.

General White asked what leverage there was on Chiang. General Taylor mentioned concessions from the Communists.

The Secretary pointed out that we had suggested reciprocal concessions at Warsaw. General White suggested that these would not be bought. The Secretary agreed but said we must show flexibility.

Mr. Murphy asked how many American personnel were on the offshores. General Twining replied very few, perhaps a dozen.

Mr. Robertson said that it made little difference to the Communists how many GRC troops there were on the offshore islands; their interest lay in Taiwan, which is the menace to them, not the offshores. However, reducing the number of troops on the offshore islands would be helpful in terms of world opinion, which has been led to believe that the troops were deployed to the islands for offensive action against the mainland rather than for the defense of the islands. Admiral Burke agreed with this, but was afraid that the islands might be lost through subversion if they were demilitarized. Mr. Robertson indicated in passing that the acquisition by the GRC of strong popular support in the United States and abroad might be worth the defection, if it occurred. Admiral Burke agreed but doubted whether such popular support would be forthcoming in any case. Moreover, the Communists would continue to make trouble for us. He felt that there was no way we could help in the situation unless President Chiang would go along. Mr. Robertson agreed and emphasized that our program was predicated on getting Chiang's voluntary agreement.

Mr. Murphy raised the question of evacuating the Tan Islands. Admiral Burke said we should let the Communists into the Tans and then clobber them. Mr. Robertson indicated that he had already discussed this question with Ambassador Yeh, who had agreed with us.

Secretary Quarles advanced the thesis that since Chiang Kai-shek had refused to negotiate, the Chinese Communists would resume hostilities Sunday and that they would take greater measures than they did before since the old tactics had failed. He was worried about what we would do then. Admiral Burke pointed out that there were standing orders to deal with the situation. If the Communist artillery bombardment resumed, we would resume escorting GRC convoys. If the Communists used air bombardment, the GRC air force would be authorized to engage in hot pursuit. If the Communists attacked Formosa, we were in it.

Secretary Quarles said he was satisfied with the standing orders but thought we should face facts. There was a brief discussion of a telegram from Admiral Smoot regarding the Tan Islands.[2] It was agreed that his recommendation was sound.

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Burke noted that we hadn't told the GRC about our position regarding the Tans. Mr. Robertson said that he had told Ambassador Yeh.

Admiral Burke asked if the Secretary felt JCS ideas were sound. The Secretary replied he thought some reduction could be brought about; this might be helpful in the free world as a gesture; it would at least indicate we had no intention of resorting to force. It would make no impression on the Communists. If the impression exists that the offshores represent a threat, that would impair our free world relations. Reallocation of forces would also improve the GRC's military posture. The President has felt this strongly since 1955 and has wanted the offshores merely as outposts. This was reflected in the Radford and Robertson talking paper.[3] The GRC is better off in the event revolution occurs on the mainland to have 50,000 troops on Formosa than on Quemoy. It would have greater flexibility.

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if there was any clue on what would be likely to happen if the cease-fire were prolonged. The Secretary replied that Ambassador Lodge had been busy dropping clues Friday night at the UN in conversations with the Indians, Norwegians, and others.

General Twining asked if the Russians were taking a softer line. The Secretary said yes. Khrushchev's interview with Tass[4] modified the language he used in his letter to Eisenhower. Governor Herter said the Communists were grasping at small straws; they had expressed satisfaction at our announcement re stopping convoys.[5]

---

[2] Reference is apparently to telegram 090942Z from COMUSTDC to CINCPAC, October 9, in which Smoot stated that he had not been asked whether the United States would support defense of the Tans but that he had laid the groundwork so that, if asked, he could reply casually: "Of course not. Defense of those islands would be silly from a military standpoint and I would not recommend it." He also stated that he had recommended to General Wang that he reduce forces on the Tans to the bare minimum. (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Tels.) Sept. 5–Dec. 30, 1958; see Supplement)

[3] For text of the talking paper for Robertson's and Radford's mission to Taipei in April 1955, approved by the President on April 17, 1955, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 493–495, but see also the President's memorandum of April 5, 1955, to Dulles, *ibid.*, pp. 444–449.

[4] Telegram 770 from Moscow, October 6, reported that *Pravda* had published that day an answer by Khrushchev to a TASS correspondent's question in which he stated that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of the PRC if it was attacked by the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/10–658)

Mr. Allen Dulles asked if interdiction of trade in the harbor of Amoy would be resumed if the military operations resumed. The Secretary said there had been no interdiction of trade by the GRC. Admiral Burke confirmed this, saying there had been no regular shipping to Amoy, only troops. The Secretary said that the British Ambassador had remarked that there had been no interference with shipping. The Secretary said we should continue that policy. He noted that there had been no grave provocations from Quemoy and Matsu, no commando raids, no agents. He noted we had instructed Ambassador Beam to inquire at the next Warsaw meeting as to just what harassments the Communists had in mind.

---

[5] A statement issued on October 8 by the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry stated that no "intrusions" by U.S. warships or aircraft into Chinese territorial waters or air space had been observed for a day, and commented that this was "worthy of notice." A copy is attached to an October 8 memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–858; see Supplement)

---

174. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 10, 1958, 2 p.m.

578. Department pass CINCPAC.

1. Admiral Smoot has invited my attention to CNO 090035Z, CINCPAC 090446Z[1] and his 090942Z[2] on subject of Tan Islands. I believe position set forth my telegram 264 responding Deptels 138 and 163[3] is still valid.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1058. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. The documents cited in footnotes 1, 3, and 4 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Telegram 090446Z from CINCPAC to CNO, October 9, commented on CNO 090035Z; it concurred that the Tans were a military liability. A copy is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83, FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 173.

[3] Regarding telegram 138 to Taipei, see footnote 1, Document 43. Telegram 163 to Taipei, August 29, requested Drumright's and Smoot's views as to whether the GRC should be informed of the decision conveyed in telegram 138. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2958) Telegram 264 from Taipei, August 30, stated that Drumright and Smoot advised against this. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/8–3058)

Militarily there may be little justification to hold islands and if attack is resumed with increased vigor GRC may eventually find it necessary to evacuate them. But it is more likely GRC will garrison them to bitter end while reducing number of defenders to more manageable levels. In fact this is already taking place.

2. President and other GRC leaders have repeatedly vowed openly "not one inch of GRC territory will be evacuated". Problem to them is largely political and psychological, not military. They reason that evacuation would have highly adverse repercussions here, abroad and on mainland, as well as among Kinmen defenders. They think it would vitiate and undercut gallant defense put up hitherto by Kinmen defenders. They fear too evacuation of Tan might set precedent for bigger evacuation in future.

3. My assessment is that it would be highly undesirable for us to meddle in this delicate problem at this time. I would suggest that we sit back and let GRC come to us if military difficulty arises. Then we can discuss islands purely from military viewpoint. If we take initiative to urge evacuation I predict such action will sow dissension and renew GRC suspicions about our basic policies in regard to Offshores. I predict too that our urging to evacuate Tans will be rebuffed by Chiang.

4. I also continue to believe we should not discuss with GRC what Offshore Islands we will defend and not defend unless and until there is some concrete development which renders this absolutely necessary. I still hope we can weather storm without necessity for tackling this touchy problem.[4]

Drumright

---

[4] Telegram 334 to Taipei, October 11, stated that Nationalist withdrawal from the Tans would be welcome but agreed that neither Drumright nor Smoot should take the initiative in urging it. It instructed Drumright that if the GRC requested his opinion, he should advise that Smoot be consulted; if the question was put to Smoot, he was authorized to reply as he had suggested in his telegram 090942Z. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–1058)

175. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, October 10, 1958, 7 p.m.

562. Beam–Wang Talks. Eightieth meeting two hours 35 minutes.[1]

Wang led off with brief prepared statement attempting draw sharp distinction between Chinese civil war which exclusively internal matter and international dispute between US and PRC arising from US intervention Chinese internal affairs. Emphasized cease-fire announced October 5 a unilateral act entirely unrelated to US demand for cease-fire and not fit subject for discussion between US and PRC since no fighting between us. Said he assumed I not authorized represent Chiang Kai-shek and even if I were PRC would not accept me as Chiang's representative. Referred to Chiang's condemnation Warsaw talks. Insisted talks between us must be limited to subject of US occupation Chinese territory and withdrawal therefrom. Demanded US cease convoying GRC ships, halt intrusions and war threats which would create favorable atmosphere for discussion withdrawal US forces from Taiwan area.

I replied along lines Deptel 414[2] following which Wang read from longer prepared statement repeated and elaborating ideas first presented. He objected to discussion whether cease-fire would be extended saying whether cease-fire short or long PRC's own business. During subsequent give and take was able make points mentioned reference telegram and emphasized international character of problem. Wang did not refer to US escorting occurring subsequent cease-fire nor specific intrusions but several times repeated demand for cessation escorting, intrusions and war threats.

Wang proposed next meeting Wednesday October 15, 3 p.m. to which I agreed.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1058. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 564 from Warsaw, October 10. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] Document 170.

176. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 12, 1958, noon.

581. For Secretary. Your telegram 336.[1] Admiral Smoot and I have sought all available opportunities to urge GRC to avoid all provocations.

We are satisfied all is well except in air where it appears GRC is conducting more aggressive patrolling of coastal areas than seems desirable or warranted in present state of affairs. MND has issued a satisfactory directive to CAF covering this problem, but on October 10 and again October 11 it appears CAF planes were over Communist territory—if our radar monitoring is correct.

Admiral Smoot and I will seek further opportunities to urge complete restraint at this juncture. Will also ask Secretary McElroy, who arrives this afternoon and is to have conference with Gimo tomorrow at ten o'clock, to suggest utmost restraint.[2]

Drumright

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Telegram 336 to Taipei, October 11, a personal message to Drumright from Dulles, reads: "I assume everything possible has been done to assure that over coming hours and days Nationalists will hold their fire unless attacked and will avoid provocative actions." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–158)

[2] Drumright reported in telegram 596, sent on October 14 but incorrectly dated October 15, that McElroy had stressed to Chiang the importance of restraint and that Drumright had spoken along similar lines to Defense Minister Yu on October 12. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–1558)

---

177. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 12, 1958, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles
Senator Green
Assistant Secretary Macomber
Mr. Carl Marcy[1]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Macomber. The conversation was held at the Secretary's residence. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1258.

[1] Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

After the usual pleasantries, the Secretary led off the conversation by giving Senator Green the news of the Chinese Communists' announcement that they would continue the cease-fire for two more weeks.[2] Senator Green, after expressing his satisfaction with this development, asked the Secretary whether he had thought the Chinese Communists would do this. The Secretary said that he had been asked to wager on whether they would extend the cease-fire or resume the shelling of Quemoy, but had refrained from doing so. However, he had asked his intelligence people to prepare an estimate regarding the course the Chinese Communists would take at the end of the first week of the cease-fire. The intelligence report which he had read earlier in the day had predicted that the cease-fire would be extended for another period.[3] The Secretary indicated that he, too, had thought this would probably be the course that the Chinese Communists would take, primarily because he could not see the advantage to them of ceasing fire for a week then starting up again. The Secretary then read almost in its entirety a transcript of the Chinese Communist statement announcing the extended cease-fire.

Senator Green asked the Secretary what he thought the Chinese Communists were up to. The Secretary replied that he thought the objective of the Chinese Communists undoubtedly was to eliminate United States influence from the Western Pacific. In this connection, the Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists always lumped together Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu and took considerable pains to make it clear that their objectives were not limited to the off-shore islands.

In this particular phase, however, the Secretary thought that the Chinese Communists were conducting an operation which in many ways was similar to the Berlin Blockade. They were attempting with force, but with a limitation of that force, to capture Quemoy and Matsu. The same conditions prevailed in the Berlin situation. The Soviets could have brought to bear more actual force in that situation. They were evidently not prepared however to go beyond the measures that they took. They were hoping that those measures would accomplish their purpose; when these failed, they were not willing to risk a general war which additional measures might have precipitated. The Quemoy situation was similar in this respect. The Chinese Communists took certain limited measures, i.e., an artillery interdiction. The Chinese Nationalists, with our help, were able to meet this threat by developing the resupply system, to the point where the interdiction was not going to be successful. The Secretary explained that we had not completely conquered the resupply problem but had made great progress in this regard, and in his judgment were on the verge of mastering the problem. The result was that the Chinese Communists were faced with the problem of either continuing their rather expensive efforts to no avail, ceasing those efforts, or increasing them to a degree which might well precipitate a larger war. In this latter regard the Secretary pointed out that the logical step for the Chinese Communists to take if they wished to increase their efforts would be to begin to use air power against Quemoy. If this began, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force would attack the Chinese Communist bombers and would probably carry that attack to the air fields on which the Chinese Communist planes were based. If this happened the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly bomb Formosa itself, which in turn under our treaty commitment and the Formosa Resolution would bring the United States into the war. The Secretary felt that the Chinese Communists probably did not wish to take a step which would lead to these consequences.

---

[2] A copy is attached to a memorandum of October 12 from Cumming to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1258; see Supplement) For excerpts, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1174–1175.

[3] Reference is to a memorandum of October 10 from Arneson to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 693.94A2/10–1058; see Supplement)

Mr. Marcy, while expressing satisfaction that the truce had been extended, asked the Secretary whether he did not think that the basic issue remains; that the Chinese Communists could not back down in their demands to actually get possession of the off-shore islands and the Chinese Nationalists could not back down to the point where these islands were turned over to the Chinese Communists. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Marcy that the basic issue remained, but he pointed out that that issue had existed for a number of years now, and that he did not think that the issue had to be resolved in the immediate future. He pointed out that the Chinese have a different sense of time than others, and that they were willing to take a long range view of things.

Senator Green asked what the Japanese views were of this situation. The Secretary said that the Japanese were privately supporting a strong position on the part of the United States and had been quite helpful in the situation. He added, parenthetically, that the trouble with Japan as a nation was that it had real religion, and therefore it tended to be expedient rather than a nation dedicated to principles. He went on to point out that what the Japanese respect more than anything else is strength, and for this reason it is always important to show strength if we wish to keep the Japanese on our side. He added, however, that Kishi[4] was the best Prime Minister they had had since the war, and that he had been helpful to us in this situation.

---

[4] Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi.

The Secretary mentioned the Philippines and said they too favored a strong policy on the part of the United States in this matter. He added that the Garcia Government[5] gave him considerable concern because it was weak and corrupt. He expressed his regret that Magsaysay,[6] whom he considered an outstanding leader, had passed from the scene.

At this point the Secretary mentioned to Senator Green our intention to explore, with the Japanese, the possibility of negotiating a new security treaty. The Secretary pointed out that the present one was rather one-sided and reflected Japan's weakened position following World War II. Senator Green made no specific comment, but he seemed to understand the need for revision of the treaty.

Senator Green asked about the future of Formosa and particularly the Taiwanese. The Secretary said that he thought there were evolutionary forces at work there, and that the Taiwanese would have an increasing influence in the government and policies of Formosa as the mainland Chinese grew older. He pointed out that a number of the mainland soldiers were leaving the army because of their age and that their places were being filled in increasing numbers by Taiwanese. He felt that in time this development would reflect in the policies of the Formosa Government and indicated that the Taiwanese would be less interested in going back to the mainland than the present rulers of Formosa. In this connection, the Secretary indicated that one of the reasons that the original efforts in resupplying Quemoy had not gone off better was because we had not trained the Nationalist Chinese on amphibious operations. The Secretary felt, however, that the existence of Chiang and his army would be very useful in the future if there should be a revolution on the mainland. He pointed out that if there had been a free Hungarian Army on the borders of Hungary at the time of the Hungarian Revolution, the outcome might have been quite different.

Senator Green asked whether we had made any commitment to defend the off-shore islands at this time. The Secretary said that he did not think that under the Formosa Resolution we had the authority to make any commitment in advance of an actual attack on the off-shore islands. Senator Green agreed with this point, but asked whether or not any commitment had in fact been made. The Secretary replied that no commitment had been made.

Mr. Marcy asked whether we had any indications of what the Russian attitude had been in this situation. The Secretary replied that while we could speculate what their attitude and influence had been, we had no hard information to go on.

---

[5] Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia.

[6] Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines from 1953 until his death in 1957.

Senator Green said that if we were about to get involved in a war, in view of Congress' responsibilities he hoped that they would be called back. The Secretary replied that we were aware of Congressional interest in this matter, but that Congress had already debated the issue and had set the policy when they passed the Formosa Resolution. Under modern conditions there might not always be time to get Congress back before a war starts. He said it was similar to the NATO situation, that he himself had been in the Senate at the time the NATO Treaty was debated,[7] and that he had made the point that there might not be time to act before the war started. The Secretary had pointed out that they were having the debate then, in advance of such a contingency, so that American policy would be defined ahead of time. (On this subject I spoke to Mr. Marcy privately later and indicated that the Administration did not at this time plan to call Congress back into special session. We did plan, however, if war seemed imminent to call back the Congressional leaders, if time permitted.)

As the meeting was ending, the Secretary made one further point to Senator Green. He said that there was a limit to how hard we could push the Chinese Nationalists. He said that if we push them too hard they might feel they were being abandoned and had no choice but to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. If this happened, Formosa would be lost to the West. The Secretary pointed out this is the type of a thing that cannot be discussed in public, but nevertheless was very much in our thinking and something that had to be taken into account in planning our moves in the area. He concluded by saying that he did not wish the Senator to think that we were just being stubborn and difficult in this situation, but that after the most careful thought and thorough consideration of all the alternative courses, we felt that the position we were taking was the best one under the circumstances and the one most calculated to prevent a major war.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Green produced a draft statement which he suggested he might give to the press regarding this truce with the Secretary. The Secretary approved this statement with one or two minor changes.

The meeting then concluded, after a brief discussion of one or two non-official matters.

(A copy of the statement issued [by] Senator Green at the conclusion of the meeting is attached.)[8]

---

[7] In 1949.

[8] Not printed. Drafts showing Dulles' revisions are also attached but not printed.

178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 13, 1958, 4 p.m.

584. 1. Accompanied Secretary McElroy on one-hour call on President Chiang this morning.[1] Also present were Premier, Foreign and Defense Ministers, Chang Chun and Tiger Wang and Admirals Felt, Russell and Smoot. President was relaxed and conversation was somewhat general in content. Significantly, there was virtually no reference to military problems; President clearly revealed preoccupation with and uneasiness over future course of political or diplomatic negotiations in wake of continued cease-fire.

2. President opened by saying he believes there is imperative need for US to fix its strategy and policy in Far East. Soviet and ChiCom aim to destroy GRC and drive US from Western Pacific had been smashed for moment. Military means having failed, Reds now resorting to negotiations to blackmail us. We must recognize this changed Communist tactic and devise new methods and concepts of our own to meet it. We must abandon old means and methods lest we fall into Communist trap. We must not allow Red attempts to provoke differences between us to succeed. President said since Communists have declared two cease-fires and Khrushchev made statement to TASS on October 5, it is possible to discern Communist tactic. It has two prongs, one to charge US with interference in internal Chinese affairs as shrewd propaganda move to put US in difficult position, and other to claim Taiwan Strait problem is one for negotiation between two Chinese groups. President then said it behooves GRC and US to study most carefully these two moves on part of Communists, to consult and exchange views fully and to cooperate wholeheartedly.

3. President repeated wish for fullest consultation and cooperation on two or three occasions. On one occasion he turned to me and said he hoped Secretary Dulles could find time to come here to consult personally and to fix new policy needed to cope with changed Communist tactics. If Secretary came here for discussions there would need to be careful preparation and timing and it would be desirable to avoid impression Secretary to press for reduction of forces on Offshores, withdrawal or demilitarization. He then asked me to inquire if Secretary agreed and would be willing to discuss problem. In this connection President said it

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] A record of the meeting prepared by Chiang's secretary, James Shen, is *ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Misc.), Oct. 1–14, 1958.

desirable for our two countries to maintain more than ordinary cooperation existing between two countries. If we could achieve closest cooperation and agreement it would not be necessary to maintain strongest forces to keep Communists in check. At same time he cautioned that Communist aims will not change so that a strong military posture is needed.

4. President praised statement attributed Secretary McElroy on his arrival in Korea denying newspaper report he was proceeding to Taiwan to accomplish reduction in GRC forces on Offshore Islands and stating GRC is sovereign nation and would have to be dealt with on basis of equality. President said this was an effective reply to Communist charges of US intervention in China and should clear up many doubts. President said he hoped if Secretary McElroy is asked about this matter here he can repeat statement made in Korea.

5. President asked Secretary McElroy to convey to President Eisenhower his assurance of faithfulness as an ally and his determination to be a worthy ally and to justify all aid provided by US. He expressed appreciation for aid given. President also praised cooperation he had received from US agencies here and made particular point of praising US advisors who had remained at Kinmen throughout bombardment.

6. Secretary McElroy agreed there must be a close working relationship between us in diplomatic and military fields. He had discussed with Defense Minister Yu how to strengthen mutual military position. He intended to pursue these matters here and in US and elsewhere. There was of course question of availability of funds and how best to dispose of them to best interest of all. Secretary McElroy observed with extension of cease-fire, crisis appeared to be moving into diplomatic sphere. He could not speak for Secretary Dulles or Ambassador in this regard, but he could give assurance US glad to work fully with President. Secretary McElroy also said US has every confidence in steadfastness of President. He also praised performance of CAF and Chinese defenders of Kinmen. Secretary McElroy said if there is Communist acceptance of firmness of US support of GRC, it appeared to him there might occur some relaxation of Communist pressures and buildup. If so, it would seem favorable for US by phases to reduce US strength here over period of time. Secretary McElroy said he would not know what GRC should do in this regard, but in view of respect each has for other he believed there would be room for discussion of mutual problems at an appropriate time. Secretary McElroy agreed with President that Communist aims would not change. He regretted need to spend so much on military preparations but so long as threat remains our military strength must be maintained at high pitch.

7. Conference closed with President's statement that GRC strength is US strength, reassurance of his desire to carry out his commitments, need for two countries to review and fully coordinate and unite policies.

8. Comment will follow separately.[2]

Drumright

---

[2] See Document 181.

---

179. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, October 13, 1958, 8:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
General Goodpaster

General Twining first reported that we plan to have our troops out of Lebanon by the thirty-first of October. The British will begin moving out of Jordan on October 24, and expect to be out completely by November 10. The two U.S. Marine battalions will remain afloat in the Eastern Mediterranean.

General Twining said the Chiefs had met with Secretary Dulles Friday[1] concerning the cease-fire situation in Taiwan, and consensus was that it would be wise to wait until the artillery fire "quiets" and then withdraw at least two-thirds of the Chinese Nationalist troops from Quemoy. The possibility of demilitarizing the off-shore islands was discussed; it raised difficult problems, but Mr. Dulles undertook to try to work them out.

The President said that, on reaching this consensus about getting troops out without loss of face in the area, the next step is to convince Chiang on the matter. We must accomplish our end through persuasion rather than pressure, since otherwise we will be charged with reversing the stand we have taken. General Twining said he thought Secretary Dulles believed it would not be too difficult to get the two-thirds of the

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on October 15.

[1] October 10; see Document 173.

force off the islands. The President commented that the big thing is not to do this under fire, or under threat. In this connection, the fact that the Chinese Communists have suspended firing for two weeks implies that they will start up again and this keeps us under some sense of pressure. If an indefinite suspension of firing were to be achieved, we would be in better position to persuade Chiang that the islands should be regarded simply as an outpost with relatively small forces.

General Twining said that there is help we could offer Chiang in return for his removing forces from the island. We could guarantee the evacuation; we could modernize his Army; we could partially modernize his Air Force, although this would be very expensive; we could give him shipping and amphibious lift to enlarge his capabilities for flexible action; perhaps we could even give him additional economic aid.

General Twining concluded by informing the President of a report from General Doan, Chief of the MAAG in the area, indicating that, on Quemoy, morale is very high, the damage suffered from firing was quite slight, and that the command is in very good shape. He added that the Chinese Nationalists have rapidly developed a capability for delivery of supplies to the islands by junks, and that the supply problem had been broken before the cease-fire began.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

---

180. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 13, 1958, 10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Offshore Island Situation and Secretary's Visit to Taipei

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

The Secretary opened the conversation by asking what Ambassador Yeh thought about the statement issued yesterday by the Chinese Com-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers) munist Ministry of National Defense extending the cease-fire for two weeks. Ambassador Yeh said he had expected such an extension. He said the Communists were trying to woo public opinion in Taiwan and in the United States. They were also trying to find out what neutral reaction would be for possible moves in the United Nations. The Secretary observed that the Chinese Communists were using all their influence to try to keep the issue out of the United Nations. They had taken this line with friendly Asian countries. The Secretary then remarked on the unusual language of the Chinese Communist statement. Ambassador Yeh said he did not think it was unusual. In fact it seemed to him somewhat nonchalant, saying they could keep on fighting or not.

The Secretary said he thought their line was rather curious. He noted that the statement invited the GRC forces to entrench themselves on Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said this was intended by the Communists as an expression of their military superiority. It made no difference to them that the GRC forces were entrenched or not.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that the theme which ran through the Chinese Communist statement was to encourage the Chinese Nationalists to do something which the Communists had been unable to prevent them from doing. The only thing which the Communists insisted upon stopping was United States convoying, which they knew we would stop anyway. The Communists have been unable to stop resupply of Quemoy so they pretend they are glad to have it resupplied.

Ambassador Yeh said he had an important message from President Chiang with reference to the conversation the Ambassador had with the Secretary on Friday.[1] President Chiang would be very happy to have the Secretary visit him on Taipei. The Generalissimo had mentioned this to Secretary McElroy in a conversation which he had just had with the latter in Taipei.[2]

The Secretary said that we are confronted with a delicate situation. The Communists had apparently concluded that a military solution of the offshore island situation would not be profitable for them. The big danger now was political. The Communists were ready to take the political offensive. More and more countries of the free world wanted to deal with the Chinese Communists because they represented power. People like to deal with power. We are having a difficult time holding our friends back who are attracted to this power.

The Secretary alluded to an instruction he had sent to Ambassador Beam in which he had predicted that the Communists, when they realized that they could not accomplish their objective at the general level of military activity they were employing, would be confronted with a choice of increasing its level or letting the fighting stop.[3] It was like the Berlin blockade. Then the Communists were willing to carry on at a certain level of activity but when they found they had to expand this level to obtain their objective, they decided to let it go. The same thing applied at Quemoy. Of course the Chinese Communists could start up again there. However, it looked as though they would probably intensify their political warfare both in the area and the rest of the world.

---

[1] October 10; see Document 172.

[2] On October 13; see Document 178.

The Secretary said that he and President Chiang should deal with the political situation and not the military. We need to give this situation very careful thought. Yesterday he had given considerable thought to the problem of what to do to meet the Communist political offensive. He didn't want to go out to Taipei and have it look as though he was putting pressure on the GRC. However, we do think there are too many soldiers on Quemoy; the military feels that there are an excessive number from the military standpoint. The Secretary mentioned a JCS military concept which would reduce forces on the offshore islands without implying retreat or abandonment.

The Secretary stressed that it is necessary to clarify the role of the GRC. We must keep alive the idea of a Free China close to the Chinese Communist mainland which would play an important role if the mainland became the scene of unrest. The GRC should be able to make decisive moves if there were uprisings on the mainland against the Communist regime. The forces on Quemoy were no good whatsoever for this purpose. They were hemmed in by strong Communist fortifications. They would be immobilized. The important question is how to preserve the GRC's international status. How can we do this without running the risk of arousing anti-American feelings in Taiwan especially in the light of current Communist appeals for Chinese unity against the United States.

Ambassador Yeh said that such appeals would have no effect on the people of Taiwan or on their attitude toward the people and Government of the United States. This kind of Communist appeal had been going on for years—there was nothing new in it. It contained the typical language of the Communists—ridicule and sarcasm.

Mr. Robertson felt that the Peng statement was very important because it made clear what the problem is, i.e. that the Communists want to get us out of Taiwan. We will get more support from our people when they see what the problem is. Mr. Robertson expressed his conviction that the grass roots opinion of the United States is overwhelmingly against the Peiping regime, but public opinion has been confused about the nature of the problem of the offshore islands.

---

[3] Reference is apparently to Document 152.

The Secretary said the Communists represent power—the power of control over 650,000,000 Chinese. There is a great attraction to power. It makes no difference whether that power is good or evil. Mr. Robertson said he thought this was an accurate statement so far as appraisal of the feeling of other countries was concerned. He had been thinking of our own public opinion.

The Secretary said what he wanted to discuss with President Chiang was how we could combat the trend against our policy. We could not hold countries like Canada, Belgium and France indefinitely. Once one or two of them switched there would be an avalanche. We must face this problem squarely. We must cooperate and help each other to meet it.

Ambassador Yeh referred to the Khrushchev statement and the Soviet support for the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said that the latest Khrushchev statement (in response to a TASS question)[4] seemed to back down from the position which Khrushchev had taken in his last letter to President Eisenhower.[5] In that letter he seemed to say that the Soviets would help the Chinese Communists oust us from the west Pacific. In the TASS statement he said only that he would aid the Chinese Communists if the United States attacked them. This seemed to be somewhat of a retreat in the Soviet position.

Ambassador Yeh reverted to the question of the Secretary's trip to Taipei saying that it would be a good thing to have all these problems talked out between the Secretary and President Chiang. He said that it was the Generalissimo's idea that after the discussions there would be a simple joint communiqué issued stating that the two had reached agreement on policy. There should be no appearance that the United States was putting pressure on the GRC for reducing troops or eliminating provocations. Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the ratio of GRC and Communist troops was 1 to 4. If the GRC reduced its troops very much it would reach the point where it couldn't hold Quemoy. The United States would then have to put in that much more assistance if the islands were attacked. If the GRC had more troops on the island, it would be easier for the United States and they could confine its activities to convoying. He hoped that during the coming two weeks there would be no further talk about reducing or withdrawing GRC forces. Such talk would be a blow to morale on Taiwan.

Mr. Robertson said that he thought we could get mileage out of the troop reduction if we played it right. The Communists don't care whether the Nationalists have 100,000 troops or 70,000 troops on the island. They are not interested in the islands per se. However, it might help us with world opinion to effect a reduction of force there as it is widely believed that the troops were deployed to the islands for offensive action against the mainland rather than for defense of the islands. The Secretary said he agreed it would be helpful in rallying free world opinion.

---

[4] See footnote 4, Document 173.

[5] Document 74.

The Secretary departed at this point.

Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese Communist statement was the most helpful statement to come our way. He thought Ambassador Yeh hadn't read the statement. Ambassador Yeh said he had not read the English text. Mr. Robertson said that the statement showed that reducing the number of troops on the offshore islands would not really help. The Communists would not be satisfied with just the offshore islands. Mr. Robertson read the whole statement to Ambassador Yeh. He pointed out that in the passages referring to the GRC entrenchment on Quemoy the Communists were simply making a virtue of necessity. He thought the statement was directed primarily at morale on Taiwan. From our standpoint it would be hard to write a better statement because it showed up the Communists' real objectives.

Yeh said that his reaction to this statement was that the one element in it which expressed the Communist attitude was the sentence saying that the United States must stop convoying. The rest of the statement he thought was sheer ballyhoo. He pointed out that the Communists know the United States has a treaty with the GRC which covers the defense of Taiwan and Penghu. They know the United States would not get out of this territory. The passage about wanting the United States to get out was just old stuff. The reference to entrenchment was simply put in to support the theme of Americans getting out and was designed to demonstrate Communist superiority. Mr. Robertson repeated that this passage was simply making a virtue out of necessity since the Communists had not been able to prevent the resupply effort.

Ambassador Yeh said we had won the first round by being firm. We have the job of taking the fullest advantage of this internationally. In Taiwan they have the job of getting ready for renewal of military action or for prolonged political propaganda.

Mr. Robertson said that the Communists were trying to get the GRC into direct negotiations. Ambassador Yeh replied that the GRC would never negotiate with the Communists. Mr. Robertson said the Chinese Communists might have to go back to firing but there would be no mileage in that so far as world opinion was concerned. Ambassador Yeh thought that this might cause many countries to bring pressure on the United States because they were afraid of war.

Mr. Robertson said there was no pressure in the United States to withdraw support from the GRC. People simply did not want to go to war over the offshore islands. They have been "brain washed by their own wishful thinking" into the belief that all the Communists wanted was the offshore islands and the matter could be settled if you gave them to the Communists. What the Communists want is to get rid of Taiwan and the GRC. Mr. Robertson noted that the Communists' statement says that they will recover the offshore islands and Taiwan and Penghu as a whole.

Mr. Robertson said we did not want to see a reduction of forces on the offshore islands as a concession to the Communists but as a means of strengthening our own strategic position. There might be some quid pro quo such as increase of firepower for the remaining troops.

Ambassador Yeh said the Communists know that the United States has a treaty with the GRC and it won't pull out of Taiwan and the Penghus. The Communists also know that United States public opinion (even including the *Washington Post* and the ADA) believes the United States must draw the line against Communist aggression. The trouble is that they don't want to draw the line on the offshore islands. The Communists' real intention at this stage is to get the offshore islands. They know that the neutralist countries will say that it is absurd to put pressure on the United States to pull out of Taiwan. The purpose of the Chinese Communists is to get the neutralists to pressure us into getting out of the offshore islands, not out of Taiwan. The statement is a typical Communist tactic of "putting on a great big hat" to hide their real objective. Despite the statement, therefore, the real aim of the Communist is still the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh said that balanced opinion in the United States felt that the offshore islands should not be used for provocative actions. He recalled that President Chiang pledged he would not use the islands to attack the mainland.[6] Mr. Robertson recalled that the Generalissimo had stated this publicly. Ambassador Yeh said his position had been taken by President Chiang in order to ease the United States Government's position at the time of Congressional elections. We could use this pledge on the part of the GRC in discussions with Senator Green and other members of Congress.

Ambassador Yeh said that the Chinese Communist military buildup on the mainland opposite the offshore islands had made necessary the buildup of the GRC forces. It would be a political mistake to talk about GRC reduction of force unless in terms of reciprocal Communist reduction. There had been too much talk about reducing GRC forces on the offshore islands.

---

[6] Reference is apparently to a statement made by Chiang at a press conference on September 29. Telegram 508 from Taipei, September 30, reported that Chiang had "affirmed GRC holding Kinmen and Matsu for defensive, not offensive, reasons." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–3058; see Supplement)

Mr. Robertson said it was very important from the United States point of view not just to think about the offshore islands. There was no public support at all for the GRC on the offshore islands. He didn't agree with Ambassador Yeh as to the significance of the Communist statement. The Chinese Communists wanted the offshore islands as the first step but this was not their objective. Of course, if they could get the offshore islands so much the better for them; it would help break down morale on Taiwan. We must convince people that this is only the first step, that their objective is Taiwan. Mr. Robertson cited an article by William Henry Chamberlain in the October 6 issue of "Human Events" which he thought was the clearest statement of the situation which we face that he had seen from any columnist.

Reverting to the Secretary's visit, Ambassador Yeh said that he and President Chiang would leave the date of the Secretary's visit up to him. The Generalissimo thought that the military problem was now pretty well taken care of and the field of discussion between them should be narrowed down to political problems. Mr. Robertson agreed; this was what the Secretary wanted to do. They should discuss how to deal with the political offensive of the Communists. Mr. Robertson affirmed that we did not want the discussions to be interpreted as a weakening of our position. Ambassador Yeh said in light of the recent Peng statement it was important that the United States and the GRC maintain the same line.

Ambassador Yeh said that the Generalissimo had mentioned the invitation to Secretary McElroy because he wanted to emphasize that it had been extended on his own initiative. The actual invitation would be conveyed to the Secretary through Ambassador Yeh. Mr. Robertson said that was the way we wanted it—that the initiative should come from President Chiang.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 13, 1958, 7 p.m.

587. Following are my comments on Chiang–McElroy conference (Embtel 584).[1]

1. Chiang is clearly obsessed with idea that in our negotiations with Communists we will somehow give way points or fumble ball to detriment of GRC. Communists have failed militarily but "talk and fight" tactics may yet prove successful and gain them their objective. Chiang is probably laboring under impression we are discussing a deal at Warsaw or through some third party at expense of GRC. His fears were heightened by President's and Secretary's most recent press conferences and by persistent news reports that US is advocating reduction of offshore defenses, et cetera. He continues to hear and read about these possibilities but no responsible US officials discussed them with him. Hence his suspicion that we are cooking up a fait accompli to reduce his forces and at same time show him up as our puppet. Above all he wants to be consulted as equal and even if we say some unpalatable things he will prefer this infinitely to a fait accompli reached in bargaining with his hated enemies and without so much as consultation with him.

2. If Communists have recognized error of trying to take Kinmen by force, and I believe they have, we are indeed reaching a new stage. If so, I believe Chiang is right in seeking a joint US–GRC reassessment of situation and a reformulation of our common aims and tactics against Communists. Only in this way can we keep solidly together and prevent misunderstandings. We have made some progress by our limited consultations re Warsaw talks, but we would do better to discuss in advance with GRC positions proposed to be taken at Warsaw and attempt to arrive at agreed positions.

3. Time has also come to discuss with GRC questions relating to holding and defending offshores. We have raised these issues in press conference but not privately with President. If we have decided convictions on these matters they should be presented for discussion. If they are discussed I believe we would be wise to discuss them purely as military problems and not as political bargaining concessions. If we consider Chiang has too many forces deployed on offshores we could present him with a staff study giving supporting reasons. He will respect this whereas he will have no part of a political settlement. In this

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:45 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

[1] Document 178.

connection, attention is invited to next to last sentence of paragraph 3 of Embtel 584. While Chiang's meaning was not explicit, it may mean he would be amenable to some reduction of his offshore forces if he had a thoroughgoing common understanding with US. In return for some reduction of his offshore forces, he would probably want an explicit declaration of US intent to defend offshores and he would probably request installation on islands of adequate quantities of modern defense weapons and provisions of augmented shipping.

4. Another matter on which there should be advance consultation with GRC would be any decision to withdraw US forces and equipment from Taiwan area. This is a problem that well could be discussed at Warsaw if we deem it advisable to do so, but our position here would be more satisfactory if we went over pros and cons with GRC beforehand.

5. GRC will likely oppose withdrawals of US forces until considerable time has elapsed in which to judge Communist tactics. And in any case GRC may object to withdrawals which seem responsive to Communist demands or assurances.

6. Chiang will of course refuse to enter into any negotiations with Communists. It is clear Communists recognize this fact, but it is apparent from recent Peiping broadcasts that they hope to split Chiang and people through massive propaganda and psychological war program.

7. Our and GRC firmness have won first round. It is highly essential that we maintain and strengthen our solidarity and continue our position of firmness toward Taiwan and offshore problems. If Communists perceive there is no profit in their political endeavors, we may see situation restored essentially to pre-August 23 status. Since agreement at Warsaw or anywhere else seems out of question, that is perhaps best solution.

Drumright

182. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 13, 1958, 12:06–12:59 p.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits

PARTICIPANTS

The Hon. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
The Hon. Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador
Mr. J. Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary for External Affairs, Australia
Mr. Malcolm R. Booker, Counselor, Australian Embassy

The Secretary
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs

The Minister said that he appreciated the Secretary receiving him again because he would like to discuss where we go from here on the offshore islands situation and Indonesia. With reference to Indonesia, he said that he would be seeing Mr. Robertson tomorrow and would expect to cover the subject more fully at that time.

The Minister asked whether the Secretary considered recent developments in the Taiwan Straits as a hopeful sign for the future. The Secretary said he did, that at least the fighting had stopped, which in itself was a good sign. The Secretary said that the goal of the Chinese Communists right from the beginning had been not the offshore islands but Taiwan. In attacking the offshore islands the Chinese Communists had thought they could induce us either to get the Nationalist Chinese to abandon the islands or not to help the Chinese Nationalists defend them for fear of the consequences. The Chinese Communists undoubtedly thought the Nationalist Chinese would not defend the islands without assistance from the U.S. Any action on our part to induce the Chinese Nationalists either to abandon the islands or not to fight for their defense would have meant a serious breach in U.S.-GRC relations. Not having succeeded in that course, they are now taking the line set forth in their announcement of the extension of the cease-fire, referring to the Chinese on Quemoy as "compatriots". They hope by their new maneuver to get the Chinese Nationalists to join with them and eventually drive the U.S. out of Taiwan.

Minister Casey wondered whether this was a new phase in the situation. The Secretary said he thought it might be. The Chinese Commu-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1358. Secret. Drafted by Mein. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers) nists, he said, now realize that by fighting they only draw the U.S. and the GRC closer together. Now they will try and break down our close relationship by attempting to wean the Chinese Nationalists away by other methods.

Minister Casey said he thought one of our problems now would be Chiang Kai-shek, that is, how to get him to take a more reasonable line over the islands. The Secretary commented that the Chinese Communists are actually inviting Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen the islands rather than encouraging him to withdraw. The Chinese Communists, he said, are not interested in the offshore islands. This has been made abundantly clear, that their only interests are Taiwan and the withdrawal of the U.S. from Asia. The Secretary said that if we had followed the advice of some of our amateur strategists here and that of some of our friends abroad the Chinese Communists would have succeeded in getting us out of the area. We saw the picture differently, however, and therefore did not withdraw. Now the Chinese Communists want the Chinese Nationalists to unite with them in driving the U.S. out. The Secretary agreed with a comment made by Minister Casey that the Chinese Communists were not hopeful of getting Chiang Kai-shek to side with them, but were rather attempting to get the people on Taiwan to join with the Chinese on the mainland. Mr. Robertson read excerpts from the Communist Chinese cease-fire announcement in support of this point.

Minister Casey wondered whether we expected the Chinese Communists to meet with any success in this new effort. The Secretary said that he did not think so. He said it should not be forgotten, however, that not over a year ago mobs in Taipei rioted and attacked the U.S. Embassy. Although the action basically had not been political but had been incited by the handling of a case involving a GI, there was considerable anti-American feeling at the time. The Chinese are basically anti-foreign, as evidenced by the existence of anti-foreign societies, the Boxer Rebellion, etc. The Secretary reiterated that he did not think, however, that the Chinese Communists would meet with any success in their new tactics.

Minister Casey raised the possibility of a plebiscite on Taiwan and speculated that if one were held it would certainly result in the large majority of the people voting for a separate existence from Communist China. Mr. Robertson asked whether a plebiscite would also be conducted on the mainland and commented that the Chinese on the islands are overwhelmingly against the regime on the mainland. The Secretary commented that the trouble in that area, as also on the mainland, is that the policy being followed by the government does not always reflect the wishes of the people. If a plebiscite were held on the mainland, it probably would show that a majority of the people do not approve of the present government and its policies. He said that suggestions had been made for a plebiscite on Taiwan under UN auspices which would serve as a guide for future UN action.

The Secretary said that he did not think the present tactics of the Chinese Communists would succeed. He wished, however, to emphasize a point which he had been making for the past several weeks, and that is that if we put too much pressure on the Nationalist Chinese there is danger that there will be a breakdown in morale and that they might turn against us. That is the key to the situation today. The Chinese Communist statement makes it abundantly clear that this is what they hope to accomplish. Minister Casey commented that Chiang Kai-shek's reaction to the Secretary's last press conference would seem to bear this out. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek had known our position for years and that what he had said at the press conference should have been no surprise to him. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the way the press conference had been reported had led to Chiang Kai-shek's statements.

The Secretary said he had just re-read the transcript of his press conference last week in preparation for seeing the press tomorrow and had found nothing there that would indicate a policy reversal on his part. He emphasized that there had been no change of policy indicated in the press conference. One difficulty, he said, was probably that for the first time he had said publicly what he had been saying privately right along. The Secretary reviewed briefly the main points raised in that press conference:

(1) the need for reciprocity in renunciation of force. The Secretary pointed out that this had been our emphasis in the Geneva negotiations and is a matter of public record.
(2) possible meeting with Chou En-lai, which he had indicated probably would be a disadvantage unless there was reason in advance to believe that something positive and constructive would come out of such a meeting.
(3) the possible return of the Nationalist Chinese Government to the mainland either by force or some other means.
(4) whether we would insist on a de facto or a written cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the newspapers had reported that for the first time the U.S. was giving up any hope of the GRC returning to the mainland. The Secretary again referred to his statement at the press conference on this subject, and added that there was nothing new about what he had said. There appeared to be a desire, however, on the part of many correspondents to have him change his position and for that reason they had played up his remarks in the way they did.

The Secretary said that about two weeks ago he had cabled Ambassador Beam in Warsaw our basic conception on the course events would take in the area.[1] The situation, he said, has worked out according to that analysis. Just as in Berlin where the Soviet Union was not willing to raise the blockade to a level where it might cause a war, the Chinese Communists evidently did not choose to increase the tempo of their activities in the Taiwan Straits to such a level.

Minister Casey asked whether the matter would now be left entirely to the Warsaw talks. The Secretary said that the Communist Chinese have not been willing to discuss anything at Warsaw except the withdrawal of the U.S. from the area. They maintain the line that this is a civil war situation and that all other matters except the presence of the U.S. in the area should be handled directly between the GRC and the Chinese Communist regime. That has not, however, prevented us from getting our thinking across at Warsaw. The talks afford us a channel which we welcome and wish to keep open. The next meeting is scheduled for Wednesday[2] and we will continue to talk. Mr. Robertson commented that the Communist Chinese have taken the position that the U.S. does not represent anyone except itself and that there is nothing for them to talk about with us. Minister Casey observed that nevertheless the talks had been started on Communist Chinese initiative.

Minister Casey asked whether there was any country other than the U.S. which under the circumstances could say something that would do more good than harm. The Secretary said that statements from other governments welcoming the suspension of hostilities would be helpful. The Secretary referred to his meeting in New York with Minister Casey[3] and to the suggestion made by Mr. Casey for a wider treaty endorsement for Taiwan. The Secretary said that we would continue to have talks with the Chinese Nationalists to see if that or some other method could be found to assist them in resisting the invitation which they had received from the Chinese Communists. Minister Casey commented that he thought the Chinese Communists by suggesting the resupplying of the military and civilian population on the offshore islands during the ceasefire period might be engaging in a bit of face-saving effort since they knew that the resupplying of the islands would take place anyway.

Minister Casey referred to the statement made by the Secretary at the ANZUS Council meeting[4] that he thought at that time that the next few weeks would bring the Communist Chinese to a position where they would have to decide on their next step in view of the Chinese Nationalist capability of resupplying the islands. He wondered if the extension of the cease-fire were in keeping with that and whether the situation would continue to develop or a solution sought in Warsaw. The Secretary said that the talks in Warsaw would continue. Mr. Robertson commented that those talks give us a real opportunity since there is now a de facto cease-fire and we can seek to find out from the Chinese Communists what they propose to do. Minister Casey asked what Chiang Kai-shek's attitude was toward the talks. The Secretary commented that Chiang does not like them nor has he given us any mandate. We have, however, kept him fully informed of the talks in order not to give him any reason to believe that we are preparing to sell him down the river as the Chinese Communists would have him believe. Minister Casey wondered whether Secretary McElroy might not have a difficult time in Taipei today as a result of this. Mr. Robertson said he thought not, and that Chiang Kai-shek has been very cooperative with us during all this period. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek's statement reacting to the Secretary's press conference was based on press reports of the conference. The Secretary said he had listened for a short while yesterday to the "Meet the Press" program and had noticed that one of the questioners had repeatedly attributed to the Secretary the statement that if the fighting stopped the islands would be turned back to the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek, he said, could not agree to that and he himself had said nothing in his press conference which would suggest that. Mr. Robertson said that Chiang Kai-shek has made a public statement that the offshore islands would not be used as stepping stones for an invasion of the mainland. The Secretary said that Chiang Kai-shek has given us an agreement that he will not return to the mainland without our concurrence and that he has carefully lived up to his agreement. The Secretary said that we do not anticipate any difficulty with Chiang Kai-shek unless we seek to force him to give the islands to the Chinese Communists.

---

[1] Document 152.

[2] October 15.

[3] Reference is to a brief conversation between Dulles and Casey on September 18, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation; see Supplement)

[4] On October 1; there was extensive discussion of the Taiwan Strait situation at the Council meeting. A record of the meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1128. See vol. XVI, pp. 45–58.

Mr. Robertson, commenting on the attitude of the Chinese on the offshore islands, said that when the Tachens were evacuated by the Chinese Nationalists only 19 out of the 18,924 inhabitants of the islands opted to stay under the Communist Chinese. The Secretary said that would seem to confirm what Minister Casey had said earlier, that the people on the islands in a plebiscite would not want a Communist Chinese regime.

The Secretary said that as time passes a large number of the people on Taiwan will be wanting Taiwan to be considered a separate state. In reply to a question by Minister Casey, the Secretary indicated he thought it would be something over the next five or more years. Ambassador Beale commented that recent reports indicated that a large percentage of the Nationalist Chinese Army is composed of Taiwanese. The Secretary confirmed this and said that this percentage would increase as time went on. Mr. Robertson commented that the conditions on Taiwan were quite different from those existing when the Chinese Nationalists first arrived and that the difficulties encountered at first no longer exist. The Secretary said that as years go by the mainlanders on Taiwan will also be more interested in the development of the island itself, having become rooted there, than in returning to the mainland.

Minister Casey commented that this would in effect lead to two Chinas. The Secretary said that the natural force of evolution are moving in that direction. He said that we cannot force that movement but also we cannot prevent those forces from moving in that direction. Minister Casey asked whether this movement should not be encouraged and the Secretary said that he did not think so.

---

183. Editorial Note

At the 382d meeting of the National Security Council on October 13, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by James S. Lay, Jr., October 14, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles then summarized recent developments regarding the Taiwan Strait area. He pointed to diplomatic moves by the Chinese Communists to stop an Afro-Asian resolution on the subject and to prevent UN debate. He said that both the Communists and the Nationalists were exploiting the cease-fire to strengthen their positions. However, the recent transfer of a ChiCom air squadron to a coastal airfield appeared to be a relief of another squadron. He pointed out that the Chinese Communist patrols appear to be entirely defensive.

"Mr. Dulles said the Chinese Nationalists were sending in military replacements to Kinmen while evacuating some civilians. The large resupply operation, which had been conducted without opposition during the first ten days of October, was three times the total September deliveries." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 13, 1958, 8:19 p.m.

440. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for 81st meeting:

Chinese Communist announcement extending ceasefire another two weeks seems indicate Communists may not soon resume intensive attack on offshores. It also reflects Chinese Communist determination, as did Wang's presentation 80th meeting,[1] prevent internationalization of dispute, which would inevitably produce "solutions" to crisis unacceptable to Peiping. Recent efforts "Bandung powers" in GA to draft resolution on Taiwan crisis brought sharp reaction from Chinese Communists who demanded all or nothing support their position (Deptel 441).[2] Peiping's present strategy probably to let uneasy de facto truce develop, making no constructive moves itself to reduce tension and anticipation that world opinion and US' own desire avoid repetition of crisis will cause US to exert pressures on GRC that will weaken GRC position, strain US–GRC relations, and provide opportunities for Communist exploitation. Your efforts at next meeting should therefore be directed at demonstrating that with cessation of hostilities now essential to begin meaningful negotiations with the objective of reducing provocations and harassments on both sides.

Your presentation should be along following lines: From the beginning US has taken position that when shooting stopped in the Taiwan area, meaningful negotiations could be carried on. It is encouraging development—welcomed by US and rest of world—that suspension of hostilities is being continued, whatever the reason. At this time there is no shooting in the Taiwan area nor is there any convoying by US of GRC vessels. All of this creates the necessary conditions for real negotiation.

Thus far only suggestions advanced by Wang have involved complete withdrawal US forces from Taiwan area, leaving ally GRC to be dealt with by Chinese Communists, by force if necessary. For US to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1358. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Becker, Martin, and Lutkins; cleared in draft by Dulles, Becker, Parsons, and Green, in substance with OSD, and with S/S; and approved by Martin. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and to Taipei.

[1] On October 10; see Document 175.

[2] Telegram 441 to Warsaw, October 13, informed the Embassy that on October 5, Chen Yi had summoned the Asian and African chiefs of mission in Peking and, referring to a General Assembly resolution being drafted by the Bandung powers, set forth the PRC's requirements for such a resolution; he had stated that the PRC was in "no hurry" and "not interested" in mediation. The Bandung powers had subsequently dropped the projected resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1358; see Supplement)

comply with such demands would involve unconditional surrender to Chinese Communists, including abandonment faithful ally and repudiation collective security treaty. Demand for such unconditional surrender is not negotiation but rather ultimatum.

On other hand, US has suggested a number of alternative suggestions of discussion which, if taken up, could lead to fruitful negotiation. As first step, US suggested that the Chinese Communists should detail provocative activities or harassment of which it complains, in order to explore possibility reciprocal cessation such activities. US also suggested that it is prepared to seek solution existing dispute by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement. US has also suggested reciprocal measures of restraint from harassment and provocations in area Quemoy Islands and Matsu Islands which could include reciprocal reduction forces and armaments.

Up to now, Wang's only response has been to repeat demand for US withdrawal from Taiwan area—in other words, unconditional surrender and abandonment ally GRC, contrary to treaty commitment. More than this is needed for meaningful negotiation. Now that conditions are propitious for such negotiations, which of the suggested lines of discussion raised by the US will Wang pursue. In the alternative, does Wang have any constructive suggestions of his own. Now is the time to make them.

If, as seems likely, Wang again attempts to distinguish between internal and international questions, reply along following lines: No amount of sophistry can conceal fact that one of the issues between US and Chinese Communists is latter's insistence upon extending area over which Chinese Communists exercise control by force of arms. True no shots now being exchanged between US and Chinese Communists, but whole world fully aware of grave danger of extension hostilities in Taiwan area unless problem area can be resolved through peaceful means rather than by force. US fully aware Chinese Communists' contentions but no amount words can erase from existence GRC in control substantial territory having 10,000,000 inhabitants. Immediate problem is elimination threat to peace in Taiwan area and threat to international peace in any area is matter of international concern. Principle of reciprocity included in all US proposed announcements. That is practical way to insure that measures will in fact lessen and ultimately eliminate all provocations and harassments. If Chinese representative genuinely seeks relaxation of tension in Taiwan area, he should now make substantive reply designed to reduce such tensions rather than repeat unyielding demand for unconditional surrender.

Dulles

185. Draft Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 13, 1958.

The following are conceived to be the roles of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in which the United States cooperates:

1) To maintain an anti-Communist Chinese Government on Taiwan, which, through participation in collective security with other free governments, will be strong enough to withstand Communist assaults;
2) To prevent more Chinese from being forcibly subjected to Communist tyranny;
3) To be equipped to extend significant liberating help to Chinese of the mainland if and as opportunity presents itself as a result of organized disaffection of the Chinese people;[1]
4) To help to stimulate the coming of such opportunity by providing a nearby example of political, economic and social welfare which will contrast favorably with the repressive policies of the Communist rulers and stimulate organized revolt against them;
5) To exert an influence on overseas Chinese, particularly in free Asian countries, so that they will not become a tool of the Chinese Communist Party for the overthrow of non-Communist Asian governments. In this connection it is important for the Nationalist Government to have diplomatic representation in these countries and to exclude Chicom representation;
6) To preempt the seat of China in the United Nations so that it will not go to the Communist Chinese, giving them increased prestige and influence in the world;
7) To preserve, for the benefit of all the world, Chinese culture which is being systematically suppressed and liquidated by the Communists.

The problem is how, in the light of the present situation, the Governments of the Republic of China and the United States can best cooperate to achieve these agreed objectives.

It would seem that the formulation which best serves our purposes is, on *our* side, along the area of close contact, i.e., the offshore islands, to do what we would presumably do if there were an armistice, as in Korea

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–1558. Secret; Personal and Private. The source text is marked "#3," presumably the third draft of the paper. It is filed with a memorandum of October 15 from Murphy to Dulles commenting on "the draft outline which you may be using in connection with your visit to Taipei next week." A covering note of October 16 from Calhoun to Dulles states that comments by Murphy, Robertson, Gerard Smith, and Becker are attached; that Macomber had no comment; and that Herter and Reinhardt had not responded. Typewritten notes with comments by Smith and Becker are attached to the source text; Robertson's comments are not.

[1] On Dulles' personal copy of the draft, this paragraph is revised in his handwriting to read as follows: "To be equipped with some mobility to extend significant liberating help to Chinese of the mainland if and as opportunity presents itself as a result of disaffection shared by significant elements of the Chinese Red military establishment." (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

and Vietnam; and thus, we would hope, build up a de facto armistice condition on *both* sides. It would not be practical or desirable to have a formal armistice, as neither the Chinats nor the Chicoms would desire this. But a situation might in fact be created comparable to that along the Korean and Vietnam armistice lines, where there is close contact but no provocations across the line, and at least some appreciable reduction of forces.

The bearing, if any, of the foregoing line of conduct upon the preceding seven points would be as follows:

1) There would be no problem on Taiwan if the matter were handled by the GRC as its program, not a US program it accepted under coercion.

2) Some appreciable reduction of forces under the conditions suggested would give comparable security to what now exists. There would be enough forces left not only to maintain internal security, but to put up a substantial resistance. The number left behind could at any time be augmented from Taiwan, particularly if additional amphibious power were provided.

It would be a necessary accompaniment of the foregoing that the Chinats should make clear that they did not intend to use the offshore islands for provocative purposes. Actually, there is very little "provocation" now by the Chinats from the offshore islands. They are not used for purposes of blockading the ports of Amoy and Foochow. Also these mainland areas are so heavily militarized and so forbidding in their geographical formation that they do not serve as a useful place for staging commando raids or introducing intelligence agents, much less for an invasion in aid of a future revolt.

It is possible—not probable—that other free world nations which now have diplomatic relations with the Chicoms could be induced to indicate to the Chicoms that they would break these relations and throw their political support to the Chinats if the Chicoms again broke the peace by a major war effort to capture the offshore islands.

It should be observed in this connection that the offshore islands are not covered by the United States–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, and the President is not authorized to use the Armed Forces for their defense unless he judges this necessary or appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. Thus the Chinese Communists, by disassociating attacks on the Quemoy and Matsu islands from their claims to Taiwan and Penghu, could automatically exclude United States armed participation in the defense of the offshore islands. This makes it the more important to develop increased and broader political pressures upon the Chicoms not to engage in a further armed attack on the offshore islands.

3) As regards Point 3, the ability of the Chinats would be increased with less diffusion of their forces, with more located at a focal point such

as Taiwan. From there they could be either redeployed to the offshore islands or elsewhere, rather than be immobilized on the offshore islands.

The amphibious equipment which would make a return to the offshore islands more possible would equally serve to permit their being landed elsewhere if this was appropriate to give aid and comfort to a substantial organized resistance movement.

4) As regards Point 4, the change would have some benefit in that it would tend to moderate what otherwise could be a source of division on Taiwan as between the Chinese who regard Taiwan as their home, and the recent arrivals who regard the mainland as their home. There is some evidence that the "Taiwanese" are not enthusiastic about the present dispositions which can require many of them to die for the defense of the offshore islands in which they have no sentimental interest.

5–6) As regards Points 5 and 6, we believe that some move along the lines indicated is important, almost essential, to prevent more and more nations from recognizing the Chicoms and bringing them into the UN. There is great dissatisfaction with the present situation among many nations which, in deference to the United States, do not recognize the Chicoms. They strongly deprecate a situation which, as they see it, involves them in the risk of world war because of military dispositions by the Chinats which, in their opinion, are unnecessarily provocative. They look upon the Chinat use of the offshore islands as carrying a constant invasion threat to the mainland or, at a minimum, a threat to the integrity of mainland China's principal ports, and they are sympathetic with the efforts of the Chicoms to eliminate these threats. Actually, as noted, these threats are non-existent. But it is much better that the Chinats should themselves take steps which would emphasize the reality and do so on their own volition, rather than to lose good will with possible disastrous political consequences on account of maintaining a paper "threat" which in reality is non-existent.

7) As regards Point 7, there is no particular bearing one way or another because the place where Chinese culture is being preserved is on Taiwan not on the offshore islands.

186. Message From Foreign Minister Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles

London, undated.

I have noted with interest the developments in the situation in the Formosa Strait over the last few days, and have been wondering how you now view the situation. I recall that in our conversation in New York on September 26[1] you thought that if there were some let-up in the Communist shelling of the islands for some days, it might be possible to get some of the Nationalist Forces out of the islands. I was also interested in your remark to Caccia[2] that it seemed that the only way progress could be made was for the two sides to take unilateral steps on parallel lines gradually converging. Are you thinking of any further steps of this kind at this stage? It would be of particular interest to us to have your views and to know whether we can help in any way.[3]

---

[1] See Document 130.

[2] On October 9; see Document 171.

[3] Printed from an unsigned copy.

---

187. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander, Seventh Fleet (Kivette)

Taipei, October 14, 1958, 8:44 p.m.

141244Z. As cease-fire goes into its second week operations here returning to normal except for increased US military stature which should be maintained until indications firmer ChiComs are going to keep the offshore islands in the political arena and more particularly until they

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1758. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to CNO. Received at the Department of the Navy at 5:53 p.m. The source text includes handwritten corrections, apparently made at the Department of the Navy. It is filed with a covering memorandum of October 17 from Reinhardt to Dulles stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that Smoot's proposed line of argument set forth in paragraph 4 made sense in general but that they disagreed with his argument that the artillery capability on Kinmen served little purpose.

show this intent by reduction their military posture opposite Taiwan. Fundamentally there is no benevolence in any action proclaimed or actually undertaken by ChiComs and we must constantly keep our guard up on this premise. As I look back over the tension created by artillery bombardment of Kinmen 2 facts become clear to me. First the resupply problem was in fact never a problem. The panic was created not by the military but by the GRC using the incident to involve the US in their never to die hope of returning to the mainland. Within the framework of the foregoing however the major effort undertaken was not so much related to tonnage and it never need have been. It was related to the morale factor of demonstrating that resupply could be accomplished and that it could be done by GRC forces alone with US backup so disposed as to be never directly involved in the actual warfare. This purpose was achieved, fingers came off the panic button and GRC finally realized the importance of US and world opinion.

Under the circumstances resumption of ChiCom activity in the same pattern would achieve no further purpose either for the ChiComs nor the GRC. In addition since the ChiComs have made their appeals to "friends on Taiwan" I do not believe firing will be resumed in the near future. If it is it will be accomplished by actions more provocative and on another plateau which might inevitably lead to US involvement. This too I believe unlikely unless one of two things happens. First if the ChiComs begin to foresee a political defeat in the offshore island situation they will resume force and resume it with greater intensity. Secondly if the GRC even suspects US negotiations or intentions which would prejudice their sovereign rights they might deliberately initiate provocative acts designed to renew the conflict and thoroughly involve US. Therefore I believe US must stand firm, must let the GRC know it is standing firm and must concede nothing in negotiations which would involve a reduction of strength on the offshore islands. We should not let the GRC know that there are certain islands we do not consider worth defending. Any steps we take which will create misgivings or doubts in the minds of the GRC as to our intentions either to partially abandon or to meddle with their internal affairs to their disadvantage can do nothing but play into the hands of the Commies.

There are certain military arguments which I can initiate out here provided you concur. They might be quite far reaching but it is remotely possible they could have the ultimate effect of achieving a considerable reduction on the offshore islands and be agreeable to the GRC. They are purely military in nature and to me they make sense.

I would argue this way to Tiger and Minister Yu. Your President has said you are not using the offshore islands as a stepping stone to return to the mainland. Your tremendous artillery capability on the islands is designed to neutralize enemy artillery on the mainland for this purpose.

This purpose no longer exists. 500,000 shells landing on Kinmen did very little damage. What damage could you do in the overwhelming expanse surrounding Kinmen with the relatively little artillery you can maintain there. Why not remove this great artillery capability and devote your military effort on the offshore islands purely to the concept of designing it against an invasion. Artillery serves very little purpose in this type of a defense. You need recoilless rifles, you need the well armed modernized flexible defensive types of warfare equipment. Let US streamline your offshore islands for this purpose. Let US build up your navy to adequately provide modern patrol and escort ships and an amphibious capability for resupply. This is really all you need since the President has said that the proper way of returning to the mainland is not by military campaign but by political campaign. End of argument.

Meanwhile however I cannot too strongly recommend against any suggestion of reducing the offshore island garrisons as a political measure designed to bargain with the Commies and I see no point to be gained in telling the GRC that we do not support them in the defense of certain of the small offshore islands.

One thing we do know about the GRC they are implacable enemies of communism. Everything we do should nurture that asset to our benefit.

---

188. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 14, 1958, 6 p.m.

1. I outlined to the President some of the pros and cons, as they had emerged in my discussions with my associates, of my planning to travel to Taipei en route home from Rome.[1] The President felt it important that

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at the White House.

[1] A memorandum by Dulles of a conversation with the President on October 13 reads in part as follows: "I discussed with the President a possible trip to Taiwan, going there from Rome. The President said that he was inclined to feel that it would be desirable to go there within the present two-week period of suspension. He said, however, he would await my further and more mature thinking on the subject following my talk with associates." (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

we show positive action during the present period and therefore felt that I should do so. I said that I would, if invited for that time. I pointed out that it could not be expected that out of my visit would come any announcement indicative of changes in the Chinat attitude toward the offshore islands and the deployment for their defense. I said that such a change, if it came about at all, would undoubtedly only come about gradually over a period of weeks or perhaps months and would have to be under circumstances that would indicate that the change was of their own making and of their own volition. I also added that any statement we might make would probably have to be confined to an expression of the solidarity of our two countries under our Mutual Security Treaty. The President said "yes" to that but added also "peace". I pointed out that there was a chance that the Chicoms might use my presence there as an excuse for breaking or terminating the cease-fire. The President thought this was a risk that would have to be taken; that, in fact, whether they continued or broke the cease-fire would be determined by other considerations.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

JFD

---

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 14, 1958, 7:58 p.m.

451. Beam–Wang Talks. Following supplements Deptel 440.[1] You should tell Wang that we note that the Chinese Communists claim that they are engaged in a civil war. In this connection they have a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union and are receiving much military assistance from the Soviet Union. The other party to the alleged civil war, the Republic of China, has a treaty with the US and is receiving military assistance from the US. This treaty and its observance by the US is de-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1458. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Becker and Parsons; cleared in substance by Dulles, in draft by Robertson, and with S/S; paragraph 2 cleared in substance by General Twining; and approved by Martin. Repeated to USUN for Lodge and to Taipei.

[1] Document 184.

nounced by the Chinese Communists. Are they equally prepared to denounce their treaty with the Soviet Union? Obviously, if there is a civil war and if one side in the civil war can make a treaty of alliance, the other side can do the same. If both sides have such treaties then the situation ceases to be purely a civil war but has international implications. Why are not the Chinese Communists prepared to recognize this?

You may also inform Wang that in view current suspension hostilities one of major US naval vessels (carrier) is being withdrawn from Taiwan area.

Re Embtel 583[2] do not desire go so far as state US will not reach agreement Chinese Communists without agreement GRC. Thus if Chinese Communists agree with us cease provocative activities in Quemoy–Matsu area "on a reciprocal basis" could have de facto truce such activities without express agreement GRC so long as GRC did not engage such activities. That was meaning last three sentences Deptel 440. Point out if Chinese Communists undertaking contingent on reciprocal action or non action in Quemoy and Matsu islands objective of lessening tensions will have been obtained as practical matter. If no reciprocity then no need Chinese Communists fulfill undertaking.

Dulles

---

[2] Dated October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1458; see Supplement)

---

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, October 15, 1958, 7 p.m.

596. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 81st meeting two hours 15 minutes.[1]

I led off with prepared statement based on Deptel 440.[2]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 598, October 15, and his comments and recommendations in telegram 607, October 16. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/10–1558 and 611.93/10–1658, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Document 184.

Wang replied with point by point rejection both US draft agreed announcements arguing they were simply devices to legalize US "occupation" Taiwan and carry out "two-Chinas plot". Again drew careful distinction between Chinese internal affairs which he declared not fit subject for discussion these talks and presence and preparations of US forces in the area on which he insisted discussion should be centered. Said if US sincerely interested reaching peaceful settlement through negotiation we should begin discussion on basis ChiComs September 22 [proposal].[3]

I attacked Wang's distinction between internal and international aspects of situation using material last paragraph for total US capitulation and again asked for evidence ChiCom desire reach peaceful settlement through genuine negotiation.

Using material from Secretary's press conference[4] Wang challenged US competence discuss such matters as force strength on offshore islands and again questioned authority US represent GRC. I replied along lines last paragraph Deptel 451.[5] In subsequent give and take Wang attacked GRC and US relationship thereto while I refuted his arguments.

I proposed next meeting Monday, Wang countered with Wednesday October 22, 2 p.m. Thereupon I proposed Thursday October 23, 2 p.m. which Wang accepted.

Beam

---

[3] See Document 119.

[4] Of October 14. For a transcript, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 3, 1958, pp. 681–688.

[5] Document 189.

191. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 16, 1958, 11:59 a.m.–12:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to inform Sir Harold in advance of his plans to fly on to Taiwan after attending the Pope's funeral ceremonies in Rome. He will arrive in Taipei Tuesday[1] morning and will spend two to three days discussing the situation with President Chiang. Their talks will presumably touch, among other things, on the level of GRC forces on the offshore islands. The Secretary plans to discuss this point within the context of the desirability of the GRC's developing and maintaining a posture which would tend to increase support and acceptance of it by the free world generally. There is a need, he emphasized, for the GRC to comport itself so as to take greater account of world opinion. It has a tendency to be too self-centered and to ignore outside attitudes and developments. The Secretary said that the United States believes a strong GRC on Taiwan is a key factor in our overall position of strength in the Far East. Moreover, the fact that the GRC has a seat in the United Nations constitutes a very important factor preventing a possible process of deterioration in the United Nations to the point where it might become Communist-dominated. It is noteworthy in this connection that Peiping enjoys great influence in the Asian-African world, much more so than the Soviet Union. Illustrative of this influence was the recent action of a group of Asian-African countries in immediately discontinuing their efforts to bring into the United Nations a resolution on the Taiwan situation when the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister expressed the regime's displeasure regarding it to their representatives in Peiping. This type of influence would become even greater if the Peiping regime were to be seated in the United Nations.

Sir Harold said that the UK is certainly in agreement with respect to the Secretary's point that the GRC should comport itself in a way which

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1658. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] October 21.

takes world opinion into fuller account. The question of the offshore islands is relevant in this respect. The fact that the UK believes that on juridical grounds and because of their geographic location the islands are properly part of the mainland puts it in a difficult position in seeking to maintain a joint stand with the United States. The UK, therefore, is most hopeful that this problem can be resolved.

The Secretary said that he did not expect any immediate decisions or solutions to come out of his talks with President Chiang. Any decisions or actions regarding the problem cannot seem to have been made under pressure and must appear to have been made by the GRC on its own initiative.

Commenting that he had never been quite sure of the precise nature of the United States' long-range interest in Taiwan, Sir Harold asked whether we want to have the island available as a base in the event of war. Or is it rather that our interest is the negative strategic one of wanting to deny the island to the Communists? The Secretary responded that the latter was probably the principal consideration, since Taiwan was not conceived as an essential strategic base for offensive operations. However, he doubted that it could be effectively denied to the Communists without the maintenance on it of the GRC and its strong military forces. It could probably not be neutralized or demilitarized without paving the way for a Communist take-over. In this connection, he pointed out, the thing that stands out most clearly in the Warsaw talks is the absolutely uncompromising position the Communists have taken that Taiwan belongs to them and that we must get out of the entire area. We have tried in the talks to discuss the offshore islands, the level of forces on them, and alleged provocations from them against the mainland. The Communists, however, have refused to discuss these matters and insist on limiting discussion to what they say is the only international question involved, namely the presence of United States forces in the area. In response to a query from Sir Harold, the Secretary stated that the arrival of Huang Hua[2] had not changed the nature of the Communist line of argument in the slightest. The Communists continue to deny that the crisis in the Taiwan Straits area is in any way an international problem except for the alleged interference of the United States in China's internal affairs. They argue that the comparison of the U.S.–GRC treaty with the treaty between them and the Soviets is an invalid and improper one, saying that the latter represents the justified action of two sovereign governments whereas the former involves a relationship between master and puppet.

---

[2] Chief of the Western European Department of the PRC Foreign Ministry. Wang told Beam at the September 30 meeting that Huang would replace Wang's advisor Lai at the next meeting and that at subsequent meetings, either Lai or Huang would be present, depending upon the pressure of other business on each. Beam reported this in telegram 492, September 30; see footnote 1, Document 145.

The talks so far have served no useful purpose except insofar as they provide a channel through which we can get across our view to the Communists.

---

192. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 17, 1958, 12:15–12:23 p.m.

SUBJECT

Chiang Kai-shek and the Offshore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, First Lord of the Admiralty
His Excellency Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

Lord Mountbatten said the President had suggested he see the Secretary to describe his experience in dealing with President Chiang during World War II because of its possible relevance with respect to the present situation in the Taiwan Straits. He said he had dealt with President Chiang for over two years when, as Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, he had under his command five Chinese divisions. His first contact with Chiang occurred when he visited Chungking to meet the President and discuss with him the use of these Chinese troops in a campaign then being planned to recover Burma from the Japanese.[1] He arrived in Chungking to learn from General Somervell,[2] who had been sent from Washington to introduce him to General Stilwell[3] and Chiang, that the President had just fired General Stilwell. Determined that he would not assume command of Chinese troops in this situation, he told

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1758. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles' appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

[1] In October 1943.

[2] Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, then Commanding General, U.S. Army Service Forces.

[3] Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, then Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, China–Burma–India Theater, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

General Somervell to inform Chiang that he would not employ a single Chinese soldier under his command in Burma unless General Stilwell were taken back. He advised General Somervell to give the President a graceful way out by suggesting that he could say that he had reviewed his action and out of clemency and magnanimity was taking General Stilwell back. The upshot was that the President wrestled with the problem all day and finally called General Stilwell in, embraced him, and announced that he wished him to remain as Commander.

The lesson of this incident, Lord Mountbatten stated, was that if one took a strong line with Chiang and at the same time gave him a face-saving means of retreat, he would back down. He considered it likely that in the present situation President Chiang could similarly be induced to pull out of the offshore islands if the United States took a hard line with him while at the same time giving him a graceful, face-saving means of acceding by providing additional amphibious lift and other modernization of forces. Actually, such a move would strengthen the position of the GRC and thus be in the President's best interest.

The Secretary commented that he was going out to Taiwan merely to get the feel of the situation and to give President Chiang a better understanding of the problems which the United States faced in regard to it. He planned to see what might be done to improve the situation but he did not intend to try to carry out any specific course of action at this time.

---

193. Editorial Note

On October 20, 1958, the Defense Ministry of the People's Republic of China issued a statement rescinding its order to suspend the shelling of Quemoy. The statement, as released in English, reads in part as follows: "The order for our Army to suspend the shelling of Quemoy is hereby declared invalid, since the Taiwan authorities have introduced American military escorts to the sea area of Quemoy from the night of October 19 to the morning of the following day." The statement declared: "This is an open violation of the condition for our temporary suspension of shelling." For complete text, see *Peking Review,* October 28, 1958, page 6.

Secretary of State Dulles was at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, en route to Taipei, when he received reports of renewed fighting, which apparently included an inaccurate report of air attacks. He discussed the possibility of returning to Washington in a series of telephone conversations with Acting Secretary of State Herter and other officials, including Assistant Secretary of State Robertson in Taipei, who told him the fighting had been light and that it had stopped. He then telephoned President Eisenhower. He and the President agreed that he should continue on to Taipei, and the President approved a statement which the Secretary issued to the press. Phyllis Bernau's notes of the telephone conversations, which took place between 12:26 and 2:50 a.m. (local time), are in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. For text of the statement released by the Secretary, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* page 1183.

---

194. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot)

Washington, October 20, 1958, 11:25 a.m.

201625Z. Taipei to State 633 sgd Drumright[1] says U.S. destroyer escort was provided for U.S. LSD transporting supplies to Kinmen last night.

This action is not in accord my 060045Z[2] nor my 061951Z[3] which ordered U.S. ships to cease escorting and directed all U.S. ships escorting to resume normal operations. Chicoms cited reasons for cease fire U.S. had carried out escort operations.

Submit full report of what happened and why.[4] If U.S. escorts or U.S. LSDs are being used stop it now and do not resume unless directed by CINCPAC or higher authority.

Whenever in your opinion escorting should be resumed submit recommendations.

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 63 D 76, ComTaiwan Telegrams. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Burke. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMSEVENTHFLT.

[1] Telegram 633 from Taipei, October 20, reported the PRC Defense Ministry statement and commented: "US destroyer escort was provided for US LSD transporting [small landing craft] supplied to Quemoy last night. Destroyers stayed well outside Red-claimed territorial waters, however." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/10–2058; see Supplement) The telegram was one of a series of daily reports on the situation in the Taiwan Strait which were prepared on a coordinated basis by the country team in Taipei between August 27 and October 29. (Department of State, Central File 793.00)

[2] See footnote 4, Document 156.

[3] Document 160.

[4] Smoot replied in telegram 211700Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)MAAG to CNO, October 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2158; see Supplement)

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 20, 1958, 1:40 p.m.

369. Your 633.[1] On October 6 Department questioned CNO's office on advisability and necessity using LSD during cease-fire period.[2] Department informed LSD essential in delivering small landing craft needed in resupply especially of Tan islands. Department was assured that LSD would proceed without US escort to point about 15 miles offshore whence landing craft would swim ashore. LSD also to be used for landing craft pickup.

In view subsequent US convoy escort suspension announcement October 8,[3] would appreciate full explanation relating your comment on item one reftel.[4]

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2058. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Green, cleared by Parsons and Martin, and approved by Herter.

[1] See footnote 1, Document 194.

[2] The conversation was recorded in a memorandum of October 7 from Green to Parsons. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 63 D 76, Memoranda)

[3] Cited in footnote 2, Document 165.

[4] Drumright replied in telegram 642 from Taipei, October 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5411/10–2158; see Supplement)

---

196. Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles

Taipei, October 21, 1958.

I

We congratulate the GRC upon its success in withstanding and repelling the Communist attack on Quemoy. There has been bravery and competence. We are proud to have been associated.

Source: Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Box 127, Chiang Kai-shek. Secret; Personal and Private. Published with permission of Princeton University Libraries. The text printed here incorporates revisions that appear on the source text in Dulles' handwriting. Other handwritten notations on the source text indicate that Phyllis Bernau was to keep it for the Secretary's meeting with Chiang at 4 p.m. Brief notes of the conversation in Dulles' handwriting appear on the reverse of the last page; for his memorandum of the conversation, see Document 197. Dulles' handwritten draft of the talking paper is in the Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Box 127, Chiang Kai-shek.

II

We express thanks, but not surprise, at the loyal manner in which the GRC has complied with the agreement not to use force, except in emergency self-defense, unless this was jointly agreed. We know that this restraint was exercised in the face of grave provocations.

III

We believe that it is possible to cope with the military effort of the CPR. If they resume efforts at interdiction by bombardment, that will be overcome, as in the past. If they seriously raise the level of that effort, as by use of bombers against Q and M, that may call for raising the level of GRC reply. If they attempt an amphibious assault, that can be and will be repulsed. If they attack Taiwan by air, that will evoke a joint reply.

There is capacity and will to cope with any aspect of assault at whatever level the CPR make it. In each case, the initiative will be theirs. The final word will be ours. In each case we shall use only the measure of effort needed for repulsion. If the war becomes more intense and general, theirs will be the responsibility before the world.

IV

The great danger faced by the GRC is not primarily military, but political. It stems from the world's longing for conditions of peace and the feeling of almost all free world countries that the relationship between GRC and CPR not only endangers the peace, but that the GRC *wants* it to endanger the peace.

The two other "civil" wars promoted by the Communists in Asia—the Korean War and the Indochina War—have been ended by armistices. Germany is peacefully divided. These involved considerable sacrifices.

These measure the desire for peace, if it can be reconciled with preservation of essential values.

In the case of the China civil war, there has been no armistice and while, from time to time, there have been considerable periods of de facto tranquility, both sides have claimed the *right* to resume fighting, and the ChiComs have exercised it, notably in relation to the Tachens, Quemoy and Matsu. In view of US relation to the GRC, and its world-wide power position, there is deep concern within the free world that the US will become involved, with consequences that may be world-wide and disastrous to mankind.

There is a resulting desire to see liquidated the "trouble spots".

V

The international political situation today is serious as regards the GRC. Except perhaps for the Republics of Korea and Vietnam, the USA is the *only* vigorous supporter of the GRC.

It has required the strongest representations from the US upon its friends to prevent the community of free nations from according to the CPR the unlimited status of the only China, entitled without external interference to liquidate by force the remaining elements of the civil war and thus end the risk of general war. See Lodge cable Delga 37, Sept. 24, 1958.[1]

It is doubtful whether even the US can long protect the GRC under present circumstances. It is far from certain that a subsequent US administration will be willing to be as staunch for the GRC as has been the Eisenhower–Dulles administration of foreign policy.

VI

It is today widely assumed that the GRC has only a limited life expectancy. It seems to be threatened on three fronts:

(1) There is the *overt* threat of the CPR with its vast military and propaganda capability.
(2) There is the threat that stems from the fact that the GRC on Taiwan is inevitably becoming more and more dependent on Taiwanese, e.g., Chinese whose families have long lived in Taiwan, who have no homes and family responsibilities on the Mainland and who cannot be expected to want to prolong the civil war aspect of the present phase.
(3) Free world opinion, which wants to see a liquidation of the "civil war" which carries with it the risk of general war.

It devolves upon the GRC, and the US, in consultation with it, to find a reply to these dangers, just as we have found a reply to the direct military threats. Such a reply exists, and is, we believe, to be found in a fresh approach to the mission of the GRC as spokesman for Free China.

VII

The Government of the Republic of China continues primarily to appear as a civil war survival, which is essentially militaristic in its outlook. This needs to be changed. There is still a military role to defend Taiwan against armed attack, to preserve the offshore islands from Communist seizure and to be prepared to cooperate hereafter with Chinese Mainland rebellious elements which, on the one hand, have enough sympathy and support from Communist Red military elements so that they had a chance of survival, and, on the other hand, desire such cooperation—cooperation which under some circumstances could be decisive.

But we believe that it is possible for the GRC, in cooperation with the USA, to find ways to discharge all of these military roles consistently with finding for itself a larger and more acceptable world mission.

The culture, the tradition of the Chinese nation and the wisdom of the educated Chinese constitute an asset which is valued throughout the world. Under Communist rule the true virtues of China are being liquidated and the Chinese people sought to be turned into a mass of disciplined slaves working for the rulers of International Communism.

---

[1] See footnote 3, Document 127.

The GRC has an opportunity to represent the China which has been and is honored and revered throughout all of the free world. It cannot play this role and enjoy the support of the free peoples if the image of the GRC which is transmitted abroad is that of a regime which is essentially militaristic and which is represented as having no role but a military one that is apt to precipitate a third world war.

That is an unattractive image and one which is largely regarded as unrealistic and highly dangerous to world peace.

In fact the GRC is different from this image. But it needs to dramatize that difference and to cast itself unmistakably into the larger role of custodian of Chinese culture, virtues and education. Thus it can give the world a prospect which all free peoples will welcome and support.

In this way, and perhaps only in this way, will it be possible to prevent the GRC itself being liquidated under the various pressures which now are operating against it.

VIII

In order to dramatize the GRC in its new role various lines of action will need to be vigorously pursued.

(1) The GRC should make clear that, so far as it is concerned, and on a basis of de facto reciprocity, it will conduct itself as though there were an armistice along the line of present division, and indeed would be willing itself to conclude such an armistice.

(2) There should be reemphasis on what the Gimo has already declared—that the GRC will not attempt forcibly to return on the Mainland unless invited by Chinese elements there that are respectable in their quantity and responsible in their quality.

(3) There will be an avoidance of commando raids, and like provocations and of overflights.

(4) So far as the offshore islands are concerned, the GRC recognize the danger of opposing military forces being in close proximity (e.g., demilitarized zone along Korean and Vietnam armistice lines). It will accept any solution which seems dependably to assure that the civilian population will neither be turned over to Communists or uprooted. The GRC does not intend to use these islands for its own prosecution of the civil war, e.g., for blockading the Ports of Amoy and Foochow, or "jumping off" to the Mainland.

(5) The character, and perhaps the size, of military forces of the GRC should be reviewed in an effort to achieve greater mobility with, perhaps, smaller numbers and less burden on the people of Taiwan. However, it is recognized that these adjustments cannot readily be made under fire.

The foregoing are *negative* acts. In addition there should be *positive* acts designed to dramatize the shift of effort to assure the survival of Chinese civilization. It should seek solid yet dramatic ways to cast itself in the role of the custodian of China's real greatness. There should be increasing emphasis on Chinese education, art and other aspects of Chinese culture.

Thus the GRC can better thwart the materialistic efforts of the CPR on the Mainland; can be a symbol which the Mainland Chinese will observe and envy; can attract more lasting support on Taiwan; can better hold the loyalty of overseas Chinese; and can make itself into something which not only the US but the free peoples everywhere will want to sustain and cherish.

A role on the China Mainland is more apt to come as a by-product of this new sense of mission than if such a Mainland role is looked on as something that needs to be urgently pursued and soon realized as the only alternative to extinction.

IX

It is essential that a shift of emphasis to the new mission should be authentic. It is nothing that can be imposed, but should come from the mind and spirit of the free Chinese themselves.

There is nothing novel about such an evolution. There have been comparable evolutions in many great institutions, notably that of Christianity.

Such evolutions, when responsive to the needs of the time, are not retreats, but advances. They assure continuing vitality, or the alternative to extinction.

197. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–18 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 21, 1958, 4 p.m.

PRESENT

President Chiang Kai-shek
The Honorable John Foster Dulles
Ambassador George Yeh (Interpreter)

I spoke along the general lines of the attached talking paper—points I–VII inclusive.[1] I did not discuss points VIII and IX, saying that I thought it better to postpone until tomorrow any concrete lines of action. With this the Generalissimo agreed.

I added that no doubt from time to time the USG and its members do or say things that the GRC does not like. However, it should be appreciated that this is done not with any desire to drive a wedge between us but because of the imperative need of winning popular support both in the US and with allied governments for our policy. No single person, even President Eisenhower, can under our system carry out a foreign policy unaided. There is a desperate need for public support.

The Generalissimo in his response said that he never mistrusted the purpose of sincerity of the US. He did feel that there was misunderstanding of him and lack of confidence in him. He hoped that this visit would enable us to clear our minds and to agree on basic principles which would guide our policy. Possibly presentations would be different in our different countries but the essence would be the same. I asked whether he had in mind making some sort of a joint declaration. He said no, that he thought in the main our decisions should be private. The President went on to explain that he thought that if we agreed on the principles, then it would be possible to reach agreement on the methods. He did not want a world war in order to free the Chinese people on the Mainland. He himself was a revolutionary. He realized that you could not have a revolution merely by force. What was required was popular support. If

---

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at President Chiang's residence. The source text, initialed by Dulles, incorrectly bears the notation "REAT MC–9," but other copies subsequently made and duplicated for the files are labeled REAT MC–18 (Taiwan). REAT was the document designator for the Secretary's trip to Rome, England, Alaska, and Taiwan. (Attached to the source text; also *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136)

[1] The talking paper used by Dulles is printed as Document 196. The paper attached to the source text is a copy of sections I–VII of that document, with Dulles' handwritten revisions incorporated. Copies of the talking paper attached to other copies of the memorandum of conversation in Department of States files do not include those revisions.

force alone was used, that was "aggression", not revolution. He said that we had agreed together on the principle of not attacking the Mainland by air. That was hard for them but they accepted it because they agreed with us on the principle of not taking action which might precipitate a world war. There was no desire to put the US on the spot. He above all wanted more of our confidence. He felt that even the Eisenhower Administration lacked trust in him. I said that I hoped that he was not referring to me. There was no one in the world that I would trust more implicitly than he, once he had given his word. I did not disguise the fact that there were many people, some on Taiwan, who thought that the GRC, not necessarily the President himself, were trying to involve us in war as a means of returning to the Mainland. I personally defended the Generalissimo whenever I had the opportunity. The President indicated that he was aware of these suspicions which were generated at Taiwan and he made it clear that he bitterly resented them. He discussed briefly the tactics of the Communists, saying that these intermittent attacks were bad on morale; no one could settle down. He wondered what was the effect in the US of the present type of Communist propaganda saying that the troubles here were all due to us and that we should get out and let them settle their own difficulties. I said I thought this line would not have any particular effect because it was the same line that they had taken for years in relation to NATO. I asked whether the propaganda would have an effect here. He said he thought not on Taiwan, but it might have some little effect on Kinmen. He remarked incidentally that if Kinmen were lost, he thought the effect of that on the morale on Taiwan would be so serious that the defense of Taiwan itself would crumble.

At about 6:30 I said that I thought we should leave to get ready for dinner but that I hoped we could talk again tomorrow. He said he would hold the entire day at my disposition. I said we could fix an hour at dinner. We then joined the rest of the party.

JFD

198. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Taipei, October 21, 1958, 9 p.m.

Dulte 2. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: After spending bits of yesterday at Rome, at our air base outside of London with Selwyn Lloyd, at Eielson Base from which I bothered you, we finally brought the day to a close by arriving at Taiwan except of course by then we had lost Monday[1] at the date line.

I spent the morning being briefed by our military about the Quemoy situation. There is no clear verdict as to why the bombardment was resumed and just what it means. The majority view was that it probably did not presage a major effort to take the islands by assault but primarily an effort to get away from the weekly or biweekly "extensions" and to create and perpetuate a state of uncertainty which is bad for morale. The disposition here is not to respond by our convoying further supplies for the next few days to see what develops. The supply situation has been so improved as to make this seem acceptable to our military, at least from their standpoint. However, from the political standpoint we need to bear in mind that we had announced that the orders to the Seventh Fleet were to assist so long as there was interdiction fire, to cease assisting if the interdiction fire ceased but to resume assisting if the firing resumed. However, I think we can from a political standpoint wait two or three days although I would not for long think it wise to act as though we had been deterred by Communist threats.

This afternoon I had a long talk alone with Chiang, George Yeh being the only other person present as interpreter. I expounded our general philosophy about the true role of the Republic of China and the need to eliminate the fear of the world that it is a threat to the peace. I am not certain that I got my ideas adequately across. It is difficult to tell when working through an interpreter. I did not at this stage make any concrete suggestions, leaving that until later. The Generalissimo reaffirmed his philosophy about returning to the mainland and that it would not happen unless and until there was a real desire on the part of the people reflected by their revolution against their Communist oppressors. He pleaded for more trust and confidence on our part. I emphasized that he did have a trust and confidence of those who knew him but that his position had been so consistently misrepresented not only by the Communists but even by others that it was necessary to have some dramatic gestures from time to time to emphasize his desire for peace rather than

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2158. Secret; Priority.

[1] October 20.

for war. I am leaving now for a small dinner he is giving and then perhaps tomorrow we shall get down to some more concrete matters which will throw more light on whether or not my talk today had any real impact.

I trust that your talks with the voters[2] are more surely persuasive than my talk with the Generalissimo.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

[2] Congressional elections were to be held on November 4.

---

199. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–16 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 22, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

Secretary's Trip to Rome, England, Alaska and Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	President Chiang Kai-shek
Assistant Secretary Robertson	Premier Chen Cheng
Ambassador Drumright	Foreign Minister Huang
	Ambassador Yeh
	President Secretary-General Chang Chun

SUBJECT

The Role of the Republic of China in the Free World

(*Note:* For the Secretary's paper referred to below see REAT MC–10,[1] which also refers to this conversation.)

Secretary Dulles initiated the conversation by asking the President for the latest information in regard to the status of the fighting at Kinmen. President Chiang replied that he had no recent news. At this point Premier Chen Chang interjected that firing had been resumed at 9:30 in the morning.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright. The conversation was held at President Chiang's residence.

[1] Reference should be to REAT MC–10a, Document 200.

President Chiang suggested that the discussions be resumed where he and Secretary Dulles had left off the evening before. The Secretary indicated this was agreeable with him. He then said that he had put down some thoughts on paper (see REAT MC–10). He had just asked Ambassador Yeh to read the paper and it was in Mr. Yeh's hand. The Secretary then inquired of the President as to what would be the best way to proceed with the discussion. The President, in reply, suggested that Ambassador Yeh give an oral translation of the paper. (Ambassador Yeh then proceeded to give a paragraph by paragraph oral translation of Secretary Dulles' paper.)

After Ambassador Yeh finished the translation, Secretary Dulles suggested that President Chiang might want time to have an opportunity to consider his paper. The Secretary then went on to suggest that if the President had any clarifying questions he wished to put, it might be well to do so at this juncture, then recess, and meet again after lunch. The President indicated that he had no questions at this time.

President Chiang then said that Secretary Dulles' arrival had coincided with the resumption by the Communists of the bombardment of Kinmen. He wished to ask Secretary Dulles if he had any views on how to handle this situation. The President considered it to be an urgent matter that needed to be dealt with. Secretary Dulles replied that, with the resumption of shelling, the situation should be dealt with in the same way as before the ceasefire. He said that the understandings and methods followed before are best designed to meet the situation confronting us now. He did not think it yet certain that the resumption of firing really represented a resumption of effort to take the offshore islands or was a part of a total Communist propaganda effort to take advantage of his visit to Taiwan. The Secretary added that, unless the Communists made an effort within the next two or three days to seize Kinmen, he believed that the GRC and the U.S. should revert for the time being to the procedures they had employed prior to cessation of the shelling.

The Secretary then said that the United States is redeploying to the Taiwan area some of its naval strength which had gone to other places following the Communist ceasefire. The Secretary then said he believed that before his departure a joint statement of solidarity and purpose should be issued. Such statement should make clear that Communist resumption of fighting will not serve to separate the two sides but bring them closer together. President Chiang said that he was in agreement with the Secretary's suggestion.

In response to an inquiry from Premier Chen Cheng, Secretary Dulles said he wanted to make one point clear. He said there exist four countries in the world which are divided by Communist efforts: China, Korea, Viet-Nam, and Germany. In three of these countries the situation has been dealt with in such a way that there is some confidence of no resumption of fighting. Only in the case of China is there no armistice. While the Secretary was convinced that the Communists will not accept an armistice, the Republic of China must make clear that it is willing to accept a situation comparable to that in the other three divided countries. In short, the blame for disturbing the peace must be placed on the Communists and not on the Republic of China. The Secretary continued by saying that he wished to make it perfectly clear that he does not envisage that by adopting a peaceful role, the Republic of China should give up its mission to restore freedom to the mainland. For example, if, at the time of the Hungarian revolution there had been a Free Hungarian Government with legitimacy and military power in the vicinity of Hungary, it could have insured the success of the popular revolt which took place in Hungary. Similarly, the Secretary continued, the Republic of China could in his opinion play a decisive role when the inevitable revolt occurs on the mainland. But for the Republic of China to keep alive as a symbol of China with the support of the Free World, it must place itself in a posture where it will not provoke a world war. Unless proper steps are taken, what impends now is a move soon on the part of many Free World allies to withdraw recognition from the Republic of China and accord it to the Chinese Communists. This would enhance the prestige of the Chinese Communists, enable them to gain admission to the United Nations and thereby enhance Communist control of the mainland people. The Secretary then said he believed that in order to stop this trend and to maintain support of the Republic of China by most of the Free World, including countries like France, Canada, New Zealand and a number of Latin American Governments, it will be necessary for the Republic of China to take actions along the lines indicated in his paper.

At this point, President Chiang said that he would like to reserve his views on the Secretary's paper until he and his colleagues had had time to consider it. The President then said that as the Secretary knew, he is a revolutionary and his Government is a revolutionary government. As such, he and his Government attach a great importance to principles.

After some discussion it was agreed that the Chinese side would inform the American side later in the day of the time and place of a further meeting.

200. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–10a (Taiwan) Taipei, October 22, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

Secretary's Trip to Rome, England, Alaska and Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	President Chiang Kai-shek
Assistant Secretary Robertson	Premier Chen Cheng
Ambassador Drumright	Foreign Minister Huang
	Ambassador Yeh (Interpreter)
	Presidential Secretary-General Chang Chun

SUBJECT

The Role of the Republic of China in the Free World

At the meeting with President Chiang this morning Secretary read following statement and left copies with him:

"The great danger faced by the GRC is not primarily military but political. It stems from the world's longing for conditions of peace and the feeling shared by most of the free world countries that the relationship between the GRC and CPR not only endangers the peace but that the GRC *wants* it to endanger the peace and involve the US as the only means of returning to the mainland.

The two other 'civil' wars promoted by the Communists in Asia—the Korean war and the Indochina war—have been ended by armistices. In Europe Germany is divided but the Federal Republic has agreed not to attempt reunification by force. These three situations have involved considerable sacrifices but these sacrifices have been accepted in the interest of peace.

In the case of the China civil war there has been no armistice. Both sides claim the right to resume fighting. Fighting has gone on intermittently and is going on at the present time.

There is the deep desire on the part of the free world nations to see this 'trouble spot' liquidated in some way and they look to the GRC to be willing to make a contribution to this end. We believe that the willingness of the GRC to respond will largely determine whether or not the GRC can hold its own in the political battle now being waged, a battle in which the position of the GRC has been deteriorating because it is made to appear as a civil war survival essentially militaristic in its outlook.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. The text was transmitted to the Department in Dulte 4 from Taipei, October 22. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/10–2858)

It seems to us that there is a great and assured future for the GRC if it makes clear to the world its recognition that the bases for GRC counterattack against the mainland are not in the armed might of the GRC or in its offshore island positions but rather in the minds and souls of the 600 million Chinese people on the mainland who hope and pray for delivery from their present bondage. They derive hope and are sustained during these dark days by the very existence of the free Chinese Government and the preservation by that government of the culture and tradition of the Chinese people. The GRC helps to keep alive the flame of freedom within the world's largest nation.

The real battleground between freedom and Communism is in men's minds. That is where our campaign should be centered. That is where the battles can be won. The GRC is unwilling to retreat and surrender more peoples to Chinese Communist rule. But on the other hand it is peace-loving and does not desire to be responsible for having the world consumed in flames.

The GRC recognizes that the militaristic image of itself largely held abroad is false. It will act to transform that unattractive image into one that all free peoples will welcome and support.

Among the acts which might be taken in an effort to dramatize the larger and enduring role of the GRC are the following:

(1) The GRC should make clear that, so far as it is concerned, and on a basis of de facto reciprocity, it will conduct itself as though there were an armistice along the line of present division, and indeed would be willing itself to conclude such an armistice.

(2) There should be re-emphasis on what the Generalissimo has already indicated—that the GRC will not initiate an attempt forcibly to return on the mainland.

(3) There will be an avoidance of commando raids, and like provocations and of overflights.

(4) So far as the offshore islands are concerned, the GRC recognize the danger of opposing military forces being in close proximity (e.g., demilitarized zone along Korean and Vietnam armistice lines). It will accept any solution which seems dependably to assure that the islands will not be turned over to the Communists or its civilian population uprooted. The GRC does not intend to use these islands for its own prosecution of the civil war, e.g., for blockading the ports of Amoy and Foochow, or 'jumping off' to the mainland.

(5) The character and the size of military forces of the GRC on the offshore islands and indeed generally will be reviewed from a military standpoint in an effort to achieve greater mobility. However, it is recognized that these adjustments cannot readily be made under fire.

The foregoing are *negative* acts. In addition there should be *positive* acts designed to dramatize the shift of effort to assure the survival of Chinese civilization. It should seek valid yet dramatic ways to cast itself in the role of the custodian of China's real greatness. There should be increasing emphasis on Chinese education, art and other aspects of Chinese culture.

Thus the GRC can better thwart the materialistic efforts of the CPR on the mainland; can be a symbol which the mainland Chinese will observe and envy; can attract more lasting support on Taiwan; can better hold the loyalty of overseas Chinese; and can make itself into something which not only the US but the free peoples everywhere will want to sustain and cherish."

After the Secretary briefly elaborated on this, the President suggested recess to give him time to consider it.

John Foster Dulles[1]

---

[1] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

201. Summary Record of Meeting

REAT MC–11 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 22, 1958, 1 p.m.

Secretary's Trip to Rome, England, Alaska and Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State	Vice Admiral Smoot
Assistant Secretary Robertson	General White[2]
Ambassador Drumright	Major General Doan
General Taylor[1]	Brigadier General Bonesteel[3]

SUBJECT

Troop Strength on Off-Shore Islands

The Secretary outlined his presentation to the Generalissimo.

Admiral Smoot and General Doan described a plan, which General Doan had found had the agreement of the Ministry of National Defense, for reducing the number of troops on Quemoy by a total of about 17,000 men. This plan envisages withdrawal of one full division of 12,000 men and reduction of 1,000 men from each of the remaining six divisions.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Greene. The conversation was held at the U.S. Embassy.

[1] General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, visited Taiwan October 21–23. He had planned to visit Taiwan October 22–25 in the course of a trip to several Asian countries, but his visit was rescheduled to coincide with Dulles'.

[2] General Isaac D. White, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific.

[3] Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Secretary of the General Staff, U.S. Army.

General Doan noted that it is not proposed to put this plan into effect immediately, in the present circumstances.

General Taylor noted that study is also being given the possibility of improving the artillery on the islands, including the possible addition of about 12 240 mm howitzers on Quemoy. In response to his question, the Secretary suggested that the howitzers be provided only in return for GRC agreement to reduce the total troop strength on Quemoy by between 15,000 and 20,000 men; the details of how this reduction might be accomplished the Secretary left for military determination. The Secretary also agreed that the howitzers could be put in position on the islands before an agreed troop reduction is completed, although not before agreement with the GRC on the reduction is reached. He said he is willing to take the risk that this might lead to non-fulfillment of the agreement.

---

202. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Taipei, October 22, 1958, 2 p.m.

Dulte 5. Re Dulte 3 and Tedul 6.[1] In consultation with Admiral Smoot and General Taylor, and after informing GRC, Ambassador is issuing statement quoting October 8 statement in full and adding, "I am authorized by the Secretary of State to say that the policy and purpose of the United States remains as set forth in that October 8 statement."

At the Secretary's suggestion Admiral Smoot is communicating with CNO re ordering resumption escort activity "forthwith to extent necessary". As Secretary has told Admiral Smoot he considers (1) it desirable await developments re shelling offshore islands in next few days or for as long as Secretary here, before deciding whether to resume escort; (2) if shelling continues after Secretary departs, escort activity should then be resumed.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2258. Secret; Niact.

[1] Dulles stated in Dulte 3 from Taipei, October 21, that he proposed to recall a U.S. statement of October 8 and to say that it still was valid. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–2158) The statement issued by the Department of State on October 8 declared, inter alia, that if Chinese Communist attacks were resumed, U.S. escort activity would be "resumed forthwith to the extent necessary." For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* p. 1174. Tedul 6 to Taipei, October 21, stated that the Department and Admiral Burke agreed that this would be useful. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2158)

203. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–16 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 22, 1958, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Drumright
Foreign Minister Huang

SUBJECT

The Role of the Republic of China in the Free World

Foreign Minister Huang made the following comments with regard to the statement the Secretary left with the Generalissimo at the morning meeting (see MC–10):[1]

With reference to the views expressed by Secretary Dulles at the meeting held on the morning of October 22, the Chinese Government is aware of the Free World's longing for peace and the difficulties confronting the Republic of China arising from certain misconceptions by countries which do not have the correct appraisal of the issues at stake and which are inclined to buy peace at any price, especially when the price is at other people's expense.

As has been pointed out by leaders of the U.S. Government, the often-repeated Chinese Communist declaration, like Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and The Tanaka Memorial, have made it crystal clear that what they are aiming at is not only the seizure of the offshore islands or even the elimination of Free China, but the wholesale expulsion of the U.S. from the Western Pacific, thereby to secure the domination of Asia. The continued occupation of the Chinese Mainland by the Chinese Communists is indeed a source of aggression to all countries in the region. The Republic of China serves as a strong deterrent against such aggression.

It would be a travesty of justice to consider the maintenance and defense of its legality and territorial integrity by the Republic of China against the aggressive actions of the rebel regime as a source of irritation affecting peace.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese Government has demonstrated its intense desire for peace by exercising almost superhuman self-restraint in the face of Communist provocations. Instead of delivering effective counter-blows to the enemy in return for his savage attacks, we have

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright.

[1] Reference should be to REAT MC–10a, Document 200.

gone out of our way to declare that the offshore islands would not be used as a springboard to assault the mainland. In order to show our genuine desire for peace and our deference to free-world public opinion, it may be pointed out that it has always been the Chinese Communists who have provoked tension and hostilities in the Taiwan Strait. We are even prepared not to oppose a de facto cease fire as long as the Communists would not disturb the peace. No self-respecting government can do more than this without forfeiting its birthright.

The suggestion advanced by Secretary Dulles appears to be of such a nature as almost to shake the foundation of the Republic of China. It is tantamount to a voluntary announcement by this Government of its acceptance of the "Two China" idea. This would at once alienate the support of all Chinese, especially those on the mainland who hope for eventual deliverance from Communist tyranny. The faith and hope of these Chinese people must be kept alive and nurtured at all costs. The Republic of China would not be worthy of its existence were it to lose the confidence and loyalty of the freedom-loving Chinese people. We naturally attach great importance to the sympathy and support of the free-world nations, which are essential for the maintenance of our international position. In the last analysis, however, the raison d'etre and the future of the Republic of China lie in the millions of Chinese people who look upon it as the rallying point of their efforts in restoring freedom and democracy to China. Any indication by this Government which suggests its contentment with its present status of exile and its willingness to see such a state of affairs perpetuated could only be construed as the abandonment of its ultimate objective on which the Free Chinese have been pinning their hopes. This would be suicidal. We value our international position and we are conscious of the precariousness of our diplomatic front. Nevertheless, we are confronted with the choice between the loss of support of our own people and the loss of support of some foreign governments. We would not hesitate to accept the consequences of the latter situation, however painful it may be. The Chinese Government appreciates Secretary Dulles' suggestion that we should redouble our efforts on education, art and other aspects of Chinese culture. This we have been doing and shall continue to do. Our primary concern, however, must be the preservation and strengthening of the foundation of this Government.

The above is the initial reaction to Secretary Dulles' latest proposal which will be examined on the basis of these fundamental principles.

204. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–17 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 22, 1958, 7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary	President Chiang Kai-shek
Mr. Robertson	Ambassador Yeh
Ambassador Drumright	

SUBJECTS

Communiqué
Defense of Quemoy
Use of Nuclear Weapons

(*Note:* See also REAT MC–13)[1]

Ambassador Yeh opened the conversation by asserting that rumors of a "rift" between the Republic of China and United States were circulating in press circles. Mr. Robertson stated that he had spiked these rumors at the conference he had held during the afternoon for the press.[2]

Secretary Dulles referred to the desirability of the issuance of a joint communiqué on conclusion of the talks and said that Ambassador Drumright had handed a proposed draft[3] to Foreign Minister Huang when he had seen the Minister earlier in the afternoon. He hoped that the Chinese side would study the draft and make any suggestions it deemed advisable. Ambassador Yeh observed that he thought the Foreign Minister would have some suggestions in connection with Paragraph 6 of the draft communiqué.[4] President Chiang observed humorously that he could not read the English language, but understood that Mr. Dulles had prepared the draft joint communiqué, and if that were so, it "must be good".

Secretary Dulles invited President Chiang's views as to how to proceed henceforth with the discussions; he expressed the view that it might be necessary to hold a long meeting the next morning.

President Chiang observed that it was possible that Chinese Communists had resumed firing on Kinmen as a salute or token of welcome

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright. The conversation was held at President Chiang's residence.

[1] A summary memorandum of the conversation by Greene. (*Ibid.*)

[2] The transcript of the background briefing which Robertson had held that afternoon is *ibid.*)

[3] Attachment 1 to a memorandum for the record by Greene; see Document 208.

[4] For paragraph 6 of the draft communiqué, see Document 208.

to Secretary Dulles. The President went on to say that the present Communist pattern of operations will probably continue, that is, firing awhile and stop and then resume firing. The President regarded this as a typical Communist way of attempting to paralyze the morale of the opposing side by tightening the grip on the opponent's nerves and then loosening up. In the long run, if the Communists are allowed to alternate hold-fire with shelling, the Republic of China side will suffer more than is commonly realized. The effect on the general morale of the people, the economy, et cetera, would be adverse. The Communists employ two tactics, "fight and talk, talk and fight, fire and cease-fire". The President described these as part of the tactics of the cold war.

Continuing, the President said he hoped that Secretary Dulles would find time to study the military aspects of the situation. The Republic of China, he observed, must find some way to strengthen its defenses—military and civilian—so as to offset the possible effects of Communist tactics on the morale of the population and the armed forces. The President said that when the Communists announced their first ceasefire he had sent representatives to Kinmen to inquire how the defenders felt about the cessation of firing. The reply was that the defenders preferred a straight fight to "stop and start" fighting. The President added that this attitude was especially true when the Communists resorted to the use of propaganda appeals over their loudspeakers. These Communist tactics wear down the nerve of the defenders and have an adverse effect on the defending forces. Some of his forces on Kinmen, the President observed, feel as though they were in prison. Alternation of fighting with cessation of fighting and the tension of waiting for resumption of the attack are particularly tiring and wear down troops, the President observed. The President said if the Communists employ these tactics for three or four months, they will have a cumulative bad effect on the defenders.

At this point Secretary Dulles asked what steps the President proposed to take to cope with this situation. The President replied that the most effective immediate method would be to strengthen the defenses with more guns so that the enemy positions could be silenced. Secretary Dulles responded that the United States is considering the provision of more guns, adding, however, that he knew of no one in the U.S. military establishment who believed that conventional weapons could be used to knock out deeply emplaced guns. Only nuclear guns could do that job effectively. The Secretary then asked the President whether he wanted the United States to use nuclear weapons.

The President replied that he believed that it would not be necessary to use nuclear weapons; however, he believed that the use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable. In response to this suggestion, the Secretary observed that there is no tactical atomic weapon in existence which could be used at Kinmen to knock out enemy gun emplacements that would not have the power of the Hiroshima or Nagaski bombs. The use of such a weapon at Kinmen would kill millions of people. There would be a heavy fissionable fall-out if bombs exploded in or on the ground. The danger lies not in the size of the bomb but in how it is exploded. If an atomic bomb is exploded on or in the ground, then there would inevitably be a heavy loss of human life. On the other hand if an atomic bomb was exploded in the air, the explosion would have no effect on gun positions.

The President observed that he was neither an artillery nor a nuclear expert. He accordingly suggested that this problem be left for study. He said that what he wanted to do was to stress the importance of finding a way to deter the Communist tactic of alternating fire with ceasefire. His forces at Kinmen had been allowed to suffer too long. Their patience would wear out, they would lose their martial spirit, or would attempt to retaliate against the enemy or create disturbances or trouble. In reply, the Secretary observed that aerial bombing and artillery bombardment are not effective and are like using a pea gun to attack a stone wall. The President said he agreed that air bombardment is no good. He then said he wanted to restress the importance of the psychological or morale impact on the troops at Kinmen. In other words, some positive action is needed to maintain their spirit and morale. At this point, the President said that he is not familiar with nuclear physics and would not have an appreciation of the effect of A fall-out and other aspects of nuclear bombing.

The Secretary said that to knock out guns in and around Kinmen would probably kill *very many*[5] people. In response to this statement, the President said that as a matter of principle, he would not want to use nuclear weapons if their use would start a world war or involve the United States in large-scale hostilities. In such contingencies, he would say that they should not be used. At this point the President said he wanted to mention again the fact that he had been unable to find a solution to the Kinmen problem. Accordingly, he would like to have American experts go into the problem. Secretary Dulles responded that there is no satisfactory way to take out Communist guns by use of conventional weapons; only nuclear weapons had this capacity. The use of nuclear weapons would involve Taiwan and if nuclear weapons were used to attack Taiwan, there would be nothing left of Taiwan.[6]

---

[5] Another copy of the memorandum of conversation reads "twenty million" rather than "very many." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

[6] Greene's summary of the conversation states that Dulles subsequently authorized Drumright to arrange for an authoritative military briefing on this subject for Chiang.

At this point the President observed that the Republic of China might be obliged to initiate and sustain bombing of lines of communication to stop the influx of supplies to the Communists in the Amoy area. In reply, Secretary Dulles said that the United States hopes to find and make available certain artillery which could help the defenders to some extent; in this context he would mention guns which would be capable of blasting causeways, bridges, et cetera. In response, the President said he hoped that the problem could be studied. Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed the problem with General Taylor that morning, adding that it would be studied by the United States military authorities.. The President said there was one important thing to remember. The United States tells the Republic of China not to do this or that, but there is a limit to what can be told to the Kinmen defenders. If their patience is too sorely tried, they might get out of control. In response the Secretary said that the best solution would be to have an armistice as in Korea and Germany. The trouble here is that there is a little fighting going on at Kinmen sporadically. The real problem is how to stop the fighting and have this situation maintained on a long term basis.

At this point the President asked to be excused to greet guests who had arrived for the dinner party to be given in the Secretary's honor.[7]

---

[7] Greene's summary of the conversation states: "After dinner there was a brief discussion of the proposed communiqué; the Chinese made a number of suggestions, particularly with reference to paragraph six."

---

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, October 22, 1958, 8:25 p.m.

502. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for 82nd meeting:

Our preliminary appraisal is that Chinese Communist Defense Ministry statement October 20 cancelling bombardment suspension order and subsequent shelling of Quemoy does not presage resumption large-scale continuing attack. Fire though heavy described as sporadic and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Lutkins and Frank Boas of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems; cleared in draft by Becker, in substance by Reinhardt, by Parsons and Martin, and in draft with OSD; and approved by Herter. Repeated to USUN and to Taipei.

desultory. With respect to Chinese Communist charges, LSD accompanied by one destroyer was engaged night 19–20 October in retrieving amphibious craft from Quemoy. No supply craft were unloaded and two vessels approached no closer than 15 miles to Quemoy. Two other destroyers named by Chinese Communists could have been in general area but not involved in operation. While Chinese Communists may have felt obliged retaliate against what they regarded as open defiance of their suspension of fire announcement, seems much more likely they have merely been waiting for pretext to demonstrate that ceasefire cannot be taken for granted and to try to cause rift in GRC–US relations. Secretary's trip Taiwan may have prompted them act at this particular time. This Chicom action probably represents move of essentially political rather than military nature which may be repeated from time to time in continuing de facto truce situation with intention of maintaining sense of tension and keeping pressure on US and GRC. Thrust of your presentation this meeting should be on one hand to condemn Chinese Communists' resumption of attack on Quemoy and express hope it will be short lived and on other hand vigorously to deny Chinese Communist charges US intrusions, including strong refutation validity their territorial waters and airspace claims.

Your presentation should be along following lines: On October 20 artillery bombardment of Quemoy resumed following Chinese Communist statements alleging US military escort operations to within six miles of Quemoy. This is distortion of truth; actual facts are as follows. Night 19–20 October US LSD was engaged in retrieving landing craft from Quemoy; did not escort any supply vessels and at no time approached closer than 15 miles to Quemoy. No US destroyer escorted LSD; any US destroyers in that area of Taiwan Straits engaged in normal operations in international waters. US deplores this unprovoked reversion by Chinese Communists to military force, particularly that it should have occurred apparently by intent, at very time when US Secretary of State enroute Taiwan on mission of peace. All who love peace cannot but condemn this Chicom action which is clearly designed to prevent an easing of tensions in the Straits and defies hopes of entire world for peaceful settlement of dispute in Taiwan area: While the world can only hope that this resumption of fighting will be short lived, it is becoming clearer and clearer that a relaxation of tensions in the Straits is not in accordance with Chicom wishes.

Since Chinese Communists' original ceasefire declaration October 6 they have repeatedly issued statements accusing US warships and aircraft of intruding into their territorial waters and airspace. US categorically denies that any such intrusions have taken place. In this connection you instructed reiterate that Government of US cannot accept Chinese Communist declaration of September 4, 1958 that "Extent of territorial waters of PRC been set at 12 nautical miles."[1] This declaration is clear violation of widely accepted principles of international law and also contradicts para 5 of Chinese Communists' proposed agreed announcement of September 15, 1958.[2]

Legal validity of three mile limit recognized by United Nations International Law Commission when it stated in report covering work of its seventh session that "international law does not require states to recognize a breadth (of territorial sea) beyond 3 miles." [U.N.Doc. A/2934, p. 16][3] US considers this to be correct statement of legal situation and denies that there is any obligation on part of states adhering to 3 mile rule to recognize claims on part of other states to greater breadth of territorial sea.

Position of United States concerning breadth of territorial sea determined by its attitude toward doctrine of freedom of seas. There is no doctrine of international law more universally recognized than principle that high seas are res nullius and that no part of them can be unilaterally appropriated by any state to its own use without the concurrence of other states.

At recent UN Conference on Law of Sea, position of US stated as follows:

"...3 mile rule is established international law; that it is only breadth of territorial waters on which there has ever been anything like common agreement; and that unilateral acts of states claiming greater territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international law, but are indeed in conflict with universally accepted principle of freedom of seas.[4]

There is universal agreement that each state is entitled to a territorial sea of a breadth of 3 miles or one marine league. But this cannot be said of any claim to a greater breadth, each of which claims has been protested by many states."

Chinese Communist declaration September 4 unilaterally claiming territorial sea of twelve miles is completely inconsistent with Chinese Communist proposed agreed announcement of September 15, 1958, which states: "... that freedom and security of navigation on and flight above the high seas in the Taiwan Straits must be insured." Freedom of navigation on high seas means the essential liberty of maritime transportation and communication unfettered by requirement of consent by any foreign state. This principle is clearly violated by Chinese Communist declaration extending territorial waters to breadth of 12 nautical miles coupled with statement that:

"C—Without permission of Government of People's Republic of China, no airplane or military vessel of any foreign country shall enter territorial waters of China or skies above such territorial waters. All foreign ships navigating in territorial waters of China must observe related laws and ordinances of Government of People's Republic of China."

---

[1] See footnote 4, Document 66.

[2] See Document 91.

[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4] All ellipses are in the source text.

It is a well-established principle of international law that laws and ordinances of coastal state may not extend beyond three mile limit except for very special and limited purposes.

It is likewise well-established that a country is not free to choose whether its territorial sea will be measured from low water mark on the coast, the normal baseline, or whether it will use as baseline straight lines connecting salient points or offshore islands. Straight baseline method is permissible only in circumstances and subject to criteria set forth in Article 4 of Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone adopted by recent Geneva Conference on Law of Sea.[5] It is clear that Chinese coast along which straight lines described in statement of September 4, 1958 are drawn does not conform to geographic conditions set forth in Article 4. Still less is there any legal basis for drawing straight baselines from outermost points on a group of islands and claiming waters thereby enclosed as internal waters. Similar attempts by other countries to claim as internal waters large areas of high seas within groups of islands or archipelagoes have been protested by many countries. Straight baselines described in statement of September 4, 1958 are regarded by US as completely arbitrary and without any basis in recognized international law.

Chinese Communist declaration unilaterally extending width of territorial waters constitutes encroachment on freedom of high seas and concomitant freedom to fly over high seas of world which belongs to all peoples and states alike. This freedom denied entirely in air space over those waters now designated as territorial by Chinese Communists. Since there is no right of innocent passage for aircraft over territorial seas as distance from right of innocent passage for vessels through such seas, any extension of territorial waters beyond three miles results pro tanto in diminishing freedom of flight.

Chinese Communist representative at last meeting declared that peaceful solution to dangerous situation in Taiwan Straits could only be achieved by negotiation on basis Chinese Communist proposal September 22. This proposal embodies completely one-sided and distorted approach to problem, implying that US responsible for tension in Taiwan Straits area and requiring that all US armed forces in area be withdrawn. Chinese Communists on other hand would not be committed under proposed announcement to cease their threat and use of force in area which provoked present crisis. As stated before and now reiterated proposal wholly unacceptable to US and cannot provide basis for meaningful discussion.

---

[5] Adopted on April 27, 1958; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 264–269.

Obvious that international dispute does exist, not one limited to presence of US forces in area as maintained by Chinese Communists but one caused by Chinese Communist resort to force in attempt realize territorial claims. As international dispute it should be susceptible of resolution by means commonly employed to deal with such disputes. US has expressed its readiness to seek solution through various such means including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement. If Chinese Communist representative sincerely prepared to work for negotiated settlement rather than merely reiterate unacceptable demands for unconditional surrender, he should respond to this US initiative or make some constructive alternative proposal.[6]

FYI. Purpose of Secretary's trip Taiwan is to explore all aspects of public opinion problem faced by US and GRC and attempt agree on lines of action best calculated preserve and strengthen support for Free China.

Herter

---

[6] Telegram 508 to Warsaw, October 23, modified the guidance in this telegram. It stated that after presenting the U.S. legal position on international waters, Beam should stress that in actual practice U.S. vessels on normal patrol had kept well out in international waters. It suggested that he begin his presentation by deploring "unprovoked reversion by Chicoms to military force" and that the information regarding LSD operations set forth in paragraph 2 of this telegram be given only if Wang inquired. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2258; see Supplement)

---

206. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–14 (Taiwan) Taipei, October 23, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

Secretary's Trip to Rome, England, Alaska and Taiwan

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary	Premier Chen Cheng
Mr. Robertson	Foreign Minister Huang
Ambassador Drumright	Ambassador Yeh

SUBJECT

China's Representation at United Nations

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Confidential. Drafted by Greene. The conversation was held at President Chiang's residence.

The first hour of this meeting (which started at 9:30 a.m.) was devoted to discussion with the Premier, the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Yeh of the draft communiqué.

During one interlude the Secretary asked Ambassador Yeh about the origin of the use of the name "The Republic of China" in Article 23 of the United Nations Charter.[1] Mr. Yeh said that this had originated in the Chinese Delegation at San Francisco. He explained that there had been two Communist members of the Delegation who had tried to have reference to China worded so that the Communist Government, which even at that time had already been formed, could claim that it was entitled to "China's" seat in the United Nations. The National Government's Delegation had devised the phrase "Republic of China" as a means of forestalling this move and the Communist members of the Delegation had accepted it.

Discussing this matter further, the Secretary said he wondered whether we could continue now to treat the China representation question in the United Nations as one of credentials or whether it should not be treated as one of admission of a new member. Ambassador Yeh objected that this sort of reasoning came too close to implying a "two China" theory; the Secretary disagreed with this but the discussion was inconclusive on the point.

---

[1] Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; for text, see 3 Bevans 1153.

---

207. Memorandum of Conversation

REAT MC–15 [(Taiwan)] Taipei, October 23, 1958, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

President Chiang Kai-shek
The Honorable John Foster Dulles
Ambassador George Yeh (Interpreter)

I said that I desired to discuss further my talking paper which I presented the morning before with particular relationship to the defense of

---

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at President Chiang's residence. Other copies are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136.

the offshore islands. I felt that while such defense should be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, the whole fate of Free China should not be identified with the holding of a few square miles of real estate located in a highly vulnerable position. The President had said that if Quemoy was lost, that would carry with it the loss of Taiwan and the end of Free China. I did not think that this relationship ought to be accepted. I recall that when the Generalissimo was defending Free China against the Japanese he did not identify his cause with Peking, and Nanking, or Hankow, or even Chungking. Great causes are not to be identified with the holding of particular territorial positions.

The President replied that in his opinion Taiwan could not be held long after Quemoy fell. He said that there were plenty of Communist agents on Taiwan and that they would see to it that the authority of the Government was so damaged by the loss of Quemoy that it could not long survive. There had been reports that the Chinese Communists were willing to make a deal whereby they would, in exchange for the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, agree not to use force against Taiwan for five years. They would not need five years. The Government could not survive five months. He went on to say that he could "guarantee" the successful defense of Quemoy given the level of assistance which the US was rendering. I said that while I had great respect for the military judgment of the Gimo, I did not think that anybody could "guarantee" the indefinite defense of an island situated as was Quemoy.

The President raised the question of whether measures could be taken to limit the attacking power of the Communists and to end their "on again-off again" tactics which were very disturbing to morale. I pointed out again, as I had the prior evening, that it was highly dubious that the Communist fire power could be substantially diminished by conventional fire whether from ground, ships or planes, and that the only effective measure was the use of nuclear weapons with ground bursts and that this would not really defend Quemoy but probably lead to the obliteration of all the inhabitants through lethal fallout.

The President said that my references to the Mainland fighting are not relevant because at that time they had plenty of land to trade for time. I then recalled Churchill's statement that they would fight on the beaches, etc., but that if the British Isles were conquered, they would still go on fighting from any overseas positions that were available. He had not identified the survival of Free England with holding even any part of the British Isles.

I then brought up the question of the size of the garrison on Quemoy and hoped that this could be reduced both as a political gesture and also a gesture which was consistent with sound military policy. The President indicated that he would be prepared to move in this direction if there were a suspension of hostilities. It was virtually impossible for him to do so under fire. I said that I understood that plans were being discussed for a change in the number and character of divisions and for some improvement of weapons which would reduce the Quemoy garrison by between 15,000 to 20,000 persons. I said that I hoped an opportunity could be found shortly to bring this about.

The President said that he wished me to convey to President Eisenhower the assurance of his complete loyalty and of his determination to cooperate in any views we might hold. He would however hope that as part of such cooperation there could be consultation so that the GRC point of view would be at least taken into account before decisions were made. He did not insist that the GRC point of view be accepted but only that it should at least be considered. After that they are prepared to go along. He did however hope we would not do anything which would tend to depreciate his prestige and hurt him before his people. (The reference was, I think, to some recent press conference statements by the President and myself.) I said that I would convey this assurance and I was sure it would be received with gratification by President Eisenhower and that we would hope to cooperate fully in confidence and with adequate consultation. I said that press conferences were difficult because questions were put with the deliberate purpose of creating a predicament whichever way the answer was. I hope, however, that the considered state papers would be regarded as more authoritative than impromptu responses to "loaded" questions at a press conference.

I expressed the view that I thought a very important milestone had been passed by the position to be publicly announced by the GRC in its communiqué shifting the emphasis from military to political efforts vis-à-vis the Mainland. I felt that it was essential that free world countries, while always being willing to accept war rather than retreat, should not use or risk war as an instrument of promoting their own policies. There was perhaps in this respect a "double standard" but that the free world nations did have a higher standard than the Communists and it was necessary to live up to this standard. I felt that the position of the GRC to be expressed in the communiqué, particularly if it was followed up by deeds, would help to maintain free world support for the GRC.

JFD

---

208. Editorial Note

An undated memorandum for the record by Greene with seven attachments documents the background of the communiqué issued at Taipei at 2 p.m. on October 23, 1958 (Document 209).

Attachment (1) to Greene's memorandum is the draft cited in footnote 3, Document 204. Attachment (2), headed "Addendum", unsigned and undated, reads as follows:

> "In the discussion of paragraph six after dinner on the evening of October 22, Ambassador Yeh, after conferring with the Gimo, conveyed the Chinese suggestion that the phrase 'will never itself initiate war', be amended to read 'will never itself initiate general war'.
>
> "On subsequent and separate consideration the Secretary and his advisers were not willing to accept this change. It was during the next discussion with the Chinese of paragraph six that the phrase in either form was dropped and the Chinese version of paragraph six agreed upon."

Attachment (3) is described in Greene's memorandum as "Secretary's redrafts, on the basis of (2), of alternative language for several paragraphs, which Secretary took to meeting at 9:30 a.m., October 23." The draft of paragraph 6 reads as follows:

> "The two governments reaffirmed their dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled that the Treaty under which they are acting is a defensive treaty only. The Government of the Republic of China rejects the concept that its high mission as the representative of Free China is a mission of war. The Republic of China has no military bases for attacks upon the Mainland. Its bases are already on the Mainland, in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people. These it will seek to sustain by its conduct and example."

Attached to the draft material is a statement quoting from a declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1954, undertaking "never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany." For text of the declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, volume V, pages 1352–1353.

Attachment (4) consists of a typed draft with revisions and additions in Dulles' handwriting. It is described in Greene's memorandum as "Version showing changes worked out by Chinese and Secretary 9:30–10:30, October 23. The Chinese did not accept the versions of paragraph 6 suggested by the Secretary; the version in the Secretary's handwriting was largely suggested by the Chinese." The revised draft of paragraph 6 is identical with the penultimate paragraph of the communiqué.

Greene's memorandum describes attachment (5) as "Clean re-type of results of 3 & 4, which Secretary submitted to Gimo at 12:00 a.m. He suggested no changes." Attachment (6) is described as "Version of paragraph 2 showing last minute (12:30 p.m.) changes suggested by Chinese." The last sentence, before revision, reads: "It was recognized that the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, are defensively related to Taiwan and Penghu." This was revised in Dulles' handwriting to read: "It was recognized that under present conditions, the defense of the

Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu." Attachment (7) is a typed copy of the final version as authorized for release.

The memorandum and the attachments are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. All are in the Supplement.

---

209. Joint Communiqué

Taipei, October 23, 1958.

Consultations have been taking place over the past three days between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of China pursuant to Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty. These consultations had been invited by President Chiang Kai-shek. The following are among those who took part in the consultations:

For the Republic of China:

President Chiang Kai-shek
Vice President-Premier Chen Cheng
Secretary General to the President Chang Chun
Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Shao-ku
Ambassador to the United States George K.C. Yeh

For the United States of America:

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson
Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drumright

The consultations had been arranged to be held during the two weeks when the Chinese Communists had declared they would cease fire upon Quemoy. It had been hoped that, under these circumstances, primary consideration could have been given to measures which would have contributed to stabilizing an actual situation of non-militancy. However, on the eve of the consultations, the Chinese Communists, in violation of their declaration, resumed artillery fire against the Quemoys. It was recognized that under the present conditions the de-

---

Source: Department of State Press Release No. 634, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. No classification marking. Also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1184–1186.

fense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu.

The two Governments recalled that their Mutual Defense Treaty had had the purpose of manifesting their unity "so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific area." The consultations provided a fresh occasion for demonstrating that unity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their solidarity in the face of the new Chinese Communist aggression now manifesting itself in the bombardment of the Quemoys. This aggression and the accompanying Chinese Communist propaganda have not divided them, as the Communists have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them closer together. They believe that by unitedly opposing aggression they serve not only themselves but the cause of peace. As President Eisenhower said on September 11, the position of opposing aggression by force is the only position consistent with the peace of the world.

The two Governments took note of the fact that the Chinese Communists, with the backing of the Soviet Union, avowedly seek to conquer Taiwan, to eliminate Free China and to expel the United States from the Western Pacific generally, compelling the United States to abandon its collective security arrangements with free countries of that area. This policy cannot possibly succeed. It is hoped and believed that the Communists, faced by the proven unity resolution and strength of the Governments of the United States and the Republic of China, will not put their policy to the test of general war and that they will abandon the military steps which they have already taken to initiate their futile and dangerous policy.

In addition to dealing with the current military situation, the two Governments considered the broad and long-range aspects of their relationship.

The United States, its Government and its people, have an abiding faith in the Chinese people and profound respect for the great contribution which they have made and will continue to make to a civilization that respects and honors the individual and his family life. The United States recognizes that the Republic of China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations entertained by the great mass of the Chinese people.

The Government of the Republic of China declared its purpose to be a worthy representative of the Chinese people and to strive to preserve those qualities and characteristics which have enabled the Chinese to contribute so much of benefit to humanity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled that the treaty under which they are acting is defensive in character. The Government of the

Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force.

The consultations which took place permitted a thorough study and reexamination of the pressing problems of mutual concern. As such they have proved to be of great value to both Governments. It is believed that such consultations should continue to be held at appropriate intervals.

---

210. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Taipei, October 23, 1958, 3 p.m.

Dulte 7. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: We have just finished our 3 days of consultation. I think they have been very much worth while. It was not practical to bring about any immediate military changes because of the resumption of fighting but I think a groundwork has been laid. Most importantly in the communiqué we are issuing the Chinese Nationalists declared their dependence upon political ideals rather than upon force to liberate the peoples of the China mainland. We had great difficulty in getting them to accept or at least publicly announce this important shift in emphasis. It will, I think, have important applications over the future.

The Gimo accepted the principle of an appreciable reduction of forces on Quemoy to be effected whenever there was a suspension of the fighting. Understandably he feels that he cannot reduce while the fighting is on. He pledged his full cooperation to our policies asking only that before they are formulated he should be adequately consulted.

In a few minutes I will be taking our jet tanker [*liner*?] back and it will I gather get me to Washington almost as soon as this cable.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2358. Secret; Priority.

211. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower

Washington, October 24, 1958, 10:45 a.m.

1. I went over with the President the draft of the statement which I proposed to make to the press following our conference. The President went over this and made one or two minor changes. Thereupon Mr. Hagerty came in and I gave him a copy for mimeographing.[1]

2. I then submitted to the President the proposed letter from him to the Gimo. He made one minor change in drafting and authorized it to be sent.[2]

3. I then reported to the President at some length on my private talks with the Generalissimo. I pointed out that there was some considerable difficulty in getting the "non-force" declaration. I felt, however, that my talks with the Gimo about the non-use of force and also about the unsoundness of identifying his cause with two exposed pieces of real estate such as the Quemoys and the Matsus had had some effect. I did not see any possibility of his abandoning the islands, but I did think that if there were a period of lull the forces on Quemoy would be substantially reduced by between 15,000 and 20,000 persons pursuant to a military rearrangement cutting back the number of present divisions. I also said that if anything like an armistice could be arranged, I would see no great difficulty in a further very substantial change in the character of the Nationalists' presence on the offshore islands. Apparently, however, the Chinese Communists were determined to keep the civil war revived and in a state of at least sporadic fighting activity.

The President expressed the opinion that my trip had been useful. He suggested that it would be useful for me to try to keep up a certain measure of personal correspondence with the Gimo.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

JFD

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

[1] For text of the statement released to the press at the conclusion of this meeting, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pp. 1185–1186. Dulles' draft with Eisenhower's revisions is filed with his notes for the meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

[2] See Document 212. Dulles' draft with Eisenhower's revision is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 24, 1958, 1:23 p.m.

384. Deliver following message from President to President Chiang Kai-shek soonest. Confirm date and time delivery.[1]

"October 24, 1958.

Dear Mr. President: Secretary Dulles has just returned and told me of his consultations with you and your associates at Taipei. I am fully satisfied with the results. When many outsiders are seeking to distort our respective views to create mischief and division between us, there is no substitute for face-to-face high level talks.

I wholly endorse the communiqué. It sets forth our solidarity in the face of Chinese Communist armed attacks. Also, I consider it important that your Government should have declared that its success in restoring freedom to the Mainland Chinese depends principally upon the minds and hearts of the Chinese people, and not the use by your Government of force. This free-world principle, not accepted by the Communists, sets us apart from them and morally above them. Your enunciation of that principle will, I am confident, be welcomed throughout the free world.

Secretary Dulles reported your message to me expressing your determination to cooperate with our considered views, arrived at after consultation with you. This is an important declaration which I welcome. We shall try not to abuse the trust and confidence that it signifies. We seek to have consultation on all significant matters of joint concern. No doubt at times there are unintended inadequacies. But I can assure you that it is our purpose never to take any important new position, or to ask anything of your Government, unless we have previously had an opportunity to consider fully your point of view.

I know that these are difficult days, with the Chinese Communists keeping an atmosphere of uncertainty and mixing force with illusory promises. I have no doubt that our two countries will stand together, resolute and firm, in the face of these tactics and that we shall cause them to fail. I am grateful that we have in you so experienced, wise and reliable a leader of Free China.

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2458. Confidential; Priority; Presidential Handling. Drafted and approved by Dulles and cleared by the President.

[1] Telegram 667 from Taipei, October 25, reported that the message had been given to the Foreign Minister that morning. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/10–2558)

213. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Drumright)

Washington, October 24, 1958.

DEAR DRUM: I refer to the Embassy's Despatch 169 of October 3[1] concerning a proposed GRC–United States field training exercise for Special Forces. I note that the exercise, called Meion Feng, was tentatively scheduled for October–November this year but "will probably be delayed to a later date."

It is my feeling that a joint exercise of this type and on the scale proposed would be unwise in the near future. For the duration of the present critical situation in the Taiwan Straits, I believe it most important that we avoid any unnecessary actions that might embarrass us before world opinion in our efforts to demonstrate that we and our Chinese allies are earnestly seeking a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese Communists could probably be expected to find out about the exercise and to make all possible political propaganda out of it.

I realize the importance of such exercises in the training of Special Forces, and particularly in this case as a means of demonstrating realistically both the strengths and liabilities of Special Forces to GRC officials. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that you discuss with Admiral Smoot the matter of deferring this exercise for the time being. I will be interested in receiving your reactions as well as those of Admiral Smoot to this suggestion.[2]

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons[3]

P.S. I am signing this in ignorance of whether or not this question was dealt with during Mr. Robertson's current visit to Taipei and, needless to say, any decisions thus arrived at would be overriding.

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Drumright. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by William M. Kahmann of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

[1] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/10–358; see Supplement)

[2] Subsequent correspondence on this subject between Parsons, Martin, and Drumright has not been found, but is referred to in telegram 1023 from Taipei, March 19, 1959, which reported that Smoot had scheduled the exercise for May and requested the Department's concurrence. The Department concurred in telegram 631 to Taipei, March 23, 1959. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–1959) Despatch 117 from Taipei, August 26, 1959, reported that the exercise had been held April 27–May 29. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/8–2659; see Supplement)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

214. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, October 25, 1958, 4:08 p.m.

250808Z. CNO 232149Z[1] NOTAL authorizes me to resume operations accordance para 1A of JCS 291926Z August. In order provide you background of climate here re convoy ops have conducted several conferences with Minister Yu, Tiger Wang, Admiral Liang. These have been most satisfactory and reflect a very different attitude [from that] which prevailed prior to the cease-fire. In general all agree supply situation on offshore islands is in excellent shape and that there is no need to demonstrate our capability of running convoys just for the sake of running them. Accordingly there are no specific convoy plans now and there has been no request to resume convoy escort with US forces. The agreed position is that LST–LVT method will be used as necessary to provide critical items as required and as limited by weather. Attitude demonstrated by GRC authorities indicates this general posture for convoy ops should suffice for several weeks. Minister particularly wishes to avoid resumption air resupply to obviate possibility of expanding air war.[2]

Question of use of LSD came up and have general agreement that there is no need for its use until movement of heavy equipment is called for. Nothing in sight in this category at the moment but arrival of 240 millimeters planned by Army will undoubtedly call for use of LSD.

TDC preparing recommendations for future employment of LSD in resupply ops and will submit soonest.

New subject. Ambassador informed me yesterday that Secretary of State and Gimo had short discussion of use of nuclears against Commie gun positions which demonstrated alarming ignorance of Gimo on capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons. It was Sec State's desire that I brief Gimo on this subject but find our capability here to do so intelli-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2558. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to CNO, COMSEVENTHFLT, and CTF 72. Received at the Department of the Navy at 7:32 a.m.

[1] Telegram 232149Z from CNO to COMUSTDC, October 23, authorized Smoot to resume operations in accordance with paragraph 1A of JCS 947298 (Document 53) but called his attention to the stipulation of military necessity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 41) It was sent in response to telegram 231355Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CNO, October 23, which stated that Smoot expected a GRC request for the resumption of convoys and requested instructions. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Telegram 251839Z from CNO to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US), October 25, replied that Smoot's telegram was welcome; the announcement that the Communists would bombard Quemoy only on odd days had caused some concern that escorting would be resumed unnecessarily. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

gently very limited. I would not undertake this project without complete knowledge of all phases including the extent to which Gimo can be briefed. Solicit CINCPAC's help and views in this matter.

---

215. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, October 24, 1958.

DEAR SELWYN: In view of the interest of Harold and yourself in the Formosa Straits situation, I give you this information to supplement the public statements.

The Communist resumption of attacks on Quemoy, timed to coincide with my arrival and in breach of their announced two-weeks' suspension, seemed to be deliberately calculated to make it more difficult to make progress on what might be called "peace" or "armistice" proposals. The Peiping radio last night announced that "the United States has met with defeat in her original plot to use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy to promote a permanent cease-fire". We believe that the Chinese Communists, for the time being, want to keep the civil war at least intermittently active, and to use Quemoy as a sort of "whipping boy" to be lashed whenever there are "intrusions" by the United States or acts by the Chinese Nationalists which indicate lack of "repentance".

The feeling in our intelligence community and also among the Americans on Taiwan is that the presently revived shelling is not designed primarily as a military operation to take the island, or even effectively to interdict its supply, but merely to harass and perhaps ultimately provoke the Nationalists.

I found that it is understandably difficult for the Nationalists to be subject to the Chinese Communists' initiative in firing and stop firing whenever they please, without any freedom to attack the Mainland except by relatively ineffectual counterbattery fire when the Communists

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Dulles and cleared by Robertson. Dulles gave the letter to Ambassador Caccia at noon on October 25. A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, Central Files, 611.93/10–2558; see Supplement.

have elected to bombard. Perhaps the Communists calculate that either the restraint or the morale of the Chinese Nationalists will break under their tactics.

I had many hours of conversation privately with the Gimo, with only an interpreter being present. I expounded fully my philosophy that the Nationalists should look upon their mission as an essentially peaceful one and should renounce the use of force in an attempt to reunify China. I pointed out that there had been such renunciations in the case of Germany, Korea and Vietnam and I thought that the position of the Government of the Republic of China would be much stronger in the Free World if it indicated a willingness also to renounce. The Generalissimo pointed out that this was very difficult, particularly since there would probably be no reciprocity, as was the case in the three other countries. Nevertheless, in the face of appreciable political misgivings, he and his principal associates, notably the Vice President, agreed to make the statement in the communiqué to the effect that the Government's principal means of achieving its mission would be to keep the Sun Yat Sen principles alive in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people and "not the use of force".

I came away with the definite impression that there would be no insuperable obstacles on the Nationalist side to working out a reasonable program for tranquilizing the situation in the Taiwan area and greatly reducing the emphasis on militarization. I did not press the matter to a definite conclusion because the Communist attitude made it seem unrealistic. But already the Government is working with our military advisers on plans for a substantial reduction of forces in Quemoy and Matsu.

It seems that the Chinese Communists are out to get Taiwan and want to play a "cat-and-mouse" game with the offshore islands as a means to this end. They clearly do not now want to permit the situation to become stabilized and they seem to feel under no particular pressure from world opinion in this regard.

It seems to me, in the light of the foregoing, that it is important now to put all available pressure on the Chinese Communists to be ready to stop their military activities. I feel confident that if this disposition could be brought about, there would be reciprocity from the Chinese Nationalists.

I believe that the talks which I had with the Gimo with reference to the "mission" of Free China will prove in retrospect to have initiated a definitive and important reshaping of their policy. In this respect our talks were, I think, worthwhile, as well as my probing into what might be acceptable as their contribution to a cease-fire. We must hope that there will come about a change in Communist tactics which will give some significance to my explorations in this latter phase of the matter.

We can, of course, feel that there is less likelihood of the situation developing into general war if the Communist objectives are as I describe. However, we should not ignore the fact that their tactics are highly aggravating and humiliating to the Chinese Nationalists, given the restraints under which they are operating. I do not think we should count on the situation remaining indefinitely on its present one-sided basis. And, of course, the Communists may at any time shift to even more aggressive measures.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[1]

October 25, 1958.

P.S. Since dictating the foregoing, there has just come in this morning the new Chinese Communist announcement about not firing on the offshore islands on even numbered days and perhaps firing on odd numbered days.[2] This rather fantastic statement seems to confirm our analysis of the Chinese Communist attitude as being essentially political and propaganda rather than military.

---

[1] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[2] Reference is to a message from P'eng Te-huai to "compatriots in Taiwan" issued by the PRC Ministry of National Defense on October 25. The statement also noted that refraining from shelling "is still conditional on not introducing American escorts." (*Peking Review*, October 28, 1958, p. 5)

---

216. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions

Washington, October 25, 1958, 4:11 p.m.

501. To Chiefs of Mission. You should take appropriate occasion to discuss with leaders Government to which you accredited significance of Secretary's talks with President Chiang Kai-shek in following terms: Point out that Communiqué issued at conclusion of meetings between

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2558. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Martin, cleared by Dulles, and approved by Robertson.

President Chiang and Secretary Dulles at Taipei October 23 (transmitted by wireless file), contains important declaration by Republic of China that discharge of its mission of freedom to peoples on mainland is to be carried through primarily by keeping active in minds and hearts of Chinese people principles of freedom as expressed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles" and not by use of force. This declaration is indicative of important evolution in thinking of GRC away from expectation of early return to mainland through violent means toward reliance on longer term prospect of reunification of country in freedom after collapse of Communist tyranny. As authentic custodian and defender of cultural and spiritual values long identified with China, GRC accepts mission of bringing about freedom to Chinese on mainland by conduct and example rather than by military conquest.

Posture adopted by GRC puts Republic of China in same category as other countries divided by Communism. Thus in divided Korea, Republic of Korea accepts armistice which denies it use of force to reunite Korea. GVN also accepts armistice which prevents use of force to reunite Viet-Nam. In Germany Adenauer has renounced use of force to bring about reunification. This declaration of GRC is comparable.

If similar policy were to be adopted by Chinese Communists there would be same kind of de facto stabilization in Taiwan Straits area which exists in other divided countries. But Chinese Communists deliberately resumed firing at Quemoy to make Secretary's mission to Taiwan more difficult, even boasting "The United States has met with defeat in her original plot to use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy to promote a permanent cease-fire." Chinese Communists clearly wish keep civil war alive in their effort get Taiwan. Continued provocative shelling by Chinese Communists whenever they please could ultimately break admirable restraint of GRC and destroy our hopes of working out with it reasonable program for tranquilizing Taiwan situation. Unfortunately, this appears to be precisely Chinese Communist objective. Thus it is of utmost importance to bring all possible pressure to bear on Peiping regime to stop its military activities.

Foregoing sent information only to Moscow, Belgrade, Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, and Prague.[1]

Dulles

---

[1] Telegram 709 to Moscow, October 31, sent also to Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, and Warsaw, instructed the Chiefs of Mission at those Embassies to take action at their discretion along the lines requested in this telegram but with some changes in the text. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/10–3158; see Supplement)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, October 25, 1958, 7 p.m.

645. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 82nd meeting one hour 45 minutes.[1]

Invited Wang lead off but he declined and I read prepared statement based Deptel 502[2] but reserving detailed factual statement on LSD action and legal arguments on territorial sea until later. Wang responded with rather brief statement reiterating familiar arguments that question of cease-fire was internal matter and did not arise between US and PRC; that US had engaged in escorting and committed additional intrusions in Chinese territorial waters and air; that Secretary's visit to Taiwan and subsequent communiqué revealed US aggressive designs against Chinese people; and that if US really sincere we would begin discussion of withdrawal from Taiwan area on basis their September 22 proposal. I responded with factual statement on LSD action and legal argumentation, concluding with statement emphasizing peaceful purpose Secretary's trip. In subsequent give and take Wang argued right each state set own territorial sea and reiterate usual line that only US intervention responsible for tension in area. I replied briefly, particularly pointing out damage to freedom of seas principle if Wang's principle were generally accepted. Wang proposed next meeting Saturday, November 8. I suggested Saturday meetings placed some burden on Polish hosts and Wang then proposed Friday, November 7, 2 p.m. on which we agreed.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and priority to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 649 from Warsaw, October 25, and his comments and recommendations in telegram 651 from Warsaw, October 26. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/10–2558 and 611.93/10–2658, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Document 205.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 27, 1958, 6 p.m.

678. For Secretary and Robertson.

1. Reference discussions you had here October 22 with Generals Taylor, White, Doan, Bonesteel and Admiral Smoot on modernization of GRC forces and rationalization of Kinmen defenses.[1]

2. Pursuant your directive, Admiral Smoot and General Doan had general discussion of subject with Defense Minister Yu and Chief of General Staff Tiger Wang morning of October 25. Apart from general subject of modernization GRC forces, concept of converting Kinmen to island fortress was explored. US side intimated if reorganization could be carried out to meet latter concept, US might be prepared to provide advice and additional appropriate equipment. Smoot reports his and Doan's suggestion seemed to meet with favorable response, especially from Minister Yu. It was tentatively agreed that joint US-GRC study should be undertaken forthwith to come up with recommendations. Accordingly Doan is meeting with Wang this afternoon to discuss formation of joint committee.

3. Word of talks apparently got around quickly, for when I saw Foreign Minister morning of October 25 he asked about Smoot–Doan approach. I emphasized its military character and said its aim is to strengthen Kinmen defenses, not weaken them. Minister had no comment other than to caution that any approach to troop reduction should be handled carefully and not be pushed precipitately by United States. He intimated if not handled well, troop reduction could be exploited psychologically by Communists and pointed out press is already carrying reports to effect US is pressing GRC to effect troop reduction on offshores.

4. Ambassador Yeh also lost no time in contacting Admiral Smoot to sound him out on US proposal. He seemed mollified when Smoot told him afternoon of 25 US suggestion was part of our MAP effort aimed at rationalizing and strengthening Kinmen defenses.

5. Doan tells me he was informed by Tiger Wang today that President Chiang had been apprised of initial conversation and had reacted favorably.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2758. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:13 a.m.

[1] See Document 201.

6. Thus a good start appears to have been made on what is generally regarded to be a delicate problem. If kept in military channels and handled as military matter, I think we stand good chance of reaching joint agreement for changed but stronger Kinmen defense including lesser garrison.

Drumright

---

219. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, October 27, 1958, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining
Major Eisenhower

General Twining, first of all, reminded the President that the last American troops left Lebanon as of October 25th.

General Twining then brought up the matter of the guidance under which Admiral Smoot, Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, should now operate. In particular, the Admiral is concerned over his immediate action to be implemented in the event of an emergency. General Twining's views would be to reinstate the original guidance which instructed ComTaiwanDefCom to convoy only in international waters, when required. He feels that the GRC cannot perform this function themselves. The President's view in this matter would be to instruct Admiral Smoot to resume *normal* patrolling with no mention of convoying as such. The President expressed the opinion that an emergency requiring immediate automatic action will not happen. At the most, enemy action can only cut off one day's supply, and supplies on Quemoy are now quite adequate. He pointed out that in this view he is influenced by the ever present possibility of a leak. The President feels that the Generalissimo should not receive any inkling of a lack of confidence on our part in his ability to take care of himself or lack of determination on our part that he should do so within his capabilities. In this connection, the President pointed out that Secretary Dulles' conferences with the Generalissimo have had good results in softening up his attitude. General Twining is to call Secretary Dulles on this entire matter.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

John S.D. Eisenhower
Major, United States Army

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Major John S.D. Eisenhower, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President.

220. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 100–12–58 Washington, October 28, 1958.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS

The Problem

To estimate probable Chinese Communist courses of action with respect to the crisis which has existed in the Taiwan Strait since August; and probable Chinese Communist, Chinese Nationalist, and non-Communist East Asian reactions to various possible developments in the Taiwan Strait area.

The Estimate

I. The Chinese Communists and the Taiwan Strait Crisis

A. Chinese Communist Objectives and Motives in Initiating the Crisis

1. In initiating the present crisis, Communist China has shown greater boldness in probing US intentions in the Taiwan Strait than at any time heretofore. This shift in tactics has taken place against a background of generally increased Chinese Communist assertiveness and confidence since the advent of sputnik. In general, however, we believe that the shift in tactics in the Taiwan area does not portend any basic change in the over-all conduct of Chinese Communist foreign policy as described in NIE 13–58 (16 May 1958).[1]

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 28 October 1958."

[1] NIE 13–58 (16 May 1958) held that: the Chinese Communists view the present world position of the Bloc with considerable confidence; they feel the trend in Asia to be running against the West; they are not impatient to achieve their goals; they are directing their energies toward the intermediate objective of weakening the position and influence of the US in Asia; the principal thrust of their policy will continue to be reasonableness and peaceful coexistence, though they will display more assertiveness; they are concerned about the growth of "two Chinas" sentiment; they will probably not resort to overt military aggression which they believe would involve them in military action with the US; they will continue their efforts to undermine Nationalist will; and "the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese Communists will adopt a more aggressive policy toward the Offshore Islands, in part because of intense irritation and a sense of affront, in part to emphasize their determination to destroy the Nationalist Government, and in part to test US intentions in the Taiwan area." [Footnote in the source text. NIE 13–58 is printed as Document 13.]

2. The Chinese Communists regard continued GRC control of the offshore islands as an affront to their national prestige and dignity. They may still regard the GRC position on the offshore islands, backed as it is by the US, as a military threat. However, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists initiated the present crisis with the firm intention of obtaining the offshore islands regardless of GRC, US, and world reactions. Such recent actions in the present crisis as the failure to use the CCAF for offensive action, the less than maximum possible artillery effort, the emphasis on the undermining of Chinese Nationalist morale, and the cessation of the bombardment between 6 and 20 October almost certainly indicate that Peiping's leaders are using military power primarily as a political weapon, and that they are not committed to the immediate capture of the islands at all costs.

3. Nor do we believe that the Chinese Communists viewed the acquisition of the offshore islands as their fundamental objective. Their primary purpose in increasing military and political pressure in the Taiwan Strait area was undoubtedly to further their ultimate goal of eliminating the GRC and bringing about the withdrawal of US forces from the Taiwan area. They probably believed that their action would serve this purpose: (a) by probing US determination to support the GRC; (b) by driving a wedge between the US and the GRC; (c) by discrediting the GRC and the US before world opinion; (d) by reminding the world that Communist China must be reckoned with; (e) by preventing a drift toward wider acceptance of a de facto "two Chinas" situation; and (f) by straining Nationalist morale. Although domestic considerations probably played some part in the timing of the Chinese Communist initial attack, we believe that these considerations were of secondary importance in the reaching of the decision to initiate the attack.

4. Available evidence, [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*] indicates that the USSR did not initiate the crisis by encouraging the Chinese Communists to their actions. However, the Soviets clearly acquiesced in it and have supported it, almost certainly in the belief that it would not lead to large-scale hostilities between Communist China and the US. [*2-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]

B. *Present Chinese Communist Intentions*

5. Whatever the expectations of the Chinese Communist leaders in July and August, they have probably become convinced that the US itself would fight rather than permit the offshore islands to fall in the face of direct military pressure. In these circumstances, the Chinese Communists, apparently unwilling to risk resort to those increased military measures which would be necessary to effect a complete interdiction of the islands, probably estimate that they can best pursue their objectives at the moment by emphasizing the political aspect of their effort, while maintaining a measure of military pressure. They probably retain con-

siderable confidence that a course of shelling and intermittent "truces" will still serve to aggravate US–GRC relations, erode Nationalist morale, and exert world and domestic pressures on the US to effect a withdrawal of Nationalist troops from the offshore islands, as a step towards Communist China's aim of eliminating the GRC.

6. The Chinese Communists almost certainly consider that their position is a strong one and that there is little compulsion on them to make concessions. They probably intend to maintain in the Warsaw talks that the only issue negotiable with the US is a withdrawal of US forces from the Taiwan area, insisting that the question of the offshore islands and Taiwan is a purely Chinese affair. However, they probably view a continuation of these talks as desirable in order to give the world the impression that they are willing to negotiate, to forestall UN or other international consideration of the crisis, to arouse doubts in the GRC's mind regarding US policy, and to reap whatever prestige benefits result from direct talks with the US. At the same time, they will probably continue to offer to negotiate with the GRC, suggesting to the Nationalists openly and through covert contacts that they had better make a deal soon before the US abandons them. They will almost certainly prefer such negotiating channels to any discussion of the crisis in the UN or in any other international forum, since this would probably involve resolutions which would not fully endorse Peiping's position and which might have "two Chinas" connotations.

7. Peiping's negotiating position is limited by its concern that acceptance of any concessions might prejudice its claim to Taiwan and the offshore islands. It may hope that the US will exert pressure on the GRC to withdraw from the offshore islands, calculating that such pressure will exacerbate US–GRC relations. However, the Chinese Communists would not accept such a withdrawal as a permanent solution to the Taiwan problem, although they may suggest that if they were given the offshore islands and if the US were to withdraw its forces from the Taiwan area, they would not use force against Taiwan for a certain period. They certainly do not view a de facto neutralization or a reduction of the Nationalist garrisons as acceptable solutions, and it is most unlikely that they would respond to such proposals by offering any concessions. Certainly they would not agree to such reciprocal measures as a demilitarization of the coastal area opposite the offshore islands.

8. The specific actions which Communist China will pursue within the limits indicated above—refraining from both extreme risks and major concessions—are difficult to estimate. Chinese Communist tactics will depend in large measure on Soviet attitudes and on Nationalist and particularly US actions. The Chinese Communists will probably move up new and improved aircraft and other weapons into the immediate coastal areas, but we believe that they will continue to refrain from

launching a direct assault to capture the major offshore islands as long as they believe that this would involve them in hostilities with the US. Nevertheless, this does not rule out, especially in the event that their present tactics fail to advance their cause, the resumption of serious interdiction efforts and more aggressive employment of air and naval units in the Taiwan Strait. Although the Chinese Communists probably now believe that the US would fight rather than permit the islands to fall in the face of direct military pressure, they probably also believe that the US would exercise considerable restraint short of a direct and flagrant Chinese Communist challenge. Consequently, they probably believe that it would be safe again to create a high degree of military tension in the Strait area. In such a situation there would always remain a serious chance of miscalculation, from which hostilities could develop between US and Chinese Communist forces.

9. On balance, we feel that for the near future the chances favor a prolongation of the present situation of no maximum interdiction effort, no serious negotiation, no solution. Assuming the Nationalists remain on the offshore islands, the Chinese Communists will probably maintain an atmosphere of crisis and tension in the Taiwan Strait for some time to come. In any event, they will not give up their efforts to split the US and the GRC, to cause the collapse of the GRC, and to undermine US prestige in Asia.

10. We do not anticipate that the Chinese Communists will take overt military action against other Far Eastern countries during the near future. In the event that the offshore islands were lost by the Chinese Nationalists, we would foresee heightened Communist pressures against other areas of Asia.

II. *The Chinese Nationalists and the Taiwan Strait Crisis*

A. *The Present GRC Position*

11. For the GRC, the progress of the crisis to date has almost certainly raised doubts and uneasiness regarding its long-term prospects. To be sure, its air force and offshore island garrisons have performed admirably against a stronger enemy. New and improved US weapons have been given the GRC or stationed on its territory. The events of the crisis have probably made the GRC reasonably sure that the US would assist the GRC in the defense of the offshore islands from invasion. On the other hand, Nationalist officials feel that there has been an alarming shift in US public opinion toward giving the offshore islands to the Communists and forcing a "two Chinas" solution. GRC officials were concerned by the possible impact of recent US statements about return to the mainland upon military and civilian morale. The US has restrained the CAF from more aggressive action, ceased the US escorting efforts over Nationalist protests, and raised the possibility of reducing the island garrisons. The recent visit of Secretary of State Dulles has probably made the

GRC leaders more confident of US support during the present crisis, but they are probably uncertain concerning US long-term intentions, and may believe that the US is groping toward an eventual resolution of the offshore island question at the expense of the GRC.

12. The bulk of world opinion favors Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore islands, and in more general terms the crisis has demonstrated the weakness of international support for the GRC. The GRC probably considers that its position in the UN as the representative of China has been weakened.

13. [*16-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]

14. Despite these various problems, there have been no indications that the determination of the top Nationalist leadership to maintain the GRC's national purpose has been seriously weakened. To our knowledge, there has been no receptiveness among the leaders to Communist overtures. Some officials have advocated retaliatory attacks against the mainland, but regard for the effects on US support and the GRC's international status have prevailed. More generally, the GRC leaders have not panicked, and their actions have demonstrated a considerable degree of realism and restraint.

B. *Probable GRC Courses of Action*

15. We believe that the Chinese Nationalists will stand firm for the foreseeable future against Communist military pressures and propaganda appeals. Nationalist leaders will reject any offers by the Chinese Communists to negotiate, in consonance with their view that the Communists are mortal enemies of the Chinese people and that any negotiations are but a trap designed to further Communist interests. Nevertheless, the increased concern over the future may produce some receptivity to Communist appeals, especially among middle-level Nationalist civilian and military officials. For at least the near term, however, we do not believe that there will be serious defections or revolts against GRC policies.

16. The Chinmen garrison is a key element at present and the Chinese Communists will probably continue to mount a major psychological effort against it. The garrison is being told by the Communists that the US is deserting it and that it will be offered surcease from bombardment if it turns its guns on Chiang and comes "home" to the mainland. But "home" is Taiwan to almost half of the garrison, and the picture which the Nationalist mainlander troops on Chinmen now have of "communal" life on the mainland is not an attractive one. We believe that the officers are loyal to the Generalissimo and that they are prepared to stay and fight as long as the GRC appears to have the support and assistance of the US. Thus far the troops, including the Taiwanese, have performed well under fire. However, if the garrison came to believe that there was no al-

ternative to gradual attrition or military defeat, there would be a serious weakening of the will to resist.

17. The Chinese Nationalists would be reluctant to reduce the garrisons on the offshore islands unless convinced that the move would be militarily or politically advantageous. However, they might be persuaded to effect such a reduction if there were a corresponding build-up of fire power on the islands. They would probably be unwilling to portray any such garrison reduction as a political move designed to facilitate the achievement of a modus vivendi with the Chinese Communists on the offshore island question. Their opposition to a proposal to demilitarize or neutralize the offshore islands would be even stronger, as they would view such action as tantamount to surrendering the offshore islands.

[*2-1/2 pages of 2-column source text not declassified*]

---

221. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 29, 1958, 7 p.m.

689. In conversation October 25 and 26 Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister Chow expressed concern about two points of joint communiqué of October 23.[1] I suggested letter on subject would be helpful and have now received one dated October 28. Substantive part of letter as follows (unessential words deleted):

"First concerns sentence in communiqué which reads: 'the US recognizes that Republic of China is authentic spokesman of Free China and of hopes and aspirations entertained by great mass of Chinese people.' Inasmuch as Republic of China generally known as Free China and judging from context word 'free' should be in small letters, otherwise its insertion here superfluous and misleading. Owing to pressure of time, this not noticed before communiqué's release. Presume our understanding of what US Government meant by this expression correct. Clarification in order not only because of distortion this sentence by Chinese Commu-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2958. Confidential. Received at 10:34 a.m.

[1] Document 209.

nist broadcast October 25 but also because of possible exploitation by countries unfriendly to us at future meetings UN and other international organizations.

"Second point concerns declaration by Chinese Government that in achieving its sacred mission of restoring freedom its people on mainland, it will not use force as *principal means*. Impression since been created ROC has committed itself not to use force under any circumstances to deliver its people on mainland. Such interpretation would be inconsistent with context. As Chinese Government understands it, above-mentioned declaration only means we will not use force as principal means attain our objective; but this does not preclude our use of force if circumstances make it necessary, especially when there is large-scale effort on mainland.

"Shall appreciate if you will kindly take note of foregoing observations and communicate same to State Department."

Drumright

---

222. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, undated.

POSSIBLE S/P REVIEW OF US CHINA POLICY

I raised this subject with the Secretary after the NSC briefing today on the basis of the attached memo.[1]

The Secretary asked what aspects of the policy would be studied, whether there are experts on the area presently assigned to the Staff, and what would be the purpose of such a study. He referred to the danger of possible leaks if a study of this kind were to be made, and mentioned the serious implications any word of it might have on the security of the regime on Taiwan. He agreed that his remarks in the San Francisco speech

---

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1957–58. Secret. Drafted by Howard E. Furnas of the Policy Planning Staff on October 29. A note on the source text reads: "Only one copy made." An attached note by Smith, January 20, 1959, reads as follows: "I talked to Mr. Herter today about the conversation I had with the Secretary back in October."

[1] The attachment, not printed, an unsigned memorandum dated October 27, noted that in recent years the Policy Planning Staff had avoided the general subject of China policy, reflecting Dulles' wishes as expressed to Smith's predecessor Robert R. Bowie, and requested guidance as to whether it should engage in such a review.

at the Lions Convention,[2] to the effect that this policy is continuously under review in the Department, probably represents the best answer to questions which might be asked on this subject by Congressional Committees or others. He went on to say that the results of his recent trip to Taipei demonstrate this fact and the flexibility of the Department's approach to the problem.

The Secretary mentioned a remark made to him last night by Prime Minister Diefenbaker of Canada. The latter said that he was greatly relieved and enthusiastic about the outcome of the Secretary's trip and he felt that the danger of Chiang's getting himself and the US into a war with the Chinese Communists was removed.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that as long as he is Secretary of State there will be no change in US policy toward the Chinese Communists so far as US recognition or their admission to the UN are concerned. On this basis, he has no objection to S/P's examining his San Francisco speech to see whether the subordinate policy elements in it should be reviewed. He was emphatic, however, that the basic concept of US policy toward Communist China as set forth in it should remain unchanged.

The Secretary also said he believed that we had made a serious mistake in recognizing the USSR and that he would be much happier about a UN without Soviet membership.

Gerard C. Smith[3]

---

[2] On June 28, 1957; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 558–566.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

223. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 29, 1958.

SUBJECT

Reaction to GRC–United States Joint Communiqué of October 23

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Ambassador Yeh said that the reaction of the overseas Chinese to the joint Communiqué of October 23 had been uniformly bad. He cited the

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2958. Secret. Drafted by Martin.

Kung Shang Jih Pao owned by Sir Robert Ho-tung which had carried several editorials attacking the policy set forth in the Communiqué regarding return to the mainland. He said even the *Central News* (which is Government-owned) gives the impression that this policy is dubious. The Chinese press in New York and San Francisco had also reacted adversely to the Communiqué. The common point of the concern expressed by these newspapers centered on the question of use of force.

Ambassador Yeh said that Foreign Minister S.K. Huang had been requested by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan to make an appearance (presumably to report on the Dulles–Chiang talks). Huang had asked that his appearance be postponed until after the United States elections on November 4. In a preliminary discussion as to what Huang would say, Ambassador Yeh suggested that he indicate that the GRC had not given up its intention to restore freedom to the mainland but would carry out its intention 70% by political means and 30% by military if and when necessary. If a revolution occurred on the mainland, there was nothing to prevent the GRC's going back to the mainland to assist, if so requested.

Ambassador Yeh thought that this line might take care of the internal situation. But there was still the problem of overseas Chinese reaction. On the advice of his staff he was thinking of making a trip around the country to talk to overseas Chinese communities. He would assure them that GRC policy remained unchanged in regard to going back to the mainland. The joint Communiqué had simply clarified the stand of the GRC that this objective would be achieved primarily by building up psychological bases on the mainland. It was important to differentiate the GRC from the Communists, who used force to achieve their objectives. Before he decided on such a tour and what line he would take, however, Ambassador Yeh wanted to consult further with S.K. Huang.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the GRC relied on the support of its overseas communities more than a Government usually does, and therefore it was disconcerting to have this adverse reaction from these communities. He felt the United States Government would want the GRC to enjoy overseas Chinese support. The question was how to dispel their fears and to raise the GRC's prestige among them. The overseas Chinese had gotten the impression from the headlines that the GRC would not use force under any circumstances.

Mr. Robertson agreed that newspapers do distort particularly in the use of headlines, and pointed out the example of the distorted headline given by the *New York Times* to Ambassador Yeh's statement from Taipei about the use of force. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the joint Communiqué had been very favorably received in the United States. The position of the GRC with regard to return to the mainland had in the past been distorted by the press, and this impression had been helped by the

Generalissimo's annual statements about going back to the mainland. Such statements were in sharp contrast to statements by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany that he would not use force for unification. The GRC was losing support in this country especially among Democrats, and there would probably be a Democratic Congress after this election. Some Democratic leaders such as Fulbright were hostile to the GRC. Against this background, the Communiqué had been extremely helpful and reaction to it here has been very fine. It would be dangerous to do anything which would put the GRC back into the old perspective. If Ambassador Yeh were to make statements all over the country tending to deny the reality of the Communiqué, public support for the GRC would suffer badly. It is all very well for the overseas Chinese to say that the GRC should take back the mainland by force, but in the face of the strength of the Chinese Communist army and air force, there was no way in which this could be done by the GRC unless with United States support. The overseas Chinese in other words wanted to commit United States forces to recapture the mainland. The United States, however, was not going to use its forces offensively for such a purpose. We are interested in strengthening United States ties with the GRC. But this can't be done if the Generalissimo is presented as a warlike figure bent on dragging the United States into a war. No one here thinks that the GRC should renounce the use of force for defensive purposes, or in case of a revolution on the mainland. It should be made clear, however, that the GRC would not initiate offensive action to reunify China. Anything which looks like a repudiation of the joint Communiqué should certainly be avoided, in order not to ruin the favorable effect it has created.

Ambassador Yeh said he had told the Generalissimo that the overseas Chinese would never be satisfied until the GRC gets back to the mainland. He must balance the adverse reaction of overseas Chinese opinion against the favorable reaction of world opinion. Ambassador Yeh mentioned that he had been under attack in Taiwan for the part he had played in persuading the Generalissimo to agree to the policy set forth in the Communiqué. He said that the attack on him wouldn't matter much if he were still in Taipei, but it would take some time to kill in Washington. Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Yeh had done a very good job for his country.

Ambassador Yeh said that the GRC must work more closely with the overseas Chinese community. He thought the GRC should invest in some newspapers. They control one paper in Thailand but they should control more. He said he would like to discuss this further sometime. Mr. Robertson replied that we would be glad to talk about it.

Ambassador Yeh said he would also like to talk about the request for increased economic aid which his Government was making as a result of the emergency situation. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the amount of

Mutual Security funds already spent because of the emergency was over $200,000,000. This had knocked the worldwide distribution of such funds out of kilter. Ambassador Yeh said he was not talking about military aid funds but economic funds. Mr. Robertson said that there was only so much money appropriated (and this was less than had been requested) and a terrible problem was created by the special demands made upon these funds. Mr. Robertson assured Ambassador Yeh, however, that we would be glad to have his comments on an emergency economic aid program.

Mr. Robertson then raised the question of what Ambassador Yeh should say to the press. He felt it was important that Ambassador Yeh not say anything which could be interpreted as repudiating the joint Communiqué. He suggested that Ambassador Yeh might emphasize that the GRC was not going to take any offensive action against the mainland, although it was not going to give up its right of self-defense or its right to help people on the mainland in case of an uprising.

Ambassador Yeh agreed that care should be given as to what was said on this subject but pointed out that you couldn't control the headlines. The text of what he had said in Taiwan had been reported accurately, but the headlines had been distorted. He said he was not going to say anything until he and Huang had agreed on a draft. His purpose would be to strengthen the Communiqué and to dispel unfriendly reactions to it. Mr. Robertson said it was terribly important to do this. He said if possible he would like to see a statement before it was made.

Ambassador Yeh said he had some information he would like to pass along. He had read the Chinese Communist newspapers and the three statements by Peng Te-huai. He had come to the conclusion that there was considerable disagreement between the Communist generals before the second cease-fire announcement was issued. He said that GRC agents had reported a telephone conversation between Mao Tsetung and Peng in which Mao had shouted that the extension of the cease-fire had to be carried out. Peng opposed this decision but Mao shouted at him "you don't understand, you don't understand." This was the origin of the paragraph in Peng's statement of October 13[1] extending the cease-fire containing the sentences, "we don't understand! we don't understand!". In Ambassador Yeh's opinion it was quite evident from the wording of Peng's statement that it did not come from one person. Peng is alleged to have told Mao that there was considerable opposition among the military to the continuation of the cease-fire. Yeh noted that two Communist regimental commanders in the area had been changed.

---

[1] See footnote 2, Document 177.

Mr. Robertson asked the Ambassador what he thought about the tactics of firing every other day. Yeh replied that it showed that the Communists had no sense of dignity or propriety.

Mr. Robertson said he thought the Communists were losing ground while the GRC had gained ground by the issuance of the joint Communiqué. Ambassador Yeh emphasized that the GRC did not like to have it said that the Communiqué represented a reformulation of GRC policy. He thought the best way to describe the Communiqué was as the Secretary had done in his press conference on October 28,[2] when he said that the GRC had put its emphasis on political means of recovering the mainland. (The Secretary said "it (Communiqué) was important in putting the emphasis upon winning through peaceful processes rather than through attempts to win by force".)

Mr. Robertson pointed out that as far as people in this country were concerned the Communiqué did appear to be a fresh public formulation of the GRC's position. President Chiang had been accustomed to saying every year that "this year" would be the year in which the GRC would go back to the mainland. These statements had been counter-productive as far as the public here was concerned. Ambassador Yeh said that these New Year messages of the Generalissimo had been quite an ordeal for him. He felt in the last two or three years they had been much better. While he was Foreign Minister he conscientiously avoided using the word "reconquest" in connection with GRC's going back to the mainland. He had stressed that the GRC could only go back to the mainland in response to the desires and wishes of the people. Mr. Robertson said that unfortunately this had not been made clear and the people in the United States and other countries had not been aware of this position.

---

[2] For a transcript of the Secretary's news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 17, 1958, pp. 768–773.

---

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 29, 1958, 7:50 p.m.

395. Please deliver following personal message to President Chiang from Secretary.

"October 29, 1958. Dear Mr. President: I have been greatly encouraged by the impact of our joint communiqué upon the free world

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–2958. Confidential. Drafted by Dulles, cleared by Robertson, and approved by Dulles.

nations. I sense a general feeling of relief, and of recognition of your statesmanship in having been willing to put the mission of your Government on a higher plane than mere reliance on force alone.

We have been actively bringing your statement, in sympathetic terms, to the attention of various friendly governments, and invariably the reaction has been good. I do not doubt but what there has been a very considerable gain in world opinion, at least in stemming a tide which was running strongly against our common policies.

Immediately upon your return, Mrs. Dulles and I spoke to Madame [Chiang] on the telephone in New York and gave her the report of our visit and of you.

With high regard, I am

Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles."

Dulles

---

225. Memorandum by Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, October 29, 1958.

1. I emphasized to the Gimo that free world public opinion was running against him because it was feared that he was, in fact, bound to policies which would invite hostilities which in turn would probably involve the United States and thus the whole world. I emphasized that if he wished to maintain the loyal support of friendly non-Communist governments, he owed it to them to clarify in a public way what his real policy was and that it did not involve reliance on offensive or provocative force.

2. It was not easy for the Gimo to do this. His Government and Army are largely dominated by "Mainlanders" and they and many of the overseas Chinese do not like anything which seems in any degree to diminish the chances of getting back to the Mainland. Quite possibly some of them, at a low level, do, in fact, look forward to a war in which the United States would be involved. Many Koreans feel that way. Nevertheless the Gimo and other top officials recognized the validity of our presentation and made the self-denying declaration. It has attracted some public criticism already on Taiwan.

Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962). Secret. A copy is filed with a covering note of October 29 from Dulles to Lodge, which indicates that it was background material for Lodge to use in discussions with Latin American representatives at the United Nations.

3. The clinching arguments were the arguments which I made, based upon the other three countries divided by Communism. In Korea and Vietnam there are armistices which, although never signed by the Governments of the Republic of Korea or Vietnam, nevertheless are acquiesced in by these Governments. Then there is the declaration which Chancellor Adenauer made at London on October 3, 1954, that "the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany".

This does not involve a "two China" policy any more than there are "two Korea", "two Vietnam" or "two Germany" policies. In each of these cases we and most of the free world recognize the free governments as the only lawful governments and we do not deal with the other regimes except on a limited de facto basis.

4. We do not accept the present Communist regime in China as permanent. How quickly it will change, I do not know. But that it will change, I do not doubt. The present reports about what the Communists are doing there are shocking. They seem to be turning the entire population into slaves under the most barbaric system, completely disrupting the family life and denying all personal possessions. That cannot, I think, but bring about powerful opposition.

5. I was impressed by the caliber of the men in the Chinese Nationalist Government in addition to Chiang. It is by no means a one-man affair. The Vice President and others whom I met are men of real ability and character and they were fully consulted by President Chiang during the course of our talks there. I am convinced that the Free China Government will not disappear if Chiang should die.

6. The conditions on Taiwan are good and the people enjoy the highest standard of living of any country of Asia except Japan. The Taiwanese have never been so well off. They have a large amount of local self-government and, according to reports, are on the whole quite contented.

7. The Chinese Communist policy contrasts sharply with that of the Chinats. They will not reciprocate in a renunciation of force to reunite China their way. They publicly boasted that by resuming the firing, while I was en route to Peiping, they "defeated my plot" to bring about a "permanent cease-fire". Their shelling of Quemoy for avowedly non-military purposes is mere sadistic terrorism. (See my press conference comment.)[1]

J.F.D.[2]

---

[1] Of October 28; see footnote 2, Document 223.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

226. Memorandum of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 30, 1958, 9 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. *Report by the Secretary of State on His Recent Visit to Taiwan*

Secretary Dulles explained that the primary purpose of his going to Taiwan had been to contribute to a peaceful solution of the problems of that area without involving a loss of U.S. prestige or security in the area. One of the main factors influencing him to take this trip had been the Communist success in convincing so many people in the world that the Chinese Nationalists were simply trying to involve the United States in a war with Communist China in order to regain the China mainland. Probably some people in Taiwan were actually trying to do just this, but it was not true of the top Nationalist leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek himself. Nevertheless, many friendly nations believed the Communist propaganda line that Chiang Kai-shek was the master of U.S. policy with respect to the problems of Taiwan and the offshore islands.

Secretary Dulles went on to state that he had had a good many hours of conversation with Chiang alone, except for an interpreter. Together they had discussed the world situation and the situation of Taiwan in the world, and the need to dissipate the fog of Communist propaganda which he had earlier mentioned. Secretary Dulles expressed a certainty that the Generalissimo was converted to the idea that renunciation of the use of military force to retake the mainland was a sound course of action. Secretary Dulles then explained how the final communiqué with respect to the visit had been developed—first on the basis of a draft submitted by him, which was in turn the subject of extensive discussion by the Chinese Nationalist authorities.

Secretary Dulles felt that the most persuasive argument he had made to Chiang in the matter of renunciation of force, was that of the four countries whose territory was now divided between a Communist government and a free government—namely, Korea, Vietnam, Germany, and China—all except Nationalist China had accepted the concept of not using military force to achieve reunification. Chancellor Adenauer's statement to this effect had carried particular weight with the Generalissimo.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 31. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

As to the effect of this declaration by Chiang on allied and Free World opinion, Secretary Dulles estimated it to be very good, and predicted that it would put Chiang in a much better posture in their eyes.

As an adjunct to the main topic of conversation—namely, the renunciation of force to recover the mainland—Secretary Dulles said that he had had quite a lot of conversation about the status of Quemoy and Matsu. In this connection, Secretary Dulles stated that Chiang had generally accepted the proposal that we would gradually develop with Chiang a more sensible policy with respect to these offshore islands. The problem of these islands would be easier to deal with in the light of Chiang's new position regarding the problem of the reunification of China. Secretary Dulles cautioned that this did not mean that Chiang would agree at once to any great reduction of Chinese Nationalist forces now stationed on these offshore islands. But he did agree, first, that there would be discussions between his military people and our military people as to the character of a rational defense force on these islands; and secondly, that this would result in some reduction of existing Nationalist forces, both on Quemoy and on the Matsus. Secretary Dulles added that he further believed that if we could achieve a genuine cease-fire in this area, an even greater reduction in Nationalist forces on the offshore islands could occur, and that even their eventual demilitarization was a possibility. However, the present atmosphere created by the Chinese Communists was obviously not very salubrious for the achievement of these objectives. In point of fact, we simply did not know the intentions of the Chinese Communists.

Secretary Dulles said that he had also discussed with the Generalissimo the unwisdom of attaching and identifying his cause with two pieces of real estate which perhaps, in this uncertain world, could not always be defended under all conceivable circumstances. The Generalissimo had replied strongly that he could *guarantee* that these islands could be held. While Secretary Dulles refused to believe this proposition, he did not press the discussion topic to a firm conclusion.

All in all, Secretary Dulles felt that our problems with Chiang Kai-shek in the future would be much more manageable than in the past. Morale on Taiwan was good. The quality of the higher officials of the Nationalist Government was very good. The Government of Taiwan was not just a one-man show, and all would not, accordingly, be lost when the Generalissimo disappeared from the scene. As to the Taiwanese population itself, to judge from all the reports Secretary Dulles could obtain, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] they were extremely contented on the whole. They had never been much accustomed to political authority;

their economic condition was better than it had ever been before in history. The influence of the Taiwanese in the Army was growing. In general, Secretary Dulles detected no sharp divergencies between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders.

The National Security Council:[1]

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State summarizing his recent consultations with officials of the Government of the Republic of China, and analyzing the implications thereof.

3. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

The Director of Central Intelligence spoke at some length about what he called a new "social experiment" by the Chinese Communists in the form of the so-called people's commune. This reorganization of Chinese society Mr. Allen Dulles described as "massive slavery". It encompassed the reorganization of all the nonurban areas of China. He briefly described the system of communes which he said appeared to be tied in with the so-called "Great Leap Forward". Mr. Dulles promised that he would circulate in the future a detailed report on this new development, which goes far beyond any social reorganizations yet tried in the Soviet Union or any other Communist country. The failure of Moscow to mention the new communes perhaps indicated Soviet coolness to this experiment. The Chinese Communists claim to have organized 500 million people in the new communes, a figure which seemed incredible on the face of it.

Secretary Dulles interrupted to comment that officials on Taiwan felt that the Chinese Communists wouldn't get away with this massive attempt to destroy traditional Chinese family life, and that the attempt would provoke revolution against the Communist regime on the mainland. This, of course, could be wishful thinking on the part of the Chinese Nationalists; on the other hand, there might be something in it.

[Here follow the remainder of the discussion of agenda item 3 and agenda item 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

[1] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2001. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

227. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, October 30, 1958, 10:55 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
General Twining
Major Eisenhower

REFERENCES

JCS telegram 947298;[1] Navy telegram 4744; Navy telegram 25929[2]

This informal meeting was called in order to verify the specific instructions which are now in effect with regard to U.S. convoy activities in the Taiwan Straits. In the meeting with General Twining on 27 October,[3] the President had understood that only "normal" patrolling would be in effect; however, the above referenced messages indicated that convoying up to a three-mile limit was permissible. In this regard, General Twining had met with Secretary Dulles on the afternoon of 27 October on this subject and they had likewise conferred with Admiral Burke on 29 October. Initially, Secretary Dulles gave the following background to the problem as it exists today: The Chinese Communists are willingly allowing the Nationalist Chinese to re-supply Quemoy on even numbered days. Whether or not the Nationalist Chinese attempt to re-supply on odd numbered days should be left to them, Secretary Dulles feels, as a political decision. It would be bad politically to coerce the Nationalist Chinese into "jumping through the hoop"—i.e. complying slavishly to the policies of the Chinese Communists. Accordingly, U.S. Commanders are instructed to convoy only in case of military necessity, which would be limited to situations where the Communists attack supply convoys on even numbered days. The Secretary feels that we have no responsibility to convoy in the event the GRC choose to convoy on odd numbered days.

At this point the President introduced the question of pre-decision. If there is not a big emergency, in the President's view, Admiral Felt can easily check with Washington for instructions. Secretary Dulles then out-

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major Eisenhower. The conference was held after the NSC meeting (see Document 226). A memorandum of the conversation by Dulles, attached to a memorandum for the record by Boster, October 31, is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President.

[1] Document 53.

[2] Telegram 231355Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CNO, and telegram 232149Z from CNO to COMUSTDC, both October 23; see footnote 1, Document 214.

[3] See Document 219.

lined three major points at issue in the convoy, which had been covered in a recent telegram from Admiral Felt:[4]

(a) First, there is the question of re-supplying on odd versus even numbered days. Admiral Smoot had desired to limit the GRC to re-supplying on even numbered days. In this matter, Admiral Felt disagreed, and in the light of political considerations, Secretary Dulles sided with Admiral Felt.

(b) Next, there is the issue of U.S. convoy policy. U.S. ships will not convoy so long as the re-supply on even numbered days is proceeding satisfactorily.

(c) Finally, there is the question of areas to patrol. The twelve-mile limit theoretically imposed by the Chinese Nationalist Government resulted in a line which extends sometimes thirty miles from the coast. In view of this, Admiral Felt had desired to make occasional, purposeful intrusions so as to indicate our nonacceptance of this limit. In this connection, Secretary Dulles, with the concurrence of General Twining, pointed out that our position in the Warsaw conferences makes our attitude clear and there is no need to demonstrate our attitude by overt acts at this time.

The positions taken by Secretary Dulles received the President's approval subject to an additional modification with respect to the convoy instructions. Here he pointed out that a convoy affords protection against naval action but not against artillery fire from the shore. Accordingly, it was decided that the United States, pending further instructions, would not engage in convoying operations unless the Chinese Communists attempted by sea and/or air to interfere with the re-supply on even days in what we regard as international waters.[5]

General Twining then brought up a final point with reference to reconnaissance activities, which is set forth in a separate memorandum.[6]

John S.D. Eisenhower
Major, United States Army

---

[4] Telegram 282336Z from CINCPAC to CNO, October 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–2858; see Supplement)

[5] Attached to the source text is an addendum by Major Eisenhower, October 31, stating that Dulles, with Twining's concurrence, subsequently forwarded the following paragraph which represented his understanding of the policy on convoy operations approved by the President:

> "The United States, pending further instructions, would not engage in convoying operations unless the ChiComs attempted by sea and/or air to interfere with the resupply on 'even' days in what we regarded as international waters. Such convoy and escort protection will be engaged in by the United States only in case of military necessity and to extent necessary."

The addendum states that the President had approved this.

[6] Document 228.

228. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 30, 1958.

At the conference between the President, Secretary Dulles, and General Twining (10:55 AM, 30 October 1958),[1] General Twining brought up the subject of aerial reconnaissance in the Taiwan Straits area.

Admiral Smoot had desired to resume conducting Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance flights over China; this had been disapproved. In this regard, Secretary Dulles indicated that the U.S. had dispatched its own high-altitude reconnaissance flights to the mainland with the understanding that permission had been granted by the President. The President indicated that he had been unaware of the resumption of this activity. The meeting ended with the understanding that such reconnaissance flights as are flown should be flown by U.S. forces and that the benefit of these flights should be given to the Chinese Nationalists. Permission to execute these reconnaissance missions must be secured *on a mission-by-mission basis* from the President.

John S.D. Eisenhower
Major, United States Army

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Major Eisenhower.

[1] See Document 227.

---

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, October 30, 1958, 8:21 p.m.

400. Embtel 689.[1] In response Foreign Minister's letter dated October 28 suggest you comment to Foreign Minister orally repeat orally along following lines:

Foreign Minister's letter had been communicated to Department of State which has taken note of observations contained in it. As to first ob-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2958. Secret. Drafted by Martin, cleared by Parsons and in draft by Dulles, and approved by Robertson.

[1] Document 221.

servation, Department agrees that US Government's meaning would be correctly conveyed by spelling word "free" with small "f". Department notes that in Chinese text of Communiqué Chinese equivalent of "free" (tzuyuti) rather than of "Free" (tzuyu) was used, thus making clear to Chinese readers everywhere that phrase "free China" merely descriptive and not name of separate new political entity (Embtel 682).[2] However Department has no objection if in subsequent releases of English language text GRC wishes to spell "free" with small "f".

Regarding second point in Foreign Minister's letter, Department fully agrees that any interpretation that Communiqué committed Republic of China not to use force under any circumstances is totally inconsistent with context. Wording of Communiqué seems perfectly clear that force would not be used as principal means of achieving GRC's mission, and does not preclude use of force for self-defense or in case of large scale uprising on mainland. It will be recalled that the draft declaration suggested by Secretary Dulles read "It (GRC) will never itself initiate war to reestablish its authority upon the mainland". This language was deliberately designed to make clear that what the Government of the Republic of China rejected was the responsibility for initiating war. If war on the mainland occurs without having been initiated by the Nationalists, that would alter the basic assumption underlying the present declaration.

In conveying foregoing to the Foreign Minister emphasize that any attempt now to amend or interpret Communiqué by exchange of letters or by any other device would be counter-productive. Communiqué has already received wide circulation and has made extremely favorable impact in US and rest of Free World. It would be catastrophe if this favorable reaction should now be undermined by statements seeming to qualify clear meaning of Communiqué or indicating disagreement between US and ROC.

Dulles

---

[2] Telegram 682 from Taipei, October 28, pointed this out. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2858)

230. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, October 30, 1958, 8:21[?] p.m.[1]

300121Z. Your 282336Z[2] is both timely and welcome. Whatever may be ChiCom purpose in restricting OSI bombardment, our actions now should support U.S. objective of reducing tensions in Taiwan area without losing our current advantageous position.

Concur your recommendation Alfa.[3] Gimo should make decision on when and how he resupplies. Should he choose resupply on odd days and his ships get damaged he should understand of course that that does not mean that U.S. will escort because of attack since by supplying on even days there would be no military necessity of having convoys on odd days at all, let alone U.S. escorting them. Your Bravo concur unreservedly.

Although I agree with your Charlie, State Department feels that because the situation appears to be gradually subsiding, it would not now be desirable to resume patrols which come within the falsely claimed Communist twelve mile limit. This will insure the Communists have no excuse whatever for charging provocative acts on our part. Sooner or later though we will have to take actions to dispel any Communist ideas that we are actually accepting their twelve mile limit as a practical measure even though we protest. We don't want a twelve mile limit to become a de facto situation.

By separate dispatch we will later authorize reduction in Naval forces on station so that two carriers and supporting ships can remain on station and the others in Subic or Yokosuka. Your point on doing this without announcement and after informing Gimo is important.

Understand State is sending similar dispatch to Amb Taipei.[4]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–3058. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burke. Repeated to JCS, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and COMUSTDC.

[1] The date/time group is evidently incorrect; it presumably should read 310121Z.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 227.

[3] The alphabetically-listed recommendations correspond to the alphabetically-listed subparagraphs in Document 227.

[4] Telegram 398, October 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–3058; see Supplement)

231. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 31, 1958, 6 p.m.

702. CINCPAC for Felt and Steeves. Smoot and I agree with tactics set forth CINCPAC 282336Z and Deptel 398[1] for handling existing situation.

Chiang's position is not clear to Smoot and me; Wang has told Smoot he is agreeable to trying to beach single LST on even days weather permitting. In general, GRC appears taking relaxed position toward resupply now. Smoot considers Defense Minister, Tiger Wang and Admiral Liang all have displayed reticence. He does not know whether this reticence is deliberate or whether officials simply have not made up minds how to tackle situation. It appears likely, however, attempt will be made when weather abates to beach single LST on even days to test Communist reaction. If all goes well number beached should be stepped up. Additionally, in order to vary resupply method and avoid appearance full compliance with Communist dictates some token attempts may be made on odd days to send LVTs. Smoot will advise against latter action as risky and costly unless deemed logistically necessary.

GRC has not asked for US escort since Communists laid down latest rules; their most recent request has been for use of LSD which was not pressed when Smoot demurred. Smoot and I agree time will come when GRC may need LSD. In anticipation of this need and in order to avoid direct US participation, Smoot is recommending that we lend one LSD to GRC and train GRC crew in its use. I endorse this recommendation and urge it be acted upon affirmatively at early date.

Drumright

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–3158. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Felt and Steeves.

[1] See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 230.

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1958, AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS: THE QUESTION OF NATIONALIST FORCES ON THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS; INCREASED U.S. MILITARY AID TO THE NATIONALISTS

232. Editorial Note

On November 5, 1958, members of the U.S. delegation to the technical military discussions on preventing surprise attack, which were to open in Geneva on November 10, met with President Eisenhower. A memorandum of the conversation by Gordon Gray, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, reads in part as follows:

> "The President then said that he would like to make one particular request of the delegation: he indicated that it is entirely possible that the Russians might become freely talkative, and he would be most eager to have their views toward Communist China. He wondered if the Soviets were not really becoming concerned about Communist China as a possible threat to them in the future.
>
> "Mr. Foster indicated that they would actively bear this request in mind. He said that it had occurred to him that there may be some chance that an exchange of views of this sort was one of the things the Soviets had in mind when they agreed to the discussions, expressing his view that if the Soviet Union were not worried, they certainly should be." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)

Information concerning the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack, which met in Geneva November 10–December 18, 1958, is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958,* pages 1396–1407.

---

233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, November 5, 1958, 8:11 p.m.

560. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for 83rd meeting:

In joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles October 23 GRC declared that foundation of its mission of restor-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bennett and Green, cleared by Robertson and in draft by Parsons and Martin, cleared with L and in substance with the Department of Defense, and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Taipei and USUN for Lodge.

ing freedom to its people on mainland resides in minds and hearts of Chinese people and that principal means of successfully achieving its mission is implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples' Principles and not use of force. GRC posture regarding reunification China now similar in fundamentals to that Federal German Republic, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam as regards reunification their countries. Communist regimes these countries reciprocate, as clearly shown by Communist acceptance Korean armistice and Geneva accord on Vietnam. Among countries divided by Communism only Chinese Communists publicly insisting on free hand use offensive military force unite country. Your principal purpose at meeting should be to expose this Chinese Communist position, emphasizing the fallacy of claiming this purely "domestic" in view GRC and US Mutual Defense Treaty and PRC and Soviet treaty alliance.

You should begin with strong denunciation Communist every other day bombardment policy making point that such continued wanton killing abhorrent entire community civilized nations. Recall that on November 3 Chinese Communists suddenly fired almost 40,000 shells against Quemoy group. This was by far heaviest shelling since September 11. No reason given for this onslaught which, because of its suddenness and complete lack of justification by any criterion, was bound to exact unusually heavy toll in the towns and countryside of Quemoy. World shocked at this latest Communist display of callous disregard for human life. It confirmed widely held opinions or suspicions about rulers in Peiping. But that was not all. Peiping then charged that Quemoy's defenders were firing back poison gas shells.[1] Peiping knows full well that this is a lie. Why then the charge? Is it an effort to divert world attention from Communist shelling of innocent civilians on the islands? Is it effort to justify such wanton killing, is it effort to justify Communist use of such weapons?

You should draw conclusion from foregoing that it is now even more apparent than it was at previous meeting with Wang that his side not interested in restoring tranquil conditions in Taiwan Strait, but rather in keeping atmosphere charged with dangers and tensions in a dangerous effort to realize Peiping's expansionist aims.

Ask Wang whether his side prepared undertake not initiative war for purpose taking Taiwan, Penghu and offshore islands. Tell him this step required remove present grave danger to peace in Taiwan Strait, and whole world would welcome such action his side. However, failure his government adopt such policy would make it responsible before world public opinion as alone among regimes in divided countries in insisting as matter of right on attempting to extend its domain by military force at risk world peace.

---

[1] Telegram 555 to Warsaw, November 4, transmitted the text of a November 4 broadcast making this charge. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/11–458)

In response Wang's certain riposte that Taiwan Straits situation "internal matter" repeat our arguments that this obviously not case as shown by US treaty with GRC, by world-wide concern expressed since his side launched attacks Quemoy and by strong expressions support for Wang's side, including references Sino-Soviet Treaty, which have come from USSR. Constant repetition of formula "internal matter" will deceive no one into believing situation threatening world peace is Wang's, regime's exclusive concern. You should also deny inevitable charge that joint communiqué of October 23 simply an unfolding our "plot" create "two Chinas". Point out US recognizes only one Chinese Government, GRC, just as it recognizes only one Korean, one Vietnamese and one German Government. Fact that these countries unhappily divided and neither side insisting on recognition of "right" launch armed attacks on other obviously does not mean free governments these countries and their allies accept division their countries as immutable condition. What gives Wang's regime superior rights over rest of world to press claims for territory at risk of war? Is this admission Wang's part it impossible establish inherent justice his side's claim without constant shooting and shedding innocent blood?

Point out that reason why there is general acceptance of principle that divided countries should not be reunited by resort to offensive military action is precisely because such attempts would endanger world peace. Wang's side itself acknowledged such situations not merely internal matter countries concerned by taking part in Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina in 1954. China clearly no exception this general rule. How can one say that situation which has already twice in four years gravely imperiled peace of Asia should be exempt from general principles applied other divided countries? US is first among countries deploring fact so many peoples torn between contending sides and ardently hopes for day when all peoples so divided, including Chinese, can be reunited under representative government their own free choosing. But US agrees with other countries in world that process unification divided nations must not be permitted precipitate conflicts imperiling peace and security of world. GRC declaration in Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles October 23 "that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Peoples' Principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force" made clear that it too, holds this view. Ask Wang if he is prepared in principle to make a declaration similar to this declaration by GRC eschewing force. If so two sides can immediately begin consideration of appropriate text.

FYI. Do not believe proposal for observation by third parties (paragraph 4 your 651)[2] feasible since could lead to demand that observers be stationed US vessels and aircraft to assure implementation and would appear to give recognition right PRC to establish limits of territorial sea. Regarding question of territorial sea, there have been no Communist charges of "intrusions" by our vessels or aircraft since October 23. Arguments for your use in case Wang makes detailed reply our position being sent in separate telegram. You may also find International Court of Justice decision in Norwegian fisheries case (Deptel 554)[3] useful in establishing point that no part high seas can be unilaterally appropriated by any state to its own use without concurrence other states. Suggest you defer reply to points not readily handled with material at hand until following meeting.

Dulles

---

[2] See footnote 1, Document 217.

[3] Telegram 554 to Warsaw, November 4, transmitted an extract from the decision. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–458)

---

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, November 7, 1958, 5 p.m.

696. USUN information for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks.

83rd meeting one hour forty minutes.[1] Wang led off with brief statement protesting alleged use US-supplied poison gas by GRC and demanding discussion US withdrawal from Taiwan area. I responded with sharp attack on ChiCom shelling Quemoy and concocting of poison gas charge along lines Deptel 560.[2] Wang then read lengthy statement mak-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–758. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 697 from Warsaw, November 7, and his comments and recommendations in telegram 703 from Warsaw, November 8. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/11–758 and 611.93/11–858, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Document 233.

ing usual accusations US interfering in Chinese internal affairs and endeavoring create two Chinas. I responded with material showing international character of dispute and drawing analogy to situation other divided countries as set forth reference telegram. Wang replied denying applicability of analogy and in rather abusive language charging US continuing practice provoking civil war in China which it had engaged in for past century. I rebuked Wang for abusiveness of language following which he somewhat milder but that nothing new to offer. I proposed next meeting Tuesday November 25, 2 p.m. to which Wang agreed.

Beam

---

235. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Washington, November 11, 1958, 3:47 p.m.

112047Z. COMUSTDC 110830Z.[1] If ChiComs do resume firing on even days it will be because their recent actions have not been successful in accomplishing their objectives. We will have an opportunity to condemn ChiCom continued use of force despite our attempts to ease tensions. So our policies may not be as bad as COMTAIWANDEFCOM (US) seems to think.

Feeling here at highest level is that firm but unprovocative stand is beginning to pay off with gain in public support for way situation has been handled, and this not right time take any action which will change this.

Therefore, with full understanding COMTAIWANDEFCOM feeling of impatience against restrictions his freedom of action, cannot at this

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–1158. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rear Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, Assistant Director of the Strategic Plans Division in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy; and approved by Burke. Repeated to COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US). The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Telegram 110830Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG TAIWAN to CINCPAC argued that by following a policy of "complete non-provocation," the United States had "lost the initiative," negated its strong and positive reactions to the earlier Communist probes, and "permitted Chicoms to control situation." (Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the GRC)

time concur his approval photo recon ChiCom arty positions Kinmen area. Approval of use of LSD, resumption deep recon flights and action reassert our rights in international waters must await further developments and discussions with JCS and State. Will advise.

COMTAIWANDEFCOM has authority resume escort if militarily necessary but assume he will advise prior taking that action. State concurs.[2]

---

[2] Tedul 8 to Seattle, November 12, informed Secretary Dulles that Admiral Burke had discussed Smoot's message with Robertson, who had advised him "that this involved questions in which the President took a very personal interest." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.93/11–1258)

---

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, November 14, 1958, 8 p.m.

746. 1. Admiral Smoot, General Doan and I called on President Chiang late yesterday at his request. He referred to recent discussions between MAAG and MND re augmentation of matériel for defense of offshores in reduction of manpower.[1]

2. Chiang said at outset he would agree to manpower reduction in principle, but could not undertake reduction under fire. He said problem is to suppress communist artillery fire. He stressed importance of making Kinmen impregnable, adding strengthening of Matsu defenses not nearly so pressing and could be looked into after Kinmen requirements met.

3. Indicating he was thoroughly familiar with MAAG MND studies and findings, Chiang suggested all 12 of 240MM Howitzers now on way here be sent Kinmen. He hoped say four more could be made available for delivery to Matsu. With regard to 36 155 MM guns on way here,

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/11–1458. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:57 p.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. The documents cited in footnotes 1, 2, and 4 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Telegram 131013Z from Chief MAAG Taiwan, November 13, reported that Generals Doan and Wang had reached oral agreement on this subject on November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–1358)

he hoped they would arrive soon; he suggested 12 be sent Kinmen and a few to Matsu. He said study should be made meanwhile to determine what proportion of 155 Howitzers vs guns should be placed on off-shores.

4. Replying, Doan suggested counter battery artillery be augmented as follows:

A. Kinmen; 240 MM Howitzers 12, 155 MM guns 12.

B. Matsu: 240 MM Howitzers four or more when available, 155 MM guns, one battalion when available.

C. Further study to be made of possible additional artillery which should be placed following emplacement and effectiveness of foregoing guns.

D. Lacrosse Missile to be considered later if operational and available.

5. Chiang said he felt infantry reduction should be compensated by augmentation of tank units. He felt this problem should be studied; meanwhile, he not prepared to recommend how many tanks should be sent Kinmen. In response, Doan proposed Kinmen armor be augmented as follows:

A. One tank battalion (to be made up of M–24 tanks already in GRC possession).

B. Study be made of optimum and strength required support revised defense plans.

C. If local experiment to modify excess M–8 assault gun carriages into armored personnel carriers feasible, provide sufficient converted vehicles to motorize two battalions of infantry.

In return for foregoing, Doan proposed Kinmen force reduction of one infantry division plus additional units and individuals to obtain net reduction in supported forces of not less than 15,000 men.[2]

6. Chiang then made a plea for provision of two additional battalions of M–41 tanks to supplement one battalion already provided. He evinced knowledge of MAAG recommendations for 205 M–41 tanks to replace obsolete WW II tanks which are obsolete, difficult to maintain and expensive. Chiang solicited my personal assistance in transmitting his plea direct to Secretary and Robertson. I said I would do so.

7. Doan believes there are sound military reasons for providing 114 additional M–41 tanks which, with those already on hand would equip three battalions. These tanks would be retained on Taiwan and M–24s on Taiwan would then replace obsolescent M–5s on Kinmen. This would conform to Defense Department's requirement that new tanks be used

---

[2] A memorandum of understanding along these lines was signed by Doan and Wang on November 17; a copy was enclosed with despatch 256 from Taipei, November 25. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/11–2558)

only for Taiwan defense. In this connection, CINCPAC's 240016Z September 1958[3] recommended US continue modernize GRC armor with M–41s as rapidly as conditions permit.

8. I personally hope we will find it possible to move toward modernization of armor as recommended by Doan and CINCPAC. I believe agreement to do so will remove snag which might impede troop reduction we seek on off-shores.[4]

Drumright

---

[3] Not found.

[4] Telegram 436 to Taipei, November 20, stated that the Department considered these questions essentially military in nature and thought decisions on them should be reached primarily on military considerations. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/11–1458)

---

237. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Chiang

Washington, November 14, 1958.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your letter of November fifth.[1] I quite understand your apprehensions concerning the attempts by the Communists to distort the meaning of the joint communiqué in order to negate its effect and confuse the world. However, I assure you that reports we have received from capitals around the world are most encouraging and indicate that the communiqué has met with an almost uniformly favorable response. I think it is now clear to all that our two governments are truly united in their devotion to peace and freedom and that it is the Communists, by contrast, who are imperiling the peace of the world by seeking to extend the limits of their oppressive

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted in the Department of State and cleared by Dulles, who added the second paragraph. A draft was sent to him in Seattle in Tedul 7, November 12; he replied in Dulte 8 from Seattle, November 13. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.93/11–1258 and 611.93/11–1358, respectively) The message was transmitted to Taipei in telegram 424, November 17; telegram 751 from Taipei, November 18, reported that it had been delivered that evening. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/11–1758 and 793.00/11–1858, respectively)

[1] The letter, together with a letter of the same date from Chiang to Dulles, is filed with a covering letter of November 6 from Yeh to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204; see Supplement)

rule through force of arms. Your own wise decision during the present trying crisis to deny the Communists any conceivable pretext for extending the scope of their attacks has been amply rewarded by dramatizing this contrast to the world.

I assume of course that your reference to means and actions in support of anti-Communist activities on the mainland is to be understood as being within the context of the joint communiqué and our other understandings.

I believe that our alliance, contrary to Communist expectations, has become even stronger and closer in the present difficult situation. I join you in believing that our close cooperation in the cause of freedom serves to keep alive the hopes of those in your country and elsewhere who are struggling to regain the freedom of which they have been so cruelly deprived.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

238. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, November 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Quemoy Situation

After you left the briefing on nuclear weapons on the morning of November 7,[1] Mr. Reinhardt posed your question as to the utility and the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons to take out the Chinese Communist gun emplacements opposite Quemoy.

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1957–58. Secret.

[1] Apparently the meeting described in Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1980), pp. 10–11.

Admiral Parker responded with an initial disclaimer, saying that his organization, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, did not have the necessary intelligence and other information required to discuss the use of nuclear weapons in a specific situation such as that now existing in the Taiwan Straits. After some further prodding from the State Department representatives present, Admiral Parker and particularly Dr. Shelton did make some general comments.

Dr. Shelton said that it was almost impossible to inflict any serious and lasting damage on well constructed gun emplacements by the airburst of nuclear weapons. Surface or, more probably, subsurface bursts would be required to knock out such installations. He thought that a 25 kiloton penetrating weapon delivered by air would be the appropriate weapon to deal with the Chinese Communist gun emplacements.

Dr. Shelton and Admiral Parker further pointed out that this weapon would have to be delivered within 200 feet of the target if it were to achieve the desired effect. Because of this need for accuracy they thought it likely that an average of two weapons for each target might be required. Hence, a considerable number of 25 kiloton bombs would have to be dropped to take out all the gun emplacements opposite Quemoy.

Since subsurface bursts were contemplated, there would be heavy fallout, the lethal extent of which would be about six miles. Much of the Quemoy Island group would lie within this six-mile area, so that the weapons could be used only in meteorological conditions which insured that the fallout would occur over the mainland. There would very probably be heavy and perhaps lethal fallout over the city of Amoy. This would result from the overlapping fallout patterns of a number of weapons.

There was also some rather inconclusive discussion of the utility of one or two kiloton projectiles fired from 8-inch Howitzers on Quemoy. These could be delivered on target and would cause considerable damage to the Chinese Communist gun emplacements. The flavor of Admiral Parker's comments was, however, that this would be a punitive rather than a destructive use of nuclear weapons. He remarked that after a few of these projectiles had been fired the Communists might lose their taste for the battle. The fallout effects from these weapons would be negligible.

At the conclusion of the meeting Admiral Parker undertook to inform General Picher, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS, that you would like to have a report on the weapons effects, including an estimate of civilian casualties, if nuclear weapons were to be used against the Chinese Communists' gun emplacements threatening Quemoy.

239. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)

Washington, November 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Provision of Amphibious Lift Capability to GRC

The attached memorandum from Ed Martin[1] provides a helpful review of actions and positions taken following the President's memorandum of October 7 to the Secretary on the above subject.[2] The memorandum does not cover most recent developments, including Admiral Smoot's telegram[3] discussing his oral understandings with Tiger Wang, CINCPAC's reactions, CINCUSARPAC's reactions and the Embassy's comments.[4]

With regard to substance, I wonder if the President's concept has not in fact been overtaken and somewhat altered by the line emphasized by the Secretary during his meetings with the Gimo. If the bases for counterattacking the mainland "lie in the minds and hearts of 600,000,000 Chinese," if we are trying to dissuade the Chinats from resort to force, if we are trying to persuade them to improve their posture before the world and retain their international standing—if *those* aims are to be emphasized, would we not badly serve our objectives by building up what would look to the world like an amphibious armada for returning to the mainland? Would this not have a reversing effect on the favorable evolution in GRC thinking we are trying to bring about?

I have always had doubts about the utility of concentrating our energies on thinning out GRC forces on the offshores, fearing that that might detract from channeling our energies, powers of persuasion and incentives toward the realization of the broad positive course charted by the joint communiqué signed by the Gimo and the Secretary.

That course, it seems to me, calls for deemphasis on things military and for long-neglected emphasis on the GRC's role as improver of conditions of life, in sharp contrast to the Orwellian horrors of Communist China.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/11–1858. Secret. Drafted by Green.

[1] The November 13 memorandum, not attached to the source text, is *ibid.*, 793.5/10–758; see Supplement.

[2] Document 166.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 236.

[4] Reference is apparently to Document 236; the CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC telegrams have not been found.

240. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, November 19, 1958.

DEAR SELWYN: Thank you for your message delivered to Under Secretary Herter by Harold Caccia on November 11.[1] I greatly appreciate your continued efforts to guide public opinion in the United Kingdom and your thoughtful suggestions on the problem of how to induce the Chinese Communists to stop their military activities.

I share your doubt that an approach to the Russians would be productive at this point in view of the altered military situation in the Taiwan Straits. With respect to the Indians, I agree that it is unlikely that any pressure can be exerted on the Chinese Communists through this channel. However, it would be useful to get a fuller idea of Nehru's views, and there could be no objection to Malcolm MacDonald's talking to him along the general lines you suggest. It may be of interest to you in this connection to know that our Ambassador in Delhi has pointed out to Nehru the significance we attach to the declaration made by the Republic of China in the joint communiqué issued at the end of my visit to Taiwan. Our Ambassador reported that while Nehru did not comment on this point he appeared to disapprove strongly of the Chinese Communists' attempt to seize the offshore islands by force.[2]

You ask for my views on whether making too much of the joint communiqué would be counterproductive and lead Chiang to add to the qualifications already made by his Foreign Minister and others. I do not think that this would prove to the be case. I do not consider these qualifications to be substantive, e.g., the Foreign Minister indicated that there is no renunciation of the right to use force in self-defense. President Chiang was fully aware of the significance of the joint communiqué as a means of establishing the peaceful intentions of his Government.

I hope that you will continue to give me the benefit of your thinking on means of tranquilizing the situation in the Straits.[3]

Sincerely yours,

Foster

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret.

[1] Undated. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] Ambassador Bunker reported the conversation in telegram 1023 from New Delhi, November 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–358; see Supplement)

[3] British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia Sir Robert Scott met with Department of State officials November 17–19 for discussions of the situation in East and Southeast Asia. A memorandum of a conversation on November 17 between Dulles and Scott is printed in vol. XVI, pp. 61–68. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/11–1758) Memoranda of conversations on November 18 and 19 between Scott and Robertson concerning China and the Taiwan Strait situation are *ibid.*, 793.00/11–1858 and 793.00/11–1958, respectively; see Supplement.

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland[1]

Washington, November 22, 1958, 4:02 p.m.

619. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is guidance for 84th meeting.

You should attempt pin Wang down on question whether Peiping prepared in principle follow GRC's lead and make declaration re non-use of force similar to GRC's in communiqué of October 23. You should raise again issues imprisoned Americans and missing Korean war personnel in light certain new developments affecting former.

Begin by pointing out that despite Wang's persistent efforts to obfuscate issue, conditions prevailing in China identical in basic respects with those in other countries divided by Communism: Korea, Vietnam, Germany. In each case there is situation recognized by both sides and by world at large as an international dispute. In each case evident danger to world peace that would result from pressing effort to reunify country by military means has led both sides to eschew use of force for this purpose. Chinese Communists' continued resort to force in pressing claim to Quemoy, Matsus, Penghus, and Taiwan contrasts vividly with posture of self-restraint displayed by opposing regimes in other divided countries. What gives them right to consider China exception to situation existing in other divided countries and to pursue course of action that threatens to plunge world into war? What difference is there between situation in China and that in three other countries that can possibly justify their patently false argument that no international dispute exists and that they are justified in using any means to realize their objectives?

Republic of China in joint Sino-American communiqué of October 23 has made public declaration of its intent not to use force to implement mission of restoring freedom to people of China but to rely principally on political example. At last meeting Chinese Communist representative was asked whether his government prepared make similar undertaking, but he avoided direct answer. He should now state clearly and unequivocally his government's position on this basic point.

You should then take up problem of American citizens held in Communist China and unaccounted for military personnel, referring to previous discussion at Geneva and mention of subject at first Warsaw meeting. You should emphasize particularly US demand that four civilian prisoners be released in accordance Chinese Communist pledge in

---

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Robert A. Aylward of the Office of Chinese Affairs and by Martin and Lutkins; cleared by Robertson and Becker and in draft by Green and with the Department of Defense; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Taipei and USUN for Lodge.

Agreed Announcement. Re unaccounted for military personnel you should avoid mention any specific number when presenting demand for accounting.

In addition reiterating US position re these issues you should take Communists to task re following recent developments involving packages and mail which have provided fresh demonstration Communists' violation of basic humanitarian principles in treatment of prisoners.

At June 15, 1954 meeting with Johnson,[1] Wang agreed families of imprisoned Americans might send small packages to them. American Red Cross February 1955 cabled Chinese Communist Red Cross requesting direct border transfer at Hong Kong to avoid circuitous route through USSR. April 29, 1955 reply agreed to transfer at border "on every month's 15th and 30th". Since May 1955 Communists have accepted both Red Cross and family parcels twice monthly which apparently delivered promptly to prisoners. Late September 1958 American Red Cross received letter dated September 11 from Chinese Communist Red Cross stating since only four US prisoners, number of parcels reduced, and "in order to reduce administrative work to the minimum" they decided readjust time of parcel delivery to once monthly on 30th. Also entrusted China International Travel Service at Shumchun accept parcels their behalf. This unilateral and callous change in non-political, humanitarian arrangement after three years smooth operation difficult to understand. October 2 President American Red Cross personally wrote Madam Li Teh-chuan[2] requesting reconsideration their decision pointing out humanitarian aspects this matter in no way altered since inception this arrangement more than three years ago and hoping delivery be maintained at same rate her Society suggested April 1955. To date no reply received. Emphasize humanitarian considerations alone would dictate maintaining previous schedule. FYI. Red Cross officials attempted regular delivery food parcels at border October 15 to no avail but Chinese accepted 18 parcels on 30th. Department considering making public details Chinese Communist action on parcels. End FYI.

Further example Communist callousness is manipulation of prisoners' mail. Until late July 1958 no prisoner's family received any letter written after December 1, 1957 shortly prior visit by three mothers. One mother who visited son January received first letter October 6 written July 8. Father Wagner released June 15 when queried by sister why he had written no letter after late November 1957 stated: "I wrote four or five times. I guess they didn't mail them." US Government forced conclude Peiping regime once again flaunted accepted standards international morality and decency as well violated a publicly made pledge. At second of meetings with Johnson at Geneva June 10, 1954[3] Wang agreed letters addressed care of "Red Cross Society of China, Peking" would be delivered imprisoned Americans. Added prisoners permitted transmit mail through same channel.

---

[1] Johnson, then serving as U.S. Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, and Wang, then Secretary General of the PRC Delegation, met four times at the conference to discuss the problem of U.S. nationals imprisoned in China and Chinese nationals restricted from leaving the United States. For a report of the June 15 meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, pp. 468–471.

[2] Li Te-ch'uan, Minister of Public Health and President of the Red Cross Society of China.

In July 1958 after non-receipt mail caused great anxiety families, British Embassy Peiping at behest US asked Chinese Communist Red Cross about mail situation. Was told that organization "responsible only for transferring letters and that none been recently received from prisoners." However less than two weeks later in response cables from mothers Peiping Red Cross replied "surprised your not hearing from son who sends letters to you regularly through this Society." In letter to another mother Chinese Communist Red Cross stated "really strange you have not received any of them. Evidently these letters held up or lost in course of delivery. In our opinion, more likely held up because inconceivable all were lost. Suggest you try to find out reason in US."

Indeed inconceivable all mail from six men for period six months or more disappeared. Assure Wang letters not held up in US and query him re contradictory Chinese Communist Red Cross explanations to British Embassy and to mothers. Establishment letter package arrangements June 1954 implied belated recognition by Chinese Communists non-political humanitarian nature these matters. Only cynical disregard for standards accepted by all civilized nations can explain their arbitrary manipulation these arrangements.

You should inquire re whereabouts and welfare Maryknoll Bishop James Edward Walsh now apparently missing. British Consulate General Shanghai reported November 3 Walsh not seen for almost two weeks and its inquiries receiving evasive replies. According later report following visit to Bishop's residence November 17 caretaker said Bishop left home "about fortnight ago" leaving only a few possessions behind and not seen since. Had no idea Bishop's whereabouts and preferred not talk about it. British note November 3 to Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department still unanswered.

FYI. If Wang raises subject 41st and 42nd (or any subsequent) "warnings" you should reject them categorically along lines suggested Deptel 450.[4]

Herter

---

[3] For a report of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations,* 1952–1954, vol. XIV, pp. 466–467.

[4] Dated October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1358; see Supplement)

242. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Honolulu, November 24, 1958, 5:17 p.m.

250317Z. As reflected in CNO 112047Z[1] fully realize that there are many aspects of Taiwan situation in addition to military factors. Recognizing facts of life, I feel strongly that military considerations must be continuously stirred into pot along with political and psychological factors that are influencing our policy with regard to operations in Taiwan area.

With regard to our policy of non-provocation, GRC aircraft have been overflying mainland for years. These overflights have been made with the encouragement of the US to obviate necessity for use US forces to procure vital intelligence. We have recently turned over 2 RB–57D to them for this purpose. Additionally, RF–101 and 100's are programmed in near future.

Military importance of photo recon is equally as great now as in past for following reasons: (1) Before further phase down of US forces in Taiwan area there is vital requirement for confirmation of intelligence information as to possible build up ChiCom forces opposite Taiwan. (2) Intelligence information as to presence newer high performance aircraft in China requires confirmation. (3) Urgent requirement for photo recon ChiCom installations in Kinmen area in order to be prepared fully for resumption heavy artillery bombardment. Request authority execute RB–57D mission to fulfill highest priority intelligence requirements as a trial balloon.[2] This, if successful, to be followed by other missions. Do not contemplate requesting approval any fighter recce overflights at this time.

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 3500–3699. Top Secret; Routine. Received at 1:43 a.m. on November 25. Repeated to JCS, COMUSTDC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC.

[1] Document 235.

[2] A memorandum by John Eisenhower of a meeting on November 28 among the President, Secretary McElroy, and General Twining reads as follows:

"General Twining requested permission to fly an RB57 photo reconnaissance flight over the mainland of China. The purpose is to determine any ChiCom buildup opposite Taiwan and the Offshore islands. CIA and State concur. Permission granted." (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)

A memorandum of January 8, 1959, by Goodpaster states that the President had received a Department of the Navy proposal, which had been cleared by Quarles and Herter and with CIA, for the "resumption of certain high-altitude reconnaissance operations over the Chinese Mainland, employing RB57s turned over to the Chinese Nationalists, and Chinese Nationalist pilots." The President approved the proposal after revisions were made at his request to exclude "the northern sector" from the area to be covered and to provide that bases in Korea should not be used. (*Ibid.*)

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, November 25, 1958, 6 p.m.

761. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 84th meeting 2 hours.[1]

I led off with brief statement along lines Department telegram 619[2] querying Wang further on ChiCom attitude toward renunciation force. Wang replied in customary language accusing US of aggression in Taiwan area, rejecting renunciation force as unacceptable since related to Chinese internal matter, and demanding US discuss basic issue between us which he described as withdrawal all US forces from Taiwan area.

In brief give and take which followed I rejected charge US aggression and pointed out only forces presently engaged in offensive military action Taiwan area were ChiComs. I then presented problem American citizens held in China and unaccounted for military personnel. Wang questioned our motive raising these issues, accusing us of deliberate procrastination and alleged talks should deal only with Taiwan problem. I replied these issues unsettled in talks at Geneva and there no question but what we entitled bring up these or any other issues to which Wang replied only that these should continue to be handled between respective Red Cross Societies. I pointed out they had been satisfactorily so handled in past, but no reply received to American Red Cross latest communication. Wang replied he sure Chinese Red Cross would respond to "any reasonable request".

I proposed next meeting Wednesday, December 10. Wang countered with Friday, December 12, 2 p.m. and we agreed on that date.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:13 a.m. on November 26. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 762 from Warsaw and his comments and recommendations in telegram 763, both November 25. (*Ibid.;* see Supplement)

[2] Document 241.

244. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

No. 261 Taipei, November 27, 1958.

REF

Embassy Telegram #746, November 14, 1958; Deptel #436, November 21, 1958; Embassy Despatch #256, November 25, 1958[1]

SUBJECT

Future Military Needs of the GRC

Dr. Yu Ta-wei, Minister of National Defense, Government of the Republic of China, will depart Taipei quietly November 28, 1958, on his annual visit to Washington, D.C., for the purpose of medical treatment and discussions with officials of the Departments of State and Defense. He evidently plans to remain in the United States for approximately three months. As in previous years, the Minister has been readying himself for the trip by stating his views and seeking those of senior United States officials in Taipei concerning the present and future military posture, missions and needs of the GRC. Some indications of the GRC's interests in these connections have already been furnished the Department in the communications under reference. Additional material on the GRC's interests is now available and forwarded attached to this despatch[2] for the information of the Department during the Minister's calls in Washington.

During recent discussions Minister Yu asked Admiral Smoot, Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command, for the ideas of local United States military officials on a concept for modernization of the Chinese military forces. He reportedly sought a "combined United States strategic concept of ChiNat Forces". The United States comments were furnished in a personal letter from the Admiral to the Minister, dated November 20, 1958, a copy of which is attached as Enclosure #1. The comments were general in nature and avoided specifics with respect to numbers and items of equipment. As a basis for his personal comments concerning the future military needs of the GRC Admiral Smoot informed the Minister that through the experience of facing problems over the past few years the United States had reached certain conclusions: The Free World faces a long range threat during which period the missions

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–2758. Secret; Noforn Except GRC. Drafted by William T. Carpenter, Jr.

[1] See Document 236 and footnotes 2 and 4 thereto.

[2] The enclosures are in the Supplement.

and the support required in the several United States Services must change and undergo modification. Forces maintained over the period cannot be completely modern and completely equipped at the same time and they must be maintained in the context of the collective capability of all those nations opposing the common enemy. Recent events have confirmed that defense capabilities of the collective community must exist in depth. Proceeding from that basis the Admiral informed Minister Yu that he suggests a smaller GRC Army force structure, a slight increase in the Navy and continuing modernization of the Chinese Air Force, which he considers to be the primary defensive requirement in this area.

The Ambassador called upon Minister Yu on November 26 to bid him farewell prior to his departure for the United States. A memorandum of that conversation is attached as Enclosure #2. During the conversation the Minister indicated general agreement with the approach set forth by Admiral Smoot's letter of November 20. He particularly concurred in the Admiral's concept that the Chinese Air Force and Navy be strengthened. However, he was not enthusiastic about the suggestion that the strength of the Chinese Army be reduced, maintaining that considerable progress has been made in reducing the overall strength of the Chinese armed forces through retrenchment of non-supported units. In the Minister's opinion, reductions beyond those of this nature at this particular time would be especially unwise and might bring about an adverse psychological reaction among the Chinese people and armed forces. The Ambassador, on the other hand, sought to encourage the Minister to come up with some program for a reduction, pointing out that such a move would provide a more favorable climate for United States agreement toward modernization of Chinese defense forces.

For the Ambassador:
David L. Osborn
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

---

245. Editorial Note

A synopsis of Department of State and Intelligence material reported to the President on December 4, 1958, prepared by John S.D. Eisenhower, includes the following item:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concurred with CINCPAC proposal that Air Force augmentation on Taiwan be reduced. CINCPAC was directed to redeploy the air units at his discretion with news releases being held to a low key. In this connection, you noted previously that the reduction by 17,000 of the forces on the offshore islands does not satisfy the requirement for bringing the force to a reasonable size. State and Defense say that they are still pushing for greater reductions; this represents only the first step. In exchange for this reduction we supply one M–24 Tk Bn, twelve 240mm Howitzers, twelve 155mm guns (Long Toms) for Quemoy, and four 240mm Howitzers and a Bn of Long Toms for Matsu. CINCPAC (with concurrence General White, CINCUSARPAC) objects only to the M–24 Tk Bn for Quemoy. Action not yet complete." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

---

246. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

Foreign Minister Huang's Letter to Secretary Regarding Reaction to Joint Communiqué

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Hsu, Chinese Minister
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Ambassador Yeh called at Mr. Robertson's request. Mr. Robertson said that because the Secretary was in the hospital he had not yet been able to reply to the letter which he had received from Foreign Minister Huang just before he made his San Francisco speech.[1] However, he wanted to read to Ambassador Yeh the reply to Foreign Minister Huang's letter which was being recommended to the Secretary.[2] Ambassador Yeh indicated that Huang's letter had been intended to keep the Secretary informed about overseas Chinese opinion.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–958. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.

[1] The letter, dated December 3, is filed with a covering note of December 4 from Patrick Pichi Sun, Republic of China Consul General in San Francisco, to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/12–458; see Supplement) Dulles addressed the California Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco on December 4 on the subject of U.S. policy in the Far East. For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1958, pp. 989–994.

[2] Dulles' reply to Huang, December 12, was drafted on December 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–1258; see Supplement)

Mr. Robertson pointed out that if the GRC were to get involved in a war, it would be dependent upon United States forces for support. The United States wanted to strengthen and support the GRC to meet developments on the mainland, but the United States was against the use of force to reunite China and the other divided countries. The GRC should adopt tactics to meet this situation. Mr. Robertson stressed that the Joint Communiqué of October 23 had been a tremendous help in giving our allies a true picture of the GRC's role and of destroying the false picture which many of them had of a government planning to drag the world into war in its attempt to recover China. Any denigration of the Joint Communiqué by Taipei might destroy support for the GRC in the United States, let alone in the rest of the world. Mr. Robertson then read the text of the proposed letter to Foreign Minister Huang.

Ambassador Yeh said he thought the proposed letter was a good one, and again expressed the opinion that the purpose of Huang's letter was to keep the Secretary informed. He said that during his visits to the overseas Chinese communities in New York and San Francisco, which he had thought were reasonably successful, he had encountered two lines of criticism. First, since the Chinese Communist regime was now getting an even tighter grip on the people through the communes, it was necessary to offset this with increased pressure from the outside. Such external pressure was necessary to bring about conditions for an uprising. Secondly, since the bases for the return to the mainland were in the hearts and minds of the people, it was essential to keep their hopes for freedom alive. According to the critics, the Joint Communiqué failed on both these points.

Mr. Robertson replied that all the opposition which could be generated on the mainland among the people would not be capable of bringing about a successful revolution until the Red Army, or a significant part of it, went over to the side of the people. The peoples' support could be obtained now but, considering that the Red Army comprised 2-1/2 million men and that the GRC forces were comparatively small in size, the peoples' support alone was not enough. Moreover, the GRC alone could not succeed without United States support. Ambassador Yeh agreed.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that attacks on the GRC were coming from *Shih Chieh Jih Pao* (*Chinese World*) and *Lien Ho Jih Pao* (*United Journal*), both published in New York City. He said these papers had been supported by United States agencies in the past. While they were anti-Communist they were also critical of the GRC. In addition, there was a Communist paper in New York called the *Hua Chiao Jih Pao*. Ambassador Yeh said the editor of the *Lien Ho Jih Pao*, Mr. Wu Ching-fu, had editorially called for the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek and his chief advisors. His paper had also criticized Secretary Dulles for having "a two Chinas" policy.

Ambassador Yeh said that Foreign Minister Huang was very reasonable and would be the last person to retract any statement such as the Joint Communiqué, to which the GRC had agreed. Minister Huang would be very surprised and sorry to hear that Mr. Dulles was upset by his letter.

Mr. Robertson said that the GRC should not regard the Joint Communiqué as a negative thing to which it was tied by agreement, but should make it the basis for a positive policy. Unfortunately, Vice President Chen Cheng's statement about counterattacking the mainland[3] was contrary to the concept of the Joint Communiqué. Ambassador Yeh stressed that he had telegraphed his government some time ago to avoid using the word "counterattack." However, he had had no reply to this message.

---

[3] Reference is apparently to a speech by Ch'en on November 12, reported in telegram 743 to Taipei, November 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/11–1458)

---

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, December 12, 1958, 6 p.m.

829. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 85th meeting 2 hours 20 minutes.[1] Wang led off with sharp attack on US along usual lines charging US had committed aggression against China's territory Taiwan and was proposing renunciation of force as means cloak its aggression and promote two Chinas plot. Said if US sincere we would discuss basic cause of tension in area, namely presence US forces. Urged mutual renunciation force between PRC and US which US would carry out by retiring forces from Taiwan area thus demonstrating sincerity.

I pointed out only offensive action in area was being carried out by ChiCom forces and that US forces present in Taiwan area by agreement with ally to assist in defense that ally against ChiCom attack. Then denied Wang's allegations US plotting create two Chinas using material Deptel 669.[2] Wang responded in customary fashion.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1258. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:42 a.m. on December 13. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 831 from Warsaw and his comments and recommendations in telegram 830, both December 12. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 669 to Warsaw, December 10, transmitted Beam's instructions for the 85th meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–1058; see Supplement)

I then justified discussion prisoner and missing military personnel issues as instructed reference telegram repeating demand for release remaining Americans. In subsequent give and take Wang accused US of introducing "side issues and nonexistent issues" for purpose procrastination. I insisted our right introduce such issues and Wang avoided expressly excluding their discussion. In fact he counter-attacked briefly re Chinese in US to which I responded. Wang also alleged agreed announcement applicable to "civilians" not "convicts", which I refuted by pointing out it was American prisoners whose release sought by Ambassador Johnson and who were subject of discussions culminating in agreed announcement.

I then asked if Wang had information on Bishop Walsh. Wang replied Walsh had violated Chinese law and his case was under consideration by judicial authorities. Until investigation had been completed Wang could give me no further information regarding case. I asked that British be informed concerning whereabouts and health of Walsh.

I then mentioned disappearance two groups Americans Taiwan Strait[3] and gave Wang written statement facts each incident. He merely said he had noted my statement. I concluded by requesting receipt packages by ChiCom Red Cross at December 19 meeting at Shumchun. Wang replied he thought such matters could be worked out between Red Cross societies.

I proposed holiday recess and next meeting, January 9, 2 p.m., to which Wang agreed.

Beam

---

[3] Telegram 669 to Warsaw instructed Beam to request any available information on possible survivors of the yacht *Tora*, which had disappeared in July en route from Taiwan to Hong Kong with four Americans aboard, and a Foshing Airlines plane lost on October 1 in flight between Matsu and Taiwan with five Chinese and four Americans on board.

248. Report by the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)

Taipei, undated.

COMUSTDC/MAAG TAIWAN REPORT OF TAIWAN–KINMEN OPERATIONS, AUG–DEC 1958

1. *General Narrative.*

a. Tension in the Taiwan Straits developed in July and August as a result of increased ChiCom military capabilities opposite Taiwan, accompanied by overt threats of aggressive ChiCom intentions. US and GRC reactions prior to 23 August 1958 to counteract this threat included reinforcement of US forces, re-scheduling of a combined exercise (Land Ho), stockpiling on the offshore islands, and public announcements designed to indicate intent.

b. Heavy ChiCom shelling of the Kinmen group on 23 August precipitated urgent GRC requests for US support and participation in offshore island defense, and also precipitated US decisions for a major show of force and for logistic assistance to GRC forces. On 24 August President Chiang estimated ChiCom intent to be interdiction of offshore island supply and not invasion. At the same time he declared that in his view the US commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty included strategic domination of the Straits area.

c. GRC reaction initially was indecisive, marked by overly centralized control of resupply operations, ineffective organization and coordination at operating levels, and continuous efforts to determine and influence the extent to which the US might participate in offshore island defense. Inasmuch as ChiCom actions had included surface interdiction, considerable emphasis was placed on the function of escort. Counterbattery actions by GRC were not aggressive, due at least in part to the reluctance of the Kinmen Defense Commander to expend stocks of ammunition before he was reassured of resupply.

d. Some decentralization of convoy operations was achieved and the first coordinated convoy under US escort discharged its cargo at Kinmen on 7 September without incident. However, the convoy which followed on the next day met heavy and effective shelling on the beach and achieved only limited success. At this time US escort vessels,

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–3158. Secret; Noforn. The report and a covering memorandum of December 15 from Smoot to Felt were transmitted to the Department as enclosures to despatch 337 from Taipei, December 31. All are in the Supplement.

including a cruiser, were standing off in the Straits and there was some adverse GRC reaction against the failure of US forces to intervene at this point.

e. During this period concurrent efforts were being made to determine minimum resupply requirements of the offshore islands, to establish logistical priorities by class of supply, and to initiate methods of resupply which did not involve beaching of major ships in the face of accurate ChiCom bombardment.

f. During September it was determined that about 300 tons a day would sustain the garrison and permit a reasonable volume of counter-battery fire. Organization for resupply by air and surface means was gradually improved, and additional beaches were cleared of defensive obstacles in order to permit use of dispersed landing areas on Kinmen. During the month about one-third of the estimated garrison requirement was delivered.

g. During this same period very heavy pressures developed on the part of the GRC for more direct US participation and particular anxiety was expressed with reference to the plight of the small garrisons on Ta Tan and Erh Tan Islands adjacent to Kinmen. Equally great pressure was being exerted from US authorities to achieve an early demonstration of successful and adequate resupply.

h. On 18 September COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan requested from MND authority to take over the responsibility of air defense of Taiwan to permit the CAF to concentrate on combat operations and advanced training in new equipment. MND agreed to this plan on 24 September and the US took over this responsibility utilizing both US and GRC resources. Enclosure (4)[1] explains in detail air defense operations. COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan, in recent exchange of letters with MND, is in the process of passing air defense responsibilities back to the GRC.

i. By early October the improved beach and shore party organization on Kinmen, and direct coordination of convoy plans between US CTF 72 and GRC CTF 65 had begun to show good results. Concurrent action to develop CAF air delivery capability, which was limited initially by loading and handling capacity, rather than air lift, resulted in approaching a capability of up to 600 tons daily by a combination of free drop and parachute delivery.

j. In order to provide a demonstration of massive resupply of Kinmen, plans were perfected for a combined air and surface delivery of 2,000 tons or more within a 24-hour period. Originally scheduled for 4 October, this was delayed by weather until the night of 5–6 October.

---

[1] The enclosures are not filed with the source text. Enclosure (4) was listed in Smoot's memorandum as COMDR ATF 13(P) Summary Report.

Despite continued adverse weather, this convoy and air delivery operation was successful in landing almost 1,000 tons. However, this success became anti-climactic as a result of the ChiCom ceasefire announcement on 6 October.

k. The US tacitly accepted ChiCom conditions for ceasefire and stopped escort operations. In the next two weeks the GRC succeeded in delivering more than 40,000 tons of supplies to Kinmen and thereby reestablished a very strong tactical and logistical position for offshore island defense. Throughout this period concurrent deliveries were being made to the Matsu group and plans and preparations were made in the Matsu and White Dog groups for the possible initiation of combat supply operations for those garrisons. ChiCom cancellation of the ceasefire on 20 October was received by the GRC hierarchy with apparent enthusiasm, for they were obviously interested in prolonging hostilities to obtain their own political objectives. They reacted quickly and re-instituted mobile loading methods for a continuation of resupply action.

l. During the ceasefire the GRC made no strong request for US escort assistance, but did make a request for employment of a US LSD for transport and recovery of LCMs and other small craft. This request was granted. The operations of this ship were used as one of the ChiCom excuses for ending the first "ceasefire". On 25 October the ChiComs announced the day-on, day-off ceasefire. Initially there was some GRC reluctance to take notice of this ceasefire arrangement; however, convoy operations were soon re-established to provide for landing of supplies only on even days.

m. In late October it was found militarily feasible to reduce the forces assigned to CTF 72 and one LSD and four DDs reverted to normal Seventh Fleet operational control. On 15 November COMUSTDC/ MAAG Taiwan recommended initiation of a general reduction of US forces in the area and re-deployment schedules are now being carried out. On 2 December CINCPAC directed a reversion to normal readiness posture excepting the Taiwan area, which remains in alert condition X-Ray.

2. *General Observations.*

a. Containment of the Taiwan emergency is largely attributed to immediate reaction by the US in positioning of forces. The US reaction very likely deterred the ChiComs from invading one or more of the offshore islands and convinced the GRC of US firmness and power to act. It is apparent that political limitations are necessarily controlling considerations in the implementation of any contingency military plans. These limitations are manifested as the overall framework of any US reaction to an emergency such as just experienced in the Taiwan Straits. There were many benefits gained from the emergency but perhaps the most gratifying experience was the cooperative manner in which all of the services pooled their resources and worked together. This was particularly true before command channels were clearly established and as a result no major problems pertaining to coordination and control of operating forces were encountered. In reflecting back on the emergency there were two major errors or lessons learned in dealing with the GRC that immediately come to mind. The most important was not appreciating that the situation on Kinmen was never as serious as reported by the GRC. The other GRC trap was the constant panic expressed by certain GRC officials during the peak of the emergency, resulting in reports going to higher headquarters describing situations, in some instances, as more critical than they proved to be.

b. The appearance on the night of 24 August of high performance aircraft of the Seventh Fleet on ChiCom EW radar screens is believed to have been highly effective as a demonstration against the ChiComs. This demonstration, supported by other USN and USAF deployments immediately following, probably had a major influence in restraining ChiCom action, and greatly strengthened COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan's hand in restraining the GRC from undertaking precipitate unilateral action against mainland targets.

c. US action in designating an on-scene US commander was an effective example to the GRC of the importance of delegating authority, and permitted effective military/political coordination in the Taiwan area, which was most essential in the conduct of escort and other operations.

d. Experience during this period demonstrated that the offshore islands can be effectively resupplied under the ground rules which obtained during the period, although at relatively high cost. Air delivery was never fully exploited, but it is estimated that air supply of most daily consumables would be feasible in the absence of effective air or antiaircraft counteraction. Surface resupply should be regarded as resupply by infiltration, rather than "amphibious" resupply. This is true because amphibious resupply anticipates concurrent action to deepen a beachhead and neutralize opposing fire on the beaches.

e. Notwithstanding continuous GRC efforts to test US intentions, it is considered that GRC officials generally deferred most carefully to US desires for restraint, and generally appreciated the considerations which motivated the US to adopt a restraining unprovocative posture.

f. It is recognized that throughout the period higher US authority has been provided inadequate information on stock status and logistic operations in general. Reports from Kinmen had an inevitable time lag due to the process of collecting, sorting and recording supplies received over the beaches and drop zones. But the biggest problem was the GRC, who found it in their interest to confuse resupply status.

g. US operations during this period demonstrated again the ability of US forces in the field to cooperate and make quick mutual adjustments and concessions in procedures and in support, in order to get the job done.

h. Early in the period there was an unfortunate tendency by high US visiting officials to provide background briefings exclusively to US press representatives. This practice has now been largely eliminated but it is considered that a major lesson to be drawn is the importance of equitable treatment to GRC and other non-US reporters whenever we enter a combined operational situation.

i. One of the most significant US actions taken was the rapid introduction of Sidewinder capability in the Chinese Air Force. The ChiCom effort to use the Sidewinder for horror propaganda appeared to backfire. It is concluded that the US must continue vigorous efforts to maintain qualitative superiority of the CAF and should make concurrent effort to have available for future contingencies "surprise" non-atomic weapons and tactics.

j. It is to be noted that most actions taken for modernization of GRC forces during the period required MAAG augmentation in terms of special training teams. This experience tends to support the general objective of reducing the size and functions of the permanent MAAG, relying on mobile training teams for various aspects of new programs.

k. Logistic support operations were hampered by continuation of "peacetime" methods and posed many problems in obtaining the accurate allocation of funds for MAP, for support of US forces, and for other categories. Absence of firm planning assumptions on duration of US support under the ground rules in effect, and lack of applicable experience factors, made it most difficult to predict continuing requirements for combat losses of landing craft and other equipment. It is apparent that during August and much of September, GRC officials were strongly motivated by their desire to involve the United States, and for this reason they uniformly exaggerated the urgency of support of the offshore island garrisons. During the latter part of September the GRC seemed to recognize that they might be going too far, and might even goad the US into a reduction of the support already being given.

l. As an overall evaluation subject to many specific reservations, operations during the period demonstrated that the GRC must be respected as an ally, and the GRC military forces must be respected for their discipline, spirit, acceptance of advice, and military effectiveness. Deficiencies in organization, leadership, and training are dealt with in other accompanying reports.

m. Effectiveness of GRC counterbattery fire is a continuing problem for which there is no ultimate military solution on Kinmen. It can be anticipated that qualitative improvements will continue to be made in target acquisition, survey, and planning and control of fire. Addition of 240mm howitzers will provide a heavier projectile for destruction fire. However, it must *not* be concluded that Kinmen counterbattery capabilities can ever be built up to dominate or even neutralize the open-ended artillery capabilities of the ChiComs surrounding Kinmen from multiple positions.

n. *GRC as an Ally.* The GRC proved to be a loyal and steadfast ally. They lived up to every agreement and were careful not to take action that could invalidate the Mutual Defense Treaty.

(1) One possible major criticism concerned actions by the Minister of National Defense during initial stages, when he overplayed the seriousness of the situation. He expressed almost irrational panic that the ChiComs intended to invade Kinmen and eventually Taiwan and that active US participation was essential or GRC military officials would not be able to contain the CAF from attacking coastal bases or taking other offensive actions. He played up the critical status of supplies on Kinmen, and particularly the desperate plight of Little Kinmen, Erh Tan and Ta Tan, out of all proportion. The Minister realized that the important issues were not military, and made constant requests on the US military to intervene in an effort to bring about favorable political decisions.

(2) During the last part of September the GRC recognized that they were obviously going too far in attempting to involve the US. They finally realized that their cause internationally was not a popular one and that due to their strong stand they were in danger of losing the political war. During the remainder of the emergency and to the present date the GRC attitude toward the US has been one of mutual cooperation and appreciation.

(3) The many private conferences with the President during the critical periods revealed him to be a rational individual who was eager to get all the facts before making a decision. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that he was making all the major decisions. This was unfortunate, however, for he did not always have the true picture and in many instances unfavorable news was kept from him by subordinates in fear of reprimands.

(4) As to their top military leader, the Chief of General Staff, MND, General Wang conducted himself at all times as a great soldier. He never made an unreasonable request and was at all times fully informed and on top of the situation.

[Here follow comments on GRC forces, U.S. organization and command structure, communications, planning deficiencies and future planning requirements, and an intelligence summary and estimate of future Chinese Communist courses of action.]

249. Editorial Note

At the 391st meeting of the National Security Council on December 18, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on political developments in the People's Republic of China during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, December 18, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said that [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Mao is giving up his position because he is not well and wishes to divest himself of some ceremonial functions; there appears to be no friction in the Chinese Communist leadership serious enough to cause the change. Mao will remain the No. 1 man in Communist China. Mr. Dulles felt Mao's move should be studied carefully, even though no great change in the structure of the Chinese Government was involved. Perhaps the move could be exploited in propaganda. Mr. Dulles promised the Council a briefing at a later date on the Chinese Communist commune program." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The reference is to Mao Tse-tung's decision to retire from his position as head of state. The decision was announced on December 17, but press reports based on Nationalist intelligence sources had been published earlier; information on this subject is in telegram 1095 to Hong Kong, December 13, and telegram 3197 to London, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–1358 and 793.00/12–1558, respectively)

At the 392d meeting of the Council on December 23, Dulles again commented on Chinese political developments in his briefing. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Boggs, December 23, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said CIA had obtained an interesting Chinese Communist public document, i.e., the resolution of the Central Committee accepting Mao's resignation as Chief of State. This document represents the first attempt to apply the brakes since the commune system was adopted. While reproving officials who have pushed the commune system too far, it reiterates the objective of obliterating the old society and announces some modifications in the commune system, e.g. some private property is to be permitted. One amusing item is the assertion that cooks must be chosen from the ranks of those who are politically reliable. Mr. Dulles believed the commune situation in China provided us with a great psychological warfare opportunity. He also noted that the Soviets dislike the commune system." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The reference is to a resolution adopted by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on December 10 and issued on December 17; the text is in *Communist China, 1955–1959: Policy Documents With Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), pages 488–503.

250. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, December 30, 1958.

The Department of State, together with the other United States Government departments concerned, has given careful study to the Foreign Ministry's memorandum of January 4, 1958[1] and the eight proposals made therein. The United States shares the concern of the Government of the Republic of China at the possibility of Soviet military and technical assistance to the Chinese Communists in the fields of missiles and nuclear weapons. Should the Chinese Communists acquire such capabilities, the threat to free world areas in the Far East would be greatly increased. Such a development would have to be taken into account by the United States and the Republic of China in their military planning.

The United States will continue to cooperate closely with the GRC in efforts to improve its military capabilities within the limits imposed by United States laws, other commitments, and capabilities. Concerning the eight proposals made by the Government of the Republic of China, the United States Government has the following specific comments:

With regard to proposals 1 and 2, the present Military Assistance Program has supplied certain types of guided missiles to the Chinese Armed Forces. Training in the use of these missiles is being provided as required. The United States will give continuing consideration, as has been the case in the past, to the desirability of providing additional guided missiles and appropriate missile training in the future.

Whether a public announcement, suggested in Proposal 3, concerning the arming or training of Chinese forces in a particular missile operation would be advisable would depend upon circumstances at the time. As for nuclear warheads, United States policy is not to publicize their presence in any area outside the United States, and in the event of any public inquiry regarding a specific country neither to confirm nor deny such presence.

Concerning Proposal 4, the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus has been and will continue to be a primary objective of United States forces in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56393/1–1259. Secret. Drafted in CA by Kahmann and Bennett; cleared by Martin and with S/AE, W/MSC, ISA, and JCS; and approved by Robertson. Sent to Taipei as an enclosure to airgram A–120, January 12, 1959, for transmittal to the Foreign Ministry; the Embassy was authorized to make minor textual changes. G–78 from Taipei, January 22, 1959, reported that the Embassy had transmitted to the Foreign Ministry a memorandum dated January 21. (*Ibid.*, 711.56393/1–2259)

[1] Summarized in telegram 563 from Taipei, January 5, 1958. (*Ibid.*, 711.563/1–558; see Supplement) A copy of the memorandum is filed with a letter of May 22, 1958, from Mansfield Sprague to Robertson enclosing a memorandum of May 8 from Twining to McElroy, with the JCS comments on the GRC proposals. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 471.6 Natl China)

conjunction with GRC forces. The United States believes that the capability of GRC forces to defend Taiwan against an attack by missiles and nuclear weapons from the mainland will be substantially strengthened by the guided missiles already supplied to and programmed for Taiwan and by appropriate training in their use.

The United States does not consider that special procedures for consultation between the two governments specifically relating to the employment of guided missiles and nuclear weapons in the Taiwan area, as requested in Proposal 5, are necessary. It would, however, be prepared to discuss means whereby existing procedures of consultation in implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Defense of December 2, 1954 and the exchange of notes of December 10, 1954 pursuant thereto might be better adapted to present needs, including the possible employment of missiles. It should be noted in this regard that under United States law atomic warheads must remain in the custody of United States personnel. This would preclude arming Chinese forces with atomic warheads as suggested in Proposal 6, and renders inappropriate the undertaking of a joint study to determine the extent to which the Chinese forces may be armed with nuclear weapons through United States assistance. Training defense against atomic attack will continue to be provided to the greatest practicable extent through MAAG Taiwan.

With regard to Proposal 7, the United States believes, as stated in the Department of State's note of February 8, 1958 to the Chinese Embassy on this subject, that consideration of a nuclear power project should be deferred until adequate research and training have been accomplished and specific plans for the installation of a nuclear power station have been worked out.

With regard to Proposal 8, the United States is already giving assistance to the GRC in scientific and technical training and plans to continue to do so within the limits of legislative authority and funds.

1959–1960, THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT: U.S. VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN MAINLAND CHINA; CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS AT WARSAW; EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON TAIWAN; PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S VISIT TO TAIWAN IN JUNE 1960

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, January 9, 1959, 6 p.m.

913. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 86th meeting 2 hours 25 minutes.[1]

I led off with strong statement on Taiwan issue based on Deptels 739 and 741.[2] Wang replied US mention of shelling of Quemoy was attempt drag talks back to discussion ceasefire, an attempt which could never succeed. Said shelling entirely internal Chinese matter in which no foreign power had right interfere.

Wang then read from comparatively mild prepared statement, starting out by expressing hope that New Year would bring departure US troops from Taiwan area, progress in talks and improvement relations between US and China. Continued along familiar lines accusing US of occupation Chinese territory, plotting create two Chinas and desiring obtain Taiwan for own use as unsinkable aircraft carrier. Said US effort compare China situation to that other divided countries proved US intention set up Taiwan as separate government similar to those of South Vietnam and South Korea. Then endeavored draw parallel between US relationship to Chiang and Japanese to Pu Yi. Concluded with appeal for US to show it sincerely accepted principle renunciation force by withdrawing forces from Taiwan area.

After brief rebuttal Wang statements I attacked his distorted interpretation 1955 agreed announcement using statements he had made concerning release American prisoners during Geneva negotiations.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–959. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in telegram 914, January 9, 1959, and sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 916, January 10, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/1–959 and 611.93/1–1059, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Telegrams 739 and 741 to Warsaw, January 7 and 8, respectively, transmitted Beam's instructions for the meeting. Telegram 739 instructed Beam to open with a "strong denunciation" of the "every-other-day shelling of Quemoy which results in indiscriminate killing and destruction." Telegram 741 provided updated information and argumentation. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–759 and 611.93/1–859, respectively; see Supplement)

Wang deplored diversion of discussion from Taiwan issue, maintained allegation agreed announcement did not apply to US prisoners and attacked alleged US continued detention Chinese.

After some further give and take I queried Wang on Bishop Walsh but he refused information on ground case still under investigation. Regarding fate of Americans aboard yacht *Tora* or missing airplane, Wang said his government had investigated and had no information on either incident. Then complained bitterly that reference Hong Kong newspaper reports concerning fate these Americans had been inserted by US with malicious intent of defaming PRC. I then referred to Red Cross parcel delivery following which proposed next meeting Friday, February 13, 2:00 p.m. to which Wang agreed.

Beam

---

252. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, January 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Communist China

I have your memorandum of January 10.[1]

What I had in mind was a separate paper on Communist China itself. I would not pretend to be in a position to describe to you all that would be incorporated and I certainly have no prejudgments as to any policy position which might be taken. Indeed my own personal prejudice at the moment would be to reexamine, and where necessary to amplify, our policy toward Communist China within the context of the assumption that under present conditions we will not recognize Communist China.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1459. Secret. Filed as an attachment to Herter's January 30 memorandum to Gray (Document 255).

[1] Herter's January 10 memorandum to Gray requested clarification concerning "the China paper that you wish to initiate." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

It seems to me that some of the clear justifications for a separate paper on Communist China are these:

1. Communist China is the most populous geographical entity in the world. Like it or not it has made progress industrially and economically, as well as militarily, and there is no reason to suppose that its importance as a geographical entity will diminish in the years and months ahead. It seems to me if we are to have any country papers at all we are extremely vulnerable in not having one on Communist China.
2. There seems to be some feeling that NSC 5429/5 of December 22, 1954[2] and that NSC 5723 of October 4, 1957[3] cover the situation. Very candidly, it does not seem to me that any policy statement with respect to Communist China, which was adopted four years ago, can be necessarily assumed valid today, even to the extent that the paper seeks to enunciate a policy towards Communist China. Furthermore, the 1957 paper deals with Communist China, I believe, only in a secondary way.
3. Our basic national security policy now calls for efforts to exploit differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China. I may be less than fully informed but I believe that we are doing virtually nothing to implement this policy. Incidentally, Ambassador Thompson earlier this week expressed it as his personal view that this was very important policy and that there may be new opportunities to support it.
4. Whereas I know of no intelligence estimate which predicts an early rebellion in Communist China, this possibility certainly exists. I do not believe that our present policy papers give clear guidance as to what the U.S. would do in such an event; as for example, whether we would be prepared to give support to the rebelling forces and to what extent and under what conditions. I would hope that the U.S. Government would never again find itself in the kind of state of frustration that existed at the time of the Hungarian revolt.

Finally, I would point out to you my belief that even if a review resulted in a decision to have no separate paper and involved no change at all in the fragmentation of recorded policy, a review cannot but have been useful.

Gordon Gray

---

[2] "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East"; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 1062. Several paragraphs pertaining to China were amended in NSC Action No. 1295, January 5, 1955, and NSC Action No. 1302, January 13, 1955; for texts, see *ibid.*, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 5 and 23.

[3] "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China"; for text, see *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 619. See also Documents 298 and 347.

253. Editorial Note

During a conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan on January 16, 1959, there was a brief exchange concerning China. The relevant portion of a memorandum of conversation by Edward L. Freers, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, reads as follows:

"The Secretary said he wanted to talk about two other zones in which danger of war could arise. One was the Far East. There the Chinese Communists were supported by the Soviet Union in the objective that the US must be expelled by force from Taiwan and the West Pacific. Such a policy could have very serious consequences. The United States would not be expelled by force or pressure from its collective security associations in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia. China, like Korea, Vietnam and Germany, was divided. The US was friendly with one part, the Soviet Union with the other. Unification sought by force would almost surely lead to general war. We had exerted great influence for restraint on President Rhee who wanted to unify Korea by force. On our part, we could not be expelled by force where we were present by invitation or in fulfillment of formal agreements.

"Mikoyan said there was no analogy in the situations mentioned—historically, juridically or in substance. In Germany and in Korea zones of occupation had been set up by victorious allies. In Korea troops had been withdrawn at different dates, then war had occurred—there was no analogy with Germany. As to Mr. Rhee, the Soviets were not sure our professed restraint would always hold. North Korea was now one big reconstruction site and might be envied by South Korea. The former had no intention to fight but if South Korea started, it would fight well, as it had shown. In general it was a good idea to withdraw troops. There was a need for exchanges between the Koreans in the fields of culture and trade as a gradual means of bringing about reunification.

"The division in Vietnam, according to Mikoyan, was the result of agreement reached at Geneva by all concerned.

"Turning to China, Mikoyan said that the United States had been party to agreements that Taiwan should be returned to China along with the other islands. At one time it had not interfered in Chinese affairs—a reasonable policy, useful for the United States. China would win in any case and this would be worse for the United States. After the remnants of counter-revolution had settled on Taiwan the United States had entered into a bilateral agreement and regarded Chiang Kai-shek as representing China. Treaties with him had not been accepted by the real China. No state would accept such unilateral actions. The Soviets were surprised by Chinese patience. Neither China nor the Soviet Union had ever sought to have the United States leave all the islands in the West Pacific. The United

States had a treaty with the Philippines and troops there, it had allies in Singapore, it had bases on Okinawa. They did not like this but were not attacking it. In general the Soviet Union wanted all foreign troops withdrawn and peaceful settlements guaranteed by the United Nations. If the United States left Okinawa, it would not be leaving the West Pacific. Since the United States did not want to leave under pressure of force, it should use the respite to leave voluntarily. It would not lose, but gain moral, political and military prestige if it broke with Chiang Kai-shek and recognized the CPR. The latter did not menace the United States, nor did the Soviet Union. The American position gave rise to more anti-Western feeling and tension in the area.

"The Secretary said Mikoyan had referred to the violation of the armistice in Korea as breaking up the possibility of reunification. This is what had happened at Taiwan.

"Mikoyan replied that he had been misunderstood. The Soviets did want reunification of Korea. He had made his remarks as information only and had had no specific purpose in making them." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183)

The conversation was held during a visit to the United States by Mikoyan, January 4–20; documentation on the visit is in volume X, Part 1.

---

254. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to President Chiang

Washington, January 19, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following my recent return from Jamaica I have read with interest your New Year's Day message to the Chinese people.[1] I was particularly impressed by your timely enunciation of the four points set forth in your reaffirmation of the Three People's Principles. As you said so well, the Three People's Principles are the "spearhead" and military force the "shield."

I agree with your observation that the Communists have opened both a political and a military front and that the political front is on the mainland itself. In our natural desire to strengthen our military defenses against Communist aggression it is of the utmost importance that the po-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Bennett, revised in S/S, and cleared by Parsons.

[1] Portions of the message were sent to the Department in telegram 838 from Taipei, January 1. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/1–159)

litical front not be neglected. The new extremes of oppression and cruelty to which the Communists have gone in the establishing of "communes" do, I believe, offer an opportunity for your Government to establish itself more firmly—in the eyes of the world as well as in the hearts of the Chinese people—as the true representative of China's greatness and the spokesman of her aspirations for freedom.

As I said in my message to you of October 29, the Communiqué of October 23 has produced a very favorable reaction among the free world countries, as it has also in the United States. Regardless of the misunderstanding of the purpose of the Communiqué in some quarters, I am firmly convinced of the wisdom of the policy there expressed and believe that through stout adherence to it worldwide support of your Government can be further strengthened and the end of Communist tyranny on the mainland hastened.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

255. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Herter) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, January 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

Desirability of NSC Paper on Communist China

Thank you for your memorandum of January 14[1] which has been given careful study.[2] The arguments that you present for a separate pa-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1459. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins; cleared by Furnas, Murphy, Robertson, Parsons, and Green; and initialed by Stimpson.

[1] Document 252.

[2] A memorandum of January 23 from Herter to Robertson states that he had discussed Gray's proposal with Secretary Dulles and continues: "He told me that he felt it would be desirable for us to have such a paper, placing less emphasis on explanations with regard to recognition since this was pretty well covered in 1954 and has not really changed much since, and more emphasis on the growing strength inside Communist China, the changes in its relationships with other nations, the commune system, etc. In other words, an evaluation of its position in the world in relation to our national security." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2359)

per on Communist China certainly are cogent ones. Rather than comment on them in detail, I would like to mention a number of other considerations which, it seems to me, point to the desirability of proceeding somewhat differently.

As you know, the last NSC paper which dealt exclusively with Communist China was 166/1 of November 6, 1953.[3] This was superseded by NSC 5429/5 of December 22, 1954, which resulted from a Presidential directive in August 1954 that the main features of our Far East policy be reviewed in the light of the Geneva meetings on Indochina and Korea. My understanding is that in preparing this paper the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and other participants agreed that the focus should be on China, because our attitude and policy toward it were central to our entire Far East policy. In its final form 5429/5 incorporated all the 166/1 objectives and courses of action with respect to Communist China, except for the deliberate omission of paragraph 5(h) which had stipulated that the United States should assist the Government of the Republic of China in increasing "the effectiveness of its armed forces for . . . raids against the Communist mainland, and for such offensive operations as may be in the United States interest."[4]

I believe that the considerations which resulted in the superseding of NSC 166/1 by NSC 5429/5 in 1954 are still pertinent, most importantly that it is unrealistic and unwise to set down our policy toward Communist China in isolation from the over-all Far East situation. In seeking to realize our basic policy objective of checking the growth and expansion of Chinese Communist power and influence we largely follow two different but complementary lines of action. On the one hand we seek to maintain a strong defensive posture in Eastern Asia as a means of deterring Peiping's expansionist ambitions. The other and equally important facet of our policy is our effort to build up the strength and stability of the free Asian countries around the Chinese Communist periphery. The threat that Chinese Communist power poses to the existence of free Asia is the central fact in the determination and implementation of our policy toward the region as a whole. For this reason it seems certain to me that if we were to prepare a separate paper on Communist China it would be necessary almost immediately to prepare in addition a new over-all paper on our policy toward the Far East which would inevitably cover much the same ground. I believe that it would make more sense in terms of efficient use of limited time and personnel to do the whole job in a single paper.

---

[3] "U.S. Policy Towards Communist China"; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, p. 278.

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

I propose therefore a) that no separate paper on Communist China be undertaken and b) that, instead, a new paper on United States policy toward the Far East as a whole be prepared to replace 5429/5.

I would also like to comment briefly on the suggestion in paragraph 4 of your memorandum that the question of how to deal with a possible revolt in Communist China be studied within the NSC framework. I fully agree with you that this is a most important problem and wish to assure you that it is already receiving careful attention in this Department.[5] In my view, however, it is essentially a contingency planning question which does not lend itself readily to consideration by the NSC, at least at this point. Once a new over-all Far East policy paper has been prepared, we can take another look at the matter in terms of possibly preparing an NSC paper dealing with this specific problem.

Christian A. Herter[6]

---

[5] A January 22 memorandum from Robertson to Dulles proposed establishment of a working group within the Department to prepare a preliminary staff study on this subject. It reads in part as follows: "While the possibility of such a development still seems remote, the possibility of the GRC claiming the existence of such a development is considerably less remote, and in view of what amounts to a moral commitment by us to permit its intervention in case of such an uprising and the grave implications for the United States of such intervention, it would seem wise to do some advance thinking about the kind of answer we would give." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2259; see Supplement)

A January 27 memorandum from Greene to Robertson states that Dulles had not had time to see the memorandum and suggested that Robertson institute the study; a January 28 note from Robertson to Martin authorized him to proceed. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2759)

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

---

256. Editorial Note

On February 3, 1959, French Ambassador Hervé Alphand, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, and Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy discussed China and Korea, including Sino-Soviet relations, the recent Taiwan Strait crisis, and the question of recognition. A memorandum of the conversation, which was one of a series of tripartite talks on various issues, is in Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/2–359. It is printed in volume VII, Part 2, Document 93.

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, February 5, 1959, 5:03 p.m.

542. Assistant Secretary Robertson reviewed with Amb. Yeh January 29[1] US attitude toward Ta-Tan and Ehr-Tan Islands. He first recalled similar discussion with Yeh last September[2] in which he had made clear US view that Tans were not worth defending and that Yeh had agreed but had requested that recommendation to GRC for evacuation of Tans come from him rather than US. Yeh confirmed foregoing and said that he had made such recommendation to President Chiang by telegram and had followed up with personal discussion with Gimo when he went back to Taipei at time of Secretary's visit. Generalissimo had however turned down recommendation as had Chinese General Staff.

Robertson reiterated US opinion Tans were military liability and cited opinion expressed by CINCPAC (CINCPAC's 241904Z Jan 59)[3] as indication US military thinking. He pointed out also that after evacuation of Tans they could in opinion our military effectively be denied to Communists by GRC artillery. While acknowledging that decision whether evacuate Tans solely up to GRC, Robertson stressed importance of GRC military being informed of US views re Tans and of fact that US would not become involved in any way in their defense. In response question from Yeh, Robertson denied US had any indication imminent Communist attack on Tans, emphasizing that US decision re Tans taken last August and based purely on military considerations. Decision does not represent any change in policy and does not affect in any way US attitude toward defense big and little Quemoy.

In response to Robertson's request for Yeh suggestion how best convey US attitude to GRC, Yeh recommended Admiral Smoot discuss matter with Tiger Wang. It was agreed that US military view re Tans should be presented to Chinese in order minimize political effects.

Re COMUSTDC–MAAG Taipei's telegram 310456Z[4] we do not intend "negotiate" with GRC for withdrawal from Tans. Decision is up to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–559. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared by Parsons and in draft by Green and with JCS, and approved by Robertson. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

[1] The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, 793.5/1–2959; see Supplement.

[2] See Document 137.

[3] Telegram 241904Z from CINCPAC to COMUSTDC/MAAG, January 24, expressed the view that "no appreciable price should be paid" for holding the Tans and recommended "discreet inquiries" about GRC intentions concerning them. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 3500–3699; see Supplement)

[4] Telegram 310456Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CINCPAC, January 31, stated that Drumright's view was that the Nationalists would not withdraw from the Tans and it would be inadvisable to negotiate with them on this subject. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959; see Supplement)

Chinese. But we believe it important that GRC should know US thinking re Tans as outlined above. As stated to Yeh our military considers islands can be effectively denied to Communists as a means for Communists to project their power closer to the Kinmens. Reduction or withdrawal of Tans garrisons would merely represent redeployment of forces within Quemoy group.

JCS instructing CINCPAC to instruct Smoot to discuss military considerations with Tiger Wang.[5] Embassy should not initiate discussion but if Generalissimo (or other GRC civilian official) should raise matter with you as result Robertson–Yeh conversation (which understand Yeh has reported to Gimo) you should be guided by foregoing in replying.

Dillon

---

[5] In JCS telegram 954570 to CINCPAC, February 6, which stated the JCS conclusions concerning the Tans: they should be regarded as possible outposts with GRC personnel markedly reduced or withdrawn, they could be denied to the Communists, and redeployment of GRC forces from the Tans would improve the overall disposition of GRC forces. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 3500–3699; see Supplement) Smoot reported in telegram 062219Z [*sic*] from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CINCPAC, February 17, that he had discussed the Tans with Wang, who disagreed with all three of the above points. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–1759; see Supplement)

---

258. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–2–59 Washington, February 10, 1959.

PRESENT TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Problem

To assess the significance of the "great leap forward" and the commune programs, and their interrelation with the question of Mao Tse-tung's leadership, Sino-Soviet relations, and Chinese Communist foreign policy.[1]

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on February 1959."

[1] [*Footnote in the source text (7 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified.*]

Conclusions

1. The Chinese Communist "great leap forward" program has been based largely upon a prodigious expenditure of manpower. Although it is difficult to make precise assessments of Chinese Communist claims, it is our preliminary judgment that remarkable increases in production have actually occurred in 1958. In agriculture the increase was at least 10 and possibly as much as 20 percent. Industrial production in some sectors such as steel, coal, and machine tools may have been nearly double that of 1957, although the quality of some of the added output is probably poor and of limited usefulness. The present year will almost certainly see another substantial increase in total production. The rate of advance will probably not be sustained after 1959, however, as some of the human and economic problems generated in this frenzied period begin to take effect.

2. Almost the entire countryside has been organized, in varying degrees, into communes. We believe that the recent party directive modifying the commune program, including the postponement of city communes, largely reflects the need for consolidation before pushing forward again. Although there has been considerable adverse popular reaction, there is little evidence of overt resistance. We believe that the regime's strong system of controls and demonstrated flexibility will enable Peiping to avoid either a repressive blood bath or a forced retreat from the communal experiment.

3. Mao Tse-tung's announced intention to resign his position as Chairman of the government has occasioned considerable speculation as to his position in the party. However, we believe his decision was not the result of any party disapproval of his leadership but was motivated, as officially announced, by his desire to concentrate his efforts upon policy problems and Communist theory. As Chairman of the party he will still be number one man in the country.

4. Although the leap forward and commune programs have caused some new frictions in Sino-Soviet relations, these frictions are highly unlikely to threaten Sino-Soviet solidarity against the Western world.

5. There is no firm evidence as to the precise interrelation of Communist China's domestic and foreign adventurousness during 1958. Both appear to be facets of a drive to speed up revolutionary Communist processes. Although Peiping probably estimated that the activation of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be useful in rallying the people to the leap forward and commune programs, we do not believe that this was the primary motive in activating the crisis.

6. The US and GRC response and world reaction during the offshore islands crisis may have had some tempering effect on Peiping's general foreign policy thinking. Less stress is being given to the alleged

weakness of the US and more emphasis placed on the "peaceful" and "reasonable" nature of Chinese aims and policies in Asia. These considerations by no means preclude a forceful Chinese Communist move, especially one in response to some target of opportunity.

7. There has already been some adverse Asian reaction to the social costs of the leap forward and commune programs. If these programs fail dismally, communism will tend to be discredited in Asia, and Communist China's ability to influence other Asian governments will be reduced. However, anything short of a major failure in these programs will still leave the regime in the position to exert heavy pressure on its neighbors. If these programs succeed, fear of Communist China will grow in South and Southeast Asia, thus making it more difficult to prevent small neighboring states such as Cambodia and Thailand from accommodating to Chinese Communist demands. Success will significantly augment the confidence of Peiping's leaders in their ability to press rapidly toward their goals, both domestic and foreign, and will strengthen their belief that basic Communist principles provide the only guide to those goals.

Discussion

I. *Introduction*

8. The dramatic events of the past year in Communist China may have greater long-term significance for China's domestic and foreign policies and for its role in the Bloc than any other domestic development since the Communist acquisition of power in 1949.

9. The already rapid pace of economic development was suddenly greatly accelerated in a "great leap forward" program which sought a fuller mobilization of Communist China's vast, underdeveloped labor potential. This involved important modifications in its established economic pattern, which was originally based on the Soviet model. A far-reaching social revolution was undertaken which in scope and audacity dwarfed previous Communist efforts in China or elsewhere and sought to create the commune as the primary unit of economic, political, and social organization of the state. These vast programs were accompanied by assertive ideological claims, greater manifestation of self-confidence, and a general truculence in foreign policy which included the initiation of the serious crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Later in the year it was announced that Mao Tse-tung, while remaining head of the party, intended to step down from his post as Chairman of the government.

10. The unrestrained and almost explosive manner in which the leap forward movement and especially the organization of the communes developed came as a surprise to the world. In the years preceding 1958 the regime had achieved considerable success with its various programs. Control over most of the country had been firmly established; the goals

of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) had generally been met or exceeded; GNP had been increased at an average rate of about 7 to 8 percent a year; organization into rural collectives and the socialization of industry and trade had been accomplished with speed and relative ease; Peiping's special status and important role in the Bloc had been recognized and China's position in Asia had been greatly strengthened. While some economic and political difficulties had emerged in 1956 and 1957, the potential for economic growth appeared favorable and there was no serious threat to the regime's stability. To men less ambitious than Peiping's rulers this general record of successful achievement might have dictated a continuation of established and proved policies.

11. Instead, the past year produced radical innovations. Though moderated somewhat at year's end, these innovations highlight Chinese Communist leadership's seriousness with respect to Communist doctrine, the compulsion to push forward in "uninterrupted revolution," and the establishment of a modern industrial economy. If the leap forward and commune innovations succeed over a period of time, they could transform China into a George Orwellian society and accelerate Communist China's progress toward becoming a major world power.

[Here follow 10-1/2 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, February 11, 1959, 7 p.m.

918. Department's 543.[1]

1. From time of Secretary's visit to Taipei in October 1958 until February in keeping with US-urged policy of avoidance provocative actions GRC ceased attacking Communist shipping. In late January, Commander in Chief Chinese Navy informed Commander US TDC he had

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1159. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.

[1] Telegram 543 to Taipei, February 5, referred to several recent reports from Taipei which seemed to indicate "increasing GRC emphasis on military and paramilitary activities," stated that the Department considered it "most important that GRC accent peaceful methods of waging anti-Communist struggle and avoid provocative actions involving use of force," and requested the Embassy's assessment of the significance of the reports. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2–559; see Supplement)

received orders to commence interception of shipping in offshore island area for purpose of enhancing military security. Since that time, only possible actions in implementation those orders have been two incidents described in Situation Reports 1544, 1545 and 1546.[2] (See paragraph 3 below.) Embassy will ask TDC to look into this matter to determine its purpose. Unless it seems justified for military reasons GRC will be asked to desist.

2. General Wang Shu-ming's formal written request of Admiral Smoot for pre-concurrence in CAF attacks on mainland installations in event of Communist attack on Tans[3] was delivered in manner which gave impression he was making request for sake of record. However, submission this request was consistent with recent GRC warnings of imminent Communist hostile action against islands (see Embtel 913),[4] which probably designed in part to prevent relaxation of US alertness and posture of military readiness with regard to offshore islands. Any resumption by Communists of military pressures on offshore islands in degree similar to that of crisis period would almost certainly cause GRC to make strong effort win US concurrence to CAF attacks. Wang's letter might in part be effort to prepare ground for later specific request for US concurrence, if contingency arises.

3. Prior to crisis, GRC had long used offshore islands as base from which to infiltrate agents into mainland for intelligence collection. US agencies Taiwan not aware of any such effort having been made in past three months. IBMND operation mentioned reference telegram (4), on basis available evidence, does not appear to have been effort conduct mainland operation. In fact, Communist explanation of sinking of vessel as reported by FBIS (i.e., that vessel was interfering with fishing boats) could be accurate.

4. Four-point program for mainland operations as outlined by Chiang Ching-kuo ([*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] report cited in reference telegram) is still in stage of planning and development. In addition to stated purpose of such planning it also serves (and may be intended) as prop for morale of top GRC operating level. Phases 1 and 2 of projected plan (collection of intelligence and psychological warfare) call for effort to enlarge scope of activities like those already being carried on by GRC with US encouragement and support (in line with US policy as set forth in NSC 5723).

---

[2] Not found. They were apparently part of a series of situation reports from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG to CNO and other addressees.

[3] Reported in telegram 310455Z from COMUSTDC/MAAG to CINCPAC, January 31. (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959; see Supplement)

[4] Dated February 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–659; see Supplement)

5. Phase 3, the promotion of passive resistance and low level active dissidence, is predicated on substantial success (as yet to be achieved) with phases 1 and 2. GRC officials charged with carrying out planning for this phase almost certainly regard it as hypothetical at this time. In their view phase 3 operations would, like two preceding steps, be entirely consistent with established US objectives. Further, GRC clearly sees this phase as part of implementation of reformulation of its mission set forth in joint communiqué of October 23. President Chiang's New Year's Day address refers to "the political front on the mainland" in context of "passive resistance", disillusionment, sabotage, and uprisings on mainland, and says "for this reason, we have based our strategy of counter-offensive and national recovery primarily on political means and secondarily on military force".

6. Phase 4, military exploitation of phase 3, even more hypothetical than phase 3. In Embassy view, GRC would not reach conclusion time had come for implementation this phase except in approximately situation hypothecated by Secretary Dulles in September 30, 1958 press conference. In such contingency, GRC would almost certainly regard US commitment to assist, or stand ready to assist, as essential prerequisite for opening this phase. It is barely conceivable that situation could arise where GRC thought it could exercise decisive influence on mainland by use of force at its disposal, without active US assistance. If GRC were convinced success possible on this basis, it might go ahead on own. However, even in this case, it would most probably seek US acquiescence.

Conclusions:

7. GRC policies with respect to Off Shore Islands, activities in Strait, and para-military operations against mainland, diverge from related US policies. GRC desires, if opportunity is presented by renewal Communist aggression, to utilize Off Shore Island theater for infliction of maximum military damage against Communists, in hopes that might speed Communist collapse on mainland (this clearly stated in President Chiang's New Year's Day speech). GRC is reluctant see Off Shore Island situation crystallize into kind of border line which separates other divided countries. In GRC leadership's view, Free China is engaged in protracted struggle with Communist insurgents, and Off Shore Islands–Strait area are principal remaining arena for that struggle. GRC regards paramilitary activities against mainland as means of retaining at least limited degree of initiative in pursuit of recovery of mainland. As reported by Embassy in past, GRC regards some degree of initiative this regard as important from standpoint domestic politics, as well as morale here, among overseas Chinese, and on mainland.

8. Actions which US desires GRC to perform, such as mainland operations, psychological warfare, and defense of Off Shore Islands (NSC 5723, 3, 12 and 29) can be performed with enthusiasm only if GRC feels

actions serve GRC objectives. GRC recognizes fundamental importance of retaining US good will, and as shown during Strait crisis, is willing bend over backward in following US counsel of restraint, even to extent of temporarily subordinating its own objectives.With regard to actions involving use of force, such as interception Communist shipping, GRC will probably continue keep US advised its intentions, and would doubtless heed US request (based on grounds it imperative keep onus for Off Shore Island hostilities on Communists) for cancellation any specific operation. GRC would probably abide faithfully by any revision of so-called "do and don't list" which US might insist upon. However, GRC could not be expected permanently abandon desires, policies, and objectives mentioned in preceding paragraph, or its "return to mainland" slogan. US effort bring about such abandonment could serve only to impair relations and reduce incentives for GRC to perform actions expected of it under stated US policy. It might also lead GRC to conclude US is moving toward a "two China" policy.

9. With regard to next-to-last paragraph of joint communiqué, as Embassy has reported in past, and as clearly set out in President Chiang's New Year's Day speech, GRC has interpreted this reformulation of its mission as subordinating, but not ruling out, use of military force in recovery of mainland. President Chiang clearly regards Off Shore Island area as possible arena for application of military force to this end, and considers para-military operations to foment hypothetical dissidence on mainland would be in implementation of, rather than in conflict with, joint communiqué's emphasis on political means.

10. Embassy believes US effort at this time to gain GRC agreement to interpretation of communiqué such as to rule out interception of Communist shipping and para-military activities would appear to GRC to be effort to treat communiqué as "renunciation of force", and would needlessly arouse serious misgivings on part GRC. If Department desires prevent or further inhibit type of activities mentioned reftel, would be more effective convey US counsel of restraint to Chinese on ad hoc basis, without linking to communiqué.

11. Embassy is of view that these para-military activities are expected by Communists and are not likely to provoke incidents leading to resumption of hostilities. On balance, Embassy is of view these activities desirable if carried out effectively and our actions to stop them would be harmful to our interests.

Drumright

260. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

No. 409 Taipei, February 12, 1959.

REF

Embassy despatch No. 382, March 5, 1957[1]

SUBJECT

The Future of Taiwan; Return to the Mainland; Unilateral Action; "Deal"; "Two Chinas"?

Summary:

Any projection of the future of Taiwan and the GRC involves a calculus of imponderables—psychological, political, economic and military. For the foreseeable future, consideration of Taiwan cannot be divorced from the context of the thirty-year-old, now stalemated, civil war between the GRC and the Chinese Communists. Either Peiping or Taipei would, if it saw a clear chance of success, seek a military resolution of this civil war. The estimate presented in this despatch, which is primarily political and psychological, is based on the premises that the various deterrents against unrestrained military action by either side will continue effective and that satisfactory economic conditions will be maintained on Taiwan. However, these premises are uncertain particularly in regard to the military prospects. No immediate probability is seen of a "disengagement" involving GRC withdrawal of its forces from the offshore islands. Apart from the offshore islands, a destruction of the delicate balance of military considerations could result from a Communist miscalculation of the United States intentions, or it could come about in other ways.

The outlook for the GRC in psychological and political terms is considerably less bleak than might appear on the basis of logical calculations alone. The hope of return to the mainland still continues an essential element in the rationale of the GRC, and an expression of the aspirations of mainland Chinese on Taiwan. However, it now seems unlikely that the mere perpetuation of the present situation, with consequent indefinite deferment of return hopes, will of itself impel the GRC to any irrational action, such as a "deal" with the Communists, or "unilateral action" against the mainland.

Thus, the immediate prospects are for a continuation of the present situation—a divided China with civil-war overtones. Over the longer

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1259. Secret.

[1] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/3–557) For a memorandum summarizing it, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, p. 510.

run, dissatisfaction with various aspects of the present uneasy equilibrium will probably grow, perhaps causing some sectors of United States public opinion and some of our allies to urge the establishment of some other situation, such as a "two-China" situation in the sense of two separate Chinese governments concurrently recognized and dealt with by other nations. Of all proposed "solutions" of the Taiwan problem, this would seem the most unrealistic at the present time. There may also be a growth of sentiment, particularly among the Taiwanese, in favor of the establishment of a "two Chinas" situation in the sense of an independent Taiwan. An independent Taiwan would be feasible only if the GRC had already lost all powers of resistance or had given up all hope of returning to the mainland. Nor would such a situation seem to be intrinsically preferable to that which exists at present, from the point of view of United States policy interests.

Note: This estimate was prepared by the Embassy, but was coordinated within the Country Team group (State, Army, Navy, Air, USTDC, and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] which collaborated in the production of daily telegraphic reports during the Strait Crisis.

[Here follow 34 paragraphs of discussion. The complete text of the document is in the Supplement.]

For the Ambassador:
David L. Osborn
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

---

261. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, February 13, 1959, 7 p.m.

927. Draper group[1] which has now been in Taiwan for two and a half days visited South Taiwan today to inspect Army, Navy, Air and eco-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/2–1359. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 9:17 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] William H. Draper, Jr., chairman of the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, headed a subcommittee that visited Taiwan February 11–14. Telegram 942 from Taipei, February 19, transmitted a summary report of the visit. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/2–1959; see Supplement)

nomic developments. Group together with Admiral Smoot, General Doan, myself and others had lunch with Gimo who has been staying in Kaohsiung area past three weeks. Prior to visiting with Gimo Mr. Draper and I discussed subjects which might carefully be brought up with Gimo.

Accordingly, General Hull spoke frankly on need for elimination of ineffectives and general reduction of forces. He advanced view that Chinese forces would be more effective if GRC got away from idea of mass forces and introduced "crack forces" concept. In reply Gimo observed that with US assistance total of 80,000 ineffective men had been eliminated and GRC now in process of retiring 24,000 officers. Gimo said this program could not have been carried out without US assistance. He said GRC is planning further cut within next 18 months of some 12 percent of existing force or a total of about 70,000. But this cut would depend upon whether funds are available for this purpose. Gimo requested that this information be kept confidential pending further study and public release by GRC. Pointing out that existing reductions have been substantial, Gimo expressed view this is best investment US has made in Taiwan.

Comment: It was clear from Gimo's statement that he is willing to make further reduction to about 600,000 if US will assist and might be willing to reduce even further at later date.

After outlining purpose of mission and suggesting that less money may be available in future years for military support, Draper discussed following points: (1) He had been told that during past few years inflationary tendencies had been under control, but recent rise in currency issue by one third indicated lessening of control. He then pointed out that once started inflation is hard to control and urged tightest restrictive measures. (2) He stressed importance of expanding exports and pointed to Germany and Japan as examples of states which had risen from ashes to prosperity through extended exports. He noted GRC exports cover only two thirds of imports, commended GRC for its progress and suggested special effort be made to increase them further. (3) He expressed concern over population growth which he had been told now exceeds three and one half percent and is catching up with GNP. Referring to example of Japan, he urged this matter be given serious thought here where limit to expansion of land resources and food production already arrived. He suggested GRC consider birth control educational work, concluding that population growth may be [omission in the source text?] all of Taiwan's problems. In reply Gimo merely observed that Draper's observations were very true and important. (4) He urged greater fostering of private enterprise, saying this could contribute materially to prosperity of Taiwan.

Gimo expressed his deep appreciation for steady US help and support of past six and one half years. He said this had laid foundation for stable Taiwan. He also said he was grateful for quick and effective support given by US in off-shore island crisis of last fall. He appreciated both material and moral assistance provided by US. He said he agreed with Draper that most serious problems are economic. He hoped that Draper's visit would give US Government deep understanding and insight of problems. He agreed that money expansion creates problem. He said this was due to heavy load imposed on GRC to maintain strong military posture. He assured Draper he would do everything possible to control inflationary danger but said he must at same time look to US for proportionately greater help in relation to grants made to other countries in this area (Korea and Viet-Nam). With this proportionately greater help the Gimo said GRC could keep situation under control. In this connection Gimo said he was aware that the US economic aid to Taiwan for FY 59 had increased slightly whereas in other areas there had been cuts. He was grateful for this but believed GRC should receive larger proportion of amounts granted to main recipient countries in Far East. He said there is no waste in Taiwan and every effort is made to stretch one dollar into two dollars of value.

In closing conversation Gimo told Draper he was happy to say US representatives in Taiwan had kept fully abreast of situation and that this had produced close cooperation between two governments.

I got impression that Draper made big hit with Gimo in spite of candor and that this conversation might be useful in helping shape up future programs here. Admiral Smoot, General Doan and I have had conversations with Draper and General Hull which will probably result in Draper's making some concrete suggestions for future courses of action here after his return to US early next week.[2]

Drumright

---

[2] The Draper Committee issued a public report entitled *Composite Report of the President's Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program*, 2 vols. (Washington, August 17, 1959).

262. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, February 13, 1959, 6 p.m.

1073. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 87th meeting two and one-half hours.[1] Wang opened with a prepared statement asking whether US considered renunciation force principle applied to itself, whether US considered principle applied in relations between US and China and whether US willing seriously begin discussions concerning carrying out this principle.

I replied that US of course considered renunciation force principle applied to itself, and that US considered principle should apply in relations between US and Wang's country. However his side's insistence on freedom use force against our ally, the GRC, was chief obstacle to the serious discussion this subject which we had long desired.

Wang denied I had answered his question and repeated familiar accusations that US had occupied Taiwan, was interfering in Chinese internal affairs, et cetera.

I replied with statement based on first part Deptel 832[2] emphasizing particularly unreal character of Chinese Communists' denials GRC existence and allegation US occupying Taiwan by armed force.

In subsequent give and take Wang likened US action to that of Nazis and Japanese in World War II to which I took strong exception causing Wang to moderate his remarks to extent of paying tribute to US role in World War II but he concluded by reiterating allegation that US now engaged in occupying other people's territories, particularly China's Taiwan.

I then presented statement on imprisoned Americans based Deptel 832 which provoked Wang into rather long response in which he insisted his government scrupulously carrying out agreed announcement and declared American prisoners must be dealt with accordance Chinese law and could not be released in advance of term except for good behavior. He then made detailed allegations as to pressures supposedly exerted by US on Chinese desiring return home which I refuted and reserved right return to this next meeting.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–1359. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:15 p.m. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–332, February 13, and sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 1076, February 14. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/2–1359 and 611.93/2–1459, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 832 to Warsaw, February 11, transmitted Beam's instructions for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1059; see Supplement)

To query on Bishop Walsh Wang replied only that case still under investigation and he could therefore give no information.

Wang introduced Yao Kuang, his Counselor of Embassy at Warsaw, as replacement for Huang Hua.

Since Polish Government requires our meeting place as guest house during next month's Party Congress we agreed next meeting be held after Congress Thursday March 19 at 2 p.m.

Beam

---

263. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

Washington, February 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

Defense Recommendation for Reviewing U.S. Policy Toward Offshore Islands

The Defense Department has submitted, in connection with the NSC Planning Board's discussion of "Lessons Learned from the Lebanon and Quemoy Operations,"[1] the following recommendation among others:

> "U.S. prestige has become closely identified with the maintenance of the Chinese Nationalist position on the Offshore Islands. In view of the general lack of Allied support for this position and the questionable strategic importance of these islands, the desirability of a review of U.S. policy toward the Offshore Islands seems to be indicated."

I told Howard Furnas (who handles NSC problems for State) that I thought NSC Planning Board and Council discussion of this subject would involve a lot of people who have no direct interest in this highly sensitive issue. He agreed.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1859. Top Secret. Sent through Parsons, who passed it on to Robertson with a handwritten note endorsing Green's recommendation.

[1] JCS drafts and related materials are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 319.1 (11–19–58).

Furnas thought the best procedure in handling this Defense recommendation would be quietly to let it ride. Furnas did not think it would be passed on to the Council for action because it was too inexplicit. If it was passed on to the Council for action, he thought the best way to handle it would be for the State representative to say that he had no doubt the Offshore Islands question would be considered in the course of our general review of NSC 5529 on Far East policies scheduled for April. Such a recommendation from State would be no doubt accepted.

I am inclined to agree with Furnas' suggested approach.

In any event, I suppose we had better start taking a long and hard look at this problem in FE, operating within a very small group and scrupulously preventing any word getting around that the matter is under review here. If we don't take the lead, somebody else will and with less understanding of the problem. Any approach must be based on an intimate understanding of the realities.[2]

---

[2] A draft by Green and Martin, entitled "Considerations Affecting a Reconsideration of Our Policies Toward the Offshore Islands," March 5, proposed two possible courses of action: first, an effort by Robertson and Felt to persuade Chiang to evacuate the islands, which was expected to fail, and second, a move to take the offshore islands problem to the United Nations in the event of another crisis or in advance of one. A covering memorandum of March 5 from Green and Martin to Parsons noted that these could be either complementary or alternative courses of actions. Parsons forwarded the draft to Robertson, stating that he had discussed it with the authors and thought Robertson should see it "in the light of gathering indications that the problem is being worried on more and more at home and abroad." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–559) A revised draft dated April 1, similar in substance, bears no indication of its disposition. (*Ibid.*, 794A.5/4–159; see Supplement)

---

264. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, February 21, 1959, 10 a.m.

953. CINCPAC for Felt.

1. At tea reception yesterday for Admiral and Mrs. Felt,[1] Generalissimo invited Felt, Smoot, Doan and me into separate room for private talk.[2] Also present were GRC Defense Minister and CGS.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2159. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[1] Admiral Felt visited Taiwan during a 3-week trip to Southeast Asia.

[2] Smoot's report of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 210330Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US)/MAAG to CINCPAC, February 21. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 3500–3699)

2. Generalissimo brought up Tan Islands, saying he had recently received personal letter from Admiral Radford urging voluntary withdrawal from islands and their destruction. Generalissimo said he had sent reply to Radford explaining impossibility of following this advice. Generalissimo said he also desired to apprise Admiral Felt of GRC position re Tans.

3. Generalissimo said Tans could not be abandoned for military and political reasons. If Tans were abandoned then Kinmen would fall and this would be followed by fall of Taiwan. Tans could not be destroyed and rendered untenable to enemy unless atomic charges were used. Withdrawal from Tans would deny GRC control of Amoy harbor—a matter of considerable importance—and Red occupation of islands within proximity to other Kinmens would represent unacceptable threat to Kinmen defenses.

4. Generalissimo pointed to heroic defense put up by Tan defenders after August 23 last and expressed confidence Tans could be held against enemy assault. He also said enemy attack against Tans would be very difficult to distinguish from attack on other Kinmens. In any case, Reds had announced openly their objective in Taiwan and any attack on Tans could only be regarded as step in effort to occupy Taiwan.

5. Generalissimo also said GRC voluntary withdrawal from Tans was even more unacceptable from political point of view which he did not desire to go into at length in this conversation. He would say, nevertheless, that abandonment of Tans would be regarded by GRC military and civilian population as indicating a less than full determination on part of GRC to defend Kinmen and Taiwan to last. Withdrawal would also have unsettling effect on mainland people who hope for liberation, as well as on overseas Chinese compatriots. Loss of confidence in him and GRC could lead to incalculable and unacceptable risks.

6. Generalissimo said he had told Mr. Dulles just before latter's departure last October that loss of Kinmen would lead to loss of Taiwan. He would say now and repeat it again and again that loss of Tans would progress to loss of Kinmen and so to loss of Taiwan. He also wanted to remind Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford of their visit to Taiwan some three years ago when they had urged withdrawal from offshores. He had told them then that withdrawal was unacceptable; he wanted them to know it is his conviction that withdrawal is even more unacceptable now.

7. In reply to Admiral Felt's query whether Red attack on Tans would lead to GRC retaliation against mainland targets, Generalissimo turned this aside with statement that such action had not been taken last year in face of broader Red attack on Kinmens. In response to my query whether he anticipated early Red attack on Tans, Generalissimo merely

said GRC had to assume possibility of such attack and had to maintain utmost vigilance.

8. *Comment:* Generalissimo spoke politely but with marked force, emphasis and conviction. It was clear that he had given this matter deep thought and has come to the conclusions related above. I am convinced that he will not be moved by our persuasions, pressures or pleas to relinquish the Tans. In fact, more argumentation will serve only to irritate him and get his back up further. There would obviously be no profit in pursuing this enterprise further, particularly since it is clear one of Reds' chief objectives is to open schism between us by showing Americans will not after all go full way to back up their ally. I would earnestly suggest, therefore, that we drop this subject once and for all.

Drumright

---

265. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, February 21, 1959, 2 p.m.

956. Joint Embassy/ICA message. Department's 559.[1] In accordance with instruction transmitted in reference telegram, ICA mission Director and Economic Counselor met February 19 with senior Chinese economic officials to continue discussions of Chinese budgetary prospects and Chinese request for additional economic aid. No new information was developed on former subject which has been gone over intensively by American and Chinese officials several times in past two months. Discussion, however, confirmed previous belief of Embassy and ICA mission that delay in official response to Chinese request inhibits Chinese action to check increasing threat of inflation. In yesterday's conference, Chinese repeatedly made point "bad answer is better than

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/2–2159. Confidential.

[1] Telegram 559 to Taipei, February 13, stated that since the current GRC aid request was based primarily upon the additional budget deficit allegedly deriving from the Quemoy crisis, it was necessary to make further efforts to obtain GRC agreement to its reduction. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/1–1659) Ambassador Yeh had requested a $20 million increase in economic aid on December 19. (Telegram 487 to Taipei, December 20, 1958; *ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/12–2058) These documents are in the Supplement.

none," and specifically stated that economic agencies cannot urge drastic budgetary economy until issue of aid level is resolved. We therefore urgently request immediate authority to inform Chinese additional aid will be no more than US $9 million. Once this issue is cleared away, Embassy and ICA mission can more effectively urge necessary anti-inflationary measures.

Following comments are keyed to numbered paragraphs of reference telegram:

1. Prospective budget deficit is only in small part inevitable consequence of Quemoy crises. (See D–395, D–335, and D–326.)[2] Role of crisis in deficit has been principally to open door to relatively unrestrained military spending not directly related to Quemoy crisis. If inflation is to be checked, it will be incumbent on GRC to scrap less essential proposed new military expenditures, stretch out others or endeavor to increase NT dollar revenues to meet expenditures. Additional infusion of US dollar aid at this juncture would not be effective; indeed it might encourage more local spending. Perhaps our best procedure now is to build up counterpart balances so as to mitigate impact of excessive military spending.

2. As relayed by Martin Wong[3] to CUSA, Department's statement to him has been interpreted as implying possibility of considerable increase in aid if only Embassy and ICA mission will concur.[4] As result, we have been placed in embarrassing position.

3. Offshore procurement of POL appears preferable to increase in defense support, since it would not only permit Chinese to earn more foreign exchange but would also make use of some presently unused capacity at Kaohsiung refinery. This cost is moreover one which US should help Chinese meet. Offshore procurement of POL would have incidental effect of reducing present GBS for POL.[5]

Drumright

---

[2] Despatches 326, 335, and 395, December 26 and 31, 1958, and February 6, 1959, reported meetings held by Embassy, ICA, and MAAG representatives with senior Chinese economic and defense officials to discuss the prospective size of the GRC deficit for the coming fiscal year. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/12–2658, 793.5–MSP/12–3158, and 793.5/2–659, respectively)

[3] Economic Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

[4] Telegram 559 to Taipei stated that the Department would suggest to the Chinese Embassy that the matter be discussed at the technical level in Taipei. Telegram 584 to Taipei, February 25, stated that the Department had told Wong that "although there is disposition to help, available data do not demonstrate financial requirements of magnitude requested, particularly in respect additional budgetary needs." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/2–2159)

[5] Telegram 610 to Taipei, March 12, authorized the Embassy to inform the ROC Government that the United States would take steps to provide additional assistance totaling approximately $6.3 million. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement)

266. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Tan Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
Edwin W. Martin, Director, Chinese Affairs

During the course of a call on Mr. Robertson, Ambassador Yeh recalled their conversation of January 29[1] in which Mr. Robertson had brought up the subject of the Tan Islands. He said he had reported this conversation to Taipei. He had now received an instruction from the Generalissimo on this subject. He said the Generalissimo appreciated the concern which the United States felt regarding the Tans but wished to make it clear that the GRC could not consider withdrawing from Ta-Tan and Ehr-Tan. Ambassador Yeh then summarized the reasons for the GRC's position and handed Mr. Robertson an informal memorandum containing them (copy attached).[2]

Mr. Robertson said that the United States position had never been that the Tans should be yielded to the Communists. In the opinion of our military the Communists could be prevented from using the islands against the Quemoys. These islands were simply small rocks of no military value. During the Quemoy crisis last fall, the Communists had been able to interdict them successfully. The GRC could do the same if the Communists tried to utilize them. There was no reason why there should be serious psychological repercussions to withdrawing GRC troops from the islands. There would not have to be any publicity. It could simply be explained as a redeployment of troops to strengthen the overall defensive position of the Quemoys or as a move to withdraw from a position which could not be supplied under attack. Ambassador Yeh replied that some supplies were dropped in by air and there was movement at night by sampan, during the recent crisis.

Mr. Robertson said that he wanted to make it very clear that the United States would not become involved with the Tans. He mentioned the fact that Admiral Radford, who was as opposed as anyone he knew to yielding a square inch of territory to the Communists, advocated with-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2459. Secret. Drafted by Martin.

[1] See Document 257 and footnote 1 thereto.

[2] Not printed but see Supplement.

drawal from the Tans as a matter of military good sense. It was of course up to President Chiang whether or not to withdraw his troops from the Tans. But it should be made clear that the United States was not going to get involved in their defense. This decision did not indicate that we were weakening one iota in our support of the GRC.

Ambassador Yeh asked what was meant when Mr. Robertson said that the United States would not get involved with the Tans. Mr. Robertson said that it meant that we put the Tans in a different category from Quemoy. When Ambassador Yeh asked whether we put little Quemoy in this category, Mr. Robertson replied in the negative. Ambassador Yeh then said that withdrawal from the Tans would make it impossible to hold little Quemoy. Mr. Robertson replied that in the judgment of our military this was not so.

---

267. Draft Statement Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

TEN PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS DERIVING FROM THE TAIWAN CRISIS

1. *As Kissinger*[1] *has pointed out, the Communists are ever likely to pose risks in such a manner that they will always seem disproportionate to the objectives in dispute.* Thus the attack made on the "worthless bits of real estate" known as the Quemoy Islands was evidently launched in the hope that the U.S. would *not* consider the islands worth one American boy's life and that U.S. failure to support the GRC in defending these islands would not only result in their capture and in the elimination of one-third of the GRC's fighting effectives, but also—and much more importantly—in the collapse of morale on Taiwan and a Communist take-over of that big island from within. The Chicoms know they cannot capture it otherwise.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1959–61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A March 2 covering memorandum from Boggs to the NSC Planning Board indicates that the draft statement was for the Board's use in its work on the subject of "Problems Illustrated by Recent Developments in the Near East and the Taiwan Straits."

[1] Henry A. Kissinger, Director of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University.

2. *Resistance to such Communist aggression requires U.S. retention of a broad conventional as well as a nuclear capability.* Had the U.S. been exclusively dependent upon nuclear weapons in this crisis, then we might have been faced with the grim choice of either Communist seizure of Quemoy or a nuclear war which, though militarily acceptable, would have been politically disastrous and would have risked a wide holocaust. Having had conventional weapons which we were able to turn over to the Chinats (guns, landing and amphibious craft, Sidewinders) as well as other conventional capabilities in reserve (U.S. naval craft gunfire) we were able to undertake at least some degree of graduated deterrent measures which brought the Chicom bombardment at least to a temporary halt. However, we ultimately moved perilously close to having to use nuclear weapons.

3. *Conventional weapons provide a cushion permitting the containment of attack while diplomatic negotiations, political pressures, and world opinion is brought to bear against the aggressor, or at least against continuation of the fighting.* Today we live in a small world where weapons are so destructive that it is mankind's understandable concern to avoid wars at almost all costs; and, if fighting breaks out anywhere, the world community will concert to prevent hostilities from spreading into an atomic war. This has been clearly demonstrated in the current crisis. In precise measure as the risk of atomic war rose, the demands of the world community for a cease-fire and a lasting settlement rose. Moscow and Peiping were evidently perturbed by world demands for cease-fire. They came to realize that every shell which landed on those islands exploded politically in their own faces. We worked hard and successfully to create that effect and result.

4. *Strong Chinese Communist opposition to the two-China concept undoubtedly played a role in bringing about the cease-fire.* The Chicoms came to see that their aggression was raising a stir in the world at large (significantly within the Afro-Asian world) for some international mediation or arbitration of the dispute. The Chicoms probably sense that any international mediatory body (the UN, the World Court, Hammarskjold or a group of countries) would probably recommend the retention of Taiwan by the GRC or might recommend a plebiscite which would result in excluding Taiwan from Peiping's domain. The Chicoms let it be clearly known that they opposed any such solutions.

5. *The issue is not the Offshore Islands but Taiwan.* Communist propaganda at the outset of the crisis stressed "provocations" from the Offshore Islands and the necessity to eliminate enemy-held islands so close to their shores. This line soon gave way to statements emphasizing that their real objective was Taiwan, not the Offshore Islands. Communist indifference to the Offshore Islands as such was underlined in their cease-fire announcements, in which they invited the GRC to strengthen its

position on them. It is clear from their many public statements as well as from what they have said at Warsaw that what they seek is "liberation" of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Offshore Islands as a whole and the withdrawal of United States forces from the Western Pacific. Any part of the package will not satisfy them; they must have the whole thing.

6. *The GRC is amenable to reasonable proposals which safeguard free China's basic interests.* Again and again during the crisis last fall, we were warned in Taipei statements (and indeed by our Embassy and Defense authorities on the scene) that if the United States acted in such-and-such a way or took such-and-such a public position, the GRC would react in disastrous fashion. There were deeply disturbing reports during the darkest days of this crisis that the GRC was about to strike out on its own against mainland bases. The GRC did not launch such attacks, even though under extreme provocation. The GRC also accepted calmly all the decisions we took in this crisis, once the decisions were taken. Perhaps we should reckon with an ally who is more amenable to realism and reason than we have given him credit for.

7. *While much Asian public opinion was averse to our protecting Quemoy measures likely to produce a war, each Far East Government seemed nevertheless fearful that the U.S. might disclose through this affair that it would not support FE countries in time of need with the most powerful assistance possible.* As a result of this ambivalence, public opinion in FE countries (except Korea, GRC, Viet-Nam, and to a large extent, the Philippines) was generally critical of the U.S. at the outset, whereas most responsible leaders confided their understanding and support of our actions. Many of these leaders did not feel strong enough politically to oppose local public opinion by openly supporting U.S. actions.

8. *Japan stood the test of this crisis in a most encouraging manner.* Last August when the shelling of Quemoy started, we were immediately concerned lest the Japanese might deny us use of our bases in Japan in support of Taiwan Strait operations. The Japanese have not interfered in our use of bases in Japan. Non-Socialist opinion in Japan has been generally favorable to us and it has been highly critical of Peiping's resort to force. Japanese leaders have scrupulously avoided actions or statements which would embarrass the U.S. All this represents a favorable evolution in U.S.-Japanese relations brought about in part by things we have done to improve relations and, in perhaps equal degree, by things the Chicoms have done to affront and antagonize Japan.

9. *Communist respect for firmness.* The recent crisis has demonstrated that the Chinese Communists respect firmness backed up by strength. We believe that it was the show of strength on the part of the United States and the firm position we took as to possible consequences that induced Peiping not to press home its attack on Quemoy. Chou En-lai's offer to resume the ambassadorial talks with the United States came

only two days after the Newport statement of September 4 in which Secretary Dulles warned that President Eisenhower would not hesitate to invoke the Formosa Resolution if he felt this necessary and that such a decision would be followed by "action both timely and effective." There is little doubt that one of the purposes behind the Communist attacks was to test our purposes and that, if weakness had been detected rather than strength, a more general attack might have followed, with fateful consequences for all.

10. *State–Defense cooperation in developing plans to cope with Chinese Communist military thrusts.* In stating his thesis last October that "imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers," Mao Tse Tung advocated an approach along the line of "battle by battle," "bit by bit," "one by one solution" and "smashing the enemy one by one". Likewise, during October the Chinese Communist Minister of National Defense, in announcing the odd-day firing on Quemoy, said it was Peiping's policy to "fight-fight, stop-stop, half-fight, half-stop. This is no trick but a normal thing." Fellow-traveling Anna Louise Strong had a series of interviews shortly thereafter with Red Chinese leaders, and in a subsequent article published in Moscow's *New Times* she made this frank disclosure of Peiping's attitude toward the employment of force:

> "Peking intends to achieve its aim by political and moral pressure, mixed with occasional shooting and not shooting, by pressure within the lands of the Pacific and from all the world's people, without permitting the pressure to develop into a major war. Peking, wise in political strategy, believes this can be done."

The foregoing quotations underscore the politico-military character of Chinese Communist concepts of warfare. Even when there is a clear recourse to force by Peiping, that force may be applied in varying degrees of intensity interlaminated with "peace" gestures, all part of a manoeuvre to serve definite political goals.

This, of course, has been traditional in Chinese Communist concepts of warfare. It is perhaps accentuated by Peiping's non-possession of atomic weapons at this time. At least until Red China has atomic weapons, we may anticipate a period of considerable blustering, restraint when it comes to the showdown, inconsistency, ambivalence and preparations for the long haul.

Since the Chinese Communists regard warfare as a politico-military operation, it is all the more important that State and Defense cooperate closely in the formulation of policies and plans for meeting various types of Chinese Communist aggression. Providentially, by the time the August crisis broke out in the Straits, State, Defense and CIA had completed a study on limited war in which these three agencies had considered 12 hypothetical local war situations in the world including a hypothetical situation in the Taiwan Straits. The latter turned out to have many features in common with what actually transpired in August and September. These studies also clarified a number of points (such as likely Chicom responses to U.S. nuclear attacks) which proved to be helpful in our contemplation of actions to meet the attack on the Quemoys.

State–Defense cooperation throughout the crisis was excellent. No instance is recalled where there was failure to consult or to coordinate on major decisions. The results showed it.

State–Defense cooperation should be as close and effective in the field of contingency planning as it seems to be when the proverbial balloon goes up.

---

268. Letter From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Martin) to the Ambassador in Poland (Beam)

Washington, March 3, 1959.

DEAR JAKE: I have received your letter of February 20[1] regarding the possibility of a picnic with Wang and have discussed the idea with Mr. Robertson. Although Alex Johnson had an informal talk or two with Wang,[2] we feel that times have changed since then. Several years of fruitless negotiations highlighted by the failure of the Chinese Communists to carry out their agreement have gone by. We also doubt that Wang would really be forthcoming about the situation on mainland China.

Mr. Robertson expressed the opinion too that there is a certain virtue in showing moral indignation at the manner in which the Chinese Communists have treated our people. He felt that our manifestations of such indignation at the negotiating table would be weakened by the kind of invitation which you mention. We therefore believe that you should take no initiative along these lines.

Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368, Warsaw Talks—Correspondence. Secret; Official–Informal.

[1] The letter, filed with the source text, suggested an informal meeting with Wang. Noting that while the heavy shelling continued in the Taiwan Strait, Beam had been "quite frigid" with Wang, but that during the last week or so they had met twice at receptions, and Wang had been "quite affable." Beam commented that no meeting would be feasible within any building in Warsaw but that a picnic lunch in the country might be arranged. (Supplement)

[2] Johnson and Wang met twice informally over dinner in August 1955; see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 58 and 70.

Your letter suggests that Wang will not be available for meetings in April or May. This raises the question of whether he will propose an interval of 2 months between meetings after March 19 or whether he will propose that meetings continue with a substitute. In view of the stand taken by the Communists in refusing to meet with me on the grounds that I was not an Ambassador, I presume they will not propose meetings at a lower level. If you have any thoughts on what Wang may propose and suggestions as to what our responses should be, please let us know so that we can include them in our instructions for the next meeting. Incidentally, I expect to be in Taipei on the date of the next meeting, in the course of a trip to several Far Eastern posts ending in Manila for the Far East Mission Chiefs Conference.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Edwin W. Martin[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

269. Editorial Note

At the 398th meeting of the National Security Council on March 5, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles summarized and commented on three National Intelligence Estimates, including NIE 13–2–59 (Document 258). The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, March 5, reads as follows:

> "The Estimates indicated that the achievement of Communist China in the course of the first year of the 'Great Leap Forward' had been remarkable. The Chinese Communists confidently expected to maintain a high growth rate for their economy although the commune program was still a great question mark."

The Council then discussed a draft of NSC 5904, "U.S. Policy in the Event of War." (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) There was considerable discussion concerning paragraph 2, which set forth the U.S. objective in the event of general war. The Department of State proposed adding language to this paragraph to make it clear that U.S. efforts would be directed against Communist China and other Bloc countries only if they were "involved in the hostilities." The President questioned this proposal, remarking, according to Gleason's memorandum of discussion, that if the United States "got into a disastrous nuclear war with the Soviet Union and in the course of the war simply ignored Communist China, we would end up in a 'hell of a fix.'" He commented later that "in the event of general war the U.S. would obviously attack its worst enemy first; that is, it would put all the weight of its attack on the U.S.S.R."

Acting Secretary of State Herter noted that the issue appeared to be whether or not Communist China would participate in a war between the United States and the Soviet Union; he thought this was "not absolutely certain." The President replied that if the United States defeated the Soviet Union in a general war in which China remained quiescent, "we would certainly take political measures to disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We simply could not just ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and intact after a terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the extreme." Later he stated again, however, that "our military plans ought not to indicate that we must hit China in the very first hours and days of the war with the Soviet Union. We should concentrate our initial attacks on the U.S.S.R." Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Twining stated that there was "no military intention to strike Communist China at once and automatically in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."

A new proposal by Acting Secretary Herter inserted the words "as necessary" before the words "Communist China" in paragraphs 2 and 6, but after the meeting, a difference of interpretation arose as whether the President had approved this language for paragraph 2 or only for paragraph 6, and the issue was left for decision at the next NSC meeting (see Document 271). (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Further documentation on the NSC 5904 series is scheduled for publication in volume III.

270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, March 9, 1959, 8:42 p.m.

606. Your 957.[1] Department for some time had been concerned at tendency apparent in GRC statements and actions to depart from principles of Joint Communiqué of October 23. GRC disposition return to emphasis on force in restoring mainland to freedom especially noticeable in passage Vice President Chen Cheng's speech of February 20 to Legislative Yuan quoted paragraph 4 reference telegram.[2]

Assistant Secretary Robertson has brought up subject Chen speech with Ambassador Yeh pointing out how it departs from Joint Communiqué statement that implementation Three People's Principles, not force, to be principal means accomplishing GRC's mainland mission and how statements this type negate effect Joint Communiqué and damage GRC's international position.

You should seek early opportunity discuss matter along same lines personally with Vice President Chen. Point out that reference to "applying political and military methods" to develop revolutionary movements on the mainland, mention of "political and military counterattack from [*on*?] the mainland," and statement that political and military aspects "cannot be separated" all appear mean that to GRC military force of equal importance with political means in inducing mainland uprisings. This concept contrary both to Joint Communiqué and to President Chiang's New Year's Day message in which Three People's Principles called "spearhead" and military force "shield." Similarly when Chen speaks of inseparability "principal battleground" on mainland from "secondary battleground" in Strait and of attaining "local military superiority" to bring about "truly effective coordination and concert of military action Taiwan Strait with mainland revolutionary movement," impression created that GRC might assume military initiative in offshore island area. This out of harmony with President Chiang's September 29 statement to press that Kinmen and Matsu are shield for Taiwan Strait, not bases for counterattack, as well as with Joint Communiqué.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–2159. Secret. Drafted by Bennett, cleared by Martin, and approved by Robertson.

[1] Telegram 957 from Taipei, February 21, reported a February 20 speech by Ch'en Ch'eng to the Legislative Yuan. (*Ibid.*)

[2] It reads in part as follows: "We should make mainland our principal battleground, applying political and military methods in endeavor to develop anti-Communist strength and revolutionary movements on mainland, and launch political and military counterattack from [*on*?] mainland."

US agrees with GRC that Joint Communiqué not "renunciation of force." We recognize GRC's inherent right self-defense and appreciate that in event large-scale mainland uprising use of force by GRC not precluded and might be required. But explain that in neither case would GRC itself initiate use of force. Stress over-riding need preserve world peace, making point that as peace-loving nations and loyal UN members neither GRC nor US can contemplate resort actions which would initiate war and might bring world disaster. Fundamental purpose Joint Communiqué to make our adherence this principle clear to world. In US view attempt provoke mainland uprising by use of force or resumption by GRC of military initiative in Taiwan Strait wholly inconsistent this purpose and would in eyes of world be indistinguishable from irresponsible and dangerous policies of Communists themselves.

Joint Communiqué has been invaluable in preventing further erosion of international support for policies GRC and US in Taiwan Strait area. Actions and statements which can be interpreted as abandonment Joint Communiqué seriously damage its effect and might cause international position of GRC suffer reverses leading to its isolation from other free nations of world. This would seriously impair ability of US give GRC effective diplomatic and political support. US therefore considers it essential that GRC make strongest possible effort present self abroad as faithful to Joint Communiqué, avoiding words and deeds appearing deviate from its principles. In US view steadfast adherence to position adopted in Joint Communiqué indispensable to security of GRC against Communist attempts destroy it and surest route to ultimate emancipation Chinese people from Communist tyranny.

Herter

---

271. Editorial Note

At the 399th meeting of the National Security Council on March 12, 1959, the Council resumed its discussion of the draft of NSC 5904, "U.S. Policy in the Event of War," which had been under consideration at the March 5 meeting (see Document 269). The memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, March 12, reads in part as follows:

"The President commented that as he understood the previous Council guidance, the U.S. would attack Communist China in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., only as necessary. The President said he agreed that the U.S. would have to be prepared to attack Communist China in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. but would not automatically attack Communist China if that country could be isolated from the hostilities. As a historical precedent for this position, the President cited the fact of the long delay before the Soviet Union finally declared war and attacked Japan in World War II."

The discussion then turned to other subjects before returning to China:

"Secretary Herter said that the State Department was prepared to accept the elimination of the words 'as necessary' from Paragraph 2 if it was made crystal clear elsewhere in the paper that in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the U.S. would not automatically attack Communist China.

"The President commented that our overall objective with respect to Communist China in the event of such a general war was to assure ourselves that we would not be in a situation of being attacked afresh by Communist China after we had defeated the Soviet Union in a general war. With respect to targets the President said he assumed that the targets we attacked would always be selected and not indiscriminate.

"Secretary Herter repeated again his concern that NSC 5904 should not seem to indicate that a U.S. attack on Communist China would be automatic. He said that he was willing to see the words 'as necessary' dropped from Paragraph 2 if Paragraph 7 [formerly paragraph 6], where it had been agreed that these two words should be inserted, also stated that it was to be the controlling Policy Guidance. Mr. Gray suggested the wording of a footnote which would make clear that Paragraph 7 was indeed the controlling Policy Guidance and Secretary McElroy suggested that this language be placed in a footnote to Paragraph 7. The President gave his approval to this solution."

Paragraph 7 of NSC 5904, as approved by the Council and subsequently approved by the President as NSC 5904/1, reads as follows:

"The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR—and as necessary in Communist China, European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries—to attain the above objectives." (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)

The Council subsequently discussed a March 4 paper prepared by the NSC Planning Board entitled "Problems Illustrated by Recent Developments in the Near East and the Taiwan Strait." (*Ibid.*; see also Document 267) The account of the discussion in Gleason's memorandum reads as follows:

"Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to the first problem illustrated in the Discussion Paper in Paragraph 2 on Page 1. This problem was described as follows: 'U.S. prestige has become closely identified with the maintenance of the Chinese Nationalists on the Offshore Islands. However, U.S. allies have not publicly supported the U.S. position with respect to these Islands.' Pointing out that the Planning Board had scheduled a review of U.S. policy toward the Far East for the month of May, Mr. Gray suggested that the Council not discuss this problem in detail at this meeting.

"Secretary Herter commented that he had seen somewhere a statement that the Chinese Communists were now engaged in producing transport planes for the use of paratroopers. If true, would this indicate a Chinese Communist intention to attack Taiwan? In reply neither Mr. Allen Dulles nor General Twining thought they could perceive any direct relation between these newly designed Chinese Communist planes and an attack on Taiwan in the near future." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Further documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume III.

---

272. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 100–4–59 Washington, March 13, 1959.

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA

The Problem

To assess Communist China's capabilities, intentions, and probable courses of action with respect to the Taiwan Strait area over the next year.

Conclusions

1. We believe that Communist China broke off the Taiwan Strait crisis last October primarily because it believed that to increase military pressures to the point necessary for a successful interdiction effort against Chinmen carried unacceptable risk of hostilities with the US. Furthermore, relations between the US and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) had not been impaired, Nationalist morale remained high, and the tensions created by Peiping's actions were proving damaging to Communist China's international prestige. Peiping was also concerned over moves by some Asian countries toward compromise proposals it considered unacceptable. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 13 March 1959."

2. There has actually been little change since last October in the military picture in the Taiwan Strait area. The Chinese Communists do not have the capability to prevent resupply of the Matsus or Big and Little Chinmen by artillery fire alone. They could at any time create considerably greater havoc on the Chinmen group than they did during the previous crisis should they choose to exercise their full artillery capability. Moreover, by supplementing artillery bombardment with attacks by aircraft and motor torpedo boats, possibly along with offensive minewarfare, they could make resupply and reinforcement of the Chinmen and Matsu garrisons virtually impossible unless US air and naval forces were committed to keeping the supply lines open. The Chinese Communist forces remain capable of taking any of the smaller coastal islands quickly and with little or no warning. Barring US intervention, they also could seize the larger coastal islands. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. There are presently no indications of any Chinese Communist preparations for increased military pressures in the Taiwan Strait. There is no firm evidence that additional troops, heavier artillery, missiles, additional aircraft, additional motor torpedo boats, or minecraft have been moved into the Strait area. However, Communist forces could be quickly and heavily reinforced, and quite possibly without detection prior to their employment. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly seek to avoid hostilities with the US. We believe that they will not attempt to seize Chinmen or undertake an all-out effort to prevent its resupply. We also believe such actions unlikely against the Matsus, though the Chinese Communists may in this case be somewhat less certain of US intentions and possible reactions. However, we believe that the Chinese Communists will continue to employ military pressures in support of their essentially political and psychological campaign in the Taiwan Strait. They will probably attempt to keep the Strait issue alive and probably will not relax their military pressures to such a degree as to permit the situation to become quiescent over an extended period of time. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. There are a number of military pressures open to the Chinese Communists. They may engage in periodic heavy shelling and limited air and/or sea operations to harass the Nationalists in the Chinmen and Matsu areas; if the CCAF improves its proficiency, it might more aggressively engage the CAF. The Chinese Communists might attempt to seize one or more of the small, lightly-held offshore islands, particularly Tatan and Erh-tan, which could probably be taken by a surprise operation before effective counteraction could be mounted. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. In the course of the Berlin crisis the Chinese Communists may exercise their ability to heighten tensions in the Taiwan Strait, either as a part of coordinated Bloc strategy or in furtherance of their own objectives in the Far East. We believe that the Chinese Communists would not heighten tensions without prior consultation with the Soviets. In either case, the Soviet position would almost certainly depend on the course of the negotiations or on events in the Berlin crisis itself. The Soviets will probably desire to keep tensions in the Far East about as they are at present so long as they judge that the Berlin situation is progressing according to their liking. Should the Soviets estimate that the Berlin situation is going badly for them, they may advise the Chinese Communists to increase tensions in the Far East. The Chinese Communist response to such Soviet advice would be influenced not only by the Berlin situation and Soviet desires but also by Peiping's own estimate of the advantages or disadvantages of heightening tensions in the Taiwan Strait or possibly elsewhere in the Far East. Any moves to heighten tension in the Taiwan Strait, however, would almost certainly be calculated to fall short of provoking major hostilities. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 19 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

273. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Implementation of Doan–Wang Agreement[1]

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

Mr. Robertson recalled that in a recent conversation with FE officers Ambassador Yeh had stated he had information to the effect that the Kin-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–1959. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins.

[1] See footnote 2, Document 236.

men garrison had been reduced by 10,000 men.[2] Since this did not square with the information available to us, we asked our Embassy in Taipei for a report on the situation. The Embassy reported[3] that according to GRC sources the Kinmen garrison had only been reduced by 500-odd men since last November. The Embassy's report also indicated that full implementation of the Doan–Wang Memorandum of Understanding of November 17 was being impeded by a failure on the Chinese side to carry out the prescribed reduction of the Kinmen garrison.

Mr. Robertson said that he wished to avoid creating any misunderstanding with respect to his remarks on the subject. We, of course, had no desire to weaken the over-all posture of the GRC on the offshore islands. However, during the Secretary's visit to Taiwan last October, he was given to understand from discussions with senior Chinese and United States military officers that a course of action providing for an appreciable reduction in the Kinmen garrison and concurrent introduction of heavier artillery would not impair the defensive strength of the island complex and might in fact increase it. Subsequently on November 17 Generals Wang and Doan concluded an agreement whereby the Kinmen garrison would be reduced by not less than 15,000 men including one division and the United States would supply certain new heavy artillery pieces for emplacement on Kinmen. It was planned that this agreement would be implemented by June 30 of this year. The new guns had already arrived in Taiwan, but their deployment to Kinmen was being held up because no reduction in the Kinmen garrison had yet taken place. Since the agreed date of implementation was approaching, we were concerned at the lack of progress on the Chinese side. The President inquired about this matter the other day and the Department had to inform him that nothing had been done. Mr. Robertson asked if Ambassador Yeh could possibly do anything to help break this unfortunate log jam.

Ambassador Yeh stated that President Chiang himself had told him a reduction in the Kinmen garrison would be carried out under the cover of the deployment of replacements. Some six weeks ago he received word from Taipei from an army source that things were beginning to move ahead. He expressed surprise regarding the June 30 implementation date, stating that he had never heard any specific time period mentioned. He indicated that he would advise his government to move ahead with implementation of the Doan–Wang agreement. As for action by the United States in Taipei, he suggested that we not pursue the matter further with General Wang but that the Ambassador should discuss the matter with the Foreign Minister, with perhaps a concurrent approach by Admiral Smoot to Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei.[4]

---

[2] Telegram 603 to Taipei, March 5, informed the Embassy that Yeh had so stated in a conversation on March 3 and requested the Embassy's comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–559)

[3] In telegram 994 from Taipei, March 10. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/3–1059; see Supplement)

In the course of discussing this subject Ambassador Yeh also mentioned the GRC's plans to reduce over-all military forces from 670,000 to roughly 600,000 by the end of FY 1960. He mentioned having received a personal letter from Vice President Chen in which he referred to the difficulty he had encountered in gaining the President's approval of this plan. According to Ambassador Yeh, the Vice President's letter also indicated that one purpose in seeking the additional $20 million aid in FY 1959[5] that the GRC requested at the end of December was to cover the expenses of disbanding these 70,000 troops. The Ambassador commented in this connection that the GRC expected to lose about $30 million in revenue this year because of lower world sugar and rice prices.

---

[4] Telegram 1031 from Taipei, March 23, reported that on March 21, General Wang had given General Doan a schedule for the redeployment of 16,645 personnel from Kinmen by June 30, that CINCPAC had accepted this schedule, and that Doan had thereupon released the artillery for delivery to Kinmen. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–2359; see Supplement) Ambassador Yeh informed Robertson along similar lines on March 26. (Memorandum of conversation, March 26; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–2659)

[5] Telegram 487 to Taipei, December 20, 1958, informed the Embassy that Yeh had called on Robertson on December 19 to request an additional $20 million economic aid or loan. He stated that the GRC estimated its additional expenditures as a result of the offshore islands crisis at $30 million, of which $10 million could be covered within the $70 million aid level. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/12–2058; see Supplement)

---

274. Editorial Note

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Washington for informal discussions March 19–24, 1959. A memorandum of conversation by General Goodpaster of a conversation on March 22 between President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister reads in part as follows:

"The discussion next turned to Far Eastern problems. Mr. Macmillan recalled that during the Quemoy/Matsu situation the British Government remained calm. He did not recall Parliament despite loud pressures to do so. He thought the free world gained through Britain's standing firm. The President said we must expect a series of such pressures. He thought Iraq would be the next major trouble spot with the Soviets making use of the Kurds who live in four countries (Iraq, Iran, Turkey and the USSR) and have never been assimilated into these.

"The President said that he has tried to get Chiang-Kai-shek to pull a large part of his forces back from Quemoy and Matsu and use these islands simply as outposts. Chiang has committed himself to pull back 15,000 troops but there is some indication that Nationalists are dragging their feet. The offshore islands are a symbol to Chiang and to the Chinese of his ability to go back to the mainland if unrest develops. The President said he had offered to give Chiang an amphibious lift in return for pulling back. With such lift Chiang could exploit any weakness on the mainland; the offshore islands are military useless, in fact, for such a purpose. It is clear that Chiang wants to keep large forces on the islands so as to make certain that the United States would have to intervene in case the islands were attacked.

"Mr. Macmillan asked why we thought the Chinese Communists had stopped or slackened off their attack. The President thought they had just gotten tired of it, and saw no way to bring about any great result without the likelihood of bringing us into full-scale war against them. Mr. Herter said there is no evidence of a significant build-up by the Chinese Communists on the mainland in the vicinity of the offshore islands. There are indications that the Chinese Communists may believe they can defeat the Nationalists internally on Formosa. He added that the islands, like Berlin, are exposed weak points in the Western system. The President added that we should look at our weakness in the Middle East. The Soviets can do the same kind of thing there. Mr. Lloyd commented that they have it within their power to produce crises whenever they want to." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

Further documentation on the Macmillan visit is printed in volume VII, Part 2.

---

275. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, March 24, 1959, 5 p.m.

1243. USUN for Lodge. 88th meeting two hours.[1]

I opened with statement emphasizing continued Chinese Communist military action in Quemoy area made relaxation tension there im-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei.

[1] Beam sent a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–371, March 24, and his comments and recommendations in telegram 1244, March 25. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/3–2459 and 611.93/3–2559, respectively) Telegram 976 to Warsaw, March 20, transmitted his instructions for the meeting. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/3–2059; see Supplement)

possible and appealed for renunciation force in order restore tranquillity. Wang responded elaborating familiar themes US intervening in unfinished Chinese civil war, following in footsteps of Japanese militarists, plotting create two Chinas, aiming at permanent occupation Taiwan, and preparing new provocations against mainland. I responded briefly, refuting Wang's principal accusations and reiterating thesis that Chinese Communist military threat was continued danger to peace.

After further response by Wang along usual lines, I made statement demanding release remaining four American civilians in compliance agreed announcement and again exposed weakness Wang's previous claim agreed announcement not applicable to Americans in prison. Wang's rejoinder contained nothing new. I then requested and was denied information on Bishop Walsh, following which I brought up question missing military personnel which Wang as usual declared outside scope these talks.

Wang informed me he returning home shortly and proposed next meeting May 20. I countered with May 19 as more convenient to us to which he agreed. Time 2 p.m.

It was agreed make usual announcement to press simply naming date and time next meeting and further agreed that if press inquired reason long interval they would be told it was for "administrative reasons".

Beam

---

276. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, March 31, 1959.

SUBJECT

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Resistance Program

1. Referring to your recent conversation on 30 March concerning my proposal by memorandum of 27 March 1959 on the above subject,[1] I

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Intelligence Matters (9). Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[1] See Document 277 and its attachment.

wish to assure you that full consideration has been given to the points that you have raised.

[3 *paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Allen W. Dulles

---

277. Memorandum for President Eisenhower's Files

Washington, April 6, 1959.

At the 25 March meeting of the 5412/2 group,[1] the activities outlined in the attached memorandum dated 27 March were discussed. At that time approval of the Group was asked only for exploratory discussions with the GRC.

On the afternoon of 30 March a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence (Mr. Thomas Parrott) came to my office and indicated that the Director of Central Intelligence wished immediate approval of these activities. He informed me that Mr. Herter and Mr. Quarles had already given their approval.

After examining the document, I informed Mr. Parrott that because of the character and far-reaching possible consequences of these actions, I did not feel I could give my approval to them on behalf of the President without a discussion with the President. I thereupon at approximately 2:45 p.m. went to the President's office and described the proposal to him. He indicated that he would not wish to have the projects approved without further information [2 *lines of source text not declassified*].

I then reported these points to Mr. Parrott who had remained in my office:

[*heading and 4 paragraphs (8 lines of source text) not declassified*]

4. He was concerned that the commitment to undertake the proposed operation would involve no commitments whatsoever to further activities in this regard which would have to be considered as they might be proposed.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Intelligence Matters (11). Secret. The source text bears the typed notation: "There were no other copies made of this memorandum."

[1] The records of this meeting have not been found. NSC 5412/2, "National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations," December 28, 1955, provided that designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the President should be advised in advance of major covert programs and should be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs. (*Ibid.*, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records)

[*heading and 2 paragraphs (5 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Mr. Parrott indicated that it might take a little time to develop dependable material on all of these points.

On 1 April, Mr. Parrott returned to my office with the memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence dated March 31 (attached)[2] which addressed itself to the various points that the President made. On the basis of this memorandum and additional similar assurances given me by Mr. Parrott, I gave my approval on behalf of the President.

This memorandum with attachments is being hand-carried by me to General Goodpaster for the President's files. There are no copies of this memorandum nor of the attachments except as may have been retained by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Gordon Gray

[Attachment][3]

March 27, 1959.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2

SUBJECT

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Resistance Program

1. *Problem*

President Chiang Kai-shek's long standing request for increased support to his efforts to keep alive resistance in Mainland China has been bolstered and given urgency by the organization of communes throughout Mainland China and the recent upsurge of Tibetan resistance.

2. *Facts*

Events since Communist China launched the commune program in April 1958 indicate the possibility of increasing latent disaffection with the Communist government among the population of the racially Chinese provinces. In the provinces of the northwest there is considerable hard intelligence indicative of fairly large scale and continuing resistance among the non-Chinese minority peoples. In Tibet, there are believed to be a substantial number of armed Khamba tribesmen actively resisting Chinese Communist domination, and the Dalai Lama is now fleeing to India through the territory controlled to a considerable extent by these tribesmen. President Chiang has pointed out that, under these circumstances, he must take action in support of the resistance in the above areas if the prestige of his government is not to suffer in the eyes of the world at large and the Chinese people. Ambassador Drumright, in recommending to the Department of State a program of increased support, qualified his recommendation by advising against any joint activities with the GRC into Tibet, since the Tibetans are antagonistic to all Chinese regardless of their political affiliations.

---

[2] Document 276.

[3] Secret; Eyes Only.

3. *Discussion*

[*3 paragraphs (23 lines of source text) not declassified*]

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] it is believed that economic progress and the development of the communes can be retarded. The Communist government can be forced to take security measures which will assist in further discrediting it in the eyes both of its own population and the world at large, as well as to limit the flexibility of the Chinese Communist regime in dealing with its people. It is believed that success in the consolidation and development of the commune system in China would seriously damage U.S. strategic interests in Asia.

[*2 headings and 3 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified*]

---

278. Notes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, April 15, 1959.

OCB LUNCHEON

[Here follows a brief summary of discussion of Yemen.]

2. *Tibet (Confidential)*

During the luncheon meeting the Board members had a general discussion of several aspects of the Tibet situation including the future of the Dalai Lama, exploitation of Chicom actions and the use of comments thereon by Asian and other leaders.

[Here follow brief summaries of discussion concerning a proposed information program on the NS *Savannah* and on Guinea.]

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Preliminary Notes. Secret.

OCB MEETING

1. *Report and Operations Plan on Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China (NSC 5723)*[1] *(Secret)*

Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson and Mr. LaRue Lutkins, of the Office of Chinese Affairs, were present for the consideration of these agenda items by the OCB.

There was considerable discussion on the general situation in Taiwan and the implications of this situation for the U.S. position in the Far East. During this discussion, Mr. Robertson stated the following views, many of them in answer to questions of the Acting Chairman (Mr. Harr):

1. U.S. Far Eastern policy has been strengthened by U.S. actions in support of GRC forces in resisting ChiCom aggression, during the off-shore island hostilities last summer.
2. The nations of the Far East were quite comprehending about the significance of U.S. action in support of the GRC.
3. The maintenance of the morale of the GRC is no "fiction" but a very real problem important to U.S. interests.
4. Despite the cost of assisting GRC forces financially, these forces actually represent a comparatively economical deterrent to any further aggression in such areas as Korea and Southeast Asia.
5. While the economic problems of Taiwan loom large, the small farmers and shopkeepers are relatively prosperous and realize that it is the GRC and the U.S. presence which is protecting them from ChiCom slavery, which they hear about from the mainland.
6. The defense of the off-shore islands last summer was, unfortunately, misinterpreted in some circles. The ChiComs had made it clear that their objectives were not only Quemoy and Matsu, but Taiwan itself, and, in fact, had made it clear that clearance of the Taiwan area of U.S. forces was also one of their objectives. Therefore, Mr. Robertson continued, the erroneous interpretation that U.S. action was at the risk of general hostilities over small off-shore islands was analogous to reasoning that a rampaging tiger could be deterred by sacrificing a village infant in hopes of protecting the village itself.

Mr. Murphy concluded the discussion by noting that the presentation had been an "excellent" one and that there should be no doubt that the objectives and courses of action outlined in the papers were the best for the U.S. to pursue under the circumstances.

The Board approved both the Report and the Operations Plan.[2]

Jeremiah J. O'Connor

---

[1] Reference is to two draft OCB documents, "Report on Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China (NSC 5723)" and "Operations Plan for Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China." The final documents were dated April 15 and April 22, respectively. (*Ibid.*, Taiwan, 1958–1959; see Supplement)

[2] Harr presented the report to the National Security Council at an NSC meeting on May 13. The memorandum of discussion by Boggs is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

279. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

Washington, May 1, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

[Here follow a list of 26 persons present, including Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Generals Twining and White, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James S. Russell, General Cabell, and NSC Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason, and discussion of the first two agenda items.]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward Certain Off-Shore Islands*

Mr. Robertson opened the discussion on this subject by referring to the special White House meeting of August 25, 1958[1] in which it was decided that U.S. interests related only to the GRC's ability to hold the two Quemoys and the five larger islands in the Matsu group. The GRC held off-shore island positions excluded from United States interests as a result of this decision are 1) Ta-tan (1,300 troops) and Ehr-tan (250 troops); 2) two additional islets in the Kinmen group, Hu-tzu Hsu (70 troops); and Dodd Island (70 troops); 3) Tung-ting, 22 nautical miles southwest of Kinmen (60 troops); 4) the Wu-chiu group, midway between the Kinmen group and the Matsus (550 irregulars); 5) Lang Tao, about 12 nautical miles northeast of the Matsus (no troops) and 6) Tung-yin Shan, 25 nautical miles east northeast of the Matsus (3,000 irregulars).

Mr. Robertson then pointed out that Ta-tan and Ehr-tan are the only two islands in the above group that are within communist artillery bombardment range from the mainland. He indicated that it was our belief, reflected in our talks with GRC officials, that the two Tan islands could be so interdicted by artillery fire as to be impossible to resupply. We have notified the GRC that the U.S. will not engage in, or assist the GRC in, a supply operation to these islands. The GRC, on the other hand, believes that it can supply the islands and it proposes to defend them vigorously. Apart from the Tans, the other small islands enumerated by Mr. Robertson were indicated as being beyond mainland artillery range. He pointed out that we have not discussed our attitude toward these islands with the GRC. The issue up for discussion with the JCS is the U.S. position in the event the Chinese communists try to capture these latter islands. Mr. Robertson felt it was important we have no misunderstanding with the GRC as to whether we would become involved if our help were required, or requested, to repel such attacks.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, Volume VII. Top Secret. Drafted by Murphy's special assistant Dwight J. Porter.

[1] See Document 43.

General Twining felt we should make clear that we will defend the Quemoys and the Matsus and not the other islands. He felt that our commitments were already so heavy that they should not be increased. General Lemnitzer commented that there are two different problems: (1) what the Chinese Nationalists think and (2) what the U.S. will do. He mentioned that he had just returned from Taiwan and he was impressed with the strength of feeling on the part of the Chinese Nationalist Government against giving up any more real estate. He felt they disagreed with the U.S. violently on the issue of whether these small islands were worth fighting for. From the GRC point of view the loss of such outposts develops a sense of insecurity as well as psychological inferiority. He was inclined to agree with the Chinese position.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that in view of the GRC determination to defend the islands (which he recognized as a fact), the U.S. could inevitably become drawn in by the force of circumstance. Mr. Murphy concurred that this was the nub of the problem; that the GRC reaction to an invasion of these small off-shore islands would have to be maximum in nature, and we might find developments such as to involve the U.S. in the large-scale military activity which would ensue. Mr. Robertson added, in response to General Lemnitzer's comments, that of course this was more than just a military problem and had to be considered in its political aspects as well.

General Twining responded that his reaction was limited to the military aspects of the situation. There is no military requirement for defending the small off-shore islands. If they are important politically, the State Department should so inform Defense in order that appropriate planning measures could take place and the GRC be advised of our decision. There followed a general discussion in which it was agreed that there should be no publicity of any sort, regardless of the decision taken.

Mr. Robertson responded to questioning by indicating that the U.S. has never discussed with the GRC our position with regard to any of the small off-shore islands except Ta-tan and Ehr-tan. He felt that indications from the U.S. that we would not intervene in the event of attack on these islands would not change the GRC decision to stand and fight. He thought they would not evacuate. He pointed out that the White House decision of August 25, 1958 had not been focused on any of the small islands except the two Tans.

There followed a brief discussion about the current status of the implementation of the Doan–Wang agreement. General Lemnitzer described his unhappiness, on finding out on his recent arrival in Taiwan, that the U.S. had not fulfilled its part of the bargain to send 10 35 mm. guns to the Quemoys. He indicated that the decision to do this had been taken in the Pentagon without consultation with State and in order to develop a bargaining position which would force the desired troop reduction on the Quemoys. It had not had this desired effect and he was glad to report that the Pentagon decision had been reversed. In this conversation, General Twining said that latest reports indicated that only 2,000 of the scheduled 15,000 troops had been removed from the Quemoys to Taiwan.

The discussion ended with agreement that the JCS would study the problem and the matter would be discussed at a subsequent meeting. General White concluded that there were three variations to the problem: (1) complete non-involvement on the part of the U.S. on the defense of the islands; (2) U.S. help in resupplying the islands with sea and air support and (3) all-out U.S. assistance.

[Here follows agenda item 4.]

5. *Tibet*

General White had asked that the item on Tibet be put on the agenda. His question was whether the U.S. was doing all it can. He mentioned the capabilities of the Air Force for resupply of the Tibetan rebels as well as the possibility provided by the geography for the use of air power to deny access to Tibet from China. There was then a general discussion of the problem of overflight of other countries and of the general Asiatic reaction to the Tibetan uprising. It was agreed that General Cabell would provide a briefing at the following meeting as to what was being done in Tibet and the general line of approach being taken by the U.S. Government with respect to the Buddhist area.

---

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, May 3, 1959, noon.

1156. For Robertson from Parsons. Drumright sending you full account of two and half hour conversation we had today[1] with Generalissimo, also attended by Green, Foreign Minister, two Vice Foreign Ministers, and interpreter.[2] Highlights as follows:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–359. Secret; Limit Distribution.

[1] May 2. Parsons, accompanied by Marshall Green, visited Taipei May 1–3, after attending the SEATO Council meeting held in Wellington April 8–10, and a U.S. Chiefs of Mission conference held in Baguio, Philippines.

[2] Drumright's memorandum of conversation was transmitted with despatch 629 from Taipei, May 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–459; see Supplement)

(1) I gave him highlights of conclusions of SEATO and Baguio conferences, stressing SEATO's and Ambassadors' views as how best to exploit Tibet situation, importance of economic development in consolidating security and institutions of free Asian countries, growing recognition in FE area of Chinese Communist menace and growing capability free FE countries to meet that menace. I stressed our continuing support for current China policies which we consider essential part of broader US world policies.

(2) Generalissimo paid warm emotional tribute to Secretary Dulles. It was clear throughout our conversations that he was worried over Dulles' resignation and yours.[3] He described you both as principal architects of policy which will long be renowned for its realism, uprightness and success. He felt it was a policy which had passed the acid test at Quemoy.

(3) Re Liu's appointment as Mao's successor, he had three points to make:

(A) Mao did not step down; he was overthrown;
(B) Mao's failure at Quemoy gave Khrushchev opportunity to exercise pressures for his removal and replacement by someone more pliant to Moscow's will, as result of which Peiping will be even more under Moscow's control than previously;
(C) Soviets will do everything possible to build up Liu's power and prestige, possibly even stirring up something in the Straits to prove Liu's greater stature.

(4) Re Tibet, Generalissimo recognized events had proved helpful in opening eyes of Asia to Red menace, but he repeatedly expressed strong displeasure over so-called failure of US so far to cooperate with GRC to exploit uprising. This was a Chinese affair in which Generalissimo felt GRC must play a role if it is to justify its mission and very reason for existence. GRC proposed to undertake guerilla warfare on the mainland, whether or not US approved; and GRC under no obligation to consult US on such matters, as distinct from obligation to consult under mutual defense treaty in event of GRC attack against mainland.

(5) Similarly, Generalissimo was critical of what he regarded as demeaning, irritating US State Department reminders of alleged GRC failure to live up to spirit of joint communiqué. Stressed that GRC was the tried and true ally which stood by its word. GRC will never try to pull anything behind US back. Even though GRC must accent recovery of mainland, it will abide by communiqué's letter and spirit in fulfilling that mission. He added that State Department remonstrances over this

---

[3] Secretary Dulles resigned on April 15. Robertson's resignation was to take effect on June 30.

matter conveyed impressions not only of US distrust but also of casting GRC in role of puppet.

(6) I replied that these matters would have to be carefully studied by my government before giving US response but that my personal preliminary reaction was that close consultations over past year had paid handsome dividends and should be continued on all matters affecting our common interests. I said that if our views had been expressed in a way or through means damaging to GRC then that was regrettable matter which must be corrected.

(7) I also alluded to GRC's difficult international position and said that efforts to improve it in spirit joint communiqué were most important in that defeat in UN and acceptance ChiComs were directly related to GRC's mission to recover mainland. If GRC lost international position, realization their position as legitimate government of China, which we supported, would be gravely affected.

(8) Comments in light this and subsequent talks with Vice President and Foreign Minister will follow soonest.

Drumright

---

281. Telegram From the Consulate General in Naha to the Department of State

Naha, Okinawa, May 4, 1959, 2 p.m.

177. For Robertson from Parsons. At Embassy reception several hours after my long conversation with President Chiang morning of May 2,[1] Foreign Minister Huang asked if he could see me privately to convey at President Chiang's request several points relative to morning's conversation. We retired to private room and Huang spoke as follows:

(1) Chiang wished to convey personal regards to Secretary Herter, recalling with pleasure Herter's 1957 visit to Taiwan.[2] He hoped Secretary would find it possible to revisit Taiwan soon.

(2) Chiang wished to make clear that his remarks that morning re State Department criticisms of GRC statements on recovering mainland

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–459. Secret.

[1] See Document 280.

[2] September 12–16, 1957; for his report of the visit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, p. 603.

had not been intended as formal complaint to be conveyed to Department. Chiang had spoken in same spirit of frankness and friendship to Secretary Dulles and to you. He was speaking casually and not trying to make an issue of it.

(3) GRC would certainly never undertake any large scale military action on mainland without prior consultation with US. Even on guerilla activities, GRC, though not bound by documentary obligations to do so, would keep US informed as appropriate so it would not be taken by surprise.

In response to latter point, I stressed as I had during morning conversation with Chiang the importance and good results already deriving from close consultations. Conversely failure to consult even on matters not covered by documents might lead to serious unexpected consequences. Balance of our conversation related to MSA, status of forces, Tibet, Laos, Malaya. Full account being air pouched from Seoul.

Comment: I am sure you will agree in reading my cable account of morning's conversation with Chiang (telegram reference numbers unavailable here) that Chiang through Huang was seeking to correct oversight and possible misunderstandings deriving from our conversation. Regarding point 3 above, Chiang as well as Vice-President Chen who also talked boldly about guerilla-support activities may have done so in considerable measure of "face" purposes (they were speaking in presence other ministers and politicos). I think they are quite realistic about need to consult with us and clearly do not expect their actions to go as far as their words would imply. There is no question but that success over Quemoy has deepened GRC understanding of value of close collaboration with US.

Deming

282. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

Governor Harriman's Visit to U.S.S.R.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Averell Harriman, Former Governor of New York
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

During Governor Harriman's call on the Secretary regarding the former's forthcoming visit to the U.S.S.R., Harriman referred to his desire to explore an offer made by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan to arrange for the Governor to visit Communist China. Mr. Harriman stated that he had been fully accredited as a regular correspondent by the North American Newspaper Alliance (NANA) which had temporarily withdrawn the accreditation of its present regular correspondent. Secretary Herter questioned whether Harriman was qualified under the Department's definition of "full-time American correspondent" who would be permitted to go to Red China.[1] In this connection, the Secretary said he supposed Harriman would be prepared to be stationed in Red China "on a regular basis for six months or longer." The Secretary also observed that a visitor of Harriman's stature would lend considerable prestige to the Chinese Communists and be exploited by their propaganda. Mr. Harriman was noncommittal with respect to the Secretary's remarks and sought to put them aside by observing that the chances of the trip to Communist China working out were probably very limited. He did say in this connection that if the trip should materialize it would presumably be in the form of a side trip by Soviet jet airlines from Moscow.[2]

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler.

[1] Reference is to the Department's policy, in effect since August 1957, of issuing passports without restrictions on travel to mainland China to one correspondent from each of a number of newsgathering organizations which were prepared to station a correspondent in China on a resident basis. For text of the announcement of this policy on August 22, 1957, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 1134–1135; for text of a statement issued on April 23, 1959, announcing its extension, see *ibid., 1959*, pp. 1165–1166.

[2] Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, representing the North American Newspaper Alliance, discussed Harriman's request with Murphy and other Department officials on May 18. (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; Department of State, Central Files, 911.6293) Tocah 40 to Geneva, May 21, informed Herter of the conversation and recommended approval of the application as coming within the purview of established policy; Cahto 23 from Geneva, May 22, transmitted Hoover's approval. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/5–2159 and 611.93/5–2259, respectively; see Supplement) Telegram 2445 from Moscow, June 3, reported that Harriman would not visit China because he had not received a visa. (Department of State, 032–Harriman, Averell/6–359)

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, May 19, 1959, 4 p.m.

1503. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 89th meeting one hour forty minutes.[1]

Wang opened with usual classified [*clichéd?*] routine,[2] presentation ascribing tension in Taiwan area to US "occupation" Chinese territory and intervention in Chinese internal affairs. He called again for discussions on basis Chinese Communist September 22 draft proposal. I responded with refutation his charges against US and emphasized cause of tension lay in Chinese Communist military activity and threats to conquer Taiwan. After further exchange along usual lines I made statements on American prisoners and missing personnel which Wang met with brief stock replies. In response my query on Bishop Walsh, Wang stated he was in good health but refused any further information on grounds case still under investigation. In reply my statement on non-delivery packages Wang said inquiries this subject should be directed Red Cross channels.

Next meeting June 19, 2 p.m.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1959. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent a detailed report of the meeting in airgram G–398, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2559) Telegram 1168 to Warsaw, May 15, transmitted his instructions for the meeting. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/5–1559)

[2] Beam commented in telegram 1510, May 20: "In terms originality, Wang's presentation reached new low. Familiar clichés were strung together in almost listless fashion." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/5–2059)

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, June 19, 1959, 5 p.m.

1661. Beam–Wang Talks. 90th meeting 1 hour 40 minutes.[1]

I opened with brief statement on Taiwan problem based Deptel 1299.[2] Wang responded with usual arguments accusing US of "swashbuckling over" to seize Chinese territory and asked how US would feel if foreign country attempted create a second US in Hawaii or had interfered in American Civil War. After some give and take I made statements on missing military personnel and imprisoned Americans, eliciting usual negative response. Wang also said had no further information to give on Bishop Walsh. He concluded by referring to Robertson speech at National Press Club,[3] accusing US of violating understanding on confidential nature talks. I denied any such violation and reminded Wang his side did not have [as] clear a record in this respect as he claimed.

Next meeting Tuesday July 28, 2 p.m.

Beam

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–1959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam transmitted the transcript of the meeting in airgram G–417, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–2959) He commented in telegram 1663, June 20: "Nothing new in Wang's exposition. He seemed patently marking time." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/6–2059)

[2] Telegram 1299 to Warsaw, June 17, instructed Beam to "open with attack on Wang's tactic constant repetition false accusations against US and introduction extraneous issues, making clear we intend keep focus on war danger in Taiwan Strait." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/6–1759)

[3] On June 16; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959,* pp. 1145–1152.

285. Editorial Note

Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman met with Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Nikita S. Khrushchev in Moscow on June 23, 1959. A record of the conversation, transmitted in despatch 734 from Moscow, June 26, reads in part as follows:

> "[Khrushchev said that former French Prime Minister Pierre] Mendes-France had suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that China with its bursting population was a menace to the Soviet Union. This, he said, was hardly true. The Soviet Union, if it so desired, could turn its Siberian forests into arable land sufficient to feed all of China if necessary.
>
> "Nevertheless, he said, the Chinese presented a special and delicate situation since they had their own way of looking on problems and the Soviets did not want to tell them how to run their country. (More on China later.)"

The discussion returned to China:

> "Discussing the Japanese question, Mr. Khrushchev said, 'We helped to defeat Japan at the request of Roosevelt. It is true that we agreed to help Chiang Kai-shek but that was during the period in which Japan was the enemy. Once Japan was defeated, the situation was changed and when another force—the communists—arose, naturally we supported them against Chiang and we will continue to support them. What is China, Peking or Formosa? To whom does Formosa belong? Only to China, and China is Peking. At any time we desire, we can destroy Formosa. I will tell you confidentially, we have given the Chinese rockets which are in the Chinese hinterland but within range of Formosa and can destroy it at will. Your Seventh Fleet will be of no avail. Fleets today are made to be destroyed. If the Chinese decide to take Formosa, we will support them even if it means war.'" (Department of State, Central Files, 032–Harriman, Averell/6–2659)

Vice President Richard Nixon reminded Khrushchev of these remarks during a conversation on July 26 during a visit to the Soviet Union. A memorandum of the conversation by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler reads in part as follows:

> "The Vice President observed that this situation was a two-way street and then referred to Khrushchev's statement to Mr. Harriman to the effect that the USSR had given China missiles to shell Quemoy.
>
> "Khrushchev denied this and asserted that all he had said was that the USSR would supply China with missiles if it were attacked by the U.S. He also said that in view of the insignificant distance of 70 kilometers between the Chinese mainland and Formosa, the USSR could, if necessary, supply China with a large number of missiles capable of covering that distance, but again asserted that at the present time the USSR was not furnishing missiles to anyone." (*Ibid.*, 033.1100–NI/7–2659)

Further documentation concerning the Harriman and Nixon trips is printed in volume X, Part 1.

286. Editorial Note

At the 412th meeting of the National Security Council on July 9, 1959, during a discussion of a draft of NSC 5906, "Basic National Security Policy," the President made comments relating to China. His remarks occurred in the context of discussion concerning whether nuclear weapons should be regarded as conventional weapons. According to the memorandum of discussion by Gleason, July 9, Secretary of Defense McElroy said "the real issue seemed to him to be whether we proposed to fight a vigorous limited military engagement with Soviet Russia or Communist China without having recourse to the use of nuclear weapons." Gleason's memorandum of discussion continues as follows:

"In replying to Secretary McElroy's point, the President said that if the Chinese Communists simply went after the little Off-Shore Islands, such a military engagement would not involve a nuclear war. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists launched a major attack on Formosa, the result would be general war. With considerable warmth the President insisted that it was nonsense to imagine that we could invade the vast land mass of China, with a population of 600 million people,without making use of nuclear weapons. If anyone thought differently on this subject, then he, the President, would recommend that such an individual cease to act as one of the President's advisers. It seemed inconceivable to the President that we could engage Communist China in full-scale war without depending on nuclear weapons." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC records)

Documentation on the NSC 5906 series is scheduled for publication in volume III.

---

287. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, July 13, 1959, 2 p.m.

34. Following highlights one hour conversation with Foreign Minister Huang July 11.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–1359. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC.

1. I said we had received inquiries from Washington re CAF–ChiCom air battle of July 5.[1] Indicating US concern, I urged care be exercised to avoid provocation or appearance of aggressiveness. Minister said he had received query from Ambassador Yeh and had discussed matter with competent military authorities. He had been assured flight was non-provocative, CAF planes had not flown over Communist-held territory and CAF pilots had engaged to defend themselves. Minister said Gimo and Vice President insist that great care be exercised to avoid provocation.

2. Huang stressed "Tiger" Wang's removal was in way related to GRC attitude toward US; it signified no change whatever in GRC relations with US. He said Wang's downfall derived mainly from arrogance and poor personal relations with colleagues and indiscretions. Minister inferred Wang had habitually by-passed Defense Minister Yu who would be "more active" with Peng Meng-chi as Chief General Staff. Minister said he could assure me Peng would be just as cooperative with US military authorities as Wang. Minister expressed belief Yu Ta-wei would continue as Defense Minister and Chou Chih-jou as Governor.

3. Like Gimo (Embtel 32),[2] Minister expressed serious misgivings about Khrushchev's reported remarks to Harriman re alleged Soviet grant of rockets to ChiComs and Soviet willingness to support Communist attack on Taiwan. He believed we had to assume there would be another attack anytime. He said he had instructed Ambassador Yeh to discuss Khrushchev's statements with Department. Minister said while hard intelligence is lacking, he believed Soviets would logically have to supply ChiComs with rockets and nuclear weapons to cope with US nuclear capability in Pacific and missile installations (Nike Hercules and Matador) established on Taiwan. In any case he quoted an old Chinese proverb that "it is better to believe they exist (i.e., missiles on mainland) than to believe they do not exist". Asserting GRC authorities are concerned re Taiwan vulnerability to nuclear weapons, Minister said he would be glad to know what plans US had in event it developed Soviets had provided ChiComs with nuclear weapons. I said we had no information Soviets had so equipped ChiComs. I thought it possible Soviets may have given ChiComs some small, conventional rockets, but I doubted

---

[1] Telegram 14 to Taipei, July 7, requested the Embassy's comments as to whether a July 5 encounter between Chinese Communist MIGs and GRC F–86s, in which five MIGs were destroyed, reflected a more aggressive GRC posture. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/7–759; see Supplement) The Embassy replied in telegram 22 from Taipei, July 8, that it did not reflect a deliberately provocative gesture but might reflect "GRC restiveness re aerial reconnaissance restrictions and desire to expand reconnaissance to pattern observed in pre-Strait crisis period." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–859; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 32 from Taipei, July 10, reported a conversation with Chiang Kai-shek concerning news reports of Harriman's June 23 conversation with Khrushchev (see Document 285). (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/7–1059; see Supplement)

whether Soviets would entrust ChiComs with unconventional weapons.[3] Without going into details, I said US is continuing modernization of GRC forces—especially CAF—but I had no knowledge of any plans to provide GRC with nuclear-delivery capability. I added if Communists attacked with unconventional weapons, we would probably have to rely on Seventh Fleet and SAC for retaliation.

4. Minister expressed deep concern over Senate action in cutting military funds to GRC and other East Asian powers and said he had instructed Ambassador Yeh to voice concern to Department (Deptel 28).[4] I took much same position as Parsons in his talk with Yeh and urged GRC to abate concern and further action pending outcome of Senate–House conference on appropriation authorization.

Drumright

---

[3] Telegram 37 to Taipei, July 16, summarized Khrushchev's remarks to Harriman on this subject and commented: "We have no evidence to prove or disprove statement concerning placement of rockets within range of Taiwan and continue doubt that USSR has placed nuclear warheads at Peiping's disposal." (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/7–1059; see Supplement) The Embassy reported in telegram 53 from Taipei, July 18, that it had conveyed the substance of telegram 37 to Huang. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–1859)

[4] Telegram 28 to Taipei, July 10, summarized a conversation that day between Yeh and Parsons on this subject. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/7–1059)

---

288. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)

Washington, July 20, 1959.

SUBJECT

Serious Warnings of Alleged Violations of ChiCom-Claimed Territory

The attached telegram,[1] plus the fact we drew our 58th warning (over the "dog-leg" operation)[2] last night, prompted Admiral Burke to

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 63 D 76, Memoranda. Secret.

[1] The attachment, telegram 170220Z from CINCPACFLT to CNO, July 17, noted that the PRC Government's "serious warnings" of alleged violations of Chinese Communist territory by U.S. ships and planes now numbered 57 and requested guidance as to "whether we should do more than simply ignore them."

[2] Reference is to an area near Matsu routinely traversed by U.S. naval patrols. In this area the PRC apparently used a base line drawn between some small islands far out to sea which advanced their claim far out into the Strait. See the memorandum of conversation between Parsons and Counselor of the British Embassy A.J. de la Mare, October 24, 1958, in the Supplement. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2458)

request that his staff get together with State to see what action, if any, might be taken. Admiral Burke suggested the possibility of an inspired story in the U.S. press showing the lack of legal basis to the ChiCom warnings.

Larry Lutkins and I will discuss this with CNO representatives tomorrow after our biweekly briefing. I suggested to the Navy that meanwhile it prepare a chart of violations showing dates, nature of intrusion, exact location, etc. I shall also check with INR and USIS re the question of impact, although I doubt whether these warnings receive much if any notice in free Asia.

My preliminary reaction is to continue to ignore the warnings and to continue the same pattern of patrol operations. This reaction is based on the suppositions that the purpose of the serious warnings is (a) to cause us uneasiness and to scare us into shifting our patrol operations further out to sea; (b) to draw public attention, especially in East Asia, to how "provocatively" close our patrols operate to the China mainland. Any response from our side would run the risk of giving additional notice to the "serious warnings" and might imply to the Communists that we were, in fact, concerned.

Our Navy continues to press for State endorsement of occasional USN operations inside the 12 mile limit to show that we do not honor that limit. Here again, I recommend that we hold the line of staying outside the 12 mile limit, although not objecting to occasional "dog-leg" operations which could have the effect our Navy desires without altering present patterns of operations and without running unnecessary risks of being shown up as acting in a provocative manner.

I would be interested in your reactions to the above propositions.[3]

---

[3] The source text bears Parsons' handwritten note: "I agree. JGP".

---

289. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, July 23, 1959, 8 p.m.

66. During past few weeks Admiral Smoot, General Dean and I have discussed growing restiveness on part of President, Foreign Minister,

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/7–2359. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.

and high military authorities over checks imposed by US on aerial reconnaissance. As I reported in several recent telegrams, Khrushchev's alleged remarks to Harriman appear to have given impetus to desire to resume CAF reconnaissance. Problem approached climax yesterday when Minister Yu informed Admiral Smoot it may be necessary any time for CAF to initiate aerial reconnaissance covered by fighter escort, with or without US concurrence. Yu also told Admiral US has moral obligation to permit GRC to procure information re reported rocket sites on mainland or get such information for GRC. Problem reached climax this morning when CAF acting A-3 informed General Dean MND had just directed CAF to photograph gun positions on mainland coast opposite Kinmen and airfields in immediate vicinity.

Admiral Smoot, General Dean, General Doan and I discussed this development today, following which it was agreed that Admiral Smoot would see Minister Yu immediately, protest order, and ask its withdrawal, while I would lodge similar protest with Foreign Minister. Admiral Smoot saw Defense Minister about 3 p.m. and obtained assurance from him that order had been rescinded. I called on Foreign Minister at 5:30, recounted developments, pointed out dangers of provoked reconnaissance, including adverse repercussions to GRC interests throughout world, and urged patience pending further consideration of reconnaissance problem. Minister appeared surprised to learn categorical order had been issued by Defense Minister. He said he could assure me GRC would not carry out provocative actions.

Comment: In full discussion of this problem at yesterday's country team meeting, consensus was that if authority could be given to use high performance reconnaissance craft already available or soon to be available on Taiwan in selected unescorted reconnaissance, then GRC pressure to carry out escorted reconnaissance would be dissipated. A recommendation to this effect is going forward through military channels with which I concur.

There have been suggestions that GRC's real objective in pressing for aerial reconnaissance with escorts is to send flights over mainland that will provoke air clashes. However, I believe Chinese are genuinely concerned to obtain current intelligence in areas opposite Taiwan and have resorted to actions reported above to test US position on aerial reconnaissance. Best way to deal with problem is to maintain strong line against provocative escorted flights but to permit unescorted flights in hope this will supply GRC and our own requirements.[1]

Drumright

---

[1] Telegram 64 to Taipei, July 24, stated that the Department agreed with the country team consensus set forth in the penultimate paragraph and instructed Drumright to maintain a "strong line against escorted flights." (*Ibid.*; see Supplement) A letter of August 10 from Martin to Drumright stated that a Department of Defense message had been sent to Smoot providing that a number of high-performance RF 101 reconnaissance planes should be turned over to the Nationalists for reconnaissance flights over coastal areas. The flights should be unescorted, undertaken only for strictly intelligence purposes, and only to the extent dictated by military necessity. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Military Action Against Mainland; see Supplement)

---

290. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy

Washington, July 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Smaller Offshore Islands (U)

1. At the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 1 May 1959,[1] the Department of State representatives requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the military/political implications of U.S. participation in or support of the defense of the smaller offshore islands now occupied by the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) with a view toward recommending:

a. U.S. policy in the event of an assault by the Chinese Communists, and

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2759. Top Secret. Filed with a covering letter from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight to Murphy, August 27. Attached is an appendix, headed "Smaller Offshore Islands Occupied by GRC Forces," which lists the islands, together with their locations and the forces on each. The islands are listed as Ta Tan, Erh Tan, Pei Ting, Tung Ting Hsu, and Hu Tzu Hsu (ranging from 2 to 14 miles from the Kinmens) and Tung Yin Shan (26 miles from the Matsus) and Wu Chiu Hsu (midway between the Kinmens and Matsus). See Supplement.

[1] See Document 279.

b. Whether the GRC should be notified of the U.S. policy in advance.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed current U.S. policy concerning defense of the offshore islands, including the 25 August 1958 decision to limit U.S. interests in the offshore islands to Kinmen (Quemoy), Little Kinmen (Little Quemoy) and the five larger islands in the Matsu area.[2] In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the repeated but unsuccessful attempts by the United States to persuade the GRC to withdraw its forces from the Tan Islands.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. In general, the smaller offshore islands are of limited military value. However, some of the GRC occupied smaller islands in the Kinmen group are military outposts and constitute extensions of GRC defenses of the larger islands in the group.

b. Because of the expressed GRC determination to maintain garrisons on the smaller offshore islands (see Appendix hereto) despite the U.S. position to the contrary, it is considered politically unprofitable for the United States to continue to urge the GRC to withdraw.

c. Considerations other than military make it necessary that the United States be prepared in the event of a Chinese Communist assault against one or more of the GRC occupied islands:

(1) To support GRC forces by providing material, intelligence, technical and training assistance without planned engagement of U.S. forces in combat operations, or

(2) To participate in the defense of the islands by the active engagement of U.S. forces in combat operations to defeat attacking Chinese Communist forces.

4. The determination of the nature and extent of U.S. participation in or support of the defense of the smaller offshore islands should be made in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time. In general, active U.S. participation in the defense should be limited to those cases where it is considered necessary to prevent destruction of major GRC forces and to assure the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the GRC not be notified in advance of U.S. policy with respect to the defense of the smaller offshore islands because of the possibility the GRC might initiate precipitate action which would not be in the best interests of the United States. Any announcement concerning U.S. support or active participation in the defense of the GRC-occupied offshore islands should be based upon the prevailing situation and timed to insure determined effort on the part of GRC forces and maximum advantage to the United States.

---

[2] See Document 43.

6. It is requested that the above views be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke[3]
Chief of Naval Operations

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, July 28, 1959, 5 p.m.

167. Beam–Wang Talks. 91st meeting one hour 50 minutes.[1]

Wang opened with detailed [list of ?] 11 alleged violations by US warships and planes of ChiCom territorial waters during June and July, mainly in Paracels area. Wang charged these "military provocations" proved US aggressive intent and he lodged strong protest.[2] I rejected ChiCom claim to Paracels and stated US naval activities in international waters and on defensive mission. I continued with statement based first paragraph Deptel 85.[3]

Wang responded by reiterating charges US aggressive intent, attempted briefly document ChiCom claim to Paracels and other islands South China Sea and defended unilateral extension territorial waters. Also attacked "US two-Chinas plot" along usual lines.

I made statement on publicity in talks based paragraph 2, reference telegram to which Wang responded they had scrupulously observed agreement on private nature of talks while violations were on our side.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–2859. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1–3 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam transmitted a transcript of the meeting in airgram G-8, July 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–3159)

[2] Telegram 172 from Warsaw, July 29, which transmitted Beam's comments and recommendations, enlarged on this. Beam commented that this protest was "in somewhat stronger language than usual." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–2959)

[3] Telegram 85 to Warsaw, July 28, transmitted Beam's instructions for the meeting. Paragraph 1 instructed him again to protest Wang's "deliberate obfuscation of principal issue these talks," and to urge that "Wang's side, like authorities other divided countries, including Republic of China itself, agree refrain from actions which could lead to war." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–2559)

In response my statement on prisoners based paragraph 3, reference telegram Wang reiterated familiar allegations US obstructing departure Chinese while ChiComs had faithfully carried out agreement.

To my statement on Bishop Walsh Wang replied case in hands of judicial authorities and no one had right interfere. Next meeting Tuesday August 25, 2 pm. My leave plans not yet certain. If my departure should be delayed any appreciable time beyond first week September, I would propose to Wang deferring 92nd meeting "for administrative reasons" to date closer my departure.

Beam

---

292. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–59 Washington, July 28, 1959.

COMMUNIST CHINA

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To analyze Chinese Communist domestic developments and external relations, and to estimate probable trends during the next five years.

Conclusions

1. In this, its tenth year of power, the Chinese Communist regime exercises firm control over mainland China, the country's economy is rapidly expanding, and Communist China's weight in world affairs is on the increase. At the same time, its greatly accelerated domestic programs of the past year have brought it some of the greatest economic and social difficulties it has yet encountered. There is also growing awareness in Asia of the ruthless character of the Chinese Communist regime and the aggressive designs of its foreign policy. Such problems will make the

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 28 July 1959."

next five years rough ones indeed for Communist China. However, we believe that the regime will be able to cope with its domestic problems and that the power of Communist China will increase considerably in the next five years. In spite of Communist China's achievements, however, its national power will remain far less than that of the US or the USSR.

2. Although production increases in 1958 were far less than Peiping's extravagant claims, impressive gains in economic output were achieved. We believe that a record increase of about 20 percent was achieved in Gross National Product (GNP) in 1958, with industrial output rising about 40 percent, and agricultural output about 15 percent (due in part to unusually favorable weather). However, these production records were achieved at considerable economic and human cost. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. In attempting to achieve continued sizable production increases over the next five years, the regime will encounter serious problems with respect to incentives, dislocations in production and transportation, faulty statistical data, and ideological pressures. Nevertheless, we believe that Communist China will be able to increase its GNP by about 12 to 15 percent in 1959, and about 7 to 10 percent in each of the three succeeding years, 1960–1962. These increases will probably result in a total increase in GNP of between 65 and 85 percent for the Second Five-Year Plan period (1958–1962). The annual growth rate for industry will probably average about 50 percent higher than the remarkable 16 percent rate achieved in 1953–1957. The most dramatic increases in output over the next five years will probably be in basic industrial commodities; for example, Communist China may be able to raise production of crude steel, commercially usable though not fully up to Western standards, to about 20–25 million tons in 1962. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. Agricultural production, on the other hand, will probably not increase dramatically during the period of the estimate. The 15 percent increase achieved in 1958 is unlikely to be repeated. Total increase over the full Five-Year Plan period (1958–1962) will probably be between 20 and 30 percent. Such an increase will probably be adequate to sustain economic expansion, but will not permit significant increases in consumption. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. The commune system has provided the regime with a more effective means of mobilizing and directing Communist China's vast labor potential. However, the regime will face serious difficulties over the next five years in attempting to establish the commune as the basic unit of Chinese Communist society. It is inescapable that the commune program has generated extensive bitterness toward the regime. This bitterness, together with economic dislocations, has already led the regime to modify

certain of the more extreme features of the communes. We believe that Peiping will continue the communal program, introducing modifications as they become economically or politically necessary. The ceaseless pressures on the people will probably result in a populace that for the most part is no better than grudgingly acquiescent. However, given the regime's flexibility and controls, it is unlikely that popular resistance will reach the point where the regime will have to choose between a blood bath or an abandonment of the communal experiment. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. We believe that Mao Tse-tung will continue to be the dominant figure in Communist China, even though there are indications that the party's unique cohesion of the past quarter of a century has begun to feel the erosion of time. The selection of Liu Shao-ch'i as Mao's successor as government Chairman is probably designed to confirm him as Mao's heir to party leadership as well. In the event of Mao's death or incapacitation, an initial transfer of power to Liu would probably occur without challenge, but the party's effectiveness, vigor, and its prestige within the Communist world might decline. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. There will be a substantial growth in Communist China's capability to assemble or produce complex military equipment over the next five years. However, Communist China probably will not have developed a significant native guided missile program during the period of this estimate. The USSR will probably provide, or help the Chinese Communists to produce, relatively unsophisticated missiles. Within the period of this estimate, Chinese Communist forces will probably have one or more of the following types of missiles of Soviet design: surface-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface, short-range surface-to-surface. Communist China has probably initiated a nuclear weapons development program, but will almost certainly not have developed a nuclear weapons production capability of its own by 1963.[1] [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

8. We believe that Soviet and Chinese Communist interests with respect to nuclear weapons are in some degree incompatible. The USSR is almost certainly reluctant to see the Chinese Communists acquire nuclear weapons under their own control. For its part, Communist China almost certainly wants nuclear weapons and recognizes that its chances of developing a production capability would be seriously impaired if a test ban agreement should be reached. There is no reliable evidence regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Communist China. We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets have transferred nuclear weapons to Chinese Communist control. It is possible, however, that they have

---

[1] [*Footnote in the source text (6-1/2 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified.*]

provided the Chinese Communists with some surface-to-surface missiles—adaptable to nuclear use and of sufficient range to reach Taiwan. *[10-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified]*

9. The Sino-Soviet alliance will almost certainly remain firmly united against the West during the period of this estimate, with the USSR retaining its senior position in that alliance. As Communist China grows in strength and stature, however, it will probably exert an increasing influence on general Bloc policy and Communist ideology, and the reconciliation of Sino-Soviet interests will probably become increasingly difficult. In particular, differences of view will probably arise with respect to nuclear weapons, attitudes and tactics toward the West, and patterns of economic and social development. We also believe that, while Moscow welcomes Communist China's increasing contribution to Bloc strength, it will become increasingly concerned over the long-range implications of Communist China's growing power. Nevertheless, both partners will undoubtedly recognize that their problems are the inevitable consequence of the alliance itself, and that there is no feasible alternative to maintaining it in essentially its present form. Over the next five years, therefore, the main effect of these differences will be an increasing need for the two countries to make accommodations to each other in policy matters, not a weakening of the alliance itself. *[less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]*

10. The aggressiveness which the Chinese Communist regime has displayed in domestic programs, in the Tibetan situation, and in foreign policy has caused increased apprehension throughout Asia of Communist China's strength and intentions. Despite the foreign policy setbacks the Chinese Communists have suffered during the past year, they probably view the future with considerable confidence and optimism. We believe that there will continue to be frequent manifestations of Chinese Communist truculence and of an impatience to emerge as an acknowledged major power. World pressures will increase for Communist China's admission into the UN and into other international organizations. The Chinese Communists will probably seek to gain their objectives principally by political and subversive means. They will also continue their trade and aid offensive, but this effort will probably remain restricted and selective because of economic limitations. However, the emphasis on nonmilitary means will not preclude the use of force to exploit some target of opportunity or to respond to some situation which they might interpret as a serious threat to their position in Asia. *[less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified]*

11. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly not let the situation in the Taiwan Strait area remain quiescent indefinitely. An invasion of the major offshore islands is unlikely, at least during the next year or so, unless Peiping comes to believe that US determination to help the

Government of the Republic of China (GRC) defend the islands has weakened. The Chinese Communists will probably continue sporadic military pressures in the area, such as shellings and occasional naval and air sorties. The chances of some kind of major military probings in the Taiwan Strait area to test US intentions will increase as time passes. An attack against one or more of the smaller Nationalist-held islands is possible at any time. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 47-1/2 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, August 3, 1959, 4:10 p.m.

123. Beam–Wang Talks. Urtel 172 paragraph 2.[1] FYI. There has been no change in US Navy's normal practice of operating well out in international waters as stated by you to Wang at 82nd meeting. Standard patrol pattern has in fact been even outside 12 mile zone calculated from assumed Chinese Communist base line. No intention here to alter existing patrol patterns.

As noted by you most "serious warnings" in June and July have involved overflights of Paracels. These represent regular reconnaissance patrol which we have conducted for many months without eliciting any protests. ChiCom claims to islands have no status and recent "serious warnings" over them appear to be part of broader Communist effort in West Pacific to force U.S. patrol lines back by threats, claims, protests and occasional attacks. Letter follows. End FYI.

Murphy

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–2959. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins, cleared with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and approved by Green. Repeated to Taipei, USUN, and to London for Clough.

[1] See footnote 2, Document 291. Paragraph 2 asked whether there had been any change in the Navy's practice of keeping well out in international waters as Beam had stated to Wang on October 25 in accordance with telegram 508 to Warsaw of October 23 (see footnote 6, Document 205).

294. Editorial Note

At the 417th meeting of the National Security Council on August 18, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on China during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, Director of the Planning Board Secretariat, August 26, reads as follows:

"Resuming his briefing, the Director of Central Intelligence said that the intelligence community was puzzled by developments in Communist China. The Communist Chinese had been out of the world press for some time now, and were probably anxious to assert their claims to great-power status by taking some sort of action. The top leaders have been out of view for about seven weeks and have been meeting somewhere outside Peiping. They have apparently been reviewing both domestic and foreign policy. They may be re-assessing the 'giant leap forward' and attempting to determine whether or not to slow down. They are no doubt concerned about the adverse effect of floods and droughts upon the crops in many areas. October 1 is the 10th anniversary of the regime, and there may be something special by way of announcement or action at that time. The peasants in the communes are still dismayed, and Tibet is a problem. [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] The fact that a number of Chinese Communist Ambassadors have been recalled tends to confirm the view that foreign policy is under review. There is no change in the military situation in the Taiwan Straits area indicating a resumption of hostilities, but it would be possible for the Communists to do so on short notice. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Though the Sino-Soviet alliance is firm, there is not a complete identity of interests. While Khrushchev was in Poland he criticized the Chinese communes. The Chinese Communists have supported plans for the exchange of visits between the President and Khrushchev, but CIA does not believe that the Chinese are happy about this exchange—they have been left out too many times. Khrushchev may need to find time for a personal exchange of views with Mao in the near future, or at least to send some top Soviet leader, such as Mikoyan, to China.

"Mr. Dulles noted the Chinese Communists' loss of prestige in South Asia. There had been the Indian reaction to Tibet; [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Rangoon was also irritated over Chinese stalling on the border issue. Mr. Dulles concluded by again stating his belief that something was cooking in Communist China." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

295. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, August 19, 1959.

DEAR MR. GRAY: I am enclosing herewith for your information a copy of an informal study which was made in the Department of State on the subject of "Uprisings in Communist China".[1] You may recall that in the Planning Board meeting of August 4 Mr. Marshall Green mentioned that such a study had been prepared in the Department and that he would make a copy available to you. As Mr. Green said at that time, we feel that the subject is more properly dealt with as a contingency paper rather than as a part of a NSC policy paper.

The content of the memorandum may be summarized as follows:

Part I of the memorandum, which deals with the likelihood of uprisings in Communist China, concludes that in view of the widespread dissatisfaction which the Chinese Communist regime's domestic policies are believed to have generated, uprisings of a small-scale, local nature will probably continue to occur intermittently. Within national minority areas, such as Tibet, these uprisings may take on fairly serious proportions. However, uprisings on a national scale or even large-scale regional uprisings are most unlikely to occur within the foreseeable future.

Part II of the study deals hypothetically with various types of uprisings and examines probable GRC and Soviet reactions to them. The question of free world reaction is not dealt with in detail, since such reaction would vary widely.

Part III of the study seeks to determine under what conditions the United States should encourage and support GRC intervention, or act to prevent it, in the different types of hypothetical uprisings discussed under Part II. It concludes that the United States should restrain the GRC from the use of force against the mainland in support of local uprisings, or uprisings confined to national minority areas, since the chances of such intervention leading to overthrow of the Peiping regime would be extremely remote. Uprisings on a national or regional scale would inevitably result in very strong pressure from the GRC for United States agreement to its intervention with force. The prospects for success of GRC

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of August 19 from Calhoun to Gray, sent through Goodpaster.

[1] Unsigned and undated; see the Supplement. According to a memorandum of July 24 from Parsons to Murphy, attaching a copy of the study, it was prepared by an informal working group representing FE, S/P, INR, and EUR. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Military Action Against Mainland China)

intervention would depend upon such factors as the attitude of the revolting forces. Unsuccessful GRC intervention might well spell the end of the GRC, while under some circumstances GRC intervention might actually inhibit the success of the revolt. Therefore, it would seem advisable for the United States to restrain the GRC from intervention on the mainland in support of large-scale uprisings until such time as we could satisfy ourselves that:

(a) GRC intervention would not be likely to cause the mainland strife to spread into a general war;

(b) There was a reasonable prospect that GRC intervention would prove successful in making possible the establishment of control over a substantial area of mainland China by the GRC, or by mainland elements committed to a policy of non-alignment with the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement.

Soviet reaction would almost certainly be very strong to any large-scale uprising holding out the serious possibility of overthrowing the Peiping regime, and the Soviets could be expected to take strong action to prevent such an outcome. In the case of a complete collapse of Peiping's authority, however, the Soviet Union would probably not attempt to occupy the whole country, but would probably seek to occupy adjacent Chinese territory such as Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. United States intervention with United States forces would run a high risk of precipitating Soviet intervention with Soviet forces, thus bringing about a direct United States-Soviet clash of arms. GRC intervention alone without any United States action except logistic support would be less likely to bring about direct Soviet intervention.

To sum up, it seems clear that while the occurrence of large-scale uprisings in Communist China might well create a situation in which the use of force by the GRC against the mainland would be in our interest, it is equally clear that GRC intervention would not necessarily be advantageous and in some circumstances might even be disastrous. Certainly caution would have to be exercised in giving agreement and support to GRC intervention until the nature of the uprisings and implications of such intervention became fairly clear. On the other hand, the mission of the GRC military establishment, which is both to defend Taiwan and to contribute to overall free world defense and deterrent posture in the Western Pacific, continues to be an important one. By retaining its present general counter-offensive capabilities to support rebellions on the mainland, the GRC military establishment obviously helps deter Chinese Communist military adventures not only in the vicinity of Taiwan but elsewhere around the periphery of the bloc.

Because of the important intelligence aspects of the problem of uprisings on Communist China, the Department has requested CIA for its comments. I would be glad to have your own reaction to the memorandum and any suggestions as to the contingency planning which might usefully be undertaken.

A similar letter, enclosing a copy of the "Uprisings" study, has been sent to General Campbell of JCS.

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons

---

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 1, 1959, 6 p.m.

403. Beam–Wang Talks. 92nd meeting two hours 20 minutes.[1]

I opened with statement on Taiwan issue based first paragraph Deptel 274.[2] Wang responded with usual accusations US had committed aggression against China, occupied Taiwan, carried out two China's plot, et cetera. Then cited four "serious warnings" concerning alleged encroachments Paracels area. He followed this with strong statement accusing US of aggressive activities in Laos. I responded with statements based Paragraphs 2 and 3 reference telegram adding some additional material on Laos from circular telegram 114.[3]

After further exchange on Laos, including lengthy second prepared statement from Wang, I made statement on prisoners including material on letters and packages based fifth paragraph reference telegram. Wang countered with fairly lengthy defense Chinese Communist position that agreed announcement did not apply to prisoners and made familiar accusations re US obstruction departure Chinese. He then read statement aimed at proving Chinese Communists had scrupulously observed 1954

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–159. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN and Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 410 from Warsaw, September 2, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–33, September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–259 and 611.93/9–459)

[2] Telegram 274 to Warsaw, August 28, transmitted Beam's instructions for the meeting. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/8–2859)

[3] Circular telegram 114, August 7, contained background information on the situation in Laos. (*Ibid.*, 751J.00/8–759)

agreement on letters and packages.[4] He blamed US for any missing letters, quoting Canadian press report that US postal authorities regularly confiscated and burned hundreds of thousands of letters. With respect to packages, he said all were delivered which conformed to regulations but sending materials containing malicious political propaganda or sent by other than relatives of prisoners could not be accepted. He quoted from letter from Robert McCann expressing gratitude to Chinese Communist authorities for meticulous delivery of packages.

I reiterated our position on American prisoners, refuted Wang's charges re obstruction Chinese in US and said I was glad his authorities had looked into the matter of packages and letters and hoped improvement could be expected in future.

I told Wang I had been called to US for consultation and proposed next meeting Tuesday, November 13, 2 p.m. which he accepted.

Beam

---

[4] Reference is apparently to Wang's statements at a meeting with U. Alexis Johnson at Geneva on June 15, 1954, concerning arrangements for the relatives of imprisoned Americans to send letters and packages to them; see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, pp. 468–471.

---

297. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices

Washington, September 2, 1959, 8:04 p.m.

211. Department concerned over indications that certain nations Africa may be planning recognize Chinese Communist regime. This comes at time when there are signs that even uncommitted Asian countries beginning show keen awareness Chinese Communist threat their security. At 1959 meeting United States Far East Chiefs of Missions it was unanimous conclusion our Ambassadors that there is in Far East not only increasing realization nature of Communist menace, but increasing determination resist Communist encroachments. That determination

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/9–259. Secret. Drafted by Arthur H. Rosen of the Office of Chinese Affairs; cleared by Green and with NEA, AF, SOA, and IO/UNP; and approved by Parsons. Sent to Addis Ababa, Conakry, and Tunis and pouched to Accra, Cairo, Benghazi, Rabat, Khartoum, Jidda, Baghdad, Taiz, Monrovia, Taipei, Lagos, Dakar, Yaounde, Dar es Salaam, and USUN.

would be weakened by any erosion free world opposition to recognition Chinese Communist regime so long as Peiping remains dedicated to aim of communizing world. We have received private advice from leaders certain Asian "neutralist" nations (which recognized Peiping prior latter's aggression against Korea) that strong United States Far Eastern policy, as exemplified in Taiwan Strait crisis, has contributed to their own feeling security and of assurance as to our steadfastness.

There are apparently considerations involved in decisions move toward recognition ChiComs which in views of African leaders are more immediate than any readily perceptible threat their security from nation so remotely situated. These include, to varying degree each country, attraction of possible reward in form economic or military assistance by Peiping, trade expansion, sense of "unity" with other Afro-Arab nations, desire make certain peripheral concessions to Soviet bloc which presumably would not seriously affect relations with free world, desire demonstrate "independence" of west in foreign policy matters, and in some cases desire use recognition as lever against United States to obtain more "favorable" American attitude toward issues affecting those nations in their relations with certain European powers. Whatever the motives, Department believes interests those nations and entire free world would be seriously injured by action any of them to strengthen international position of Chinese Communist regime by according recognition.

Brutal Chinese Communist measures suppress Tibet revolt have shocked all Asia. While some nations bordering Communist China feel selves in no position sever relations with Peiping and government leaders have hesitated react publicly, they have through pro-government press and other means indicated true feelings to their people and world at large. Others, such as Laos, despite intense Communist pressure, refuse recognize Peiping and are expanding contacts with free China. Thailand, Malaya, Viet-Nam, Philippines also refuse accord recognition Peiping and maintain strong controls designed curb Chinese Communist penetration.

India has not only recognized Peiping regime, but has maintained policy of friendship towards ChiComs. This has not prevented incursions into Indian territory and continued publication maps claiming parts of India as Chinese. Since India in humanitarian gesture gave asylum Dalai Lama and accepted thousands Tibetan refugees additional ChiCom hostile pressures have included further border incursions, virtual house arrest Indian ConGen Lhasa and arrogant treatment Indian Ambassador Peiping, restrictions traditional Indian travel and trade activities Tibet which Nehru has protested unsuccessfully to Peiping. Indians have reacted with increasing irritation as demonstrated remarks Nehru and other officials to press and Parliament.

Nepal has reacted to Chinese Communist actions Tibet by increasing defense expenditures. Nepal Government party issued statement saying Tibet provides "Asian parallel to Hungarian annihilation," and "tragedy of Tibet should be lesson to other Asian countries." Prime Minister Koirala stated August 11 that in view Tibet developments Nepal can no longer remain defenseless on Northern border. Bhutan seeking strengthen ties with India as defense against Chinese Communists. During past week Chinese Communists arrested, imprisoned Bhutan diplomatic couriers at Tibet border, and opened pouches in flagrant breach accepted standards international conduct.

Foregoing amply demonstrates Chinese Communist arrogant hostility toward Asian nations which recognize and seek friendly relations Peiping when latter refuse hew Peiping's political line, and exposes unchanged aggressive posture Peiping regime which previously demonstrated Korea, Indo-China and Taiwan Strait. With this knowledge it is difficult for US and free world understand how newly independent nations such as Tunisia and historic victims aggression such as Ethiopia (which responded magnificently to Chinese Communist aggression against free world in Korea) can seriously consider rewarding aggressors by according recognition. While we recognize that certain vocal elements Afro-Arab world insistently demand Chinese Communist recognition, fact is that Peiping has no relations in area outside UAR, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, Morocco. On other hand, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Liberia, Lebanon maintain relations with free China. (Ghana states that it has inherited recognition of Communist China from the British but has no diplomatic relations with it; Guinea implicitly recognized both the Republic of China and Communist China but has relations with neither.) Of 13 free nations in Far East only Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia recognize Chinese Communists.

Foregoing for your discretionary use in discussions China issue with senior government officials.

Dillon

---

298. Editorial Note

At the 419th meeting of the National Security Council on September 17, 1959, the Council discussed NSC 5913, "U.S. Policy in the Far East," September 3, 1959. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5913 Series) Some of the discussion focused on paragraph 37, which reads as follows:

"Do not agree to GRC, ROK or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to actions by these countries against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Communist reaction against free Asian countries."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed a substitute that reads as follows:

"Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK, and GVN which are in clear retaliation against Communist attack; and condone and support certain military activities by these governments against Communist held territory which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success."

After some discussion, the Council agreed on the general terms of a revised version of the original paragraph; the precise language was determined after the meeting. The Council adopted NSC 5913, as amended, as NSC 5913/1, "U.S. Policy in the Far East," approved September 25, 1959. Paragraph 37 reads as follows:

"a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC, ROK, or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory.

"b. Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK or GVN against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Communist reaction against free Asian countries." (*Ibid.*)

For text of NSC 5913/1, see volume XVI, pages 133–144.

Following the discussion of paragraph 37, the memorandum of the NSC discussion by Boggs includes the following discussion:

"Continuing his briefing, Mr. Gray then noted that NSC 5913 did not include language which clearly stated U.S. policy in the event of a major uprising in Communist China. The President said that a major uprising had once occurred in Hungary and everyone had been afraid to take action. In the event of an uprising in Communist China, we have to decide what would be gained by action and what the people of China wanted. The Chinese people were not a pawn in a struggle between Mao and Chiang. If they wanted freedom and called for help, that might be one thing; but a decision by the U.S. to intervene in the absence of an appeal for help would be quite another thing. This was the type of situation the governing factors of which could not be calculated in advance. General Twining wondered whether Paragraph 37 could not be used in such a situation. Mr. Gray said he had merely wanted the Council to be aware of this gap in NSC 5913. He believed the problem of a major uprising might be considered covered by Paragraph 37, however." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

For the record of the discussion of paragraph 37, see volume XVI, pages 116–127.

A September 25 memorandum from Lay to all holders of NSC 5723, "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China," October 4, 1957, enclosed a revised page of NSC 5723, stating that it incorporated amendments in paragraph 11 to bring that paragraph into conformity with paragraph 37 of NSC 5913/1. Lay's memorandum requested that the revised page should be substituted in all copies of NSC 5723 for the superseded page, which should be destroyed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 Series) The text of NSC 5723 as printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, volume III, pages 619–623, includes only the revised page including revised paragraph 11.

Paragraph 11 of NSC 5723, as approved October 4, 1957, was identical to paragraph 11 of NSC 5503, January 11, 1955 (see *ibid.*, volume II, pages 30–34), except that the names "Formosa" and "the Pescadores" were changed to "Taiwan" and "the Penghus." It reads as follows:

> "Do not agree to GRC offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Taiwan and the Penghus."

Paragraph 11, as revised September 25, 1959, reads as follows:

> "a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC offensive actions against the mainland of Communist China.
>
> "b. Under circumstances approved by the President agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are a prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Chinese Communist reaction against Taiwan and the Penghus."

A copy of NSC 5723 including both the original and revised pages is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File, NSC 5723. See Supplement under date of August 24, 1960. See also Document 347.

299. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

Communist China

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Duncan Wilson, Former British Chargé d'Affaires in Peiping
Mr. A.J. de la Mare, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Marshall Green, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. George Morgan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, S/P
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, CA
Mr. Josiah W. Bennett, Acting Deputy Director, CA

In the course of a call on Mr. Green on the afternoon of September 18 Mr. Wilson, responding to questions put by Mr. Green and others present, gave the following views on the situation in Communist China.[1]

Mr. Wilson opened by saying that when he first went to China in the summer of 1957 he had thought that, if the Moscow–Peiping Alliance were to be split, the leverage should be applied in Peiping. He was now of the opinion that just the reverse was the case and the leverage, if any, should be applied in Moscow. Amplifying his remark at a later point, he said he saw three causes of stress in the Sino-Soviet alliance:

1. Soviet fear that failure of Chinese grandiose economic plans would result in Chinese Communist efforts to get the USSR to bail them out in a big way;
2. The Chinese Communists' inclination to push a tougher, more aggressive foreign policy than the Soviets;
3. Ideological differences, particulary over the communes. Wilson said that he was inclined to disagree with CIA on the relative importance of this factor and felt that ideological differences were third rather than first in importance.

Mr. Green noted the trends of 1958 in the direction of frantic internal activity—the communes and the "big leap forward"—combined with aggressive foreign policies and asked Mr. Wilson what explanation he had for this change in Communist policies. The reply was that, while of course it was impossible to know, he, Wilson, felt that the success of the Russian Sputnik and the recession in the United States may have been partly responsible for a mood of over-confidence in Peiping. He said that

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/9–1859. Secret. Drafted by Bennett.

[1] Wilson also met on September 18 with a larger group of Department and USIA officers; a memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, 793.00/9–1859.

he thought the Communists attached a great deal of importance to the recession in the United States and he had noted that it was given considerable attention in the Communist press.

One interesting point stressed by Wilson is the Chinese Communists' way of offending and alienating foreign diplomats in their country. He noted that English diplomats by now were "used to being hated everywhere they went" but that it was quite a new experience for the representatives of the newly created Asian countries. The Indians, Indonesians and others have become extremely bitter at the insults and abuses they have encountered at the hands of Communist officials. In Peiping there was always a group of "good countries" and a group of "bad countries". The bad countries were always the target of especially unpleasant treatment.

Asked about the behavior of Soviet Russians in Communist China, Wilson said that they kept very much to themselves. They lived in two large self-contained buildings and seldom appeared except when they were to be seen shaking hands madly at official receptions. Wilson had the impression that the Soviets were almost as much isolated in Peiping as any other foreign group, and given the same treatment by the Chinese Communists.

One phase of the prevailing mood in Peiping is what Wilson described as an anti-intellectual movement. Attacks on intellectuals have been carried even to the point where professors are told that they have more to learn from the students than the students from them.

Asked about the views of the Chinese Communists towards birth control, Wilson said this was a puzzling one, but it appears that the party has retreated from its former policy of promoting it. There are evidences that party officials make an effort to limit the size of their families; but the present line is generally that a human being is a producer, not a consumer. Perhaps it is a case of the technicians having discovered that birth control is not really possible in China, while the ideologues have discovered that it is not necessary.

Wilson several times mentioned that he in Peiping was in no position to observe certain facets of the situation and he mentioned that certain types of information were best obtained by a close study of the newspapers. He himself had only two friends outside official circles with whom he could have conversations of interest. The former Indian ambassador had told him that since the summer of 1958 he had had no worthwhile conversations whatever with Communist officials.

Asked about how people lived in China and whether or not they were better off than before, Wilson said that so far as the cities were concerned it was quite apparent that up until last April times were very hard indeed. Shortages of food and other goods were very evident. With reference to production of motor vehicles, he told the story of the English representative of an automobile factory in Coventry who, after visiting the Changchun Truck Factory, reported that the assembly line had had to shut down for several weeks in order to convert from production of trucks to cars for the big parade this coming October. After only a handful of cars had been produced, it reconverted to the production of trucks.

On the communes, Wilson said that the Communists had backtracked greatly. He said he thought the communes now were little more than units for the organization of labor and collection of taxes. He gave it as his opinion that the most difficult feature of the communes to implement was not so much the reorganization of family life as the "free supply system". The latter has now gone out of favor and the return of money incentives is very much in evidence. Wilson said that although the communes and the "great leap forward" have failed and have been pushed somewhat into the background, the same basic factor in the Communist psychology which produced them remains. We can expect similar drives to be launched at almost any time.

Asked whether he thought this "crazy trend" in Communist China's internal and external policies was likely to continue so that we could expect more and crazier things to be done as time went by, Wilson said yes. It seems apparent that the Chinese Communists are not willing to learn from anybody else's mistakes, even those of the Russians. Instead, they are bent on making all their own mistakes and learning the hard way.

---

300. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, September 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: *Recent Reports on Sino-Soviet Disagreements*

Recent reports from bloc sources allege that critical strains have emerged in the Sino-Soviet relationship. One such report from a senior Soviet official states that the Soviet Union recently rebuffed an urgent

---

Source: Department of State, Intelligence Files: Lot 58 D 776, Intelligence Notes. Secret/Noforn.

Peiping request for additional aid to rescue the Chinese Communists' development program from "economic chaos." He further stated that the Chinese Communists insisted that the Soviet Union take their advice in dealing with the Americans and also that Moscow warned the Chinese Communists not to create trouble in the Taiwan Straits area in an effort to sabotage Khrushchev's visit. Another report from a less authoritative Chinese Communist source also claimed that Peiping had requested a large increase in Soviet economic assistance, which Moscow refused, and that the Chinese Communists warned that they might be forced to offset domestic problems with aggressive moves in Southeast Asia. There have also been a number of reports from Soviet sources regarding Soviet disapproval of Chinese Communist policy towards India and Laos.

It appears very likely that the Soviets, in the hopes of influencing the US position in the US–USSR talks, have recently embarked on a campaign to convince the US that there are serious strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship. One aspect of this campaign is the attempt to disassociate the Soviet Union from some of Peiping's more aggressive foreign policy moves.

Despite the probability that some of these reports have been deliberately planted by the Soviets, one cannot completely discount the substance of the reports. Chinese Communist economic policy over the last year or so has led to serious dislocations, which have now forced Peiping to make major changes in its economic program. In this situation, Peiping may well have hoped that Moscow would provide increased assistance. There is also confirmatory evidence that Moscow and Peiping have different views on such important questions as the commune program and the Sino-Indian dispute. This is also true, to a lesser extent, of the exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev, with Peiping evidencing considerably more scepticism than Moscow regarding the benefits which might be derived from the visits or from a Soviet attempt to reach agreement with the US on major issues.

While available evidence does suggest that the Sino-Soviet relationship at the present time may be subjected to unusual strains, it would be premature to conclude that the problems cannot be resolved at least to the extent of preventing a serious weakening of the alliance itself. It is noteworthy that the Soviet official who was the source of the first report mentioned above stated, "No one should be foolish enough to expect an open conflict between China and the Soviet Union." Nevertheless, recent developments are indicative of the difficulties the two nations face in accommodating to each other.

301. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, September 26 and 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Exchange; Communist China

PARTICIPANTS

US	*USSR*
The President	Chairman Khrushchev
The Secretary of State	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Soldatov [1]
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Troyanovsky
Mr. Kohler	
Mr. Akalovsky	

September 26:

[Here follows the President's summary of Khrushchev's remarks during an informal conversation.]

September 27, approximately 10:15 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of a possible agreement on exchanges of information on peaceful uses of atomic energy.]

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent to the President's statement, but said he first wanted to mention another subject. He [Khrushchev] said he had no brief to speak on behalf of the Chinese Government and that, even if such authority had been offered, he would not have taken the responsibility on himself. However, he would be visiting China in the near future and he would not want to be in the position of saying he had lost the Chinese needle in a haystack. He would like, therefore, to inquire about U.S. policy toward the Chinese Government and what the future course of our policy might be.

The President replied that the Chinese Communists by their own actions have made it practically impossible for us to talk with them except in a very sketchy way through the occasional ambassadorial talks. These had taken place first in Geneva and now were continuing in Warsaw but related mainly to such questions as that of the American personnel imprisoned or detained in Communist China. The Chinese Communists

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Alexander Akalovsky of the Division of Language Services, who served as U.S. interpreter; cleared by Merchant and Kohler; and approved by the White House on October 12. Chairman Khrushchev visited the United States, September 15–27; documentation concerning his visit, including the full text of this memorandum, is printed in volume X, Part 1.

[1] Aleksandr A. Soldatov, Director of the American Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry.

are engaged in aggressive actions and have defied the United Nations. Until they purged themselves, there was not much prospect of any change in our position. In fact, there was not much we could do in the circumstances. We were basically in a position of waiting.

Secretary Herter interjected that the Chinese Communists were still threatening to use force against Taiwan and the islands in the Formosa Straits. They were still holding five American prisoners and were refusing to release them, although they had promised to do so in writing. Communist China was still an outlaw as far as the United Nations was concerned because of its aggression in Korea.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets regard it as too bad that the United States takes the position that it does with regard to the Chinese Communist Government and believes that this position does not contribute to a good overall international atmosphere. With respect to the question of the Americans detained in China, Mr. Khrushchev said he knew nothing about this and he could not comment on the subject. However, when he goes to Peiping in the near future he thought he might ask the Chinese leadership about the question. With respect to the question of Taiwan, the Soviets agree with the Chinese Communists. Taiwan is a province of China and what goes on with respect to the island is part of the process of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union fully understands China's aspirations in that respect. The United States is to blame for the fact that the Chinese Communists are not in the United Nations. In opposing the Chinese Communists, the United States has taken advantage of its temporary majority in the United Nations and had pursued a policy which is in fact detrimental to the United Nations. It would be better if the United States would do away with all this and thus contribute to the general peace. He said the President should realize that if some islands were detached from the United States by a mutinous general and the USSR should support that general, the United States would not like it. Taiwan is a part of China and Chiang Kai-shek is comparable to Kerensky, though the latter has no territory at the moment. Essentially, however, the United States concluding a treaty with Chiang is like the United States concluding a treaty with Kerensky. He understood, however, that Kerensky had recently married a rich American lady, so maybe Kerensky would not be interested and would not now need U.S. Government support.

The Secretary said he wanted to stress that the Chairman had made an important statement in saying that the USSR supported the Chinese Communist use of force against Taiwan.

Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the Chinese Communists have the right to liberate Taiwan from a Chinese general who has mutinied against the Government. In that respect the Soviet Union supports Communist China.

The President said that it was clear that our views were so divergent on this subject that there was really no point in discussing the question in detail. However, if his memory served him right, in the later stages of World War II, the United States, the USSR and Britain had all agreed to support Chiang, who had fought the Japanese so valiantly during the entire war, as the legitimate government of China. Since then the Soviet position had become different. It was the belief of the United States that there had been a great cataclysm in China and as a result, Chiang Kai-shek had been driven to Formosa. He could not be considered a mutinous general. The President would repeat that our positions were now diametrically opposed and that there would appear to be no use in discussing the question further.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he agreed that there was not much point in further discussion of this question. It was true that during the war the Soviet Government had had good relations with Chiang. General Chuikov, who later was the famous defender of Stalingrad, had been a military adviser to Chiang. In fact, many other Russian generals also advised Chiang. However, a revolution is a revolution. It turns everything upside down. If one could suppose that some Soviet general should have mutinied, seized Sakhalin and concluded a treaty of support with the United States, the Soviet Government would have had to hit him and hit him hard. In the reverse case, the United States would take the same action if one of our generals seized an island and secured Soviet support. Therefore, he could not understand why Communist China should act differently. However, he agreed the question did not seem ripe for discussion.

The President replied that he did not agree with the comparison which the Chairman had made. These were not valid analogies. President Chiang Kai-shek headed the legitimate government of China. It was true that he had been defeated on the mainland but he had decided to hang on where he could, that is, on Taiwan. In no way could he be compared to a mutineer.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that there could not be two legal governments in one country. The question arises as to which will be the legitimate government in China—Formosa or Peiping. The only possible answer to this question is Peiping, as the government established in the Chinese capital. He said the President prefers Chiang. This was a matter of taste. He prefers Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai.

The President replied that it was not a matter of taste. The U.S. has obligations toward the government of the Republic of China which it respects and intends to fulfill.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that these were obligations which we took on ourselves voluntarily. They were not given to us by an act of God. Therefore, they could be changed. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also had undertaken certain obligations.

The President said he certainly did not claim perfection with respect to the many decisions he was called upon to make. He simply sought to do the right thing.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had to respect the President's statement. He merely would point out that he considered that there was a lack of consistency in our policy. The President said that if the two German states remained, they would be an indefinite hot bed of conflict. If this statement was true with respect to Germany, then it was true with respect to China, too. In fact, it was more serious with respect to China because in Germany the two states had respectively 18,000,000 and 50,000,000 inhabitants. In China the Chinese Communists had 650,000,000 to 7–9,000,000 on Taiwan.

The President agreed that it was possible to make such a comparison. However, he commented that human affairs got very badly tangled at times and that we would simply have to try to straighten them out.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he realized this but that he had just wanted to point out the inconsistency of our policy. He then quoted a Russian proverb which turned out to be untranslatable as related to the conversation, to the effect that "policy is like a wagon tongue between two horses".

The President said he wanted to add that while he admitted the comparison between the German and Chinese situations, he wished to point out that the U.S. seeks peaceful settlements in both instances.

The Secretary added also in Korea and Viet Nam.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he did not insist on a military solution in China. There could be a peaceful settlement, he continued, if the U.S. did not give military support to Chiang. In turn, he continued, the USSR also gave military aid to the Chinese Communists. Chiang was our ally, Mao was their ally. However, he agreed that this subject had been exhausted.

The President commented that it would remain a problem for some time.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed with this, saying he meant that the subject had been exhausted only insofar as the present exchange of views was concerned.

The President then referred to the suggestion that he and the Chairman have a private talk as to whether they wanted to say anything at the conclusion of their talks. They could then turn over to their aides the necessary drafting.[2]

Thereupon the President and Chairman Khrushchev entered private discussions at approximately 11:45 a.m.[3]

---

[2] Text of the joint communiqué issued by the President and Chairman Khrushchev on September 27 is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959,* pp. 930–931.

[3] A memorandum of this conversation on the Berlin crisis is printed in vol. IX, Document 14.

302. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin)

Washington, September 28, 1959.

DEAR MR. IRWIN: I refer to Mr. Knight's letter of August 27, 1959, and accompanying JCS memorandum,[1] on the subject of United States policy toward the smaller offshore islands occupied by the Republic of China.

I believe it important that the United States maintain some degree of flexibility in this matter, and welcome the JCS view that determination of the nature and extent of United States participation in or support of the smaller offshore islands should be made in light of circumstances prevailing at the time. I believe we should seek White House concurrence to the more flexible approach at an early opportunity.

Mr. Knight also expressed the view that for reasons external to the situation in the immediate area or because of changes in the local situation, there may be a time when it will be desirable to make further approaches to the GRC concerning a withdrawal from the islands. While agreeing with the JCS view in the memorandum that it is politically unprofitable for the United States to continue to urge the GRC to withdraw from the smaller islands, a situation could of course develop when it would be advisable to urge the GRC to withdraw from any or all of them. We would be pleased to have your suggestions on the matter at any time.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy[2]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2759. Top Secret. Drafted by Kahmann. A September 24 memorandum from Parsons to Murphy which forwarded the draft letter and commented on the views expressed therein is *ibid.*, 794A.5/9–2459; see Supplement.

[1] See Document 290 and the source note thereto.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

303. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, September 29, 1959.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been thinking over what you were saying to me on Sunday[1] at Camp David in regard to the question of China. In view of the number of subjects on which our thinking seemed to be coming closer together, the exposition of your views on this one point disturbs me. Consequently, I felt the need to give to you immediately our views in somewhat more detail than was possible at Camp David, and in the spirit of frank exchange of views which we both agreed would be valuable.

You left me with the clear impression that you thought the People's Republic of China had the right to seek to take territory of the Republic of China, that is to say Taiwan, the Pescadores and other islands, by force of arms. If I understood you correctly, you further thought that this was a question of civil war and that the Government of the Republic of China under President Chiang Kai-shek should in fact be regarded as a rebel defying the legitimate government of the country. You emphasized that in your view this grave question relating to China was a domestic question and not an international question.

I feel that in the interest of understanding between us I must state in all frankness that I cannot agree that this is purely a domestic question. The China question is important to our common interest in the peace of the world. Some 45 countries including the United States recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate government of that country. As for the United States, we have a formal treaty of mutual defense with the Republic of China. Under these circumstances, the proposition that the People's Republic is entitled to enforce its will on the Republic of China by force of arms is inconsistent with the needs of peace and is at variance with our common objectives.

The world in which we live is in a sense an indivisible one. I must say that I find a disturbing contrast between what you said to me on China

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Herter and revised by the President. Herter sent his draft to Eisenhower with a covering letter of September 28, which reads in part as follows: "All day I have been haunted by the statements made by Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David with regard to Taiwan. They are so completely contrary to the spirit of the things for which you, and ostensibly he, are working, that I have taken the liberty of drafting a suggested message from you to him which, if you found it acceptable, should reach him before he leaves for his official visit to China."

Eisenhower returned the revised draft to Herter with a covering note of September 29. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/9–2959; see Supplement) Telegram 889 to Moscow, September 29, transmitted the text of the letter and instructed that it be delivered immediately. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2959)

[1] September 27; see Document 301.

toward the close of our talks and what you said to me with regard to the question of Germany, which is also a great—and divided—country. You spoke of the need for a peaceful solution of the German question but you said the People's Republic could legitimately use force in China. We, of course, disagree with this view. In my view both are international matters. I have expressed my willingness to discuss the German question seriously with you and the other interested parties in the hope of reaching a peaceful conclusion in the interest of our two countries and mankind as a whole. I think that the question of China[2] can, in time, be resolved the same way. At the same time, I agree with you that this question has not, at this moment, matured to the point where rapid progress through negotiation could be foreseen. I feel, however, that this fact makes all the more necessary a policy of restraint and moderation, in order to prevent further exacerbation and threat to peace.

You have also stressed to me that the central question of our times is disarmament and I have agreed with you both privately and publicly. I cannot think of any way in which to destroy our common objective, disarmament, more effectively than to endorse the use of force against the Republic of China. In the case of all the other countries so tragically divided in the post-war years, there has been a renunciation of the use of force on both sides, either as a result of an armistice, and agreement of some other act having practical effect, but in the sole case of China one side continues to insist that the use of force is legitimate.

Having in mind the great effort which you and I have made to take a step which would lessen the chance of international conflict, and having in mind how much the peoples of all countries look to you and me at this time in this regard, I await your reply in the hope that, even with regard to the strained situation that exists in China, we can guide our respective courses in such a way as to help safeguard peace.

In sending this message directly to you, I am sure you will understand that I feel that strictly personal exchanges of views between us can at times be of value in the continuation of the type of frank discussion which we held together at Camp David.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower[3]

---

[2] The original draft and the revised draft here read "the two Chinas." The revision, which appears in unidentified handwriting on the revised draft, was apparently made by Herter or Parsons.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

304. Editorial Note

At the 420th meeting of the National Security Council on October 1, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Boggs, October 2, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said celebrations of the Tenth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime were now in progress. In this connection Khrushchev had made an important speech, which was perhaps not well received in Communist China, in which he had said that the Communist countries had challenged the capitalist countries, but that a test of force between communism and capitalism would be wrong. The Chinese Minister of Defense subsequently delivered a bellicose speech quite inconsistent with Khrushchev's speech. The Chinese Communists are apparently unhappy over the contrast between the US, which consults its allies before negotiating with the USSR, and Khrushchev who consults his allies later. Mr. Dulles thought many potential areas of friction between Communist China and the USSR existed, and felt that the Chinese Communists had perhaps been cudgeled into making a statement approving the US–USSR Joint Communiqué.

"Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Dulles had any information on what Khrushchev might be saying privately to the Chinese Communists about the use of force. Mr. Dulles replied that time would be required to collect such information, and that one could not be sure of its accuracy. Mr. Dulles thought it was significant that Khrushchev's speech was broadcast in China. In response to a question from Mr. Allen, Mr. Dulles said he would have to determine later the extent to which Khrushchev's speech was carried in Chinese throughout Communist China, and also whether it was broadcast in the USSR. A recent broadcast in the USSR had not accurately reflected the views of US industrialists on Russia. Secretary Mueller thought the Soviets were trying to drive a wedge between the attitude of business and the attitude of the Administration toward the USSR; the Soviets think these attitudes differ." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The text of Chairman Khrushchev's September 30 speech in Peking is in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, volume XI, No. 39, October 28, 1959, pages 20–22.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 2, 1959, 6 p.m.

330. (Copy this telegram handed CINCPAC.) Yesterday Secretary McElroy[1] had an hour's conversation with President Chiang at which Defense Minister Yu, General White, General Doan and I were present. Admiral Smoot was at airport meeting Admiral Felt.[2]

Partly in response to McElroy's questions and partly on own initiative Chiang expressed following views:

1. ChiCom actions except in minor matters dictated by Soviet Russia. Possibly ChiComs had gone further against India than Soviets desired, but ChiComs would not press India further now. Joint Soviet-ChiCom aim is to continue instability in Southeast Asia. Free world should have no illusions as to peaceful intentions of Soviets or ChiComs. Laos, then Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are early objectives.

2. Khrushchev's efforts to pose peaceful posture (disarmament, trade, cultural exchange, et cetera) are temporary diversionary tactics. They constitute no change in Russia's aim to dominate world. Present tactics have been used before.

3. Communists will continue probes to develop weak spots in free world defenses. Probes will be in Asia and spearheaded by ChiComs at instance of Russia. Probes will not be military in nature, but will make use of indirect methods and indigenous elements. Laos is current example. Unless free world maintains firm line Communists will continue advances.

4. Basically, present free world policy has effect of slowing down but not eradicating Communist disease. Inflamed appendix of free world is in Southeast Asia, but ChiComs have larger one in mainland China. Need is to bring about "explosion" on mainland. With US assistance this can be accomplished without using troops to invade mainland.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–259. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.

[1] Secretary McElroy visited Taiwan September 30–October 3.

[2] Telegram 331 from Taipei, October 2, reported that in a conversation with Felt later that morning, Chiang made a plea for special consideration in respect to military assistance, stressing the Nationalists' need to maintain qualitative superiority over the Communist air force. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/10–259; see Supplement)

But US Government apparently gives this possibility no consideration, has no plans to make use of "visible forces" on mainland. Thus it left to GRC to take small, limited steps to bring about explosion on mainland. Earnestly hope GRC and US can reach understanding whereby GRC can assume more active and prominent role to bring about upheaval on mainland. If revolution is to succeed, revolutionary efforts must be created, risks taken. Cannot sit back and expect revolution on mainland to come of itself. Already US and GRC failed to cooperate in Tibetan uprising with grievous losses. Other opportunities will present themselves. There is urgent need for full US–GRC consultation, understanding, cooperation. US Government spends much money wastefully attempting put out fires on periphery of mainland China. Urgent need is to work with and through GRC to deal with source of trouble—Communist China. US could help from "outside" and GRC from "inside".

Comment: Chiang was not specific about program he has in mind and there was inadequate time to probe deeply, but appears he envisages a broad-based, intensive infiltration, psychological warfare program directed to mainland. When reminded of existence of such program, Chiang dismissed it as minor "intelligence" effort and wholly inadequate for purposes he has in mind.

Secretary McElroy was generally noncommittal.

Full account of conversation with comment will follow by despatch.[3]

Drumright

---

[3] Sent as an enclosure to despatch 184 from Taipei, October 5. [*text not declassified*] (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–559)

---

306. Editorial Note

At a news conference on October 6, 1959, Secretary of State Herter made a number of comments on U.S. policy toward China and Sino-Soviet relations. When asked whether he saw any easing of tension in the Far East as a result of Khrushchev's visits to Washington and Peking, he replied that he could see "no visible easing of tensions as between [the] Chinese Communists and ourselves." He went on to remark, however, that there had been some discrepancies between Khrushchev's statements in Peking and the Chinese statements and concluded that this might indicate that the Soviets were "taking a rather different line" on international affairs from that of the Chinese. He replied to a subsequent question that it was "very difficult" to determine how deep the differences were between the two.

When asked how he reconciled his remarks on Sino-Soviet relations with Chinese recognition of Soviet leadership in the Communist world, Herter stated: "There is no question in our mind that that demand for recognition as the leader of the Communist world places upon the Russians a degree of responsibility for the actions of other members of the bloc that is very real." In response to subsequent questions, he elaborated this view. When asked if in the U.S. view, the Soviet Government has some responsibility for China's actions in such specific places as Korea, Formosa, and Laos, he replied: "A degree of responsibility, as long as they maintain that they are the leaders of the bloc."

To the question of what conditions he would regard as necessary for diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communists, Herter replied:

> "We have never laid out specific conditions. We have often enumerated, as Mr. Robertson did at the United Nations, some of the very basic difficulties that have grown up between us. The continued imprisonment contrary to signed agreement of five American citizens in China is one. The continuing overt threat to use force against Taiwan is another. The continued condemnation as an aggressor of the Chinese Communists by the United Nations is the third. I wouldn't say that that was an exclusive list, and I wouldn't want to say that we would necessarily recognize Communist China if all of those conditions were rectified, but they are among some of the very real grievances that we have and it makes us feel that it is not in our national interest to recognize the Chinese Communists at this time."

The transcript of the news conference is in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 26, 1959, pages 575–581; extracts are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959,* pages 1178–1180. The statement which U.S. Representative Walter S. Robertson made on September 21 before the U.N. General Assembly on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations is *ibid.*, pages 106–114.

307. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower

Moscow, October 12, 1959.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thank you for your letter transmitted through the Embassy of the United States at Moscow on September 30.[1] I have studied it carefully. First of all, I should like to say that I fully agree with you that in the future, too, a strictly personal exchange of opinion between us on questions which either side might have will be desirable and useful. As I see it, it will be a good continuation of those frank conversations which you and I had at Camp David.

As to the substance of the question raised in your letter, I must say the following. I well remember our conversation of September 27, during which the question of China was touched upon. We both expressed at that time our points of view, and each of us retained his own opinion. However, I should like to emphasize at the outset that, according to my firm conviction, the essence of our divergent views concerning the problems touched upon in your letter does not at all consist in the different attitudes toward the question of the use of force in international relations. On this score we have no disagreement. We both unanimously agreed that all international disputes should be settled not by the use of force or by fanning the "cold war" but rather by peaceful means, through negotiation. I note with satisfaction and fully share the desire expressed in your letter that the foreign policies of our countries be directed toward the preservation of peace. The tenor of our conversation and the contents of your letter lead to the definite conclusion that the substance of our differences lies in different attitudes toward the question of whether or not any foreign states have the right to interfere in the affairs of China.

The so-called Taiwan question is one of relations between Chinese and Chinese, a purely internal affair of China. The extension to Taiwan of the system of government which now exists on all remaining territory of China will in effect be the concluding phase of the revolutionary liberation process which has been going on in China for many years. No international complications whatsoever would have arisen in connection with Taiwan but for the foreign interference in the civil war in China, but for the situation artificially created on Taiwan, a situation caused by the military support and protection of Chiang Kai-shek by the United States of America. Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands would have been liberated long ago and reunited with China if it had not been for the position

---

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Presidential Handling. The source text is a copy of the official translation that was sent to the White House along with the original text in Russian. The letter was delivered to the Department of State on October 14 by Soviet Counselor of Embassy Mikhail N. Smirnovsky. (Memorandum of conversation, October 14; *ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/10–1459)

[1] Document 303.

taken by the United States, which has armed forces on the Island of Taiwan and in the Taiwan Straits. History tells us that revolutionary liberation processes lead to deep, radical changes in the lives of peoples and states. Many contemporary states, including the United States of America, owe their existence to such changes. This was true before and it is true today. The radical socio-political changes which in our own time have brought about the regeneration of China, the new birth of that great power, represent an expression of the supreme will of the Chinese people. To support artificially despotic regimes that have long outlived their time means only to bring upon oneself the wrath of peoples. The great Chinese nation has definitively rejected the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. This is an unalterable fact which it is impossible to ignore.

The experience of our Soviet country, as well as of many other countries including the United States of America, indicates convincingly enough what dire consequences are caused by the interference of foreign powers in a civil war that takes place in any state. You know, Mr. President, that, soon after the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, insurgent generals, supporters of the old overthrown regime—Kolchak, Denikin, Vrangel—established themselves in different parts of the territory of our county with the direct and active support of the Entente powers. Foreign support of these former Czarist generals brought about a situation where a long and bloody civil war was imposed upon the people of Soviet Russia. Yet our people, who had just emerged from the slaughterhouse of the First World War, longed for one thing only: to restore the ruined economy, to build peacefully a new life.

We deeply regret that the United States of America continues to take the position of a country that is using its armed forces for interference in the internal affairs of China. Naturally, under such conditions we fully support and will continue to support the legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic.

As is well known, the Government of the Chinese People's Republic has repeatedly proposed to its compatriots on Taiwan to begin negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the present situation. Also, it is impossible to deny that the fact of the presence in the Taiwan area of foreign armed forces is a serious obstacle on the road to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

As to your statement that the United States has a mutual security agreement with the Taiwan authorities, it is obvious that Chiang Kai-shek has no more basis for speaking on behalf of the Chinese people than, for instance, Kerensky has today on behalf of Russian people.

In your letter, Mr. President, you draw an analogy between China and Germany. But one cannot agree with such an analogy. It is generally known that the German question, in that part where it is really an international question, was born of the Second World War, is a result of the joint victory by the states in the anti-Hitler coalition over Fascist Germany, and derives from our joint responsibility for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. As to the unification of Germany, the Soviet Union as you know is of the firm opinion that this is an internal problem of the Germans which they themselves must settle and in which no foreign state has the right to interfere. The conclusion of a peace treaty, the liquidation of the occupation regime in that part of German territory where it still exists, the withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory—these are the areas in which the question of Germany is really an international one. As for the situation in China, the international problem here is, strictly speaking, only the fact of the presence of foreign armed forces on Taiwan.

China cannot be considered a divided country because it is generally known that Taiwan is an integral part—a province—of China, and the fact of the return of Taiwan to China was recognized by a good number of states, including the United States, and recorded in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations.

I must also confess, Mr. President, that it is difficult to agree with respect to the relationship suggested in your letter between the Taiwan question and the solution of the disarmament problem. I believe that the solution of the disarmament problem, which both you and I have recognized as the most important of the problems facing mankind, should not be made contingent upon the obligatory acceptance of the viewpoint of one of the sides on certain specific questions regarding which there are differences of opinion between our governments. This is all the more so with respect to the question of Taiwan which, as I have already indicated, is an internal affair of China and only of China. If we embark upon the path of linking the disarmament problem with other problems which have no direct bearing on it, then it should be admitted that the willingness to have disarmament will remain only a verbal one. I should like to hope sincerely that the Government of the United States will not follow this path and that, as you and I have agreed, the governments of our two countries will exert every effort to the end that the disarmament problem may be successfully resolved and that the peoples may at last be liberated from the burden of armaments and from the fear of a new war.

And if mention is made of any links between the disarmament problem and questions pertaining to China, then in our opinion the discontinuance of military support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime would certainly facilitate the creation of a more favorable climate for a solution of the disarmament problem. And what, other than unnecessary difficulties in the matter of accomplishing the great task of universal and total disarmament, is created by the unrealistic policy of depriving the Chinese People's Republic of its legitimate place in the UN, and by the hopeless attempts to isolate internationally a state with a population of six hundred and fifty million? It is now perfectly clear, I believe, that such a policy can lead nowhere.

Incidentally, since the disarmament problem is mentioned in your letter, I should like also to draw your attention to the fact that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic has come out with full support of the general disarmament proposal presented by the Soviet Union for consideration by the United Nations.

Mr. President, I fully understand that the problem of Taiwan and of the attitude toward the Chinese People's Republic is a complex and delicate problem for the Government of the United States. Nevertheless, I should like to express once again my hope that you will approach this problem without any prejudice, taking due account of the powerful historical factors of our times and proceeding from the sincere desire for the preservation and consolidation of peace throughout the world by which, I am convinced, you are guided.[2]

With sincere respect,

N. Khrushchev[3]

---

[2] Herter recommended in a memorandum of October 28 to Eisenhower that he make no reply. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

308. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, October 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Public U.S. Comment on the Sino-Soviet Relationship

Since your October 6 press conference[1] and Mr. Dillon's October 7 speech to the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry[2] we have noted an inclination on the part of some U.S. newsmen to look for

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/10–1659. Confidential. Drafted by Culver Gleysteen of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs and sent through Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Livingston T. Merchant with a copy to Murphy. Memoranda from Parsons and Berding commenting on this memorandum, both dated October 22, are *ibid.*, 661.93/10–2259. A memorandum of October 16 from Green to Parsons on the subject of "The Herter Doctrine" is *ibid.*, 661.93/10–1659; both documents are in the Supplement.

[1] See Document 306.

[2] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 26, 1959, pp. 571–574.

changes in the U.S. approach toward the Soviet relationship with Communist China. Some newsmen have interpreted your remark concerning Moscow's share in the responsibility for Peiping's actions as a new "doctrine" in U.S. policy, "the doctrine of partial responsibility."

As reflected in the position papers prepared for the Khrushchev visit, we believe that the U.S.S.R. should be urged to restrain Communist Chinese aggressiveness. The U.S.S.R.'s preeminent position in the Bloc and Communist China's dependence on the U.S.S.R. for indispensable economic, technological, and military end-item assistance places the U.S.S.R. in a strong position to influence Chinese Communist policy. If, as seems fairly clear, Khrushchev wishes to avoid being drawn into a nuclear war over issues in which Soviet vital interests are not directly threatened, he probably will attempt to restrain and may already have restrained Peiping in connection with the Taiwan problem.

Although the Soviets maintain that Taiwan is an internal Chinese problem, they apparently recognize that it is also de facto an international issue. There is, therefore, reason to assume that Khrushchev is seeking to get the Chinese Communists to give practical application to the principle of non-use of force in connection with Taiwan (Khrushchev as a Communist leader is not in a position to identify publicly the Chinese Communist effort to obtain control of Taiwan as an international, rather than a domestic issue). This assumption certainly was borne out, rather than weakened, by Khrushchev's recent conduct in Peiping. To win Peiping's acceptance of this tacit arrangement will be a hard task for Khrushchev because it involves a Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the justice of liberative wars and because it subordinates a vital issue in Communist China to a bilateral U.S.-Soviet understanding that nuclear warfare must be avoided.

We think it was useful to make the point publicly once or twice that the U.S.S.R. must assume some responsibility for actions by other Bloc countries as long as the Bloc claims to have monolithic unity and is tied together by military alliances. But we should avoid going too far in taxing the Soviets with responsibility for actions over which they have less control than they have with other parties. The Soviets certainly are not averse to being regarded as the leader of the Bloc. But if this point is unduly stressed, they may be forced to increase their public support of Chinese Communist actions and will have less room for maneuver and compromise in places like the U.N.

EUR recommends that for the time being discussion of Sino-Soviet relations be played down in our propaganda output. We should continue to draw attention to the disparity between actions by Communist China and Soviet statements about coexistence. But as long as there is reason to believe that the Soviets are urging moderation on Peiping, we should not overstress Soviet responsibility for Chinese Communist actions.

309. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, October 16, 1959.[1]

SUBJECT

US Exploitation of Sino-Soviet Rifts

Following our recent discussion, I have given some more thought to the question of the Sino-Soviet relationship and to the reaction of those two countries to possible efforts by the US directly to influence that relationship, either by public statements or by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. I have examined the question from an intelligence rather than policy standpoint, although I recognize that in the present instance it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two functions.

It may be useful for me first to recapitulate, very briefly, our estimate on the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship.

We believe that underlying the relationship at the present time are very real mutual interests and mutual benefits. Nevertheless, problems arise. Both partners certainly are realistic enough to recognize that some problems are inevitable, and at the present time both are determined to prevent such problems from seriously weakening the alliance. To this end, each is prepared to make some accommodations to the other's point of view. Despite this effort, it is very possible that during the coming years—and this may be in some ten or twenty rather than one or two—the frequency and intensity of these frictions will increase substantially.

Secondly, there is no quarrel with the fact that Moscow does consider itself to be the leader of world communism, and that, generally speaking, Peiping so regards it and publicly accepts it as such, in the belief that at the present time only Moscow can provide that leadership. Here again, however, the coin has two sides, for Peiping has—and Moscow recognizes that it has—considerable autonomy on both domestic and foreign policies. Communist China is not a subservient satellite, and Moscow probably estimates that an attempt to force Peiping into certain courses of action might jeopardize the alliance itself. Moscow, certainly at present, is unwilling to take this risk, although it undoubtedly attempts, with some success, to influence Peiping on matters of major concern to the Soviet Union.

Source: Department of State, Intelligence Files: Lot 58 D 776, Intelligence Notes. Secret.

[1] The date is handwritten on the source text.

On the basis of this estimate, in which we have considerable confidence, it is possible to make some further estimates of the effect on the Soviets and the Chinese Communists—and, also, on other countries—of particular US moves to influence the alliance and the actions of the two partners.

In the first place, the future course of the Sino-Soviet relationship will be determined primarily by certain basic factors. What the US—and the rest of the world—*says* about that relationship is of some importance and may have at least a marginal impact. What the US *does* on major policy issues affecting the Soviet Union and Communist China will, of course, exert even more influence on the policies of the two countries and therefore on their alliance, but this point is outside the scope of my comments here.

With respect to this marginal impact, it seems to me that the Soviet and Chinese Communist reaction to any US effort to exploit possible differences by publicly emphasizing them might well be a renewed determination to display their essential solidarity. Moreover, this would probably be their minimum reaction, since it is very possible that a publicized display of solidarity would be accompanied by genuine efforts to reduce their differences in order to strengthen their common front against the West. It is by no means certain that this process would be limited to Peiping's accommodating itself to Soviet views; the reverse might also occur. Moreover, there is already so much public speculation in the West (and perhaps within the bloc) regarding Sino-Soviet rifts that official US statements, particularly if they occur with any frequency, may serve to aggravate Soviet and Chinese Communist concern.

A possible additional disadvantage of continuing US public stress on Sino-Soviet differences is, of course, the reaction of non-Communist countries, since there may be a tendency to take undue comfort from the thought of a Sino-Soviet rupture and to assume that since the Chinese Communists are the more belligerent at present, Moscow is in fact "peaceful."

It is somewhat more difficult to assess Moscow's and Peiping's reaction to further US public emphasis on the concept of Soviet responsibility for Peiping's actions, but I believe that the effect may be roughly similar to that described above. It might be more difficult for the two partners to discuss frankly their countermoves to such US moves. However, Peiping is likely to be considerably less inclined to respond to Soviet policy suggestions if it believes—or can argue—that the Soviets are making such suggestions under US pressure. The Soviets, in turn, are less likely to make such suggestions if the Chinese Communists, the bloc or the West are given grounds for believing that the Soviet action is in response to US demands. In its capacity as "leader" of the Communist bloc, Moscow nevertheless prefers not to act in a manner that casts it in the role of blatantly dictating policy to another Communist country, and obviously this aversion would be increased if the dictation could be interpreted as being prompted by US insistence. Now that we have publicly made the point of Moscow's "leadership" responsibility, it would seem perhaps counter-productive to keep on repeating it in public statements.

My comments above are directed at overt US actions. Non-publicized moves might be more fruitful. It seems to me that there may well be merit in non-publicized official US statements to the Soviets to the effect that they cannot make exceptions to their "peaceful coexistence" proposals on the grounds that they have no control over the actions of other Communists throughout the world, including the Chinese Communists, and to remind them of their self-avowed leadership role. [*4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

I hope these thoughts will be of some use to you. As you will note, my discussion has been a generalized one, and I will be glad to fill in the details if this would be helpful.

Foregoing represents the considered views of INR: China experts as well as Soviet experts.[2]

---

[2] The last sentence is handwritten.

---

310. Memorandum of Conversation

Taipei, October 21, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Far East Situation—Chiang's Views on Relations Between USSR and Communist China; The Situation on the Mainland; GRC Action Against the Mainland

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1508. Secret. Drafted by Osborn. The conversation was held during a visit to Taiwan by Under Secretary Dillon October 21–23, during which he also met with Vice President Ch'en, Foreign Minister Huang, and Defense Minister Yu. Memoranda of those conversations are *ibid.*

PARTICIPANTS

United States	*China*
Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon	President Chiang Kai-shek
Ambassador Everett F. Drumright	Vice President Ch'en Cheng
Mr. David L. Osborn, Embassy	Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, Chang Chung
Mr. Graham Martin, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary	Minister of National Defense, Yu Ta-wei
Mr. James Wilson, Deputy Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Huang Shao-ku
	Minister of Finance, C.K. Yen
	Mr. James Shen, Director of Information Department, Minister of Foreign Affairs, President's interpreter

The President in greeting the Under Secretary referred to the very close cooperation which has existed between the United States and China in the past and hoped that as a result of this visit the relationship would be closer still. The Under Secretary said that the late Secretary Dulles, with whom he had been very close, had mentioned many times the great esteem in which he held President Chiang, which was an additional reason the Under Secretary had looked forward to this visit. The President remarked on the deep sense of personal loss which he felt on the passing of Secretary Dulles.[1] The Under Secretary said that the United States Government had been deeply touched by Madame Chiang's coming all the way to Washington to participate in the last rites for the Secretary.

The President inquired whether Mr. Dillon had anything that he wished to bring up for discussion. The Under Secretary said that he had come to Taiwan to learn rather than to talk. He hoped that the President would give him his views on the general situation in the Far East. He would also be glad to answer any questions that the President might wish to ask regarding developments in Washington.

The President asked about Mr. Dillon's view of the Far Eastern situation—whose core is the problem of the Communist regime on the mainland—following the visit of Khrushchev to Peiping. Mr. Dillon said that it was of course difficult to know what Khrushchev actually said to the Communist leaders. However, when Khrushchev was in Washington, the Department was certain that, for reasons of his own, he was really interested in a relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. However, the United States had no indication that this desire necessarily extended to Communist China, and in fact there was some feeling that the question of China was regarded by Khrushchev as a separate situation. That was one of the reasons why the Department has recently been trying to make it very clear that it is impossible to have a relaxation in one part of the world and none in the Far East. As President Chiang was aware, Khrushchev did make some speeches with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes and so on in Peiping. The Chinese Communist leaders did not reply in kind at that time; however, in the last few days the Chinese Communists have also made some speeches about peace. Naturally, speeches alone cannot accomplish very much. The Under Secretary said he would be interested in the President's views on the subject.

---

[1] Secretary Dulles died on May 24.

The President complimented the United States Government on its very clever propaganda line since the Khrushchev visit to Peiping. The President was in agreement with the speech of Mr. Dillon in New York October 7 and had noted this as an instance of how the United States Government was reacting toward the Communist attempts to have a relaxation of tensions in the West, and an indication that the question had occurred to the United States whether the desire to relax tensions extended to the Far East as well. This question was a very pertinent one. The President thought it was excellent tactics to try to pin Khrushchev down, because in fact tensions in Europe and Asia are inseparable. He felt it was really a matter of great importance that Khrushchev should be told that it is impossible to have a relaxation in Europe without a relaxation in the Far East. This is an entirely correct policy to pursue prior to a Summit Conference. Unless Khrushchev is told he will be held responsible for what Communist China might do in this part of the world, there should be no Summit. Without such an assurance, the best that could be expected from a Summit would be that the Communists would refrain before and during the conference but would resume their aggression after the conference. The President said he was no prophet but had been dealing with the Communists for so long that he had some special knowledge in this field. He hoped that Mr. Dillon would convey his views to the Secretary and to President Eisenhower.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that the Department has adopted the line favored by the President in various statements that have been made, and has said that as long as the Soviet Union claims to be the leader of the Communist camp, a leadership which Peiping acknowledges, the Soviet Union obviously has a measure of responsibility for the actions of Peiping. That is a fact which is well understood by public opinion in the United States, and the press has been quick to pick up and use this same line.

The President asked whether Mr. Dillon would like to hear an exposition of his views on the relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China and between Khrushchev and Mao. The President felt quite possibly some of his American friends may not see things exactly the way he does, but he would be pleased to explain his own views with the hope that they would be used by the Secretary in the formulation of his policies. According to information available to the GRC, the three days of conferences between Khrushchev and Mao did not lead to any agreement or bring forth any conclusion. This is known for a definite fact. The President said that the friction or differences between Khrushchev and Mao started some three years ago. During the recent visit of Khrushchev, the friction came more to the surface. As far as the GRC is aware Khrushchev has never been in favor of the commune system, nor has Khrushchev been favorably disposed to the rise of Mao Tse-tung as a leader of the Communist movement in the Far East. The schism between the two, though dating back three years, has now become more obvious. This friction is primarily between Khrushchev and Mao; it is not between the Soviet Union and the Communist regime. The President asserted that Khrushchev's way of controlling the Chinese Communist Party differs from the methods he has used in controlling other satellites. His method of controlling the Peiping regime is not one applied at the top through Mao Tse-tung. Mao has very little regard for Khrushchev nor would he consider taking orders from him. Mao is a contemporary of Stalin and considers himself ahead of Khrushchev. Mao has little respect for Khrushchev as a theorist, regarding himself as the leading theoretician in the Communist movement at the present time. The President commented that in fact Mao is correct; he has made a longer study of the Communist doctrine than has Khrushchev. As a result, over the last few years, Khrushchev has not been able to control Mao nor has Mao been willing to accept his control. Mao, the President said, probably feels much closer in spirit to Molotov than to Khrushchev. Khrushchev's recent visit provided additional evidence of the growing schism between the two leaders. It follows, the President thought, that Khrushchev realizes Mao is less likely to follow the Soviet lead in seeking to bring about stability in the Far East. Knowing what he is up against, Khrushchev has resorted to a device of controlling the Communist Party through controlling the six other members of the Chinese Politburo. These six members of the Politburo are under the control of Khrushchev as individuals. If and when a showdown were to come in the Politburo (that is, if Khrushchev should lay down the line) he would be certain of six members of the Politburo opposed to Mao Tse-tung. The President noted the telegram recently sent from Communist China to Khrushchev endorsing the peace offensive and that Mao Tse-tung was one of the four signing that telegram. This shows that as long as the other members are under Khrushchev's control, Mao has no choice but to go along with them. In other words, despite the friction between Mao and Khrushchev, Khrushchev still has a firm grip on the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore it would be a mistake to think that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are synonymous.

Mr. Dillon said that the only question he had regarding the most interesting presentation by the President was with respect to the means of control exercised by Khrushchev over the other six members of the Politburo. He wondered why the other six members allowed themselves to be controlled by Khrushchev and how Khrushchev was able to exercise this control. The President explained that the first reason was the following. All six other members joined the International Communist Party before they joined the Chinese Communist Party. They became Communists while in the USSR or while in Europe and have all along been under the direct control of the international Communist movement. Mao is the only truly indigenous Chinese Communist leader. The second point was that all along the international Communist movement has kept a firm grip on its individual members through its intelligence network. This control is exercised not through the Chinese Communist Party as a whole but through its individual members. Liu Shao-chi studied in Moscow. Chu Teh joined the Communist movement in France and in Germany. Chou En-lai joined in France. Both Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping (the Secretary-General of the party) were Russian trainees. In reply to the Under Secretary's question whether there was any connection between the recent change in Defense Ministers and other personnel shifts in Peiping and the subject which the President was discussing, the President declared there was not the slightest doubt that the changes were the result of a policy decision on the part of the Russians, and that this policy decision might have gone against the wishes of Mao Tse-tung. Up to the present time, however, the President said Mao Tse-tung still retains quite a bit of influence at the provincial level and among the rank and file of the armed forces. Accordingly, Khrushchev has not yet found it convenient to get rid of Mao. That was why at least for the time being the other six members of the Politburo would have to keep up the appearance of supporting Mao, until Khrushchev is ready for a final break with him. The Under Secretary expressed his appreciation for the President's presentation and said that when he returned to Washington he would pass these views on to those concerned. Ambassador Drumright asked the President whether Khrushchev and the six other members of the Politburo would in fact have any difficulty in ousting Mao Tse-tung later on. The President said there was no question about this and it was only a matter of time until the blow fell. Time would be required because of the considerable influence Mao still retained at the present time.

Mr. Dillon asked whether in the President's opinion the commune system was created in accordance with the theories of Mao, as opposed to the ideas of the international Communist movement. The President said the communes represented an attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to apply Communist theories to the mainland. The aim was to form a new kind of society in which the armed forces, industry, and the agricultural sectors would be merged. The system was not closely related to the international Communist movement. Mao appears to work on the assumption that the Chinese people are more pliable than the Russians and can be more easily coerced into this new society. Mao claims the creation of this system as his own. The President said that perhaps too much time had been taken by this discussion of the Communist situation on the mainland and asked whether the Under Secretary had any other questions.

Mr. Dillon said that a year ago when he visited India there was a great deal of concern about developments in Red China because of the feeling that the Communists were making tremendous economic progress which, if it continued, would have an attraction for the Indian people. Now they have seen that the claims made were not true and that much of the so-called progress was false. Nevertheless the Indians still have some fears of Communist China's rapid economic progress. The United States, the Under Secretary said, has great hope that by working closely together here in Taiwan the United States and China can show that faster and greater progress can be made under freedom than under the slave system on the mainland. Mr. Dillon asked whether in the President's view the Chinese Communists will be able to continue to develop at a rapid pace.

The President said that given a continuation of past United States policy which allows the Chinese Communists to stabilize their control over the mainland, and in the absence of an external force which would be able to go to the aid of the people there, the mainland population have not much choice but to submit to Communist control. So long as that is the case, the Communists—and particularly Mao Tse-tung—will seek to retain the commune system. The present policy of the United States is not one of trying to get rid of the Chinese Communists but has had the effect of permitting them to retain their control. United States policy with respect to the GRC has been a sound one thus far, but now that a new situation has arisen following the Khrushchev visit to Peiping and the fresh developments on the mainland, it is time for that policy to be reconsidered. The President said he was not asking permission to use troops in open counteroffensive, but for United States agreement that the GRC should be free to take necessary measures to organize and stir up anti-Communist movements on the mainland. Unless that happened, he said, the commune system would continue, and although the Chinese Communists would not be able to score any spectacular successes they would be able to continue their control because the mainland population has no choice. The President asked Mr. Dillon to assure President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter that the GRC for its part will always tailor its policies to fit those of the United States. The Chinese Government has no plan to use its regular forces in an open attack against the mainland, but the time has come, the President thought, to let the GRC use non-military or quasi-military measures to stir up trouble on the mainland and deny the Communists the opportunity to consolidate their position. This is the only way of seeking the eventual destruction of the Communist regime.

The President referred to what he considered a lack of confidence on the part of the United States Government in the capability of the GRC to organize anti-Communist movements on the mainland. Three years ago, the President pointed out, it was decided that a certain amount of equipment would be made available to our Special Forces. Thus far, only a very small amount of the equipment has been delivered. That shows there is a conflict of policy in the United States Government. On the one hand the United States does not wish to use its own regular forces; on the other hand the United States is not willing to permit the Chinese to use non-military or quasi-military to create uprisings. Thus, the President thought, the time had come to let the GRC have more leeway in its activity toward the mainland. Mr. Dillon said that it would be helpful to him if the President could state in a little more detail what he had in mind in the way of effective and necessary measures and "non-military and quasi-military" actions. He also wished to know in more detail what effect these measures would produce on the mainland. The President asked to be excused for his unwillingness to come forward with any concrete proposals at this moment. Two years ago, he recalled, prior to the visit of then Under Secretary Herter,[2] he had asked for 30 thousand parachutes to be used for training of paratroops. He was supplied with 3 thousand. He has been told from year to year and month to month that this material is being delivered but nothing is received. Apparently there is some fear in Washington that if the Chinese Government were supplied with these parachutes, it might touch off a third world war. So, the President saw no use in outlining his plan in detail. Ambassador Drumright commented that the United States has a 3 thousand-man Special Forces program within the MAP, which was going forward. The Special Forces were being trained. However, these Special Forces are a part of the regular forces. When Mr. Herter was here the President asked him about the possibility of training 30 thousand paratroopers[3] and Mr. Herter took the suggestion back to Washington for consideration. Mr. Herter later wrote back in reply that we were willing to have the GRC train additional paratroopers provided this was at no additional expense. However, so far this matter remains between our MAAG and the Chinese military and there has not been any agreement. As to the parachutes, the Ambassador said he had been told that they have had a low priority in our assistance program and that is the reason why they have not been put in the program so far. The Ambassador suggested that if the President feels the parachutes should have a higher priority, it would be appropriate to make this known to the military. The President said that he is sure the project he has in mind will receive the endorsement of the United States Government. In the first place it would not involve the United States in any action, and nobody would even blame the United States for being behind it. There would be no risk of touching off a global conflict.

---

[2] September 12–14, 1957. For a record of a conversation between Herter and Chiang on September 14, 1957, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 603–607.

[3] See note at end of memo. [Footnote in the source text.]

Mr. Dillon inquired whether the situation on the mainland at the present time was ripe for the defection of the Chinese Communist armed forces. The President said this was definitely the case. The peasantry on the mainland had originally supported the Communists because of the anti-landlord campaign. The experience of the Communists had drastically changed things and now there was deep resentment and opposition to the regime on the part of the peasantry. Since the greater part of the armed forces came from the countryside, this disaffection could not help but be reflected in the armed forces. The coming year would be an ideal time, and there is growing unrest throughout a broad portion of the military forces.

Should there be any organized military force which could take hold on any part of the mainland there would be an uprising supported by a good portion of the Communist armed forces. In view of the friction between Khrushchev and Mao, which has been made more evident during the recent reshuffle of Communist commanders, the possibility exists that the Communist forces might be split in two, one going against the Russians, one siding with the pro-Russians. This possibility, the President thought, had always existed but it would be greater than ever before during the coming twelve months.

Closing the interview, the President remarked that he did not wish Mr. Dillon to go away with the impression that he was dissatisfied with the relations between the GRC and the United States missions here. What he had said this morning related to policy. Mr. Dillon for his part referred to the President's mention of a possible lack of confidence in the capabilities of the GRC. He said that the United States has the fullest confidence in the President's judgment, though there might be some difference of judgment regarding the over-all consequences of GRC action and where such action might lead. However, this was a question of policy and did not involve any lack of confidence in the President's judgment.

Note: As I recall it, the President proposed through [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a program to train 30,000 Army troops in parachute jump techniques. This proposal was made either late in 1956 or early in 1957. Nothing happened. When Mr. Herter visited Taiwan in September 1957, the President proposed a reduced, compromise version of the plan, calling for the jump-training of 10,000 troops. In response to this, the Department in effect said it was all right for the GRC to train additional troops in jump techniques—provided it was without additional cost, and provided use of these troops was subject to existing restraints.[4] In the meantime, Washington approval was given for the training of special forces under the MAP. These are to operate not as guerillas, but as adjuncts of the regular forces. They, too are subject to existing restraints. Provision of equipment under MAP has lagged. (If this note proves inaccurate on further research, a revision will be sent to Tokyo.)

---

[4] See Document 3.

---

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland

Washington, November 4, 1959, 7:12 p.m.

551. Verbatim text. Beam–Wang Talks. Following is text draft Agreed Announcement for presentation 93rd meeting:

DRAFT AGREED ANNOUNCEMENT

Noting that the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR have agreed in the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué of September 27, 1959 to the principle "that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiations," Ambassador Jacob D. Beam on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed to announce:

Ambassador Beam, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, has declared:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–459. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin and by Katherine F. Lincoln of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs; cleared by Legal Adviser Eric H. Hager, Merchant, Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John M. Steeves, Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs Richard M. Service, and with the Department of Defense; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Taipei and USUN for Lodge.

1. The United States of America will abide by the aforementioned principle in the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué in seeking to resolve disputes between itself and the People's Republic of China.
2. Accordingly it will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere, except in individual or collective self-defense, but will adhere to peaceful means in the pursuit of its policies.
3. The United States Ambassador will continue talks with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China in an effort to settle practical matters at issue between them.

Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, has declared:

1. The People's Republic of China will abide by the aforementioned principle in the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué in seeking to resolve disputes between itself and the United States of America.
2. Accordingly it will not resort to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere, except in individual or collective self-defense, but will adhere to peaceful means in the pursuit of its policies.
3. The Ambassador of the People's Republic of China will continue talks with the Ambassador of the United States in an effort to settle practical matters at issue between them.

Herter

---

312. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, November 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

Further Reflections on the "Doctrine of Partial Responsibility"

In a wide range of areas we will want to seek opportunities to test Mr. Khrushchev's protestations of peace and suggest opportunities for him to apply in practice the doctrine of the denial of force as an instrument of international relations. As this applies to China in the realm of Russo-China affairs it gives Khrushchev the opportunity to apply the restraining hand on China. If he tries and fails, he must either imply criticism of a China that will not submit to his bidding or he must face having

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/11–459. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons and sent through Merchant. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Noted. C.A.H."

to accept responsibility for a partner whose conduct shows the hollowness of the Communist peace offensive. In either case we reap an advantage, be it from the restraining of China, from the frictions induced by Soviet restraining efforts, or from the demonstrated contradictions between bloc peaceful pretensions and practice in a critical area, the Far East.

The "doctrine of partial responsibility" as a policy approach is not new. We have long recognized Moscow's pre-eminent position in the world Communist movement. So has the Communist world. However, the coincidence of Soviet efforts to achieve a détente in the West and the outbreak of Communist-inspired troubles in Asia gives this policy new emphasis and perhaps greater utility. This "doctrine" is in a sense a diplomatic and propaganda tactic. As a tactic it affords us a degree of flexibility in that the degree of responsibility being undefined, we can decide when and to what extent we are to attribute responsibility to the Soviet Union. It thus has the merit of conforming to reality in that it does not depend on either of the extreme interpretations of the Moscow–Peiping relationships (satellites or equals).

As the degree of responsibility which we assign to the USSR is our option, we can be guided by the particular tactical situation. Further, by assessing the Soviet Union with that degree of responsibility for Peiping's actions which our estimate of the situation demands, we put the Soviets in the position of having to choose between exposure of the falsity of their announced desire for an East-West détente or of disavowing its position of leadership of the Communist bloc. Intra-bloc frictions could be fanned by either of these developments. If the Soviet Union chose the further and likely alternative of assuring the Chinese People's Republic privately of its support while continuing publicly to espouse peaceful solutions, we at least force it to live with a false position which we can, as opportunity offers, profitably exploit.

We would, of course, have to be selective in the use of this tactic of "partial responsibility". One of its by-products is that we should gain support from Asian neutrals who genuinely desire a détente and who will react to the exposure of bloc contradictions. This could pose a further complication for the Soviet Union, assuming Chinese intransigence.

As an alternative to the doctrine of "partial responsibility" we could try to create the impression that Khrushchev expressed concern to the President about Peiping's behavior. One objection to this is that it invites as a refutation not only a public demonstration of Soviet-Communist Chinese solidarity but also actions designed to give concrete evidence of such solidarity. Another difficulty with this approach is that it might tend to exaggerate in the minds of some of our allies, as well as the American public, the extent of the differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Such a lead on our part would probably receive great press attention and we might find it difficult to maintain our position in the face of press demands for clarification. We would be hard put to adduce the facts which led us to imply Khrushchev was worried about the Chinese and we and the Russians had therefore come closer together than we could admit openly. If this alternative tactic should succeed, it might tend to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift. However, in our view as stated earlier, it would be more liable to lead to redoubled effort by the USSR to prove to the Chinese that there was nothing to the U.S. insinuations of secret US–USSR rapprochement.

It could also be said that the "partial responsibility" principle in a sense puts Peiping on the defensive by forcing it to justify itself to Moscow, modify its policies, or add to the strain in bloc relations. There is nothing in Peiping's reactions to date, however, to support this thesis—in fact quite the contrary.

The alternative tactic of implying a greater US–USSR rapprochement than exists could put the Soviet Union on the defensive.[1] If use of this tactic created doubts in Peiping or concern in Moscow, Khrushchev might find it necessary to explain and deny that he had reached any secret accommodation with us. Not only should this prove easy for him but there is a further disadvantage to this tactic from the U.S. viewpoint. At a time when it was allaying Peiping's suspicions the Soviet Union would be less likely to criticize or to seek to restrain the Peiping regime lest the Chinese Communists interpret this criticism as indicating Khrushchev may in fact have expressed concern about Peiping actions to the President and reached some accommodation with him. It therefore seems to me of little value to imply in any way that which has no basis in fact and which would result in loud protestations by Mr. Khrushchev denying that he made any such commitment. In order to disprove it he might well bend over backwards to give the Chinese added support required to prove his point.

The alternative tactic also involves some risk that both partners being convinced of the falsity of our insinuations would have reason to lower their estimate of our capacities in this field and hold us in less respect than the facts actually warrant. We cannot ignore the possibility that some of our Asian friends in the process would come to the same conclusion. The effect of the alternate tactic then would be likely to drive Moscow and Peiping closer together, whereas the doctrine of "partial responsibility" not only has some possibility for creating division but also corresponds to the truth. It seems to me that in the judicious use of this doctrine we cannot lose in any way that it turns and we may gain.

---

[1] A marginal note in Merchant's handwriting reads: "This I think would be a dangerous course. LTM".

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, November 6, 1959, 6 p.m.

796. New York for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 93rd meeting two hours 45 minutes.[1]

I sought opportunity to open but Wang said he had statement he wished make first. Since it was his turn I had no choice but to defer.

Wang led off with mention Eisenhower–Khrushchev communiqué and particularly quoted sentences stating that all outstanding international questions should be settled by peaceful means. He said his government was glad to note US President subscribed verbally to this principle but then proceeded to catalogue US actions which he charged violated the principle. He mentioned CENTO, Tibet, Laos, statements by prominent American officials, visits by US military to Far East and maneuvers there, et cetera. He also listed in detail 10 latest "serious warnings". He then said that if US sincerely subscribed to principle of Eisenhower–Khrushchev communiqué it should so demonstrate by withdrawing its military forces from Taiwan area and Far East. Suggested beginning discussions on basis Chinese Communist draft agreed announcement September 22, 1958.[2]

I responded by pointing out not only US but USSR and Communist China engaged in strengthening their armed forces and commenting that he had failed to note that the US was engaged in serious negotiations with the USSR aiming at suspension of nuclear tests and general disarmament. I said that threat in Far East obviously arises from aggressive attitude his side not from US defensive activities in area. I then made statement based second paragraph Deptel 552[3] and handed Wang text new draft agreed announcement.

After 25 minute recess for purpose studying new draft Wang declared it not different in substance from five previous drafts presented by

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–659. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 802 from Warsaw, November 7, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–89, undated but received on November 16. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/11–759 and 611.93/11–1659; see Supplement)

[2] See Document 119.

[3] Telegram 552 to Warsaw, November 4, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. The second paragraph instructed him to call attention to the U.S.-Soviet communiqué of September 27, urge Wang's side to join with the United States in adopting a meaningful declaration to end the continuing threat of war in the Taiwan Strait, and present the new draft Agreed Announcement. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–459; see Supplement)

US during past four years. He had rejected those and also rejected this new proposal.

I expressed hope that in view present international climate his government would not reject our proposal out of hand but give it serious consideration.

I then made statement on prisoners relating it to amnesty announcement.[4] Wang's reply avoided any reference to amnesty and simply repeated familiar line that treatment of criminals was their own business and "no foreign power" had right to intervene.

I made statement on parcels and letters based on reference telegram[5] to which Wang replied that package arrangement entirely unilateral and based on humanitarian considerations. Said that regulations at first provided for two deliveries monthly five kilos each per prisoner, and from October 1958 one delivery per month not exceeding 10 kilos per prisoner. I said there seemed to be misunderstanding concerning weight and I hope to return to this subject next meeting.

I made statement on unaccounted-for servicemen and Wang as usual replied subject not appropriate for discussion here.

Next meeting Tuesday December 8, 2 p.m.

Beam

---

[4] Reference is to a Chinese announcement of September 17.

[5] It instructed Beam to protest a recent reduction in the prisoners' monthly package allowance and the fact that no letters had been received from Bishop Walsh.

314. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

CHANGES IN PATROL PATTERN IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

On September 14, 1959 was Seventh fleet was authorized, without prior consultation with the Department of State, to resume the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait which had been in existence prior to the crisis of the fall of 1958.[1] At that time ships and planes had been required to stay further offshore in order to avoid possible incidents and the risk of accidentally triggering hostilities involving U.S. forces.

The Department of State points out that changes in the established patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait in an inshore direction could, if they became known, easily be regarded by friendly nations as unnecessarily "provocative." Free World support for our policies in the Far East stems in part from confidence that the United States, as a peace-loving nation, will adhere strictly to a posture of restraint vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists and eschew unnecessary actions that could lead to, or give a plausible pretext for, Communist counteraction. Careful consideration must therefore be given to such changes and their timing, if possible embarrassment to our foreign policy is to be averted.

There is no need to alter the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait merely for the purpose of establishing that the United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime's claim that its territorial waters extend 12 miles from a base line connecting all the offshore islands along the coast of mainland China. The United States has informed the Chinese Communist representative in the Warsaw talks of its rejection of this claim and the spokesman of the Department of State has made this position public. Furthermore, even under the patrol pattern that was observed during the crisis, United States ships and planes did not remain entirely outside Communist claimed waters. The Chinese Communists themselves do not consider that we accept their claim; and since Septem-

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Burke, Adm. Arleigh A. Confidential. Drafted by Bennett and Kahmann and cleared by Steeves and Parsons and with the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems. Enclosed with a November 13 letter from Secretary Herter to Admiral Burke.

[1] A memorandum of October 16 from Parsons to Murphy stated that he had learned that day of the Seventh Fleet's reversion to the pre-crisis patrolling pattern, under which ships were authorized to approach Chinese Communist territory as close as 10 miles and Nationalist-held islands as close as 3 miles. (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959) A memorandum of October 28 from Steeves to Parsons reported that the Navy's primary concern was that observance of the 12-mile limit would be interpreted as de facto recognition of that line. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 794A.5/10–2859) Both documents are in the Supplement.

ber 1958 they have accused the United States of "intruding" into their claimed waters or airspace in the Taiwan Strait area over 60 times.

The Department of State wishes to make clear that it recognizes that changes in the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait may be necessary and desirable. However, it considers that such changes should be made only to meet actual military needs and only after the possible non-military consequences have been taken into account. It is therefore requested that in the future, the Department of Defense inform the Department of State of any contemplated change in the Taiwan Strait patrol pattern in an inshore direction sufficiently in advance that its political implications may be fully assessed and given due weight in the final decision.

---

315. Editorial Note

At a news conference on November 12, 1959, Secretary of State Herter replied to questions about the U.S. position regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute that neither side had appealed to the United States and the United States had not taken sides in the dispute. He remarked that the border was "pretty ill defined" and indicated that the United States had no position on the issue. Following the news conference, Herter authorized the release of a statement that although his answers had related only to the legalities of the rival claims, "There is the further, and more important point, that, whatever may be the merits of a dispute, force must not be used to settle it. The Chinese Communist regime has clearly used force and, in this respect, is wholly in the wrong." On November 13, the Department of State released a statement that Secretary Herter had called in the Indian Chargé d'Affaires, D.N. Chatterjee, and made it clear that his news conference statements were not meant to imply that the United States condoned the use of force by the Chinese Communists. For the transcript of the news conference and the text of both statements, see the Department of State *Bulletin,* November 30, 1959, pages 782–787. Extracts of Herter's statements at the news conference, together with the text of both statements are in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959,* pages 1190–1191. Telegram 1781 to New Delhi, November 14, summarized Herter's conversation with Chatterjee. (Department of State, Central Files, 691.933/11–1459; see Supplement)

At a news conference on December 2, President Eisenhower replied to a question on the Sino-Indian border dispute that the real issue was whether nations were going to settle their differences by negotiation or by the use of force. For the text of his remarks, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 1191–1192; for the transcript of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pages 785–794.

---

316. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, November 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

The Tactic of "Partial Responsibility"

The question of our attitude toward the Sino-Soviet relationship is such an important one that I would like to add some further thoughts to those expressed to you by Mr. Kohler and Mr. Parsons in their memoranda of October 16 and November 4.[1]

I would like to support Mr. Parsons in suggesting that "partial responsibility" be considered a flexible and selectively applied tactic. The term "doctrine", which has been used by the press, implies a kind of fixity and permanence which seems out of keeping with our hopes and perhaps our expectations.

However, the direct assertion of partial Soviet responsibility for Chinese Communist actions seems to me to have certain drawbacks which should be kept in mind along with the advantages set forth by Mr. Parsons. As he points out, its use may be considered in connection with three possible objectives:

(1) Seeking to effect some restraint on Chinese Communist actions;
(2) Aggravating Soviet Chinese Communist frictions; and
(3) Achieving propaganda effect in the non-Communist world.

1. Use of the USSR as a brake on Chinese Communist actions may well have best chances of success if it takes place quietly and without reference on our part to Soviet responsibility. Although the USSR has valuable sources of influence over Communist China, it seems that in no

---

Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Partial Responsibility Doctrine. Confidential. Drafted by Edward E. Rice and George A. Morgan of the Policy Planning Staff. Sent through Merchant. The source text is an unsigned copy sent to Parsons.

[1] Documents 308 and 312.

sense can the Soviet Union be said to have firm control over Chinese Communist actions. Past Chinese statements which seem to recognize the USSR as the undisputed leader of the Soviet bloc may have been made in complete sincerity, but it is more likely that the Chinese did not expect them to be taken quite at full face value in Moscow. The traditions of Chinese etiquette require self-deprecatory remarks, on appropriate occasions, which are neither meant nor expected to be believed. Nehru, for instance, appears to have been misled by comments of Chou En-lai, who reportedly characterized himself as a younger brother needing Nehru's guidance and instruction. Mao Tse-tung built his power on the masses of peasants in violation of Soviet theory and guidance, which envisaged use of China's industrial proletariat as a revolutionary base. The Yugoslavs said that Stalin, right after World War II, wanted the Chinese Communists to enter a coalition government with the KMT; the Chinese Communists did not. Again, in the case of the communes, the Chinese are pursuing an independent policy. The foregoing instances relate to Chinese domestic policy matters in which Soviet guidance has not been accepted. We may be in the beginning of a period in which Communist China will resist Soviet guidance also in the field of foreign affairs, at first in matters concerning China's immediate neighbors. Communist insistence that Taiwan is a "purely internal" affair of China, which pushes the definitions of those words beyond logical limits, and Chinese behavior along the frontiers of India both suggest that such a period has begun. Mao Tse-tung, in seeking a predominant voice in bloc decisions relating to Asian affairs, may be subject to a number of inhibiting factors, but he will be abetted by the conviction that he is Khrushchev's superior in matters of revolutionary strategy as applied to Asia.

Khrushchev's difficulties in restraining Chinese Communist actions are likely to be proportionate to the degree of public knowledge that he is attempting to do so. This is so because of his ally's very Chinese sensitivity in matters involving individual and national face. "Face" is a matter of public stance before an audience rather than a question of inner self-esteem. The more public attention is focused on a trial of respective wills, the more "face" is lost by the loser. Moreover, as Mr. Kohler has suggested in his memorandum to you, if Khrushchev cannot persuade the Chinese Communists in private, he must side with them in public: Soviet prestige and the screening from view of fissures in the alliance both would require his doing so. So while public reference to Soviet responsibility for any particular Chinese Communist actions will not rule out successful Soviet influence, it probably will reduce its chances.

2. Sino-Soviet friction can be a useful result of successful efforts to get the USSR to try to serve as a brake on the Chinese Communists. However, the friction is in the nature of a by-product. If we seek it as a primary result, the USSR is virtually certain to recognize our aim, conclude we are

not seriously negotiating with it, and prove unwilling to repeat its efforts. We would thus have damaged or destroyed its usefulness to us as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese.

3. It should also be kept in mind that the US, too, is vulnerable to charges of partial responsibility for the actions of another state.[2] In view of our self-admitted role of leadership and the lack of responsiveness to our wishes of some governments dependent on us, the propaganda weapon is a two-edged one. This does not argue it should never be used, but rather that the results will not necessarily represent gain and could be counter-productive.

Conclusion: Although the USSR can be said to have partial responsibility for some Chinese Communist actions, and it may on occasion be useful to point to that fact, we should do so with a frequency which is in inverse proportion to the importance we attach to probable usefulness of the USSR as a brake on the Chinese Communists. Such usefulness appears most obvious in a period such as the present, when the USSR seems intent on reducing tensions and avoiding war. It might still continue, in a period of reversion to earlier Soviet attitudes and tactics, at least with respect to narrower aims in which Soviet interests happened to parallel our own.

---

[2] A handwritten note on the source text, keyed to an asterisk in the margin beside this sentence, reads:

"It has been used against us with effect: e.g., Suez & Indonesia. By making us assume partial responsibility for the colonial policies of our allies, the Communist bloc has succeeded in getting us to exercise a moderating influence on our allies."

317. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

NIE 43–59 Washington, November 17, 1959.

PROSPECTS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Problem

To estimate the strengths, weakness, and prospects of the Government of the Republic of China, with particular reference to both its international position and its position on Taiwan.

Conclusions

1. The past two years have been good ones for the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). Its international standing has benefited by its military showing during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis and by the truculence and brutality of its Chinese Communist rival. The GRC is supported, at least passively, by most of the inhabitants of Taiwan, who continue to enjoy one of the highest standards of living in Asia. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. Nevertheless, the GRC is faced with a basic problem in that the demands of preserving the GRC as the government for all of China and effecting its return to the mainland compete with the requirements of building a viable economic and political structure on Taiwan. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. If present trends continue, the prospect is for modest economic improvement for at least the next two years, although the rate may slow somewhat. As long as the military establishment requires a major portion of Taiwan's resources, the economy will remain heavily dependent on outside assistance. Over the longer run, however, any regime on Taiwan will almost certainly be faced with serious economic problems stemming largely from the rapid population growth. A decrease in the standard of living would create political difficulties for the GRC. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. Although, given continuing US naval and air support, Taiwan could be defended with smaller ground forces than now maintained, the

---

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 17 November 1959."

GRC considers that any serious reduction in its armed forces would cast doubt on the concept of return to the mainland. GRC leaders recognize that existing forces are not capable of a successful invasion under present conditions, [*2-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]. There have been, however, recent indications that Chiang has been considering the training of a special force of approximately 30,000 paratroopers for possible use in exploiting any widespread anti-Communist uprising that might occur or be fomented on the mainland. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. [*5-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. We believe that with strong US support the GRC will be able to hold its present position in the UN for the next two or three years. However, it is possible that this position might collapse before then, especially if Communist China refrains from further aggressive actions. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. [*18 lines of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 6-1/2 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

318. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

Washington, November 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Republic of China—Para-military Activities on the China Mainland

Problem

During your talk with President Chiang on October 21, 1959 in Taiwan,[1] he referred to what he considered a lack of confidence on the part of the United States Government in the capability of the GRC to organize anti-Communist movements on the Chinese mainland. With regard to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/11–2459. Top Secret. Drafted by Kahmann and Bennett and cleared by the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security, John O. Bell, and in substance with ISA.

[1] See Document 310.

equipment for Chinese Special Forces, he said (according to the official Chinese memorandum of the conversation handed to us later) that we had promised to supply 3,000 parachutes for Chinese Special Forces, but so far had not delivered even one. This he thought indicated a conflict of policy in the United States Government. On the one hand, the United States wishes the GRC to use methods other than military against the mainland; on the other hand, it is dilatory in the supply of parachutes which are needed to strengthen the mainland resistance movement by non-military and quasi-military methods. President Chiang said the GRC does not want the U.S. to use its troops to assist in a counterattack against the mainland, but that the U.S. "must agree" that the GRC is at liberty to support and aid resistance movements on the mainland.

On October 23, Foreign Minister Huang Shao-ku referred to President Chiang's statements to you about U.S. support for the GRC's anti-Communist campaign on the mainland and said he hoped you would convey President Chiang's views to the Secretary and the President.[2] You said that you would look into the matter upon your return to Washington.

Discussion

A. This problem goes back a number of years. A summary of developments is attached as Tab A.[3] There is no conflict in policy in the U.S. Government on this matter. Chiang apparently considers our training of 3,000 Special Forces under the MAAG as a first installment on his more grandiose plan for the training of 30,000 troops in air-drop techniques. We did not promise the GRC 3,000 parachutes as President Chiang states. We did agree to the training of 3,000 Special Forces and have scheduled 1,487 parachutes for the Special Forces for delivery under the FY 1959 MAP. According to an Army source in the Pentagon, our military does not have large stocks of such parachutes; they must be continually ordered from the manufacturer and, when delivered, are allocated on a world-wide priority basis. Our source said that the 1,487 parachutes will arrive in Taiwan in late January or early February 1960.

Additional parachutes are programmed for FY 1960 and FY 1961.

B. The United States does not object in principle to strictly *non-military* (i.e., political, psychological, intelligence, and underground resistance) activities by the GRC on the mainland; this is implicit in our support of the GRC as the government of all China and is one of the principles of the Joint Communiqué of October 23, 1958. However, there appears to be a difference between us and President Chiang in interpretation of "non-military." Air-dropping large numbers of troops on the mainland is quite different from infiltrating agents or dropping them individually or in small numbers. We therefore feel that Chiang's plan could not be considered non-military or quasi-military and should be considered "use of force" in the sense of the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954 and the Joint Communiqué.

---

[2] See the source note, Document 310.

[3] The tabs are not attached to the source text, but the document under reference, headed "Background on Chinese Government Interest in Training Paratroopers for Guerrilla Activities on the Mainland," is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959; see Supplement.

C. We do not believe that GRC troops air-dropped either in small or large groups on the mainland would have much chance of success under present conditions. This opinion is shared by our Country Team in Taiwan (Tab B),[4] and apparently by Generals Chiang Ching-kuo (President Chiang's son), and Lai Ming-tang (Vice Chief of the Chinese General Staff). We therefore feel that Chiang's paratroop plan is not sound military strategy under existing circumstances. Failure of an endeavor of this type could have grave consequences in terms of lowered morale among free Chinese and of a decline in the GRC's international standing.

D. A combined exercise using GRC and US Special Forces was held in May this year in an effort to demonstrate to the Chinese both the capabilities and limitations of its unconventional warfare forces. The exercise gave the Chinese a clearer idea of the function of these Special Forces as contrasted to paratroopers in possible mainland activities.

E. The GRC thus far has been unable to develop an effective organization on the mainland that could enlist support for the GRC and capitalize on any disaffection in the Chinese Communist army or large-scale rebellion that might occur. We believe that this is the field where it should concentrate its energies at this time, since this would be an indispensable preliminary to exploiting possible large-scale revolts on the mainland.

F. We do not believe that any GRC actions can "stimulate" large-scale mainland revolt. Any such revolt would more probably result from intolerable internal conditions generated by the oppressive policies of the Chinese Communist regime. However, the existence of an effective GRC organization on the mainland might make possible GRC assistance to and exploitation of any resistance movement that might come into being as a result of Communist misrule.

G. We have now received the Country Team's assessment and recommendations (Tab C).[5] They closely parallel our own thinking here.

---

[4] Despatch 195 from Taipei, October 12, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1259)

[5] Despatch 245 from Taipei, November 5, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/11–559)

Recommendation

That you authorize me to call in Ambassador Yeh and discuss the matter raised by President Chiang along the following lines:

1) We, of course, sympathize with the GRC's desire to restore the mainland to freedom and will continue to give what support we can to GRC measures to attain this objective by political means, including propaganda and psychological warfare.

2) We believe the highest priority should be given to determining mutually agreed GRC resistance assets to be developed on the mainland, and United States agencies are prepared to give all practicable assistance in making this determination, as well as subsequently in supporting this effort.

3) We understand that the MAAG training program for 3,000 Special Forces is under way and will be completed in the spring of 1960. According to information available to us, approximately 1,500 parachutes suitable for paratrooper use are scheduled for delivery under the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program early in 1960. Additional parachutes are included in the FY 1960 and FY 1961 Military Assistance Programs, according to the MAAG in Taiwan. If there is further question concerning delivery of parachutes, we suggest that it be taken up directly with U.S. military authorities in Taiwan.

4) Employment of these Special Forces would, of course, be governed by the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954, pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Communiqué of October 23, 1958. Unilateral employment of GRC forces, whether regular or special, against the mainland would be contrary both to these undertakings and to the international interests of the GRC.[6]

---

[6] Dillon initialed approval of the recommendation on December 3.

319. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, December 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

S/P Memorandum of November 17 entitled "The Tactic of 'Partial Responsibility'"[1]

While we in FE were most interested in S/P's commentary (Tab A)[2] addressed to you on this subject, we differ somewhat from the conclusion which suggests that we should hold the Soviets partially responsible for Chinese Communist actions only where we attach little importance to the usefulness of the USSR in acting as a brake on the Chinese. The following comments are offered in continued support of the thesis that properly used we can gain great advantage from time to time in holding the USSR publicly responsible for Communist Chinese acts which differ from the current Soviet line.

It appears to FE that S/P has slightly misconceived the concept of the "use of the USSR as a brake on Chinese Communist actions". To be sure, certain appeals must be made in private to have any chance of success, for instance for release of the five American prisoners in China. It was a pity that this appeal broke publicly. However, I have not conceived of using the USSR as a brake mainly by appeals to the sense of reasonableness, justice, and cooperation with the United States. Private actions to seek to get the USSR to moderate Chicoms' actions at this stage of our relations would, I fear, appear merely as an indication of where we were hurting, as a confession of weakness perhaps. Perhaps it is inherent in a Communist regime invariably to take advantage of such appeals unless a favorable response is procured by the prospect of compensatory advantages to it in some clearly defined agreement.

What I have had in mind has been not use of the USSR by something which would involve direct appeal to or negotiation with it, but rather putting the USSR publicly in such a position that it would later in its own interests react by private efforts at restraint on the Chinese Communists. Perhaps the recent broadcast on the Russian Far East Service obliquely suggesting that Taiwan could be taken by peaceful means is a case in point, coming as it does some time after we publicly put the bee on the

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/12–159. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons.

[1] Document 316.

[2] The tabs are not attached to the source text; Tab A is Document 316, Tab B is Document 308, and Tab C is Document 312.

Russians on this subject. In other words, I have thought of a two stage process whereby from time to time: 1) we hold the USSR publicly responsible and 2) in its own good time and in its own way the Soviet Union reacts with the Chinese as it finds that it is in its interests to do so.

I, of course, agree with the thesis that "Khrushchev's difficulties in restraining Chinese Communist actions are likely to be proportionate to the degree of public knowledge that he is attempting to do so". For that reason when we successfully impute a damaging degree of responsibility to the Russians, we are unlikely to know just how or when they put pressure on the Chinese. Occasionally, later on if we are observant, we may be able to detect developments attributable to use of the tactic of partial responsibility. From the same line of reasoning I find myself in disagreement with the sentence to be found at the end of the same paragraph on page two which reads, "So while public references to Soviet responsibility for any particular Chinese Communist actions will not rule out successful Soviet influence, it probably will reduce its chances." I would agree with this only if we imputed responsibility to the Soviets publicly and in the same pronouncement rather clearly asked them to do something about it.

---

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, December 8, 1959, 5 p.m.

971. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 94th meeting two hours.[1]

I opened with strong protest on Bombay incident based first two paragraphs Deptel 660.[2] Wang replied from prepared statement

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–859. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 12:51 p.m. on December 9. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 973 from Warsaw, December 9, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–105, December 11. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/12–959 and 611.93/12–1159)

[2] Telegram 660 to Warsaw, December 4, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. The first two paragraphs instructed him to register a strong protest against an incident in Bombay on November 26, in which a member of the U.S. Consulate General staff, while accompanying a member of the Chinese Consulate General staff who had asked for political asylum, was seized by personnel of the Chinese Consulate, bound, and held for about 6 hours. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/12–459)

charging US with inverting facts and lodging protest against alleged US kidnapping of Chinese citizen. Brief give and take followed with each restating principal points in respective versions of incident.

I inquired as to Peiping's reaction our draft agreed announcement of November 6 and Wang reiterated his rejection of draft along line he took at last meeting. Also accused US of attempting sow discord between Peiping and Moscow by use of joint Soviet-US communiqué. He referred me to Khrushchev's expressions of support for Peiping on Taiwan issue in Khrushchev's October 31 speech as evidence solidarity [garble] Soviet alliance. I responded with prepared statement based third and fourth paragraphs reference telegram. This produced brief give and take centered around Kuo Mo-jo's demands.

I made statement on prisoners referring to amnesty and ChiCom "policy of leniency". Wang simply replied that categories of persons included under amnesty were business of Chinese Government and that he had nothing further to say. I reminded Wang of his side's obligations under agreed announcement which produced further exchange along familiar lines.

Wang replied to my statement on Bishop Walsh that he like other foreign prisoners was free to communicate with his family and it was not his government's fault if Walsh did not choose to write. I requested information on Walsh's welfare but Wang said he had nothing to give us at this time.

Meeting ended following inconclusive exchange on parcel delivery question.

I proposed next meeting January 12. Wang countered with Tuesday, January 19, 2:00 p.m., which I accepted.

Beam

---

321. Editorial Note

At the 428th meeting of the National Security Council on December 10, 1959, Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Bissell discussed the Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, December 10, reads as follows:

"Mr. Bissell said that the President's trip had produced additional evidence of a divergence of views between the USSR and Communist China. The Moscow press and radio were commending the President's trip while the Chinese Communists were openly attacking the journey as an effort to 'sell a false peace.' In his last three speeches, Khrushchev showed concern over the Chinese Communist challenge to Soviet primacy in the Communist world. In Hungary, Khrushchev warned against Communist leaders who became conceited. In a lecture at a Moscow University, a speaker referred in so many words to differences between the USSR and Communist China and to the cold and incorrect reception given Khrushchev in Peiping. One reason for the Chinese Communist attitude was apparently the fact that the Chinese are at an early stage in their revolution, equivalent to the first Soviet Five Year Plan. They have been attempting an ambitious program of industrialization at the expense of the peasantry, and consequently have forced the standard of living of the country lower than at any time in recent memory. The hard line of the Chinese Communists was not surprising in the light of the present stage of Communism in China. Mr. Bissell cautioned, however, that while the strain between the USSR and Communist China was real, it would not lead to a rupture of the alliance since both parties had too much to gain from the alliance. Moreover, attempts to exploit these strains by propaganda would probably do more harm than good unless our propaganda was extremely subtle. The Vice President asked whether there was any dissenting opinion in the Intelligence Community on whether there was a real strain in the relations between the USSR and Communist China. Was there, for example, any opinion that Khrushchev might be seeking to build up the appearance of difference between the two countries? Mr. Bissell reported the Intelligence Community was unanimous in believing there was real strain in the USSR-Chinese Communist relations. There had been too many indications of strain recently to permit of an interpretation that the strain was fabricated. However, both parties probably realized that there was an advantage in pursuing different lines, the Russians pursuing the soft line and the Chinese Communists a hard line. The Vice President asked whether Mr. Bissell meant that Khrushchev felt the Chinese Communists should be tough, but now they have gone too far in toughness. He noted that the Russians had gone further than previously in urging local Communist parties around the world to preserve the appearance of independence from Moscow. Mr. Bissell confirmed the correctness of the Vice President's impression. He added that in India the Russians were influencing the Communist Party toward legal methods, away from violence and toward an identification with nationalism rather than with international Communism." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

322. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

GRC Para-Military Operations on the China Mainland

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary, FE
Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, CA

During the course of a call by Ambassador Yeh on Mr. Parsons at the latter's request, Mr. Parsons said that on his recent visit to Taipei Under Secretary Dillon had promised President Chiang[1] he would look into several points which President Chiang had raised related to GRC para-military operations on the mainland upon his return to Washington. Mr. Parsons said that this had now been done, and that Mr. Dillon had asked him to give our views to Ambassador Yeh for transmission to President Chiang.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had plans for dropping paratroops on the mainland which he had discussed several years ago with Mr. Herter. Mr. Parsons indicated that he was familiar with this plan for training of 30,000 paratroopers. It did not appear to us to be a realistic war plan. However, what he wished to discuss today was our attitude toward GRC para-military activities. First of all he would like to stress that we sympathize with the GRC's desire to restore freedom to the mainland and will continue to support as best we can GRC measures to obtain this objective by political means, including propaganda and psychological warfare. We believe that a high priority should be given to determining what resistance assets are available for development on the mainland. United States agencies are prepared to give assistance in making such a determination. We feel that it is important to have an inventory of such assets as a prerequisite to successful para-military activities.

Mr. Parsons indicated that one of the points raised by President Chiang was that the United States had failed to deliver parachutes for the 3,000 special forces which were being trained by the United States MAAG for para-military activities. Mr. Parsons said he understood that training of these forces would be completed in the spring of 1960. As to the parachutes, we anticipated that 1,500 would be delivered early in

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/12–1659. Secret. Drafted by Martin.

[1] In a conversation on October 21; see Document 310.

1960. These had been programmed in Fiscal Year 1959. The balance of the 3,000 parachutes for the special forces would be programmed in Fiscal Years 1960 and 61. Mr. Parsons suggested that any further questions regarding delivery of the parachutes be taken up on Taiwan with the MAAG.

Mr. Parsons said that it was the view of the United States Government that employment of the special forces by the GRC should be in accordance with the Exchange of Notes of December 10, 1954 between Dr. Yeh and late Secretary Dulles and also in accordance with the Joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles October 23, 1958. Unilateral employment of GRC forces, whether regular or special, against the mainland would be contrary to these undertakings and would be damaging to the GRC's international position.

Ambassador Yeh inquired whether the delivery of the balance of the 3,000 parachutes would be made before the end of Fiscal Year 1961. Mr. Parsons replied that so far as he knew, there was no definite schedule as yet for the delivery of these parachutes, but he hoped that delivery would be earlier than June 1961. Ambassador Yeh asked if this would be the latest date for the delivery. Mr. Parsons indicated that he could not be precise as to the delivery date.

Referring to the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Exchange of Notes to the use of special forces, Ambassador Yeh asked if we would consider their use as one form of the use of force, Mr. Parsons replied in the affirmative. Ambassador Yeh said that the question of the applicability of the Treaty and the Exchange of Notes to para-military forces had been raised before, and it had never been clear whether their use in para-military and psychological warfare activities would be subject to the Exchange of Notes. Ambassador Yeh said that he would therefore reserve his position in this matter.[2]

---

[2] Yeh told Parsons on January 25, 1960, that his government fully understood and agreed with the U.S. position that use of the 3,000-man special forces unit undergoing training on Taiwan should be subject to joint consultation in accordance with the December 1954 exchange of notes. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2560; see Supplement)

323. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, December 31, 1959, 3 p.m.

537. Joint Embassy/ICA message. Subject: Accelerated Development Program Taiwan.

At time of Saccio visit[1] GRC was informed of US interest in embarking on accelerated development program Taiwan and invited to submit proposals.

After Haraldson's[2] return Hong Kong conference, CUSA presented him with 4-year plan. This was very general and did little more than suggest direction of development and asked for large amounts US aid. (Copy of this plan hand carried Washington by Ellis and Hunsberger.)[3] Haraldson commented that plan provided adequate initial step but that we were interested in action program aimed at maximizing self-help.

At luncheon given by Economic and Finance Ministers for Ellis, Haraldson explained in some detail exactly what we had in mind and pointed out type of response we would like to get from GRC. (Memorandum of this conversation sent Washington.) Yager subsequently discussed proposed program in general terms with Foreign Minister and Acting Secretary-General of Kuomintang.

Another week went by and on December 24 CUSA handed Haraldson a revised 4-year plan. This was in considerably more detail, indicating expected development by sectors of economy but again referred only in most general terms to action GRC was prepared to take to further development. Haraldson informed CUSA that we would like to see more concrete statement as to specific steps that GRC was prepared to take to maximize its contribution.

Up to this point we had not been particularly successful in getting across type of mutual effort program we had in mind. CUSA seemed to be unable to understand what we meant by maximizing self-help.

K.Y. Yin asked Haraldson if he would put down on paper summary statement as to just how we visualized such program might be handled

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/12–3159. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections.

[1] ICA Deputy Director Leonard J. Saccio visited Taipei December 3 and 4. Despatch 293 from Taipei, December 4, and telegram 973 from Hong Kong, December 6, reported on his conversations with Chinese officials. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/12–459 and 793.5–MSP/12–659, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Wesley C. Haraldson, Director of the ICA Mission in Taipei.

[3] Apparently William A. Ellis and Warren A. Hunsberger of the International Cooperation Administration.

in order that he could study it carefully and have something to show other members of the government. Consequently, Haraldson prepared summary statement, outline of which follows, and translation of which was given to Vice President by CUSA December 29. (Mission pouching full text to ICA/Washington.)

I. *Why accelerated program Taiwan?*

1. Necessary to provide jobs rapidly growing population and to build attractive "showcase" of achievements free society.

2. Prerequisites of leadership, skills, resources available Taiwan.

II. *Objective.*

Maximize sound economic growth next 4–5 years attaining condition where future growth would be self-generating, thus eliminating need foreign aid except military items and surplus agriculture products.

III. *Purpose and method of operation.*

1. Conceptually aid intended:

A. Encourage GRC take positive action for constructive economic, fiscal policy and
B. Provide foreign exchange necessary support growth to extent shortage needed foreign exchange not result of internal policies.

2. To lend flexibility, aid each year might be divided into three separate categories: (A) Minimum essential defense support necessary prevent deterioration living standard, (B) supplemental DS or SA, depending on positive action GRC to maximize effort. Rationale this aid:

1. Reward government for taking necessary action which in many cases might be domestically unpopular; 2. Provide foreign exchange needed by more vigorous, expansive industry which resulted from these government actions.

(C) specific funds for specific projects would be forthcoming under SIL, CDC and DLF aid to finance sound business expansion (amount of aid here largely dependent upon appetite private sector to expand, this in turn dependent upon success GRC in making business more attractive).

IV. *Action by GRC.*

GRC should take all possible steps to make business more profitable and attractive, thereby developing optimistic anticipations and willingness to risk and invest. Specification should include but not be confined to: 1. Limiting amount of resources annually devoted to military effort; 2. Non-inflationary fiscal credit policy; 3. Tax reform intended make business more attractive; 4. Uniform realistic exchange rate; 5. Liberalized exchange control; 6. Establishment utilities commission; 7. Securities registration and marketing; 8. Government divest itself of enterprises which compete with or could be better operated by private enterprise.

Yesterday, December 30, Vice President invited Haraldson and Yager to call and to discuss proposed program.

Yager emphasized political advantages to the GRC if an attractive showcase could be created and pointed out the necessity of full conviction and support by all elements of government and population if proposed program were to succeed.

Haraldson emphasized that (1) proposal outlined in paper did not represent Washington instructions, rather Embassy/Mission attempt to put in written form general suggestions carried here by Saccio group; (2) aim of program is to maximize sound economic growth, giving primary emphasis private sector; (3) program intended to make available necessary assistance to support this growth providing the government maximizes its self-help; (4) actual amount of aid any one year indeterminate since it depended upon appetite of private sector to expand, this in turn dependent upon success of government in creating attractive business climate.

Vice President's reaction was at first somewhat formal. He agreed in principle; he emphasized serious financial problems connected with demobilized officers and men; and asked many specific questions which indicated his keen understanding of the problem but which, it became apparent, had arisen as result of hasty translation. After these questions satisfactorily resolved, he seemed to become genuinely enthusiastic. He was particularly pleased that Taiwan has been selected for program like this and pointed out that several years ago he had suggested that allies which made special efforts should have special treatment. He observed that proposed program was natural development of the Dulles–Chiang joint communiqué and suggested that proper reference to this communiqué might be made in proposed program. He emphasized difficulties which government would face in making reforms that were necessary but agreed that these must be faced. He repeated several times his determination to improve investment climate.

Finally, he agreed that we could inform Washington that he was in accord with proposal contained in paper and was eager to get started.

Question now arises as to the next move and how to formalize any final understanding.

Mission is going ahead with 1961 program along lines suggested outline above and in accordance with amounts recommended ICA/Washington. We also propose to elicit from GRC a schedule of actions it is prepared to take over next few years to adopt and pursue policies intended to maximize self-help, together with some general goals as to contemplated magnitude and direction of anticipated development.

Ultimately, we believe high level conversations, perhaps as Secretary Herter with Chinese Ambassador and Ambassador Drumright with President Chiang, may be desirable. Such conversations might be followed by formal exchange of notes setting forth major elements of new joint US-Chinese undertaking. For immediate future, we suggest exchange of letters between Haraldson and K.Y. Yin as appropriate means of committing to writing agreement already achieved, if [as] assumed some such evidence of common intent would be necessary preliminary to presentation of new proposal to Congress. If Department and ICA/Washington concur, instructions requested soonest on desired content proposed exchange.

We feel that enthusiasm here is genuine and that we must act in positive fashion to maintain and direct this enthusiasm in proper channels.

Yager

---

324. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, January 8, 1960, 11 a.m.

3399. From Parsons. Toward close of call with Barbour on Selwyn Lloyd 7th (Embtel 3398)[1] I took occasion to say that I had not given rationale our China policy at length during talks with FonOff officials because this had been done in detail with Rob Scott in Washington in Nov 1958.[2] However, I did not want any reticence on this aspect of subject to be interpreted as a sign of change or weakening in our position. Secondly, I did not wish to leave London without querying British as to whether there were any differences between us or new factors in China equation which should be ventilated. Thirdly, I wished express appreciation to Lloyd for past support on moratorium procedure in UN and to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–860. Secret; Priority. Parsons visited London for talks with Foreign Office officials January 5–7. A memorandum by Embassy officer R.J. Ballantyne of the conversation summarized in this telegram is *ibid.*, 611.93/1–760; see Supplement.

[1] Dated January 8, telegram 3398 from London pertained to Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–860; printed in vol. XVI, pp. 175–176.)

[2] See footnote 3, Document 240.

express hope for its continuance with particular emphasis on key political considerations rather than technicalities and legalisms. Lloyd asked us come back in afternoon to discuss subject.

This afternoon Lloyd said there were no new problems or new differences on China between us. He said US carried main responsibility to contain Communist China, that he appreciated what large responsibility this was and what tremendous burden it caused us. He said he wished to do nothing which would add to this burden.

In course of afternoon discussion Lloyd asked me point blank, "What is US China policy?" And I outlined in equally pointed terms our recognition GRC as legitimate Govt of China and our non-recognition of ChiComs. I stressed effects of any US change of policy on whole area. Lloyd asked about our long-term China policy and I said it was no different from what I had just described. This seemed to surprise him somewhat. At close of discussion he described British policy as continuing along present lines for indefinable period in hope that in course of time something would happen to improve situation.

Lloyd said there was UN corollary to US China policy and he questioned how much longer US thought moratorium procedure would be successful. He mentioned emergence of African states and probability that in time their influence in UN might turn balance. I observed that as long as UK and other US friends would assist us in upholding moratorium, we believed we might be successful. (I had previously in FonOff meeting urged early cooperative discussion of how to bring about favorable voting situation as regards African states.)[3] Lloyd asked, if moratorium failed, whether ensuing vote would not be on straight majority basis, in which case ChiCom admission could be prevented (*sic*). Barbour and I were both of opinion that if moratorium could not be upheld, such vote immaterial as fight would be lost. Lloyd thereupon commented "You must continue to threaten to walk out." Making reference to congressional opinion, Barbour and I again joined voices to impress on Lloyd (and Dalton[4] and MacDermot[5] who were present) seriousness of this issue in US view. Lloyd seemed impressed by our comments and remarked with wry humour that introduction of ChiComs into UN might at least be one grizzly way to wind up UN which he called a "sausage factory."

In theory, Lloyd said he looked upon UN as universal organ and it was "a nonsense to exclude from it govt which had control of 650 million people." But [garble] he said he recognized practical considerations involved and as long as ChiComs continued in alienating world opinion, continuation of UN without them did not cause him any great concern.

---

[3] In a meeting on January 7 at 3 p.m., described in a memorandum of conversation by Ballantyne. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/1–760)

[4] Peter Dalton, Head, Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.

[5] D.F. MacDermot, Assistant Under Secretary for Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.

With reference to UK assistance in excluding ChiComs from UN specialized agencies, Barbour and I stressed that UK support of our position in specialized agencies would serve to prevent erosion at UN. We told Lloyd that UK support based on overriding political considerations rather than narrow legalisms was in best interest of both countries. Lloyd remarked that UK, insofar as it could, examined these issues with broad considerations in mind.

General tenor of conversation indicated no disposition to make life more difficult for us on China or related UN problem. On contrary he seemed to me to understand situation well and to appreciate importance US–UK collaboration wherever possible.

Barbour

---

325. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, January 8, 1960, noon.

553. Joint Embassy/ICA message. Embassy's 537.[1]

Haraldson and I met late yesterday with C.K. Yen, K.Y. Yin and K.T. Li to hear report of their conference earlier that afternoon with President Chiang, Vice President Chen and General Chang Chun on proposed program of accelerated economic development. Yen, Yin and Li reported that President was briefed on proposed program and was informed both orally and in writing of eight points set forth in paper discussed with Vice President on December 30 (see reference telegram) and which Vice President has agreed were measures which GRC should take as part of proposed program. After discussion, President confirmed Vice President's agreement to all 8 points and gave his support to proposed program.

Discussion of first point, setting limit on resources devoted to military effort, led to President's agreement to follow formula:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/1–860. Confidential.

[1] Document 323.

1. Assuming no change in overall situation, GRC military budget would be fixed at "present level" and would be increased only to compensate for price rises.
2. US military local currency programs would continue to be subject to "mutual agreement" and could therefore be increased to cover any increase in local currency costs caused by military modernization.

Chinese were unable to say whether President regarded military budget for current fiscal year as "present level" or had in mind ceiling set by Executive Yuan for FY 1961. They promised to obtain clarification.

Haraldson and I congratulated Chinese on their success with President.

Concerning military budgetary formula, we indicated this approval might well be workable, but noted fact that various details need to be worked out with MAAG before firm proposal could be submitted to Washington for approval.

Concurrence of President in proposed program clears way for early exchange of letters between Haraldson and Yin[2] proposed in reference telegram. Yin has indicated officially his willingness to engage in such exchange. Early instructions needed on desired content of exchange. We believe that it is most important to respond quickly to favorable developments on Chinese side and not lose momentum which has built up in support of new program.

Yager

---

[2] Telegram 581 from Taipei, January 16, reported the receipt of a January 14 letter from Yin to Haraldson assuring him of GRC determination to carry out measures to accelerate economic growth, with an attached "Accelerated Economic Growth Program." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/1–1660; see Supplement) Yin's letter stated that the attachment had been approved by the cabinet and that the 19 measures that it listed had been approved in principle by President Chiang. The attachment, also dated January 14, included measures designed to encourage savings, establish a capital market, improve the climate for private investment, and reform the tax structure, the budget system, and banking system. One item called for holding defense spending at the current level, with allowance for inflation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 500—Accelerated Program for Taiwan)

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, January 20, 1960, 10 a.m.

1146. USUN for Lodge. Beam–Wang Talks. 95th meeting two hours.[1]

Leading off with reference to President's State of Union message[2] and comment that deeds count, not words, Wang proceeded attack US–Japan security treaty[3] and introduction nuclear weapons into South Korea. He then denounced US presence in Taiwan area, recent cooperation with GRC forces, and "two Chinas plot" in familiar terms, rejecting again latest US proposed agreed announcement.

I responded by first briefly rebutting Wang's accusations relating to Japan, Korea and US cooperation with GRC forces, pointing out all these US measures made necessary by Communist actions. I continued with material from first two paragraphs Deptel 776.[4]

I made statement on prisoners based third paragraph reference telegram, to which Wang replied in usual manner but implied prisoners not to be released until termination of sentence. I requested clarification and his reply indicated door still open for advance release.

Wang then made statement on Bombay incident[5] based on January 12 statement of Chinese Communist Consulate Bombay and attempted use it as proof US continuing promote cold war. He contrasted US behavior Bombay with exemplary Chinese Communist behavior concerning American sailors who crossed border. I responded with material from reference telegram and Deptel 777[6] on reluctance Chinese Communist cooperate with Bombay police to which Wang had no reply. He was reduced to simply reiterating accusation US had kidnapped Chang Chien-Yuh.

To my question whether Bishop Walsh had been sentenced I received evasive reply and expressed hope Wang at next meeting would

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2060. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei.

[1] The meeting was held on January 19. Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 1151 from Warsaw, January 20, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–123, January 22. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/1–2060 and 611.93/1–2260, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Of January 7; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 3–17.

[3] Signed at Washington on January 19; for text, see 11 UST 1632.

[4] Telegram 776 to Warsaw, January 15, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. The first two paragraphs instructed him to renew his arguments for the draft agreed announcement that he had presented at the November 6 meeting (see Document 311). (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1560; see Supplement)

[5] See footnote 2, Document 320.

[6] Dated January 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 122.22111/1–1660)

give us information on Bishop's welfare and whether he had been sentenced.

Wang responded as usual to my statement on unaccounted-for prisoners, saying it not appropriate for discussion here.

Next meeting February 23, 2 p.m.

Beam

---

327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, February 4, 1960, 4 p.m.

637. President Chiang asked me to see him this morning for an informal talk. At his request I gave an account of my consultations in Washington. In this regard, he referred to his conversation with Under Secretary Dillon on October 21 last[1] and asked if I had had any discussions of paramilitary mainland operations problem in Washington. I replied I had discussed it in a general way with Parsons and [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*], and during my stay in Washington Parsons had conveyed to Ambassador Yeh for transmittal to President Chiang US views re representations Chiang had made to Dillon.

Anticipating Chiang might want to discuss this issue, I had with me a copy of memorandum of conversation of December 16 between Yeh and Parsons.[2] I told President I had memo which constituted reply to his representations and asked if he desired to review conversation even though I assumed Ambassador Yeh had reported it fully. President responded affirmatively, whereupon I had President's interpreter give him virtually full translation of memo.

President change of countenance reflected his unhappiness as translation proceeded. However, he retained his composure and appeared prepared to proceed to other subjects without comment. But in response to my invitation for comment, he said US Government is "being severe and holding to a very rigid line" which suggested to him US Government continued to manifest a "lack of confidence" in him.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:09 a.m.

[1] See Document 310.

[2] Document 322.

I assured President we had every confidence in him. I said we wished to achieve same objectives, but had differences over way to approach problem before us.

I stressed our desire to be helpful in ways we could approve, and suggested further informal discussions, in which our concerned military and intelligence authorities could participate, in order to have a full exchange of views and to try to reconcile differences of approach. President indicated he would be amenable to further discussions which we will attempt to set up [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].

Comment: I thought it advisable to suggest further discussions because President clearly is still unhappy re what he regards as restrictive US attitude toward mainland operations and because there are some indications he may be making active preparations to plant paramilitary units on mainland within next few months. I would hope frank discussions with President would make realistically clear many problems to be overcome in carrying out operations he may envisage, would give us opportunity to gain clearer insight into his thinking and offer us opportunity to stress again and again our own concepts of approach and program which President does not now appear to accept.

Drumright

---

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, February 23, 1960, 7 p.m.

1308. Beam–Wang Talks. 96th meeting two hours fifteen minutes.[1]

I opened with statement incorporating substance paragraphs one and two Deptel 875.[2] Wang replied without referring directly to state-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2–2360. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 1314 from Warsaw, February 24, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–145, February 26. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/2–2460 and 611.93/2–2660, respectively)

[2] Telegram 875 to Warsaw, February 18, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. The first two paragraphs instructed him to refer to an article by a Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party leader, which said Chou En-lai and Chen Yi had told him the PRC was against settling disputes by force, and to press Wang for a public affirmation of this principle. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/2–1860)

ments reportedly made to Matsumura by Chen Yi and Chou En-lai, declaring Chinese Communists consistently upheld principle of settling disputes by negotiations without use force. He then read from prepared statement usual accusations that US causing tension by occupying Taiwan and carrying out provocative maneuvers in Far East including incursions into Chinese territorial waters and air space. He continued with long attack on US–Japan Security Treaty alleging US violating Potsdam declaration by reviving Japanese militarism for aggressive purposes. I replied by pointing to hostile posture Chinese Communists as source of Far Eastern tension and argued necessity of US defensive arrangements in Far East.

After brief reply by Wang along usual lines, I made statement on Bombay incident based third paragraph reference telegram to which Wang's only response was reiteration previous accusations against American Consulate General Bombay.

In response my request for information concerning Bishop Walsh, Wang said he had none today but that when he did he would communicate it to me. I expressed disappointment that information still unavailable after so long a time, following this with statement on other prisoners to which Wang replied briefly in customary manner.

Replying to my request for any future information concerning Yacht *Tora* and occupants, Wang said it was practice his government make available any information concerning Americans coming within their purview as exemplified by recent case of two American seamen. He said as he had told us his government had no information concerning *Tora* or occupants.

I then made statement on newsmen as instructed paragraph four reference telegram.[3] Wang replied from prepared statement alleging policy of US Government was to make it appear that responsibility for preventing exchange newsmen was on their side whereas in fact US Government was responsible. He quoted White House spokesman as saying April 7, 1959 US policy was to ban American correspondents going to Communist China. Also said Department had specifically announced that Chinese Communist correspondents would not be admitted to US to cover Khrushchev visit. He said it was entirely up to Chinese correspondents themselves whether they wished to apply for a visa to visit US but then insisted that exchange of correspondents only possible if US entered into agreement he proposed in 1957. I pointed out US could not make such agreement under its laws and said both US and presumably also Chinese Communist correspondents traveled to many countries without any such agreement and I do not see why he insisted on it. I mentioned that even certain US newsmen had been admitted to Communist China without such agreement. Wang's only response was to repeat that way to facilitate exchange of newsmen was to have agreement.

---

[3] This paragraph suggested reopening the newsmen issue by recounting the background and reaffirming the position set forth in the Department's press release of April 23, 1959 (see footnote 1, Document 282).

Telegram 975 to Warsaw, March 21, 1960, informed Beam that James Hagerty had implied this in a television interview on April 5, 1959, but that Department spokesman Lincoln White had corrected the impression left by Hagerty's remarks the next day. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2160)

Wang proposed next meeting March 29 and I countered with March 22, 2 p.m. which he accepted.

Beam

---

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, March 22, 1960, 7 p.m.

1466. Beam–Wang Talks. 97th meeting two hours.[1]

Wang opened with brief statement informing me Walsh had been tried and sentenced to 20 years for espionage and declaring this was just another example of US imperialist effort subvert new China. I responded with strong protest along lines Deptel 970.[2]

Wang rejected protest and continued to develop theme that Walsh incident proved US aggressive intent against his country, citing Parsons speech[3] and Herter letter to Dalai Lama to bolster his case. I refuted Wang's allegations of US aggressive intent and made statements on Parsons speech and Herter letter accordance guidance Deptel 966.[4]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–2260. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1, 2, and 4 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 1468 from Warsaw, March 23, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–169, March 25. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/3–2360 and 611.93/3–2560, respectively)

[2] Telegram 970 to Warsaw, March 19, instructed Beam to protest in the strongest possible terms the trial and sentencing of Bishop Walsh, which had been announced March 18. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/3–1960)

[3] Reference is to an address by Parsons before the Wisconsin Bar Association in Milwaukee on February 19; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1960, pp. 404–410.

[4] Telegram 966 to Warsaw, March 18, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/3–1860)

After some further give-and-take in which Wang attempted demonstrate US itself failed to practice principle of self-determination in respect Negroes and American Indians, he went on to cite US maneuvers in Far East, statements by US military spokesmen and alleged intrusions into Chinese Communist territorial waters as further evidence US plotting. I denied allegation by continuing with material from first paragraph Deptel 966.

There was some further give-and-take along usual lines with respect Taiwan and renunciation force, following which I made statement on US imprisoned civilians and missing servicemen. Wang made customary reply in very brief form.

I then raised question of newsmen covering material in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Deptel 966 to which Wang made short reply endeavoring demonstrate US responsible in past for failure exchange of journalists and then stating he reserved right to comment on other aspects this matter at next meeting. Since Wang's last statement indicated Chinese Communists may be planning shift in their position or some new initiative in this matter I thought it best not to inform him we intended make public statement.[5] Instead, I said we not interested in debating where responsibility lay in the past for failure of journalists travel take place but rather wanted to know whether his side was still interested in bringing about such exchange.

Wang's proposed "for administrative reasons" on his side that next meeting not be held until May and we agreed on May 17 2:00 p.m.

Beam

---

[5] A draft press release stating that Beam had raised the newsmen issue at the February 23 meeting and reiterating the U.S. position on the issue was transmitted in telegram 967 to Warsaw, March 18. (*Ibid.*) The Department did not release the statement but instead issued a press release on March 22 stating that Beam had protested the trial and sentencing of Bishop Walsh at the meeting that day; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 11, 1960, p. 556.

330. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, April 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

CIA memorandum dated 14 April 1960, same subject[1]

1. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has sent us further information relating to his progress concerning subject. Following is a summary of that information:

a. As the result of a long series of confidential talks [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Lieutenant General Chiang Ching-kuo, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has agreed to the following:

(1) The GRC will not take precipitate action to launch 200-man teams against the China Mainland this spring, although training of Special Forces in accord with the large team concept will continue.

(2) He will keep [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] informed on GRC plans and training readiness of Special Forces being developed as the 200-man team reservoir regardless of whether they are MAP-supported.

(3) He will advise [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in advance when and if the GRC feels it must implement the large team concept unilaterally.

(4) The GRC will propose small team operations in West China but recognizes that approval will be on a case-by-case evaluation of operational feasibility.

b. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has briefed Ambassador Everett F. Drumright on the above.

2. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] notes that in view of the above he considers the initial phase of the educational process mentioned in reference to be concluded.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[*name not declassified*][2]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Files: Job 83–00036R, Box 2, HS/CSG–304. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[1] Printed below.

[2] Printed from a copy that indicates [*name not declassified*] signed the original above FitzGerald's typed signature.

[Attachment][3]

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, April 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

CIA memorandum dated 7 March 1960, same subject

1. Since the forwarding of referenced memorandum to you [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has sent us further information relating to his progress concerning subject. This information is forwarded to you as an enclosure to this memorandum.

2. It should be noted that the schedule mentioned in the reference has been successfully met and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] believes that the GRC is now willing to postpone implementation of their large team concept, at least for a year. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is now trying to persuade the GRC that any smaller teams to be sent into China should be in accord with purely operational considerations.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[*name not declassified*][4]

[Enclosure][5]

1. At the Baguio conference [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] had several talks with Admiral Felt during which he briefed the Admiral on [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. He also told the

---

[3] Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on April 6.

[4] Printed from a copy that indicates [*name not declassified*] signed the original above FitzGerald's typed signature.

[5] Secret. The unsigned, untitled, and undated source text bears no drafting information.

Admiral that the GRC was urging large scale airdrops and that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was attempting to dissuade the GRC from this concept or at least to postpone implementation.

2. Our representative also had a long discussion with Assistant Secretary Parsons at Baguio and brought him up to date on the details of the GRC large scale airdrop concept and of the tactical problems involved in negotiations with the GRC regarding this concept. With the full support of Ambassador Everett Drumright our representative made these recommendations: that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek be persuaded tactfully that his initial plan is presently impossible to execute clandestinely and that, informally and unofficially, he be made to understand that his plan, which amounts to semi-overt military assault, is clearly inadvisable in the context of the present international situation.

3. Assistant Secretary Parsons agreed that these negotiating tactics are sound, and did not press for Department of State involvement as long as Ambassador Drumright and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] continue their present close coordination in the field.

4. To implement the recommendations described in paragraph 3, above, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will continue the tactic of attempting to educate the GRC [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] while committing the United States to nothing, avoiding a direct affront to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and keeping open [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to GRC thinking on this subject. In this connection we have advised him that in the absence of already organised Mainland resistance forces requiring training and direction and because even the pretense of clandestinity is impossible, we cannot agree to his involvement in the 20-man team concept which was proposed by the GRC as a more immediate addition to their larger scale operational concept.

5. The educational tactic will include [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the GRC within the framework of presently approved operational programs, of supporting feasible operational proposals, and of fobbing-off both the 200-man and 20-man team concepts by making success in other operations and the need for clandestinity strict prerequisites [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] expresses the belief that this approach will permit Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to save face and will allow [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to continue to monitor the planning done by the GRC in this field.

6. We believe, therefore, that there is no current need for the Department of State to take action in this regard.

[Attachment][6]

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, March 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

REFERENCE

CIA memorandum dated 13 February 1960, same subject

1. Since the referenced memorandum was sent to you the Central Intelligence Agency has received [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] elaborating information indicating the possibility of some watering down of the original GRC proposal for the dropping of 200-man teams into the mainland around May or June 1960. The new GRC proposal envisages the use of six intelligence teams of up to 20 men each to be dropped into six new target areas. These smaller teams are proposed as additional rather than as alternative to the large teams originally proposed. However, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is optimistic that in due time he can persuade the GRC to substitute the concept of 20-man teams for that of much larger teams. He believes that he can persuade the GRC to change its plans in this respect over a period of six weeks to two months, primarily through his frequent discussions with Chiang Ching-kuo. He believes that, in addition, there is even a possibility that the target date for these drops might be postponed by the GRC from 1960 to mid-1961.

2. Although [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has had some success in modifying the original GRC plans, CIA does not believe the concept of 20-man teams to be, for both political and technical reasons, any more acceptable than the concept of larger teams. However, we have taken note of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] suggestion that he be allowed additional time to attempt to dissuade the GRC of the advisability of aggressive action before the decision is made to make representations through diplomatic channels. We have suggested to the Department of State that for the time being it confine itself to discussing the general problem with Ambassador Drumright and informing him that, should it prove impossible to reach a meeting of the minds with the

---

[6] Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on March 7.

GRC acting through [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] diplomatic representations will then be necessary. It was additionally suggested that the draft telegram proposed by the Department of State be withheld at this time.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
Desmond FitzGerald[7]

[Attachment][8]

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Bissell) to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale of the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense

Washington, February 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

Government of the Republic of China Plans for Paramilitary Action

1. The Central Intelligence Agency has received [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a report concerning plans of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to engage in large scale paramilitary operations against Communist China. As you know, previous information on this subject was disseminated through intelligence reporting channels.

2. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has discussed with the GRC the overall problem of conducting operations on the mainland to exploit the resistance potential which the GRC believes exists there on a large scale. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has attempted to keep such planning on a modest and clandestine level, and has monitored GRC planning to ensure that it is in accord with treaty obligations and in the spirit of the joint Dulles–Chiang communiqué.

3. The report from Taipei states that the GRC planning, which is largely inspired by President Chiang Kai-shek, covers the following points:

a. The airdrop of 200- to 300-man teams as paramilitary assault units into each of nine target areas selected in the Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Sikang region.

---

[7] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[8] Secret. Drafted in the Far East Division in the Directorate of Operations on February 12.

b. These paramilitary units are to establish themselves as the leaders of local guerrilla resistance forces which the GRC insists will join or at least enthusiastically support the paramilitary units. Such units will then disperse to specified points within each target area, with an average of five points within each target area. Their objective will be to recruit or overpower the local commune militia and thereby build up their manpower and arsenal.

c. These sub-units at the separate points would have internal lateral communications with the unit designated as the Position Control Unit and this unit would have communications with GRC Taipei Headquarters.

d. The GRC wishes to drop these units within a very short span of time and believes there is no need to send in small clandestine teams in advance to assess the area situation. The GRC agrees that doing so would compromise the selected target areas which President Chiang Kai-shek has designated as ideal for airborne operations designed to spark widespread rebellion in Southwest China and would hopefully serve as the prelude to nationwide rebellion.

e. Most target areas are on provincial borders and appear to meet the standard criteria for selection of areas for clandestine action.

f. Although they prefer to use personnel from the MAP-supported Second and Third Special Forces, the GRC recognizes the U.S. hold on these troops and therefore plans to draw their paramilitary teams from the personnel of the non-MAP-supported First Special Force Group or from their old guerrilla forces which were withdrawn from the off-shore islands.

g. The GRC planning and training for the organization and employment of Special Forces against the selected targets has been going on for the past two years. The surfacing of these plans to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is due to the feeling of the GRC that opportunities for this type of operation on the mainland are greatest during the next year or two and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] might be able to get U.S. approval for such a large clandestine effort whereas regular military employment of these forces is precluded by policy considerations.

h. Lieutenant General Chiang Ching-kuo has told [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that this is the key GRC strategic plan and the GRC must execute it at the optimum time, unilaterally if necessary.

i. The GRC, however, would prefer U.S. approval of the above concept and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] support in the form of airlift, parachutes, communications equipment and ammunition as well as training and target area [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] support.

j. While timing is being argued apart from the planning concept, it is abundantly clear that President Chiang has passed down orders to be ready for large team airdrops by May or June 1960.

k. An outline of the complete plan for mainland guerrilla warfare, studies of selected target areas and personnel and training status reports on the first, Second and Third Special Forces Groups have been obtained [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The complete plan calls for a military assault force on such a scale that [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] consider it suicidally unrealistic.

4. Although [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] have attempted to moderate the more ambitious plans of the GRC, it is obvious that their counterparts are subjected to positive pressures from the highest level of the GRC. Such planning [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] considers to be of importance on the national level. The Department of State has been informed of this situation and it has been requested that it be considered at appropriate levels and that a decision be made as to what action will be taken.

5. Because of the political sensitivity of this matter, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has requested that this situation be handled outside of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] channels. He has briefed Ambassador Drumright, Admiral Smoot and General Dean.

For the Deputy Director (Plans):
[*name not declassified*][9]

---

[9] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

331. Editorial Note

At the 442d meeting of the National Security Council on April 28, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations and the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, April 28, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR and Communist China were conducting a kind of debate through public pronouncements in their journals on communist ideology. Both sides were quoting freely from Lenin. Three principal ideological points appeared to be at issue. The first point concerned the inevitability of war. The Chinese Communists say war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists and maintain that the 'socialist camp' will win such wars as occur. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that the strength of the Bloc is now so great that the theory of inevitable war may be cast aside in favor of 'peaceful competition'. A second point at issue concerns the peaceable intentions of the West. The Chinese Communists maintain that the West is increasing its military preparations. They say that since general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc would be fatal for the imperialist powers, the U.S. is planning to use its military forces to fight limited war. The Soviets, on the other hand, say that the U.S. is seeking peace. A third point concerns the possibility of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese Communists maintain that the capitalist powers are now tottering on the brink of destruction to such an extent that an aggressive policy by the communist world would complete the disintegration of the West. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that an aggressive policy by the communist powers would rally the West to make a final desperate effort. Mr. Dulles believed this doctrinal dispute indicated that the Chinese Communists feel a détente would be to their disadvantage. They fear that an agreement for the maintenance of the status quo in the West might lead to an agreement for maintenance of the status quo in Asia, thus blocking their aggressive desires.

"Mr. Dulles believed it was necessary to watch carefully the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Sixty additional fighter planes, probably MIG–17s, had been moved from other parts of China to airfields near the Taiwan Strait recently. The Watch Committee, although noting that the Chinese Nationalists are concerned about the situation, believes that the Chinese Communists do not intend immediate military activity against Taiwan. Of course the Chinese Communists have the capability of initiating an attack in the Taiwan Strait with little or no warning. Mr. Dulles thought it was possible that the Chinese Communists might decide to engage in some military activity in the region of the Taiwan Strait in order to put diplomatic pressure on the USSR in connection with the Summit Meeting." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

At President Eisenhower's news conference on May 11, a questioner asked about U.S. policy toward Quemoy and Matsu and referred to controversy in the Presidential election campaign on the subject. The text of the President's reply is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960,* page 659; for the transcript of the news conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61,* pages 403–414.

332. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 100–2–60 Washington, May 17, 1960.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

The Problem

To assess Sino-Indian relations and their international implications.

Conclusions

1. Sino-Indian border clashes have shattered the appearance of cordiality between the two states. Early agreement on the boundary dispute is unlikely. However, both sides are probably willing to live with the present stalemate for some time, although further border clashes may occur. In the event of a prolonged failure to resolve the dispute, the climate could alter significantly, particularly if Nehru leaves the scene before a settlement. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that an eventual settlement could be achieved—probably involving Indian concessions in Ladakh in return for Chinese recognition of India's claims in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). However, even if the border issue is settled, it is unlikely that the friendly relations which existed in the past can be fully restored. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. Peiping's moves have sharply increased anti-Chinese sentiment in India. They have also tended to create in India a more sympathetic view of US policies, though India remains dedicated to the principle of nonalignment, and will also be influenced by interest in continued large-scale Soviet aid and by some hope that the USSR will restrain Communist China. The position of the Indian Communist Party has been made more difficult, but it has not suffered a critical setback. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. To date Communist China has outstripped India in economic growth. The present wide gap in growth rates is expected to narrow, but the absolute disparity between the economies will probably continue to widen. As a result China will be able to maintain—and probably increase—its military superiority over India. However, as long as India is making significant economic progress, most Asian countries will probably continue to derive encouragement from India's example. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 17 May 1960."

4. Communist China's growing strength and its aggressiveness have caused a more somber assessment of Chinese Communist motivations among Asian leaders. Even if the Sino-Indian border dispute is resolved through negotiations, the more apprehensive Asian view of Communist China that has recently developed probably will not be erased. Nevertheless, it is likely that Communist China's strength and dynamism and its ambitions for political hegemony will figure more prominently in Asia than will India's influence. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 7 pages of source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, June 7, 1960, 6 p.m.

1906. Beam–Wang Talks. 98th meeting two hours and 10 minutes.[1]

I led off with brief statement urging need for elimination threat of force in Taiwan area and urging consideration our renunciation of force proposal. Wang responded by attacking US activities at Summit and in West Pacific since last meeting, accusing US Government of talking peace while preparing for war. He charged President's proposed visit Taiwan[2] was provocation against Chinese people.

I denied Wang's allegation US responsible for Summit failure[3] and referred him to President's speech May 25[4] and Secretary's May 27 testi-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–760. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1, 6, and 7 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 1907 from Warsaw, June 8, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–238, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6–860 and 611.93/6–1060, respectively)

[2] The President was scheduled to visit Taipei June 18–19.

[3] Documentation concerning the abortive four-power summit conference which met in Paris on May 16 is printed in volume IX.

[4] For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 434–441.

mony[5] for full statement US position. I then pointed out US collective security activities in western Pacific at which he complained were made necessary by his side's threat to use force against allies of US. I rejected his protest re President's Taiwan visit. Wang came back with more detailed recital of alleged US provocations and aggressive actions including intrusions into his country's territorial sea and air which I refuted briefly.

I then made statement on Bishop Walsh, prisoners and unaccounted-for servicemen along lines paragraph 4 Deptel 1222.[6] Wang made routine reply reiterating allegation Walsh was justifiably sentenced as subversive agent and US had no right interfere.

On newsmen I presented argumentation paragraphs 6 to 8 of Deptel 1222 in three installments. After each of first two installments Wang accused US of "arrogance" in denying his country reciprocity and insisting that signed agreement essential because of US "faithlessness". However, proposal that US prepared agree to public statement as contained last paragraph Deptel 1220[7] caught him off balance. He hesitated and pressed to make sure that what we had in mind was in form of agreed announcement rather than separate unilateral statements. Then said he had reservations concerning both content and form of proposed statement but would comment further at next meeting. Since he did not reject our proposal, I did not take final step as per last sentence Deptel 1222.[8]

Next meeting Friday, July 15, 2 p.m.

Beam

---

[5] For text of the Secretary's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1960, pp. 947–955.

[6] Telegram 1222 to Warsaw, May 13, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting, then scheduled for May 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–1360) Telegrams 1330 and 1337 to Warsaw, June 4 and 6, modified the instructions. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/6–460 and 611.93/6–660, respectively)

[7] Telegram 1220 to Warsaw, May 13, transmitted the text of a statement of the U.S. position on admission and treatment of newsmen. The last paragraph stated that PRC newsmen would be admitted to the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and accorded the same facilities for news reporting as were generally accorded to foreign newsmen. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/5–1360) Telegrams 1222 and 1337, cited above, authorized Beam to agree to issue this statement, together with a reciprocal Chinese statement, as an agreed announcement.

[8] It stated that if Wang continued to insist on a signed agreement, Beam should inform him that the United States intended to release the text of the statement and to note that he had rejected the principles it contained.

334. Memorandum of Discussion at the 447th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 8, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy on Hong Kong* (NSC 5717;[1] NSC 5913/1;[2] SNIE 13–3–57;[3] OCB Special Report on NSC 5717, dated December 23, 1959;[4] NSC Action No. 2172–b;[5] NSC 6007;[6] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 17 and 26, 1960;[7] Memo For All Holders of NSC 6007, dated May 31, 1960[8])

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6007. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)[9]

In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray referred to the differences of view with respect to Paragraph 7, relating to major civil disturbances in Hong Kong. The majority of the Planning Board proposed that the U.S. should be prepared to provide U.S. forces if required to prevent British loss of control of the city as a result of such disturbances; while the Bureau of the Budget proposed that the U.S. should not provide armed forces to assist the British in suppressing civil disturbances in Hong Kong.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on June 15. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, President's Daily Appointments)

[1] "U.S. Policy on Hong Kong," July 17, 1957. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5717 Series)

[2] "U.S. Policy in the Far East," September 25, 1959, printed in vol. XVI, pp. 133–144.

[3] "The Chinese Communist Threat to Hong Kong," November 19, 1957. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[4] The report recommended an NSC review of NSC 5717; the Operations Coordinating Board approved the recommendation on December 23, 1959. (Preliminary Notes of OCB Meeting, December 23, 1959; *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430)

[5] In NSC Action No. 2172–b, approved by the President on January 13, the Council directed the Planning Board to review NSC 5717 in the light of NSC 5913/1. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] "U.S. Policy on Hong Kong," a draft statement of policy, May 9, 1960. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)

[7] The May 17 memorandum transmitted a May 16 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Gates commenting on NSC 6007. The May 26 memorandum transmitted a May 25 memorandum from Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller to Gray proposing substitute language for NSC 6007. (*Ibid.*)

[8] This memorandum transmitted revisions made by the Planning Board in NSC 6007. (*Ibid.*)

[9] Drafted by P.J. Halla and dated June 6, not printed.

The President was inclined to favor the Budget point of view. He said that if the U.K. became so weak that it was not able to suppress civil disturbances in Hong Kong after we had, as set forth in the first part of Paragraph 7, provided assistance and supplies, he was unable to see why we should intervene with U.S. forces. If the U.K. was about to lose control of Hong Kong as a result of civil disturbances, it was on the point of losing control over all its territories. Accordingly, the President believed the Bureau of the Budget proposition was the correct one despite the distinguished gentlemen on the other side of the argument. Mr. Gray said he would like to take a few minutes to explain the majority position. The President said he supposed the majority had a right to be heard.

Mr. Gray then indicated the feeling of the majority that major civil disturbances in Hong Kong, no matter what their origin, would lead inevitably to communist control unless we land troops to help the British. In this connection he referred to Paragraph 28 of the General Considerations section of NSC 6007 which stated that "It is virtually certain that if civil disturbances were to proceed to a point where the British lost control of the situation, a Chinese Communist takeover would follow."

The President believed that if the British were about to lose Hong Kong as a result of civil disturbances, Hong Kong would be such a completely hostile place that there would be little use in attempting to retain it. Mr. Dillon said his reaction upon reading Paragraph 7 for the first time had been similar to that of the President. However, he believed the language proposed by the Bureau of the Budget went too far because Paragraph 9 of NSC 6007 provided that under certain circumstances the U.S. would be prepared to intervene in Hong Kong with armed force. The President felt that the majority language went too far in the opposite direction. Mr. Dillon said the State Department might make some suggestions for the revision of Paragraph 9 when the Council reached that paragraph. In the meantime, he felt Paragraph 7 should be limited to civil disturbances which in the opinion of the U.S. Government are directly communist-inspired. The President could not imagine the U.K. requiring any assistance except on a temporary emergency basis until it could deploy more forces to the area. He felt the British would be near the end of their power if they were compelled to ask for U.S. troops to suppress civil disturbances in Hong Kong.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the language of Paragraph 7 be made to conform to the language of Paragraph 9. Accordingly, he proposed that "a decision as to whether or not to provide U.S. forces to prevent loss of British control of Hong Kong in the event of major civil disturbances should be made in the light of conditions prevailing at the time." Moreover, any decision to provide U.S. forces should give consideration to actions in the U.N. The President pointed out that Paragraph 9 did not deal with strictly civil disturbances. Mr. Douglas[10] agreed that a great deal depended on the definition of civil disturbances. He thought the authors of NSC 6007 must have been referring, in Paragraph 7, not to armed invasion across the border but to major organized communist action within Hong Kong. The President was still unable to understand how we could go to the assistance of the U.K. in Hong Kong except under very unusual circumstances. Mr. Dillon pointed out that Paragraph 7, by employing the phrase "especially if communist-instigated", implied that we would help the British in the event of civil disturbances in Hong Kong which were not communist-instigated.

Mr. McCone[11] suggested that both alternative versions of the last sentence of Paragraph 7 should be deleted and that Paragraph 9 should be revised to cover both an actual Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong and major communist civil disturbances in that city. The President felt that if the disturbances were purely civil disturbances, the U.K. would be able to deal with them. Moreover, the U.K., with its good intelligence system, would probably know whether or not such disturbances were communist-inspired.

Mr. Gray said our existing policy on Hong Kong, which NSC 6007 was designed to replace, had been prepared in the contemplation that Hong Kong would have to be written off in case of communist attack. The existing policy provided that the U.S. would not intervene with armed forces. In reviewing existing policy, however, the conclusion had been reached that it was now possible to take a more positive approach. This more positive approach was reflected in NSC 6007. Mr. Gray felt that the problem presented by the alternative versions of Paragraph 7 would be solved by adopting Mr. McCone's suggestion that a decision as to whether or not to provide U.S. forces to assist the British should be made in the light of the circumstances existing at the time.

The President said that even if civil disturbances in Hong Kong were instigated by the communists, the people creating the disturbances would have to receive outside communist support or else the British would be able to suppress the disorders. The President stated that he was not ready to order the intervention of U.S. armed forces in the event of civil disturbances in Hong Kong unless there was a showing that Chinese Communist forces were involved. If it could be determined that Chinese Communist forces were intervening in Hong Kong, then he was ready to send U.S. forces to help the British. He pointed out that we were not intervening in Cuba, which was much closer to the U.S. After asking Mr. McCone to repeat his earlier suggestion, the President said that Paragraph 9 should be revised to indicate that in the event of actual Chinese

---

[10] Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas.

[11] Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone.

Communist attack on Hong Kong or civil disturbances with the direct support of the Communist Chinese, a decision as to whether or not the U.S. should intervene against the aggressor should be made in the light of conditions existing at the time. Paragraph 9, as revised, would then refer to Chinese Communist forces crossing the border into Hong Kong.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. Allen whether he wished to comment on the objective in NSC 6007 which referred to the usefulness of Hong Kong as a base for information programs. Mr. Allen said that Hong Kong was a key base for information programs with respect to Communist China and the Far East in general. Hong Kong was particularly useful as a listening post and as a publishing center for anti-communist books, periodicals, pamphlets, etc. Mr. Allen then displayed a number of anti-communist books in the Chinese language published in Hong Kong.

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraph 13 dealing with trade problems. He said this paragraph might be somewhat suspect in the light of the discussion at the last Council meeting on U.S. policy toward Japan. He recalled that the President had felt that certain economic paragraphs of the Japanese policy paper contained too much detail but he believed Paragraph 13 of NSC 6007 was less detailed. Mr. Dillon suggested that the provisions of Paragraph 13 which referred to U.S. import restrictions were rather detailed for an NSC paper in view of the situation which existed in Hong Kong. The President suggested that the phrase "without imposing U.S. import restrictions" could be eliminated from Paragraph 13 or, alternatively, the word "unnecessary" could be inserted before "U.S." Mr. Dillon said the State Department wished to avoid having its hands tied in view of the difficult situation in Hong Kong.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that Paragraph 13 referred to the participation by American business interests in Hong Kong in the production of goods for local consumption or for export. He assumed the paragraph was not intended to refer to export to Communist China. Actually, most of the goods produced in Hong Kong would go to Communist China. The Vice President thought this paragraph referred to ordinary trade goods and asked whether any problem of strategic materials was involved. Mr. Scribner said the problem was not one of strategic trade. However, he agreed with Mr. Dulles that we should not promote the participation of American business in the production of goods which would be exported to Communist China. Mr. Gray suggested that the offending phrase might be modified by referring to "goods for local consumption or for export to Free World markets." The President approved this suggestion.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that Hong Kong was rapidly building up its export trade in textiles. Japan had imposed voluntary restrictions on its export of textiles to the U.S. but Hong Kong refused to take similar measures. The Vice President said a great deal of political pressure was now being exerted with respect to importation of textiles from Hong Kong, which had replaced Japan as the major object of concern in this regard. He asked whether Hong Kong had any plan for imposing voluntary export quotas. Mr. Dillon said the U.S. had been negotiating with Hong Kong officials for some time but as yet these negotiations had produced no tangible results. Hong Kong had imposed voluntary restrictions on its exports to the U.K. but refused to impose such restrictions on exports to the U.S. The President wondered why we did not negotiate this matter with the U.K. since Hong Kong was a British colony. Mr. Dillon replied that the British always insisted that we negotiate with the Hong Kong officials. He pointed out that Hong Kong did have its own government. Mr. Dillon added that Hong Kong officials are free in saying that they intend to expand their export trade to the U.S. until we are ready to take some action against them, at which point they will voluntarily limit their exports to us. The Vice President suggested that it would be desirable to attempt to solve the problem of the importation of Hong Kong goods into the U.S. at an early date in order to avoid creating a false issue with respect to tariffs and mandatory quotas in the coming political campaign. Mr. Dillon said another major effort would be made to solve the problem. In fact, the argument just advanced by the Vice President might even be used in talking to Hong Kong officials, who understand this kind of argument. The President believed we should tell Hong Kong officials that we can tolerate a certain amount of textile imports into the U.S., but that if the trade is expanded beyond reasonable limits, we might be forced to impose some restrictions on it.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. Dulles whether he wished to comment on the objective in NSC 6007 [*3 lines of source text not declassified*]. He pointed out, however, that Hong Kong was also a Communist Chinese window on the outside world and was fully utilized by the Communist Chinese. In fact, Mr. Dulles said, Hong Kong exists because it is useful both to the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The President said he supposed that some of the goods ostensibly exported by Hong Kong actually come from Communist China.

The National Security Council:[12]

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6007; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 17, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6007, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 2, paragraph 7:* Delete both the Majority and Budget versions of the second sentence.

---

[12] Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2246, approved by the President on June 11. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(2) *Page 3, paragraph 9, 2nd line:* Insert, after "Hong Kong", the following: "or major civil disorders with the direct support of the Communist Chinese,".

(3) *Page 4, paragraph 13, 6th line:* Insert, after "export", the words "to Free World markets".

(4) *Page 4, paragraph 13, 9th line:* Delete "—without imposing U.S. import restrictions—".

Note: NSC 6007, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6007/1[13] to supersede NSC 5717 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follows agenda item 2.]

3. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows the opening portion of Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles' briefing on the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles reported that the Watch Committee had recently met to discuss the build-up of jet fighters on the Communist Chinese coast opposite the Taiwan Strait. Although the build-up was not as large as the Chinese Nationalists had reported, fifty-five jets were added to Chinese Communist planes already there, bringing the total Chinese Communist jet fighter strength opposite the Strait to 325 planes. There have been no indications of bomber deployment, however, and no evidence of unusual ground force or naval activity. The Watch Committee had concluded that Communist China was redeploying jet fighters in order to improve its air defense rather than as a prelude to an attack on Taiwan or the Offshore Islands. Mr. Dulles said the Chinese Nationalists had recently resumed reconnaissance flights and troop rotation in the Chinmen's. Recently, vessels engaged in troop rotation were the targets of 500 rounds of Chinese Communist artillery fire. The Chinese Communists had just issued their "105th serious warning" about U.S. violations of their air space and territorial waters. Peiping appeared to be giving considerable propaganda attention to President's Eisenhower's forthcoming visit to Taiwan. It is possible that the Chinese Communists will unloose an artillery barrage on the Offshore Islands during the President's visit on June 18 and 19 but there is no indication that they will attempt to capture the Islands. Such an attempt, however, could be quickly prepared.

[Here follow the remainder of Dulles' briefing and the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

---

[13] Document 335.

335. National Security Council Report

NSC 6007/1 Washington, June 11, 1960.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON HONG KONG

Objectives

1. Continuation of Hong Kong's status as a Free World outpost.

2. Enhancement of Hong Kong's usefulness as a base for U.S. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] information programs.

3. Economic, social and political conditions in Hong Kong that will continue to contrast favorably with conditions in Communist China.

Policy Guidance

4. Since a Chinese Communist take-over of Hong Kong would be prejudicial to U.S. and Free World interests in the Far East, encourage the British to maintain their position in Hong Kong, to provide for and improve the Colony's defenses, to continue to promote the economic, social and political well-being of the population, and to take effective measures against Chinese Communist subversion and strengthen internal security.

5. Continue to consult as necessary with the British in order to keep abreast of their policies regarding Hong Kong and to coordinate our contingency evacuation plans with British planning. Inform the British of the U.S. view that Hong Kong's value as a Free World outpost merits its retention under British administration and that we are prepared, as indicated below, to provide appropriate assistance to this end where feasible.

6. Make known publicly U.S. sympathy and support for the efforts of the Hong Kong Government to promote the welfare of the Colony's people, including refugees from Communist China. Continue to provide assistance at approximately current levels to support British efforts to deal with the refugee problem,[1] in such a way as to further U.S. policy objectives.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6007 Series. Secret. A June 11 covering note from Lay to the National Security Council and a table of contents are not printed. Lay's memorandum stated that the President had that day approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 6007, as amended and adopted by the Council on June 8, as NSC 6007/1, that the President directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies, that he designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency, and that the statement of policy, as approved, superseded NSC 5717. The full text of NSC 6007/1 is in the Supplement.

[1] U.S. Policy on Defectors, Escapees and Refugees from Communist Areas (NSC 5706/2) also provides (paragraph 14) for continuances of such aid at current levels. [Footnote in the source text. NSC 5706/2, approved March 8, 1957, is *ibid.*, NSC 5706 Series.]

7. If British control of Hong Kong is seriously threatened by major civil disturbances, especially if these are believed to be Communist-instigated, upon British request make available appropriate assistance and supplies for the purpose of suppressing the disturbances.

8. In the event of a threatened Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong, support the British position, as may be justified and feasible in the light of British determination to resist and the circumstances prevailing at the time, by military deployments and high-level statements which, while not committing the United States to the defense of Hong Kong, would demonstrate the extent of our concern and give clear evidence of our capability to retaliate effectively against Communist China. Also consult with the British and other Free World nations regarding the advisability of seeking UN consideration of the threatened Communist aggression.

9. In the event of an actual Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong or major civil disorders with the direct support of the Communist Chinese, a decision as to whether or not the United States should intervene against the aggressor should be made in the light of the conditions existing at the time, including the British response to the attack, the extent of the hostilities (i.e., whether limited to Hong Kong or of a more general nature), and actions which might be proposed by the United Nations. Seek immediately, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and other Free World nations, UN consideration of the Communist attack, if the UN is not already seized of the issue.

10. In the event of either actual or threatened Chinese Communist attack on Hong Kong or an attempt to seize the Colony by instigating internal disorder, after consultation with the British and with their agreement if possible, intervene to the extent necessary and practicable to preserve access to the Colony for the purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and certain other nationals whose safety is judged important to the United States.

11. Continue to give high priority to the production in Hong Kong of materials exposing and explaining the Chinese Communist problem and its area and global implications. These materials should be designed for overseas Chinese groups, government officials and other opinion leaders throughout the world.

12. Make every effort to exploit the contrast between the regimentation and hardship in Communist China and the conditions of relative well-being in Hong Kong.

13. Encourage industrial development in Hong Kong and the expansion of the Colony's trade with the Free World to help support the growing refugee population. Promote participation by American business interests in commercial ventures in Hong Kong in the production of goods for local consumption or for export to Free World markets which

are not likely to invite restrictive actions in world markets, including the United States. Seek to ease the impact of imports from Hong Kong on certain sectors of U.S. industry by encouraging Hong Kong to diversify output and avoid excessive concentration on particular items in exports to the United States. Encourage orderly marketing practices and the avoidance of market disruptions.

[Here follows the discussion portion of the report, headed "General Considerations," with sections headed "The British Presence on Hong Kong," "Role of Hong Kong in the Communist-Free World Conflict," "Security Considerations," and "Economic," and a final section headed "Financial Implications." See the Supplement.]

---

336. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/4 Taipei, June 18, 1960, 3 p.m.

PRESIDENT'S FAR EASTERN TRIP
June 1960

PARTICIPANTS

US	*Republic of China*
President Eisenhower	President Chiang
Ambassador Drumright	Madame Chiang
Lt. Colonel John Eisenhower	Vice President Chen
Mr. Hagerty	Secretary General Chang
General Goodpaster	Foreign Minister Shen
Assistant Secretary Parsons	Ambassador Yeh
Maj. General Snyder	Vice Foreign Minister Chow
	Mr. Shen (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

Free World–Sino-Soviet Relations; Chicom–Outer Mongolia Treaty; Possible Soviet-Chinese Split; Consultation among Allies; The Situation in Asia

President Eisenhower started the conversation by saying that he was pleasantly surprised to observe the healthy, happy and well-dressed

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Trips and Meetings Series. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright and approved in the White House on June 20. The conversation was held in President Chiang's office. President Eisenhower visited the Republic of China June 18–19 during a trip in which he also visited the Philippines and Korea. For text of a joint communiqué issued by Eisenhower and Chiang on June 19, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 660–661.

look of the people on the streets. Before arriving he had not known what to expect. He thought the people looked fine.

In reply President Chiang observed that President Eisenhower's visit had brought cheer and courage to the Chinese people. President Eisenhower rejoined that he was complimented by President Chiang's remarks, but he could take no credit. President Eisenhower then observed that he was particularly impressed with the sweet and lovely looks of the Chinese girls.

President Chiang observed that he could say with some pride that there are no beggars in Taiwan.

President Eisenhower said that last Saturday, just prior to his departure from the United States, he had talked with General MacArthur. He said that General MacArthur had asked him to convey his warm greetings to President and Madame Chiang, two of his oldest and warmest friends in the Far East. General MacArthur had also asked President Eisenhower to tell President Chiang that he was watching the Republic of China's progress with the greatest admiration and interest. In reply to President Chiang's query, President Eisenhower said that General MacArthur is now enjoying very good health. The General had been in a hospital for an operation from which he had made a good recovery.

President Chiang observed that President Eisenhower's visit provided a good opportunity to have an exchange of views on matters of common concern. President Eisenhower rejoined that a question of common interest is what is going on in the Communist world—the Soviet and Chinese Communist areas. President Eisenhower observed that President Chiang's long study of Communism and his deep experience with it made him one of the world's experts on the subject. Accordingly, he would be grateful to hear President Chiang's views on the subject of Communism, its stresses and strains, et cetera.

President Chiang said it was most kind of President Eisenhower to term him an expert on Communism. He said he would be glad to give his views. President Chiang referred to the view prevalent abroad that the Soviet Russians and the Chinese Communists are in conflict and will come to a parting of ways. He had heard of the theory that Chinese Mainland population pressures would push the Chinese to territorial expansion and thus threaten the Soviets. But he believed that these reports of conflicts and contradictions leading to a breach were optimistic. Adenauer had stated this theory some three years ago to a Chinese. Khrushchev, when he saw Adenauer had said that Soviet Russia had a nation on its border which constituted a threat and had asked how in that case Soviet Russia could be a threat to the West. President Chiang observed that Khrushchev's statement was merely a Soviet intrigue to create the illusion of a split between Soviet Russia and Communist China. He said the Communist idea was to make the Western nations think less of the Russian threat and also to minimize their apprehensions of danger from the Chinese Communists. President Chiang went on to observe that the first objective of the Russians is to lead the West to believe in Russian sincerity. The second objective, he said, is to lead the West to think that by approving the admission of the Chinese Communists to the UN the West would be doing itself a good turn. President Chiang said he expected the Soviets to continue this sort of propaganda and urged that the West understand their motives and stay vigilant.

President Chiang then said there was another fact he would like to explain in detail and this was that it is absolutely impossible for the Chinese Communists to separate from or abandon the Soviet Union. He said there is a theory that Khrushchev torpedoed the Paris Summit Meeting because of pressures at home and from Communist China. He granted that the Chinese Communists did not always see eye to eye with the Soviets, especially in regard to the theory of coexistence with the West. He said that another divergency between the two powers lay in the failure of the Soviet Union to make good on some military and economic aid assurances to the Chinese Communists. He also granted that ideologically there was some room for dispute on the subjects of revisionism and orthodox Communism, adding that several special phenomena occurring since the Paris Conference need watching.

President Chiang said that the first of these phenomena is the recent conclusion of a treaty of amity between Outer Mongolia and Communist China.[1] He said that the signing of this treaty marked a departure or change in the attitude of Soviet Russia. President Chiang said that the Chinese Communist-Outer Mongolia treaty is one of friendship and amity on the surface but had actually turned out to be a military treaty. In view of this, President Chiang believed that the signing of the treaty must have reflected an important change of policy on the part of the Russians because in the past the Soviet Union had attached much importance to Outer Mongolia and had carefully kept Outer Mongolia in its sphere of influence. In the past Soviet Russia and China had looked upon Outer Mongolia as a buffer state. Now, with this new treaty, Outer Mongolia was linked with Communist China. President Chiang thought that the timing of the signing of the treaty was of significance since it took place at the end of last month after the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference. President Chiang added that he hoped that this significant development would receive the close study and attention of the State Department. President Chiang continued by saying that he believed he saw a connection between the torpedoed Paris Summit Conference and the presence there of Malinovsky[2] and the conclusion of a treaty between Communist

---

[1] Signed at Ulan Bator on May 31, 1960; for text, see *Peking Review,* June 7, 1960, p. 10.

[2] Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky.

China and Outer Mongolia. He pointed out that at Paris Malinovsky never left Khrushchev's side for a moment. President Chiang then said he would like to make a few remarks in regard to Malinovsky and his relationship to the Chinese Communists. Malinovsky had for several years been the Soviet military commander in the Far East. He had been the Soviet military commander who had occupied Manchuria and who had facilitated the turnover of Manchuria to the Chinese Communists, adding that the Chinese Communists were largely the product of Malinovsky's efforts after World War II. Some of the top Chinese Communist military commanders formerly worked under Malinovsky, including General Lin Piao, present Chinese Communist Minister of Defense. In President Chiang's considered view, the Chinese Communist-Outer Mongolia treaty is the handiwork of Malinovsky. Without Malinovsky's influence, President Chiang doubted whether the treaty could have been concluded. He added that Malinovsky now undoubtedly has a great influence in the Kremlin in regard to matters relating to the Far East.

Elaborating further on the subject of Outer Mongolia, President Chiang said that Molotov, Soviet Ambassador to Outer Mongolia, proceeded to Moscow early this spring and was later allowed to return to Outer Mongolia. President Chiang believed that Molotov's influence was also a factor in the signing of the treaty. President Chiang therefore believed that the Outer Mongolia treaty constituted a sign of increased influence on the part of Malinovsky and Molotov in the Far Eastern area. President Chiang added that there was reason to believe that the Stalinists are on the way up in the Soviet hierarchy again—Malinovsky in the military sphere and Molotov in the political area.

Referring to the Central Asian area President Chiang said that two lines of communication are being constructed between Soviet Russia and Mainland China. One is a railway leading from Alma Ata to Kansu. This railway is scheduled to be completed next summer. The other route runs through Outer Mongolia and Suiyuan into China proper. The railway under construction between Alma Ata and Lanchow, Kansu, passes through the heartland of Asia. Returning to the subject of Outer Mongolia, President Chiang said he believed the Russians would not be likely to give up Outer Mongolia unless something significant had happened to bring this about. He did not know what the factor was but he thought that something might happen this fall or winter to throw light on the matter. President Chiang said he had dwelled on the matter of Outer Mongolia at such length because he believed it had high significance. President Chiang then said he felt certain that in the event of Communist aggression the Russians would stand aside at the beginning and let the Chinese Communists do the fighting.

When Mr. Dillon and Mr. Parsons had visited Taiwan he had explained relations between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists as he saw them. In any case, he said, it is impossible for the Chinese Communists to split from the Soviet Russians. He stated emphatically that the Communist bloc works as a bloc, pursues a global scheme, and no party to the bloc can take independent action. He said he also wanted to state that while on the surface Mao Tse-tung might show conflicts with the Russians, in reality he cannot turn against them. As of now, Mao is in control of the Chinese Communist Party, but if he should oppose the Kremlin, it could overthrow him. In the Far East the Communist bloc has an integrated plan of aggression and there can be no independent action. The current trouble in Japan, it is true to say, is largely the handiwork of the Chinese Communists. They have spent a great deal of money there to bring about disturbance and chaos, but Moscow also took a hand in stirring up trouble in Japan. President Chiang said he was afraid that those who see a Moscow–Peiping split will fall into a Communist trap. President Chiang said that the foregoing summed up his views on relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China. He added that he would appreciate having President Eisenhower's views on the subject.

President Eisenhower rejoined that he found nothing in President Chiang's exposition with which he differed. But he believed that President Chiang perhaps exaggerated the degree of belief in the Western world of holding that a split was possible between Soviet Russia and Communist China. President Eisenhower said further that he could see nothing that could be counted on dependably in that regard. President Eisenhower said that during the past seven or eight months he had made several trips and had talked with a number of world leaders. He said that none of them sees a split being created between Soviet Russia and Communist China. On the other hand he had heard some talk and speculation before the last summit conference to the effect that Khrushchev's softer attitude during the past year or year and a half toward the Free World was not genuine. President Eisenhower said that one background fact that he deemed most important and which Khrushchev had stated half a dozen times was that if a global war should occur, both sides were going to be destroyed. Therefore there must be no war.

President Eisenhower then said that the second fact from which he worked was that the Communists would never change their objective of dominating the world. This he believed. When Krushchev goes around practicing bad deportment and threatening the Free World, the Free World tends to be better unified. The Free World is thus more unified now than it was four months ago.

Concerning Khrushchev's reasons for breaking up the Paris Summit Conference, there was speculation that the Chinese Communists had influenced it. It was also reported that the Soviet army was unhappy about the reduction in its strength of a million men or so. The foregoing were among several reasons to explain the decision taken by Khrushchev before going to Paris to break up the Summit Conference. For a year at least, Khrushchev had pressed hard and expected to get something from the Summit Conference. Then, just before the Conference, he came to the conclusion that he would get nothing from it. He reasoned that if he had to go back to Moscow with nothing, then the effect on his fortunes would be bad. Also, according to some of his foreign colleagues, Khrushchev had finally concluded that it would be bad for him (President Eisenhower) to go to Russia. Twice in the abortive Paris Conference Khrushchev gave long dissertations on why he could not invite him (President Eisenhower) to go to Russia.

President Eisenhower said that if the whole situation was to be looked at in military terms, it must be recognized that in spite of occasional differences the Communists must be viewed as a solid monolithic aggregation. The Free World, on the contrary, is a loose federation or collection of loosely bound countries. These countries are tied together by common ties of liberty, human dignity, et cetera. All around the periphery of the Communist bloc each of the Free World countries has its own economic and military problems. For these Free World countries to do anything to protect themselves, to bring about a coalition against others, they can be united only if attacked by the other side. There is no other possibility of complete unity on the Free World side. They cannot, for example, initiate hostile action. Unfortunately, said President Eisenhower, the enemy knows this all too well. Therefore, this leaves the Communist bloc a certain latitude. They are well aware that what they can do cannot start a war.

President Eisenhower said that the United States stands in the central reserve position. The United States has mobile forces. What is needed is that all on the Free World side should be alerted. President Eisenhower continued that the Free World side must preach peace with justice and see to it that all are dedicated to liberty and freedom and opposed to anyone who gets out of line. That, said President Eisenhower, is the only hope of the Free World.

President Eisenhower said that finally he believed that since the United States is the center of the Free World and has resources to help, the United States should employ closer consultative processes with its allies. The United States must get an even closer and better meeting of minds with other allied nations and keep them informed so that all will move when necessary. Because he believed this so much, President Eisenhower said, means should be thought of to meet this consultative process. President Eisenhower said further that American Ambassadors usually do this for the United States, but sometimes it is necessary to talk together. In this connection, he said he wished to encourage United States higher officials—and not only in the State Department—to tell him what is in the minds of other Free World leaders. President Eisenhower said that his idea is to get better oral connections rather than just diplomatic cables.

President Chiang rejoined that he was completely in agreement with what President Eisenhower had said on the foregoing subject.

President Eisenhower then said that the United States is solidly with the Republic of China under the bilateral treaty of defense adding that the United States attitude has not changed one iota. President Eisenhower said further that United States agreements and commitments are exactly the same as before.

In response to the foregoing statement, President Chiang expressed his warm thanks to President Eisenhower.

President Eisenhower said that when Khrushchev visited the United States last September he wanted to take up the Communist China question.[3] When Khrushchev had done this, President Eisenhower said that he had told him that although he was in the United States as a guest, what he had to say about Communist China was exactly the opposite of what he (President Eisenhower) believed. Therefore, the President had told Khrushchev that he had better drop this subject if he wished to conform to the pattern of a good guest and have a good time.

President Chiang remarked that this was a very good way to handle Khrushchev.

President Eisenhower then said that the Communists liked to get into an argument and then while we told the truth, they used lies to support their case. This was not a very useful process.

President Chiang said he wondered whether it would be profitable for him and President Eisenhower to utilize the opportunity of their meeting to go over the Asian situation. Proceeding, President Chiang said that since the founding of the Soviet Union, its emphasis had always been on Asia. The center of aggression had been and remains in Asia. The Communists had been active elsewhere, but so long as the Asian situation is not solved to their satisfaction, he didn't think that the Communists would go all out in other areas of the world. Unfortunately, the weakest link of the Free World is in Asia. He added that this fact imposed an extremely heavy responsibility on the United States as the leader of the Free World. With the Communist seizure of Mainland China, President Chiang said the next objective of the Communists is Japan. He said that it is a Communist purpose to prevent Japan from taking the side of the Free World and he said that is why the Communists are trying so hard to sabotage the United States-Japanese treaty.

President Eisenhower stated that President Chiang was right in his statement.

---

[3] See Document 301.

President Chiang then expressed the view that the United States should try to maintain its position in Japan.

President Eisenhower asked whether President Chiang meant military bases. In reply President Chiang said that he meant both tangible and intangible things. President Eisenhower said that of the two, intangible things were most important, adding that the presence of military formations and bases of one country in other countries sometimes created great difficulties.

President Chiang said that if the Free World should let go or relax in Japan, that country might go under. He said that the repercussions would be very serious, not only for the Pacific countries but for other parts of the world. He said that this basic consideration compelled the Soviet Russians and Chinese Communists to go all out to wreck the Japanese-United States treaty. President Chiang then expressed the hope that President Eisenhower would not feel upset because the Kishi Government had postponed President Eisenhower's visit to Japan.[4]

President Eisenhower responded that the postponement was tantamount to a Red victory but said he would use this to make the American people more alert to the threat.

President Chiang stressed the need for a continued effort to keep Japan from falling under Communist control. President Chiang went on to say that the Chinese Communists are at the bottom of virtually all troubles in Asia. Therefore, ways and means need be devised to cope with them—not by military means from outside but by stirring up popular uprisings. President Chiang said that that would be the best way to insure the downfall of the Communists and bring about stability.

President Eisenhower said that he could agree with President Chiang's idea, but it would be necessary to take care not to cause a debacle. He mentioned Hungary as an example to be avoided.

President Eisenhower said that Japan is a very crowded country with a large population. He said that Japan had to trade to live. He said that he had done his best to promote Japanese trade with the United States and that the Republic of China had also done so. He added that all free countries must trade with Japan to keep it from falling under the domination of Communist China. President Eisenhower said he was prepared to do anything he could to keep Japan in the Free World camp. He added that he was not critical of Japan and its people because of what had happened the past few days. He was only critical of Communist penetration. President Eisenhower said that he had urged upon Prime Minister Macmillan, Chancellor Adenauer and President De Gaulle the need of maximizing trade with Japan in order to keep it a part of the Free World.

---

[4] The President had been scheduled to visit Japan after his visit to the Republic of China, but following disturbances in Japan, the White House announced on June 16 that the visit had been postponed at Japanese request.

At this point in the conversation Madame Chiang said that it appeared advisable to proceed to the speakers' platform because the people for the rally were all gathered and the weather was threatening.[5] Accordingly, the conversation stopped at this point.

---

[5] For text of President Eisenhower's address at the rally, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pp. 504–507.

---

337. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/5 Taipei, June 19, 1960, 8:40 a.m.

PRESIDENT'S FAR EASTERN TRIP
June 1960

PARTICIPANTS

US	*Republic of China*
President Eisenhower	President Chiang
Ambassador Drumright	Madame Chiang
Lt. Col. Eisenhower	Vice President Chen
Mr. Hagerty	Secretary General Chang
General Goodpaster	Foreign Minister Shen
Mr. Parsons	Ambassador Yeh
	Vice For. Minister Chow
	Mr. Shen (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

Free World–Sino-Soviet Relations; Proposal [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Aid Program

President Chiang explained that the previous day's talks were concerned mainly with Soviet-Chinese Communist relations. Today he wished to discuss steps which he believed should be taken to bring about the downfall of the ChiCom regime.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Trips and Meetings Series. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright and approved in the White House on June 20. The conversation was held in President Chiang's office.

The Far East, President Chiang said, happens to be the weakest link in the chain of free nations, because its educational levels are low and its economies underdeveloped. What happened in Korea[1] set off a chain of reactions affecting Turkey and Japan. This sort of political epidemic may well spread. The communists will work hard at schemes to overturn other free nations in the same way. There was in fact already apprehension in free countries that their governments might be overthrown. At this juncture, following uprisings in Korea, Turkey and Japan, the communist forces are at the high tide of success, whereas anti-communist forces are at low ebb. The time has therefore come to have a general reappraisal and review of the situation.

After expressing agreement with the President's view that the free nations must be ready to band together and act if attacked, President Chiang then said he would like to state what should be done to deal with the situation. First of all, he believed the free nations should work together and take action together against the communists. Of course, the free world is under U.S. leadership and its members will respect US policy. None would so act as to deliberately provoke an attack; at least that is the position of the Republic of China.

Communist successes and conquests, President Chiang said, are being made not by military means but by subversion, infiltration, psychological warfare, propaganda, etc. What the free world needs are counter policies and measures. The free would is also capable of devising and using measures already utilized by the communists to stir up trouble in communist areas and thus bring about the downfall of their regimes. If the free world fails to formulate such counter measures and merely waits for the communists to take positive measures then the free world countries will know no stability, endless troubles will be stirred up by the communists and the situation could only develop unfavorably for the free world. Free world reaction might then come too late and the communists might even be led to the use of military means at a time of their choosing.

The focus of trouble for the free world, President Chiang said, lies in mainland China. If the free world fails to take effective measures to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Communist regime, then Korea, Japan and Turkey can only expect the constant stirring up of trouble and instability.

President Chiang then said that he has thought out a program which he is confident could bring about the downfall of the Chinese Communist regime without resort to military force and without giving the Chinese Communists a pretext to use force. But he needs U.S. confidence in his ability to carry out his planned program. He regretted that sometimes there was not adequate mutual trust among nations.

---

[1] Reference is to the political crisis that led to the resignation of President Syngman Rhee on April 26; see volume XVIII.

President Chiang said that the population on the mainland is antagonistic to the communist regime and that this antipathy extended to the rank and file of communist party and to members of the armed services who are restless and uneasy. Since the commune system was initiated two years ago, the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people and of the families of men in the armed forces has mounted and extends even to cadres of the communist party. Psychological warfare could be useful in this situation. This state of affairs could hasten the downfall of the communist regime. In the past, failure to take action to stir up trouble on the mainland caused discouragement and despair among the mainland people. The time has come to do something to sabotage the lines of communication and to organize guerrillas. Actions of this nature would give encouragement to the mainland people.

In recent years there have been uprisings in Sinkiang, Sikang, Tibet, other frontier areas and inside of the interior provinces. But these uprisings were put down quickly because Free China could not provide help in time to enable the revolts to continue.

At the very least, President Chiang said, efforts should be made to establish a number of guerrilla forces in sparsely populated or unpopulated areas in the border regions. The reaction among people of those areas would be sympathetic. Resistance would then spread and could lead to the downfall of the communist regime. President Chiang said the program he had in mind stressed non-use of military forces from Taiwan and would give no cause at all for the ChiComs to blame the U.S. Government.

President Chiang said that four years ago he had discussed his plan with officials of the State and Defense Departments, but his approaches had met with no response. Apparently it was felt in U.S. quarters that this plan might touch off global war or involve the U.S. Government in hostilities with the ChiComs. But since then the situation had so changed that he believed the time had come to renew his plan. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] He said he hoped that President Eisenhower could devote his attention to this proposal upon his return to the U.S.

As a result of careful and detailed study, President Chiang had come to the conclusion that proposal [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was the only feasible and reasonable way without the use of military force to subvert the mainland regime and bring about its downfall. He emphasized that the whole program would be operated and carried out by Chinese personnel and all signs and identification of equipment would be Chinese. All that is needed from the U.S. are airplanes and telecommunications equipment.

President Chiang then turned to the question of the size of the Chinese Armed Forces which he said is under study. These forces presently constitute a heavy burden on the national economy. The provision of newer weapons and increased firepower could enable some reductions to be made in the Free Chinese forces. These were formerly at the level of 670,000 officers and men but have been reduced to the present level of 630,000. The Government has a plan to effect a further reduction of 48,000, but this planned reduction is difficult to carry out because the officers and men to be retired are from the mainland and have no place to settle after retirement. In Korea, President Chiang noted, it is reported that ex-soldiers with nothing to do participated in the overthrow of the Rhee Government. Free China, he said, needed some help to expand its resources so as to provide employment for the men released from the armed forces.

President Chiang then said he wished to take the opportunity to express his heartfelt thanks and appreciation for all the help President Eisenhower and the U.S. Government has given his country in past years. He spoke especially of the economic program which had moved ahead well with the assistance of local U.S. organizations and provided a basis for a proposed accelerated economic program.

President Eisenhower said that he would have President Chiang's proposal for mainland operations studied when he returned to the United States. President Eisenhower then observed that if 200,000 inspired people should demonstrate in front of the Kremlin all would be promptly and ruthlessly shot down. The free world had a different problem because its system is free and provides the communists with big advantages.

President Chiang said that he had not had in mind mass demonstrations; he knew that these would not work against the communists. His idea was to build up forces in bases at selected points. These forces would endeavor to rally the common people and even cadres and military forces against the communist regime. These forces would, however, lie low and take no action until the situation was ripe. There would be no hasty action such as occurred in Hungary.

President Eisenhower said in reply that he fully understood the position of Chiang and had merely referred to mass demonstrations as means of illustrating the different nature of the problems faced by the free world as contrasted with the communist world. For 18 years, except two years in London, he has had an opportunity to observe the plans and activities of agents. If any plan such as Chiang's was to be successful, he was convinced that it could not be done openly. Forces resorting to open operations would be hunted down relentlessly and killed by the communist regime. Any such program must start underground and be nurtured quietly. The communists would never come out in such a situation unless they are in great strength. President Eisenhower said that he thought the objective that Chiang had in mind was wonderful, but it would be necessary to have a close look at the methods of going about the operation. To insure a successful outcome the plan must employ very secret, clandestine methods or it would fail. The operation must be built up slowly and carefully and in a way to obtain the peoples' confidence.

President Chiang thanked President Eisenhower for his observations and again expressed hope that President Eisenhower could have a look at proposal [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] when he returned to the U.S. President Chiang said that he had drawn a lesson from the Hungarian revolt and would not take big risks. Of course, Hungary and the China mainland were different propositions and he thought the situation was different also.

President Eisenhower said that he was not familiar with the troop reduction and resettlement program but would be glad to study it. He said further that the U.S. would cooperate and work with the Republic of China on an accelerated aid program. He said he assumed the Government could find employment for 48,000 military officers and men in conjunction with an accelerated economic program.

President Eisenhower said he was aware of the existence of clandestine groups in his own country and went on to ask why the free world should not build similar underground groups. If successful operations are to be undertaken something must be done by way of encouragement, planning and assistance from behind the table. President Eisenhower thereupon remarked that both offensive and defensive actions must be employed if communist infiltration is to be stopped.

President Chiang said that President Eisenhower had made a very important point and referred to developments in Korea, Turkey and Japan as an indication of the need for the adoption of both offensive and defensive tactics against communism.

Once again stressing the need to keep clandestine operations as invisible as possible lest they be defeated, President Eisenhower said he would have President Chiang's proposal studied on his return to the U.S.[2]

---

[2] A July 13 memorandum from Parsons to Joseph W. Scott of the Office of the Operations Coordinator enclosed a draft message to Taipei concerning Chiang's proposal. (Department of State, CA Files: Lot 67 D 579, 1958—U.S. Policy Toward Communist China) An unlabeled and undated document in the same file, apparently the draft message, stated that under existing circumstances, operations on the scale envisaged by [*text not declassified*] would meet with almost certain defeat, with undesirable consequences for both the GRC and the United States, and that a fuller and more accurate picture of the existing resistance on the mainland was needed; it proposed continuing consultation between the two governments on the subject. (*Ibid;* see Supplement) A July 23 memorandum by Gordon Gray states that on July 19 he had discussed with the President a proposed message to the Ambassador in Taiwan relating to [*text not declassified*], that the President had made some changes in the proposed message, and that the revised document was transmitted to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President; see Supplement) No copy of the revised message has been found.

338. Memorandum of Discussion at the 448th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, June 22, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

4. *U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China* (NSC 5723; OCB Report on NSC 5723, dated May 18, 1960[1])

Mr. Harr said the Operations Coordinating Board had reviewed operations in Taiwan and had come to the conclusion that only one policy question need be reviewed at the present time; that is, the question of the support of the overseas Chinese for the GRC. The Board believed that there should be a review of the relation between developing overseas Chinese support for the GRC and promoting assimilation of the overseas Chinese in their host countries.

Mr. Harr then reported that the past year had in general been a satisfactory one for our policy in Taiwan. The stability and effectiveness of the GRC had been maintained. The morale of the government and the population was good although the low pay in government service produced tendencies toward corruption. Although Chiang's government is still enamoured of a return to the Mainland, it is devoting itself with realism to the problems of Taiwan. The international status of Taiwan has been maintained. The GRC has recently established relations with Libya and The Cameroun and is taking aggressive steps to win good will in Africa. Nationalist Chinese are making more appearances in international non-governmental activities. Attitudes to Taiwan are favorable to the U.S., although many of the Nationalist Chinese cannot eliminate the suspicion that Taiwan may eventually be a part of an overall political settlement between the U.S. and the USSR. The difference of interpretation persists between the U.S. and the GRC as to what is meant by "political activity on the Mainland." The GRC maintains that this phrase encompasses para-military activity. However, the GRC will consult with us before undertaking para-military activity.

Mr. Harr said there had been little military activity in the Taiwan Strait prior to the President's visit to Taiwan. The Chinese Communists, however, were building up artillery and jet fighters on the coast opposite

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on June 23. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, President's Daily Appointments)

[1] Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, China (GRC and Formosa))

the Offshore Islands. To offset this jet build-up, we planned to provide the GRC with F–104s.

Mr. Harr believed the economy of Taiwan had withstood floods and a slump in the sugar market. The GNP of Taiwan had continued to grow although the rate of growth had declined. There was a tendency away from the predominance of agriculture toward industrialization on the Island. The GRC had pursued a relatively conservative monetary and fiscal policy and had cooperated with the U.S. in the economic development of Taiwan. In conclusion, Mr. Harr noted that the OCB report had been prepared prior to the President's visit to Taiwan and also prior to Congressional action on mutual security funds.

The Vice President asked who was being groomed as a successor to Chiang. Secretary Herter said there had been some agitation in favor of Chiang's son but a great many people appeared to be opposed to this development. General Cabell thought that inasmuch as Chiang had just been elected for a new term, there was some hesitation about grooming a successor. In reply to a question from Secretary Gates, Secretary Herter said that Chiang was 73 or 74 years old.

Mr. Gray said the NSC Planning Board would review U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the GRC (NSC 5723) as recommended by the OCB.

Mr. Allen said he did not wish to register any objection to the OCB report on this subject but he was concerned about references in the report to a "comprehensive program" to implement the GRC's "proclaimed role as custodian of China's traditional culture and leader of Chinese intellectual life." He did not think there was much "pay dirt" in making Taiwan the custodian of traditional Chinese culture. To obtain the regard of the Far East, Taiwan must picture itself, not as the guardian of the past, but as the dynamic leader of the future, especially as a dynamic leader in economic development. The Vice President was inclined to agree with Mr. Allen. He felt that Taiwan had already achieved a great deal in looking toward the future. Mr. Allen felt Taiwan would be well advised to adopt a policy such as the one pursued by Ataturk,[2] who proclaimed the idea that his Turkey would be a new country, looking forward not back.

The National Security Council:[3]

a. Noted and discussed the reference Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, as summarized orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would undertake the limited review of NSC 5723 as recommended by the OCB.

---

[2] Kemal Ataturk, President of Turkey, 1923–1938.

[3] Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2252, approved by the President on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

5. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows the opening portion of a briefing by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell, concerning other topics.]

General Cabell, resuming his briefing, reported that a debate was currently in progress between Moscow and Peiping on Communist ideology. The Chinese Communists are criticizing "peaceful co-existence" as espoused by the Russians, while the USSR is criticizing some of the extreme measures of Chinese Communism such as the "leap forward." So far, neither side has specifically identified the other side as its opponent. As long as neither side makes a public identification of its opponent, no irrevocable step has been taken. General Cabell noted that after the break-up of the Summit Meeting, the Chinese Communists marked time for a period in order to determine whether or not Khrushchev would abandon the policy of peaceful co-existence. When it became apparent that Khrushchev had no intention of completely discarding peaceful co-existence, the Chinese Communists returned to the ideological attack. Recently, the Chinese Communists used a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions as a forum for expounding their point of view. The result has been a challenge to USSR leadership of such a magnitude that Khrushchev has been compelled to meet it head-on. A recent article in *Pravda* made it clear that in Khrushchev's view, the Chinese Communists' line was dangerous. The Eastern European satellites have been supporting Khrushchev in this ideological struggle. Khrushchev may take advantage of the meeting now going on in Roumania to try to compose his differences with the Chinese Communists. An open break between the USSR and Communist China is possible although unlikely. Even though Khrushchev may attempt to compromise, he will probably find it difficult because of the extreme positions which both sides have already taken. Apparently, the rift has widened since Khrushchev's speech in Bucharest yesterday in which Khrushchev claimed that only mad men and maniacs regard war as inevitable. In this speech Khrushchev, of course, repeated his indictment of the U.S. because of its position regarding the U–2 flights and the Summit Meeting.

The Vice President asked whether General Cabell was completely sure that there was a real difference of view between the USSR and Communist China. Secretary Gates wished to make the same inquiry; he wondered whether the Communists were not deliberately developing both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist points of view.

Secretary Herter said he understood that Khrushchev, in his Bucharest speech, had made a rather unusual reference to the works of Lenin. General Cabell said that Khrushchev had asserted that if one took the words of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin literally today, without relating them to conditions existing today, one would be in the position of a child putting words together by picking letters out of the alphabet at random.

Secretary Gates said the question of ideological differences between the USSR and Communist China was very important. He personally did not believe there were any real differences between the two countries. However, the hope that the ideological debate may lead to a break between the USSR and Communist China leads sometimes to erroneous operational concepts in this government. The possibility of such erroneous concepts worried Secretary Gates. General Cabell said there would probably be no open break between the USSR and Communist China, but in his opinion there were real ideological and policy differences between the two countries.

Secretary Herter said he had recently noticed a report from a British newspaper which predicted that Communist China would soon acquire a nuclear capability. He asked whether General Cabell had any report on this question. Asked to comment on this matter by General Cabell, Mr. McMahan said that the timing of the Chinese Communist acquisition of nuclear power would have a great effect on the Chinese Communist-USSR dispute. The Vice President asked whether CIA could make any estimate as to when the Chinese Communists might acquire a nuclear capability. Mr. McMahan said specialists were now reviewing this question. It had been suggested that 1963 or 1964 would be the dates of Chinese Communist's acquisition of a nuclear capability. General Cabell said that all these dates were guesses. Actually, CIA had no firm evidence on which to base a date. Secretary Anderson asked whether the USSR was likely to assist Communist China to attain a nuclear capability. General Cabell replied that thus far the USSR had appeared reluctant to give such help to Communist China but, doubtless, the USSR was also under pressure to give such help.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situation in Japan; possible Soviet missile tests in the Pacific; and evidences of Sino-Soviet differences.

Marion W. Boggs

---

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2253, approved by the President on June 29. (*Ibid.*)

339. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, June 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

Offshore Islands

1. The ChiComs have the capability at any time between now and the election to place the administration in an exceedingly embarrassing position. They can step up pressures against the offshore islands to the point where the US will either have to:

(a) see the islands lost to force while still subject to an ambiguous US "commitment" which would be a further blow to US prestige in the Far East; or

(b) take military action which would—to judge from our experience in 1958—be the object of bitter public and Congressional criticism.

2. It would be optimistic to believe that the ChiComs will not exercise this capability. They came at us in 1958 during an election and they may well do so again this year—only playing for keeps this time.

3. Our object should be to deny the ChiComs this opportunity.

4. This can only be done by persuading the GRC to withdraw or to announce a future withdrawal, scheduled for a specific date, from the offshore islands. Such an announcement would enable us to defend the islands in the meantime with substantial support at home and abroad.

5. We have not so far been able to persuade the GRC to this course of action because we have never been able to convince it that the alternative of non-withdrawal would involve unacceptable risks and costs.

6. Evolving US public and Congressional opinion toward the issue of the offshore islands and the nomination of a Democratic candidate publicly committed to disengaging the US from the offshore islands and to "reassessing" our China policy may have created a somewhat different situation.

7. It might be possible now to make a persuasive private approach to the GRC along the following lines (particularly if the Vice President were known to be personally involved in the approach):

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with President, 1960. Secret. The source text is unsigned and bears no drafting information, but it was apparently drafted in the Policy Planning Staff. It is attached to a memorandum of July 28 from Herter to Gerard Smith; see the source note, Document 341. A July 6 memorandum from the Secretary's Staff Assistant Roger Kirk to the Under Secretary's Special Assistant Robert C. Brewster refers to the "long and short S/P papers on Taiwan and the offshore islands." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers) For information concerning the long S/P paper, see footnote 1, Document 341.

"The GRC should be aware from the trend of public and Congressional opinion during and since the last offshore island crisis that it is increasingly unlikely that any future U.S. administration would come to the islands' defense. The nomination of a Presidential candidate publicly pledged to disengage from the islands dramatizes this fact. The next U.S. administration may well have to define its position under the Formosa resolution specifically to exclude the offshore islands, except as Formosa is being simultaneously physically invaded.

"Since the GRC cannot defend the islands alone, the choice is not whether it loses the islands, but how and when—and what goes with them.

"If the GRC stays on the islands, the ChiComs will probably play cat and mouse with them for some time before pouncing. Each time they do, they will stir up the same kind of reaction in the U.S. as we saw last time in 1958. Each time this occurs, more public and Congressional support for our broad China policy will be eroded. In the end, the GRC will lose not only the islands but a lot more besides. This is the more likely since the ChiComs will probably exploit this issue to the full during the next few months, when foreign policy will be under intensive debate in the U.S.—thus substantially embarrassing defenders of existing China policy in the U.S. and strengthening its opponents.

"If the GRC should now withdraw or announce that it intended to withdraw from the islands, on the other hand, it would greatly strengthen its position with the U.S. public and Congress—giving an impression of restraint and wisdom which would be money in the bank public relations-wise. Defenders of existing China policy would be encouraged and strengthened. This would be a way of getting a return from the islands that would be of maximum advantage to the GRC—not only in the US but internationally. To compound and exploit that advantage, the Gimo might visit the U.S. for the purpose of making a speech to the UNGA, in the course of which this announcement could be made. Such an announcement would do much to solidify support for the GRC in the UN and to re-establish the Gimo and his government in the affection and respect of the American people.

"If the GRC were minded to take such a step, we would be prepared to work out a deal which would involve a maximum amount of compensation and "face"—more military and economic aid, some amphibious lift to preserve the GRC ability to return to the mainland, increased U.S. base facilities and forces on Taiwan, and we could probably get pledges from our allies of support for the defense of Taiwan.

"If the GRC does not take such step it should be under no illusions as to what will happen if the ChiComs step up pressures on the offshores in the next few months—what will happen not only to the islands but to the basic position of the GRC in the U.S."

8. I have no idea whether such an approach would succeed, but the possibility cannot at least be wholly excluded. If it did succeed, we would have scored a major foreign policy victory—accomplishing peacefully what is much desired by the vast majority of public and Congressional opinion in the U.S. without any loss of U.S. prestige or military defeat of the GRC. It would do much to re-establish the position of the U.S. administration as an effective seeker of peace, despite the Summit

breakdown, and as a leader and molder of events in the Far East, despite recent events in Japan. If the approach failed, the GRC would probably be nonetheless somewhat shaken by it and its resistance might be somewhat weaker the next time we tried.

---

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, July 15, 1960, 5 p.m.

77. Beam–Wang Talks. Deptel 46.[1] 99th meeting one hour 30 minutes.[2]

Wang opened with wide-ranging attack on alleged US aggressive actions in Far East, Cuba, Congo, et cetera. Then concentrated his fire on accusation US had "grabbed" Taiwan ten years ago, turned it into US colony, and was pressing ahead with "2-Chinas plot". Declared only way for US to purge itself of aggression was to withdraw from Taiwan and added it would be better if US did this soon rather than later.

I replied with categorical denial Wang's accusations and said they only served to heat up atmosphere to no purpose. Then proceeded to demonstrate Chinese Communist commitment to war as instrument of national policy, as shown by recent statements, following instructions in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of reference telegram. Pointed it was threat arising from this fundamental attitude of Chinese Communist regime which made necessary defensive arrangements by US and its allies.

This exchange followed by give and take in which Wang attempted to demonstrate Chinese Communist devotion to peace and peaceful co-existence and renewed his attacks on US "aggression". I replied that his charges against US were only cloak for his own side's aggressive designs.

I called for release of prisoners and accounting for missing servicemen, in response to which Wang merely referred to previous statements.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1560. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 11:20 a.m. on July 16. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Taipei. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Telegram 46 to Warsaw, July 12, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1260)

[2] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 87 from Warsaw, July 19, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–11, July 22. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7–1960 and 611.93/7–2260, respectively)

He did not mention forthcoming visits of Mrs. Downey and Judge Walsh.

Wang then said that with respect to newsmen, his side still studying proposal we had made last meeting and would defer response to next meeting. I made statement about admission Edgar Snow, along lines paragraph 6 reference telegram,[3] to which Wang replied that his understanding of that was that Snow was a "writer" not a "correspondent". In view fact Chinese Communists still studying our proposal, I said nothing about public statement, but commented would be interested in what they have to say at next meeting.

Next meeting Tuesday, September 6, 2 p.m.

Beam

---

[3] Paragraph 6 instructed Beam to note "that we are pleased to see, re question of exchange of newsmen, that his side has abandoned its previous position on need for signed agreement between two sides by issuing visa to correspondent Edgar Snow." It noted that although Snow had described himself to a correspondent in Peking as a writer rather than a journalist, he had been granted a validated passport as a journalist at the request of Cowles publications.

---

341. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, July 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

S/P Memo on Taiwan Strait and Offshore Islands Problem[1]

I have read this very thoughtful memorandum with great interest and find myself in agreement with much of what is said about the diffi-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–2060. Top Secret. The source text, which bears no drafting information, is filed with a memorandum of July 28 from Herter to Gerard Smith which reads: "I think you will be interested in the attached memorandum from Jeff Parsons. It is my feeling that, as of the moment, we might incur graver difficulties by opening up this subject with Chiang Kai-shek than by leaving it alone. However, when an opportune moment comes, I will talk to Dick Nixon about it."

[1] Reference is to a 23-page memorandum, June 28, entitled "Taiwan Straits and Offshore Islands Problem." It recommended efforts to persuade Chiang to evacuate the offshore islands; it admitted that this would involve costs and risks but declared that the current policy was one of "holding an intermittently live wire with no end in sight and no ends in view—except the ends of others, whose hands control the switch." Copy 1 bears a note in Herter's handwriting: "Will wish to see this on my return. C.A.H." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Meetings with the President, 1960; see Supplement) Another copy indicates that Rice was the drafter. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, S/P 1959)

culties and dangers inherent in the offshore island situation. There are, as might be expected, some points in the analysis with which I do not happen to agree but I should like in this memorandum to concentrate on the recommendations which concern me most. Nevertheless, before turning to these it may be pertinent to note two assumptions with which I differ and which seem to me to underlay much of the drafter's thinking.

1. It is assumed that Chiang's objections to giving up the islands are based more on prestige than on other concerns (page 2). As this memorandum seeks to show, the matter in our opinion goes far deeper.

2. It is assumed that as the islands are associated in the minds of the two million Chinese on "Taiwan" with the return to the mainland that they would be used militarily, or at least are still conceived of as jump-off points for invasion (page 4). This concept was long ago given up by the GRC which recognizes as does the S/P memorandum that the Chicom military buildup opposite the islands would make this militarily unwise. Again the symbolic importance of the islands is something other than that which this section of the S/P paper implies.

The paper recommends that it should be U.S. policy to bring about the early evacuation of the offshore islands, but it acknowledges that it would probably be futile and certainly dangerous to rely primarily on threats and pressure. The belief is expressed that we should make a strong effort through arguments and inducements to convince the GRC that its best interest lies in voluntarily evacuating the islands. Several suggestions are made as to the arguments and inducements which could be set forth to President Chiang for this purpose.

While the paper is not sanguine about President Chiang's response to inducements, it seems at least a reasonable possibility that they would be successful in changing his mind. I believe that there are no inducements which we could realistically offer at the present time which would persuade Chiang to evacuate the offshore islands. We have tried once to persuade Chiang to give up the offshore islands and failed decisively. Following the successful frustration in 1958 of what Peiping proclaimed was an attempt on its part to take the offshore islands, it seems even less likely that we could succeed now. Aside from whatever military value he may attach to the islands in terms of the defense of Taiwan (it is probably greater than we suspect), Chiang sees retention of the offshore islands as the only tangible symbol of his claim to the mainland and of his hope for its recovery. The strength of the GRC's attachment to the offshore islands is indicated by a statement of Vice President Chen Cheng's last March to the effect that in the fall of 1958 the GRC was prepared to give up its seat in the UN rather than give up the offshore islands. In Chiang's eyes his voluntary relinquishment of the offshore islands would be tantamount to his acceptance of a "two Chinas" policy, or more accurately of a one China, one Taiwan policy. This would undermine the whole rationale for the existence of the GRC as such. Nothing we could do on Taiwan for the

GRC would overcome the implication that Chiang had given up his belief in mainland recovery. Relinquishing the offshore islands would be the antithesis of his current desires (discussed with President Eisenhower) to carry the fight to the mainland. While I believe we can continue successfully to restrain him from going forward into destruction, I strongly doubt that we can persuade him that he must now pull back as a means of improving his chances of ultimately recovering the mainland. I feel that Chiang would see such an action on his part as setting in motion an irreversible trend toward "two Chinas."

It might be argued that even though the chances of success appear virtually non-existent, we have nothing to lose in at least making an attempt to persuade Chiang that it is in his best interest to evacuate the offshore islands. However, I feel that there are definite risks involved in making the attempt and that the chances of success, at the present time at least, are so slight as to make these risks not worth taking. After having made the approach once and having been told no decisively, and after having since then given strong support in deed and word to the GRC's holding of the offshore islands, it would create particularly deep GRC resentment for him [*sic*] to abandon the islands. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, contrary to the fears of many (including some of our representatives in the field), Chiang responded most satisfactorily to our requests for the exercise of restraint during the 1958 crisis and did not embark on unilateral or aggressive moves in an effort to expand the hostilities and get us involved. I believe his restraint was due in large measure to his confidence in us generated by our actions in support of the GRC's defensive efforts. If he is now led to feel that we would no longer afford him such support because we wish him to withdraw from the islands, his confidence in us will decrease and with it our influence with him. We would find ourselves then in a position of having accomplished nothing by our approach to him but the shaking of his confidence and the lessening of our influence. This could be dangerous.

Another drawback of attempting a strong but almost certainly futile effort to induce Chiang to leave the offshore islands at this time is that such an effort might leak out and get mixed up in our domestic political campaign. While the GRC would have a strong incentive to maintain secrecy because of the seriousness of exposing such a division of opinion with the U.S. on such a vital issue, it would not hesitate if it felt pressed too hard on the matter to take its case to its friends in both political parties in the U.S., in an effort to create counter-pressures on the U.S. Government. Under these circumstances the efforts of the U.S. to induce evacuation of the islands would almost inevitably become known and might even be injected into the political campaign. Knowledge that we were trying hard to persuade a reluctant Chiang to abandon the offshore islands, while it might please our European allies, would cause apprehension among our Asian allies (possibly excepting Japan), and even among Asian "neutralist" governments which secretly count heavily on our maintaining a strong stand against Chinese Communist expansion. Fears about our reliability would be thoroughly exploited by Peiping both with respect to the Chinese on Taiwan and with respect to our other Asian friends. Furthermore, would not the exposure of a controversy with Chiang arising from our attempt to get him off the offshore islands confirm Tunku Abdul Rahman in his apparent conviction that the U.S. is about to change its policy toward Communist China and adopt a "two Chinas" approach?[2] Would this not encourage him further to advocate the admission of Peiping in the next General Assembly? Wouldn't the Japanese believe that they should also make a move in order not to be caught short?

One final point as to timing is the attitude of our President, for any serious effort to induce Chiang to leave the offshores would have to have his personal backing and even intervention. It would be presumptuous of me to pretend to be able to read the President's mind, but I can't help feeling that he would be reluctant to go so far as to urge Chiang to evacuate the offshores. In the 1958 crisis the President was of the view, I understand, that the GRC had far too many troops on these militarily vulnerable positions and he was interested in finding ways to persuade them to reduce their garrisons for military reasons. I never heard it intimated, however, that he favored urging Chiang to evacuate them all together. Judging by his reaffirmation of our present posture toward the offshore islands just last month in Taiwan and by the tenor of his reaction to President Chiang's plea for support of Pegasus, it seems unlikely to me that the President would now want personally to urge Chiang to get out of the offshores.[3]

---

[2] Reference is to the suggestion made to the press in June by the Prime Minister of Malaya for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations; related documentation is *ibid.*, Central File 793.02.

[3] A memorandum of August 1 from Rice to Smith commented that in his reading of the available records of the President's visit to Taiwan he had found no statement by the President directly concerning the offshore islands. (*Ibid.*, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China; see Supplement)

342. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Congressman Chester Bowles

Washington, July 20, 1960.

DEAR CHET: Thank you for your thoughtful letter of July 1[1] concerning the complex and dangerous problem presented by the continuing Chinese Communist threat of aggression in the Taiwan Strait area. I share your deep concern that everything possible be done to minimize the danger of hostilities in this area and want to assure you that the Department of State is keeping the situation under constant review.

I know that you would agree with me that our experience with aggressors has repeatedly demonstrated that retreat from legitimately held positions in the face of their threat or use of force does not in the long run minimize the possibility of hostilities, but is more apt to confirm the aggressors in their dedication to force as an instrument of policy. The so-called offshore islands are legitimately a part of the territory of the Republic of China and have never been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Communist regime. While from the military standpoint they are exposed positions, they are no more exposed than some others on the free world periphery and are less exposed than a position such as Berlin.

The strong support which we gave to the Republic of China in the 1958 offshore island crisis had a salutary effect throughout the Far East. Asian leaders of countries under the shadow of Chinese Communist power were significantly impressed with the swift action taken by the United States to back up its ally, the Republic of China, when its territory came under attack, even though that territory was small and exposed. At the same time, the Chinese Communists were given a prompt and decisive answer to their probing of what they thought might be a weak spot in the free world's defenses. Certainly this show of United States determination to support the heroic resistance being put up by its Chinese ally, although no United States troops were employed against the Communists or landed on the islands, must be given primary credit for frustrating the Chinese Communist efforts and damping down the crisis.

Ever since January 1955 when the President obtained from Congress the authority to employ United States armed forces for "the specific pur-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–160. Personal and Confidential. Drafted in FE, revised by Herter, and cleared in draft by the President. A memorandum from George A. Morgan proposing a less detailed draft is *ibid.*, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1959–61.

[1] This letter expressed concern at "the possibility of an explosion on the coast of China during the national election campaign" and urged that the government review the situation to ensure "that everything possible is done to minimize the danger of hostilities in the Formosa Straits." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–160; see Supplement)

pose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protecting of such related positions and territories of that area" as are required for assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, it has been clear that the so-called offshore islands might have to be defended by United States forces if it were ever necessary for the United States to fulfill its treaty commitments to the Republic of China. In fact, since the passage of Public Law 4, especially since the offshore island crisis in 1958, the Chinese Communists have repeatedly linked the offshore islands with Taiwan and the Pescadores and have given every indication that any attempt by them to seize the offshore islands would be merely a prelude to an attack on Taiwan itself. Under these circumstances it is imperative that the President continue to have the flexibility given him by Public Law 4 to make a military decision as to whether or not the offshore islands should be defended by United States Armed Forces. He must be able to do what appears necessary to him to ensure that the United States can effectively carry out its commitment to the Republic of China under the Mutual Defense Treaty to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores.

That we fully intend to carry out this commitment should be abundantly clear to everyone. Certainly it is of the utmost importance that the Communist powers be under no illusion on this score. They are, of course, aware that we are committed by treaty to come to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. It is unthinkable that the United States should fail to honor a treaty obligation. Nevertheless, we have been at pains from time to time to reiterate our fidelity to this undertaking. Let me cite the two most recent examples. Just last month during his visit to Taiwan, President Eisenhower in a public speech assured a mass rally of the leaders and people of free China that there was not "the slightest lessening of our determination" to stand with the Republic of China, and with all our free neighbors of the Pacific, against aggression.[2] In the Joint Communiqué issued by Presidents Eisenhower and Chiang Kai-shek following their discussions in Taipei "they pledged once again that both their Governments would continue to stand solidly behind the Sino-United States Mutual Defense Treaty in meeting the challenge posed by the Chinese Communists in this area."[3]

The President's specific reiteration of American commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty recalls a similar assurance contained in the Joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang Kai-shek and Secretary Dulles in October 1958.[4] That Communiqué pointed out that the very purpose of the Mutual Defense Treaty was to manifest the unity of the

---

[2] See footnote 5, Document 336.

[3] See the source note, Document 336.

[4] Document 209.

Republic of China and the United States "so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the west Pacific area". The rapid mobilization of American sea and air power in the western Pacific following the Chinese Communist initial heavy bombardment of Quemoy in August 1958 was in itself a telling demonstration of American preparedness to act under its Treaty commitments.

While our efforts to minimize the possibility of hostilities in the Taiwan area consist of standing firm with our free Chinese allies against the threat of force and of making our intentions in this respect as clear as possible, they also consist of continuing to promote a peaceful resolution of the problem. To this end we have been for nearly five years conducting bilateral talks with the Chinese Communists at Warsaw and Geneva. On September 15 [*18*], 1958 Secretary Dulles described our position to the United Nations General Assembly as follows:

> "We hope that a peaceful solution can be found. Talks are going on between the United States and Chinese Communist Ambassadors in Warsaw. We seek a prompt cease-fire and equitable conditions which will eliminate provocations and leave for peaceful resolution the different claims and counterclaims that are involved.
>
> "The United States reserves the right to bring this matter to the United Nations if it should seem that the bilateral talks between ambassadors are not going to succeed."[5]

Our position remains the same today. While no formal cease-fire has been achieved in the Warsaw talks and the Chinese Communists have persistently refused our offers of a mutual renunciation of force in the Taiwan area, Peiping did greatly abate its attacks on the islands in the fall of 1958 and we have felt it worthwhile to continue with the talks despite our disappointment in them. If the Chinese Communists now provoke large-scale hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, they will do so in full knowledge of where we stand both as to our defense commitments and as to our desire for a peaceful solution. These positions have repeatedly been made clear to them at Warsaw.

In view of your special interest in this matter, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I would be glad to talk to you further at any mutually convenient time.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter[6]

---

[5] See footnote 2, Document 103.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

343. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, July 28, 1960, 6 p.m.

54. Further to Embtel 52,[1] I reviewed general economic situation with Vice President-Premier in hour's conversation late yesterday. I reflected our concern over certain aspects of situation, pointing particularly to unbalanced budget, prospects for further price rises and inflationary pressures, continuance of disproportionately heavy military expenditures and declining private investment growth. At same time, I complimented Chen on numerous measures taken in past few months to improve business and investment climate and remove institutional impediments. I said we realized many beneficial changes were difficult to bring about, especially those involving Legislative Yuan sanction. I reminded him of our interest in accelerated economic program and voiced expectation that pace of reforms would be maintained so that accelerated program could move ahead.

Chen, who only recently returned from ten-day trip to Chinmen and appeared out of touch with current developments, spoke in general terms. He said two-thirds of nineteen points are already in various stages of consideration or implementation. He voiced confidence all points would sooner or later be applied though he expressed some uncertainty about Legislative Yuan attitudes and progress in dealing with legislation.

Regarding FY 1961 budget, Chen admitted difficulty of bringing it into balance, but said he would strive to obtain "relative balance". He voiced his determination to exercise control over military spending. He said retirement of ineffectives is big problem, especially from viewpoint of resettlement and maintenance of social stability. He expressed hope planned economic upsurge could help alleviate retirement problem.

Comment: Chen spoke with obvious sincerity and determination. As I survey and reassess situation, I cannot but be impressed with will to move ahead and indeed with net progress to date. Prospects for future cannot be definitely gauged at this point, especially enactments required to be undertaken by legislature. From available information, it appears that Legislative Yuan reaction is better than might have been expected

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 893.00/7–2860. Secret; Priority.

[1] Telegram 52 from Taipei, July 27, assessed prospects for the accelerated development program. It concluded that developments in the past few months had not been favorable but that it was too soon to discuss abandoning the program, and it recommended that U.S. policy should remain flexible so that additional increments of aid could be given when they could be put to good use. (*Ibid.*, 893.00/7–2760; see Supplement)

and omnibus incentive legislation has good chance of passage by October.

I believe it would be safe as of now to consider that GRC is moving toward desired economic reforms and that further reforms can be confidently expected, though they may not measure up to our expectation. On this basis, I think we should move ahead with Nanpu power loan and perhaps other smaller productive projects. I believe very large Tachien project should be given careful study as to its practical feasibility and economic benefit before taking final decision.

In any case, some measure of accelerated industrial progress is needed to keep up with population growth. Without our stimulus and resources, I can see Taiwan falling behind in race for survival unless it is willing to effect drastic military retrenchment. I do not believe it is militarily or politically possible today.

I believe we should avoid illusion that our accelerated economic program if carried out on envisaged scale will produce wonder of self-sufficiency within next few years. Unless there is sharp cutback of military burden I think we will find it necessary to contribute to upkeep of this island for long time to come.

Drumright

---

344. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 100–3–60 Washington, August 9, 1960.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To examine the Sino-Soviet relationship, and to estimate probable developments therein over the next five years.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and AEC.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 9 August 1960."

Conclusions

1. The growth of Communist China's power and self-confidence has brought to the Sino-Soviet relationship an increased Chinese assertiveness and a consequent sharp increase in discord, particularly concerning outlook and attitude toward the non-Communist world. There is still one Communist faith, but there are now two voices of Communist authority. As a consequence, the Sino-Soviet relationship is in process of difficult change. (Paras. 7–9)

2. The Sino-Soviet relationship is not a Communist monolith. Instead, it contains elements of both cohesion and division, and varying degrees of unity are displayed in the relations of the two powers in ideological, foreign policy, economic, and military affairs. Although joined in the pursuit of broad Communist objectives, the Soviet and Chinese partnership is subject to many of the separatist forces that have traditionally confronted alliances and coalitions. (Paras. 58–63)

3. We believe that cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationships will remain stronger than divisive forces at least through the period of this estimate. The strongest of the cohesive forces will be a mutual awareness of the heavy damage to their national interests and to the Communist cause which a substantial impairment of the alliance would inflict. The two partners will almost certainly continue to share a common hostility to the West and a belief that through their common effort in advancing international communism they can someday participate in dominating the world. Their relationship will also continue to find cohesion in the political, economic, and military advantages each receives. This will have particular force for the Chinese who, in view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, will probably feel that they have no genuinely acceptable alternative to maintaining their alliance with the Soviets. (Paras. 13–14, 64–65)

4. Divisive forces continue to be present, however, and may increase. Differing national interests and characteristics, and the wide disparity in the development of the USSR and Communist China as Communist societies, will continue to exert basic stresses on the Sino-Soviet relationship. Communist China's relative weight in the Bloc is likely to grow over the next five years. This growth will diminish the leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping's military and economic dependence. The Chinese Communists will be more inclined to pursue their own interests and to question Soviet leadership than they have during the first decade of the alliance. (Paras. 15–17, 66)

5. We do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may during the period of this estimate either come to an open break or reach a more fundamental integration of interests than now exists. We believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and flow, and that the growing

duality of power in the Bloc will become increasingly incompatible with the present Bloc structure which has been based on a single source of authority. However, differences will be unlikely to force the USSR and Communist China so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support in their common drive against the West. (Paras. 67–69)

6. The threat which the Sino-Soviet allies pose to US security and US interests is of great dimensions and is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of this estimate. Nevertheless, since the alliance is a changing and evolving relationship, it offers possibilities for favorable as well as unfavorable developments from the US point of view. Stresses and strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship will tend to weaken the hostile combination, and may provide situations and opportunities which can be exploited by the West. At the same time, Chinese Communist pressure may on occasion influence the Soviets to pursue a more militant course toward the West than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds. (Paras. 70–71)

[Here follows the "Discussion" portion of the estimate, consisting of paragraphs 7 through 71, and annexes entitled "The Impact of Soviet Trade and Technical Assistance on Communist China's Economy," "Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Relations," and "Communist China's Military Dependence on the USSR." See Supplement.]

---

345. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, August 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Background Information For Your Discussions with Congressman Bowles re Offshore Islands

I understand that Congressman Bowles, in response to your letter to him of July 20, 1960 (Tab A),[1] will call on you at your home Thursday eve-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/8–1060. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin. The source text bears Herter's initials.

[1] Tabs A, B, and D are not attached to the source text. Herter's July 20 letter is printed as Document 342. Regarding Bowles' letter, see footnote 1 thereto.

ning[2] to discuss further the problem of the offshore islands, which was raised in his letter to you of July 1 (Tab B). For your background information, I am attaching (Tab C)[3] a summary of the talks held on April 24–27, 1955, between Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford, on the one hand, and President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister George Yeh on the other, concerning a U.S. proposal for the withdrawal of the GRC from Quemoy and Matsu. To the best of my knowledge, since the decisive rejection of this proposal by Chiang, there has never been another attempt to persuade him to evacuate these islands. His attitude in April 1955 and since, together with subsequent developments in the China area, have provided no realistic basis for renewing a proposal of this kind to Chiang.

Despite the fact that Robertson and Radford in April 1955 offered Chiang the quid pro quo for withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu of interdiction by United States as well as Chinese naval forces of sea lanes along the China coast from Swatow in the south to Wenchow in the north, Chiang adamantly refused to consider the proposal, even though he was told at the same time that President Eisenhower had decided not to sanction the use of U.S. forces to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Chiang stressed that Quemoy and Matsu were the last footholds of his Government on soil that has continuously been Chinese and that he could not voluntarily abandon these islands and maintain the support of his own people. Chiang declared that from his standpoint it was far better to fight and lose the islands than to abandon them, for in the eyes of his people the latter course would mean abandonment of his cause.

This was and remains the basic reason why Chiang, regardless of the United States attitude, will not voluntarily relinquish Quemoy and Matsu. Many times before, and many times after the Robertson–Radford talks with him, Chiang has publicly declared his unalterable intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Just last week in an interview with a Scripps–Howard correspondent, Henry N. Taylor, who asked him about his reaction to the alleged opinion of Senator Kennedy and Congressman Bowles that the United States should "disentangle" itself from defending the offshore islands, Chiang reiterated his determination to defend these islands under any circumstances. In the face of his oft repeated public commitment to defend the offshore islands Chiang apparently feels it would be impossible to voluntarily evacuate them and still retain the respect and support of the Chinese people. Moreover, such a course would be contrary to everything he has stood for and fought for since his defeat on the mainland in 1949. It would symbolize to him and his supporters capitulation to the "two Chinas" concept.

---

[2] July 11. No record of the conversation has been found.

[3] Not printed.

The trend of events since April 1955 has made it even less likely that an evacuation proposal would succeed now, if it were again presented to Chiang. Thus, the quid quo pro of Naval interdiction which in 1955, as Admiral Radford strongly argued, was a real military offset to the loss of the islands would be of little significance now, for in December 1956 a railway was completed into Amoy and in November 1958 a railway was completed into Foochow so that these key ports in the area of the proposed interdiction are no longer dependent for reinforcement and supply on coastal shipping. A second major development was the GRC's successful defense of Quemoy in 1958 against one of the heaviest and most sustained artillery bombardments in history, together with a spectacular air victory over the Communists. These military achievements and the strong backing given the GRC by the United States provided a tremendous lift to the morale of the Free Chinese, making even more difficult any voluntary relinquishment of this last GRC foothold on China proper. A third new factor likely to strengthen Chiang's conviction that there must be no retreat on Quemoy and Matsu is that Chinese Communist foreign policy, which in 1955 (the year of Bandung) was at the high tide of its peace offensive phase, has in the last two years been marked by increasing belligerence. Peiping's relations with such key countries as Indonesia and especially India have deteriorated to a point undreamed of in 1955. Peiping's rape of Tibet and its encroachment on India's border lands, its open espousal of force and so-called "just wars" against imperialism, all make voluntary retreat and surrender of further GRC territory even less palatable now than in 1955 when Peiping was showing a smiling and comparatively reasonable face.

So far as I know, during the 1958 crisis there was no consideration given by either the President or Secretary Dulles to urging Chiang to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu. In fact the Joint Communiqué issued by President Chiang and Secretary Dulles on October 23, 1958 recognized that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is closely related to the defense of Taiwan. Considerable thought was given, however, to attempting to bring about a reduction in the forces on the offshore islands, particularly Quemoy. Secretary Dulles discussed this during his meetings with Chiang in October 1958. It was Mr. Dulles' view that such a reduction would not only be militarily desirable but would reassure our allies and friends that the GRC was not attempting to build up the offshore islands for offensive purposes. Subsequently, United States and Chinese military officials in Taipei worked out an agreement calling for the reduction of the GRC forces on Quemoy by one division or about 15,000 men. This reduction was carried out and GRC forces on Quemoy now total 69,632 (as of June 1) as compared with some 86,000 in the fall of 1958.

While the Chinese Communists retain the capability of renewing action against the offshore islands at any time and have the publicly declared objective of "liberating" these islands along with Taiwan and the Pescadores, there are certain inhibiting factors that should not be ignored. We cannot, of course, count on these factors preventing renewed Communist attacks and we must be prepared at all times for such attacks. Nevertheless, the Communists do not have, I feel, quite as much flexibility as Mr. Bowles' letter seems to indicate. All the evidence available to us points to the fact that the Chinese Communists are as much opposed to "two Chinas" as the GRC. They repeatedly stress their intention to "liberate" Taiwan, the Pescadores and the offshore islands as a whole. When in September 1958 a group of Afro-Asian neutralist powers broached the proposal to Peiping that the offshore islands question be taken up in the United Nations in such a way as to separate the offshore islands from Taiwan even temporarily, the Chinese rejected it catagorically and lectured the Afro-Asians on the dangers of "two Chinas". It is probable that Chinese Communist fear that some sort of "two Chinas" situation would grow out of a prolongation of the offshore island crisis of 1958 strongly influenced their decision not to prolong it.

Thus Peiping is faced with a dilemma. So long as Peiping confines itself to fighting for the offshore islands it strikes the GRC and ourselves in a militarily vulnerable and politically weak spot, but it also runs a high risk of bringing about the very "two Chinas" situation it abhors. If, on the other hand, Peiping attacks the offshore islands and Taiwan as a whole in order to avoid the emergence of "two Chinas" it runs into certain involvement with the United States and a militarily much stronger position; it also creates an issue on which the GRC and the U.S. would receive not only the political support of our allies but the sympathy of much of the uncommitted world.

The Present Situation: While the United States is not committed to use its forces in the defense of the offshore islands, we demonstrated in the 1958 crisis our willingness to do virtually anything short of this to support the GRC's defense of them and did not foreclose the strong possibility that we would use U.S. forces if worse came to worst. Our aim has been and is to deter a Communist attack on the offshore islands or if such an attack occurs, as in 1958, to limit its scope. This policy has been successful. As long as President Chiang and his Government are determined to maintain GRC forces on Quemoy and Matsu and to defend these islands regardless of our attitude, this seems to be the best policy we can devise.

If the Chinese Communists should now launch another assault, we anticipate taking the issue to the United Nations. (See my memorandum to you of June 10, 1960 (Tab D).)[4] A contingency paper dealing specifically with possible United Nations action in such an event is under preparation. In the meantime, it should be our policy to maintain our firm and consistent posture of support for the GRC on the offshore islands issue. The more the GRC and ourselves appear divided on this issue the greater will be the temptation for Peiping to embark on some new and dangerous probing operation in the area; conversely, the greater the appearance of GRC–US unity and strength, the less likely it is that Peiping will risk such a course.

---

[4] This memorandum stated that in the atmosphere following the collapse of the summit talks, the chances for the outbreak of a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait appeared greater than at any time since 1958. It recommended contingency planning for the possibility of a Communist assault on the offshore islands, with emphasis on the problem of taking the issue to the United Nations. An attached memorandum, unsigned and undated, entitled "U.S. Policy Toward the Offshore Islands in Light of Recent Developments," recommended that in case of a Communist attack on the islands, the United States should take the issue to the United Nations while providing logistic support and convoy protection to the Nationalists. (Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/6–1060; see Supplement)

---

346. Editorial Note

At the 456th meeting of the National Security Council, August 18, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Director of the Planning Board Secretariat Robert H. Johnson, August 25, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles began his briefing by saying that information and intelligence in the past weeks have indicated that friction between Communist China and the Soviet Union is more serious than estimated previously although there will be no break or other abrupt action. At the Bucharest meeting there had been an attempt to find a formula for agreement but it had not succeeded. There had been an exchange of insults and a dispute over defense arrangements at that meeting. A commission of Bloc and non-Bloc Communists had been created to deal with the dispute and its report would be taken up at a further meeting in November.

"Since Bucharest, Mr. Dulles noted, Moscow has taken the initiative in the Bloc and within the international Communist movement. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* have reaffirmed the Soviet view that peaceful coexistence is possible. On the 13th of August Moscow had announced that Khrushchev would visit North Korea in October, but with no stop-over in Peiping. TASS had refused to handle the business of the Chinese Communist News Agency in Delhi when the latter was thrown out. Moscow had offered helicopters to India which it knew would be used on the Chinese frontier. There were reports that large numbers of Soviet personnel were leaving Communist China. The decision to remove them had reportedly been taken three weeks ago. The British Embassy in Peiping and members of various other embassies have noted that families of Soviet experts are leaving. There had been changes in the pattern of Moscow broadcasts on Communist China. For more than five weeks there had been no comment on Communist China for the Russian home audience whereas previously broadcasts had regularly reported on Chinese economic progress and Soviet aid. The volume of comment on Communist China for foreign audiences had been considerably reduced. [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] On the 13th of August the *People's Daily* in Communist China had attacked the Soviet position in an editorial. The Chinese had boycotted the International Congress of Orientalists now going on in Moscow. A number of high-level Party meetings had taken place in Communist China at which the Chinese were apparently reassessing their relations with the Bloc and with their Asian neighbors. All of this, Mr. Dulles indicated, constitutes most important cumulative evidence. Mr. Dulles again emphasized that he was not predicting a break but only frictions with an effort, probably in November, to see if the differences could be resolved. Mr. Dulles said that we would gain nothing if we ourselves advertised this break. Such action would only tend to bring the two countries together.

"Mr. Dulles then elaborated on the withdrawal of Soviet experts. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] One view (held by the Yugoslavs) was that ideological differences had reached such a pitch that the Soviet Union was withdrawing these technicians as a sign of its displeasure. The other theory was that, in their technological innovations, the Chinese had so abused Soviet machinery and ignored Soviet experts that the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its technicians. [*1 line of source text not declassified*]

"Secretary Anderson inquired whether in view of the efforts the Soviet Union had made to get rid of Trotsky, CIA considered that in the present situation the Soviet Union would attempt to exterminate Mao because he was attempting to sell a different brand of Communism. Mr. Dulles noted that the situation was different; that Trotsky was in exile and easier to dispose of. Secretary Anderson suggested, however, that the Russians could eliminate Mao if they wanted to. Mr. Dulles, however, suggested that this would not help the Soviet Union because the ideological positions of other Chinese leaders were the same as that of Mao.

"Secretary Gates asked whether it was possible that Communist China would move aggressively, for example in Formosa or Korea. The President indicated that he did not believe that they would move against Formosa because they simply did not have the 'stuff'. The President considered, however, that it was possible that they might move on the Indian border, against Nepal or in Southeast Asia. However, the President did not think that if the Chinese break with the Russians, they would be likely to take us on. In the course of this discussion, the President indicated that he thought it would be desirable for the NSC members to see a Chinese Communist propaganda film which he had seen and which reflected Chinese economic advances.

"Mr. Dulles said he wished he could predict the outcome of the dispute between the USSR and the Communist Chinese. It was possible that the Chinese Communists might give in. If the Chinese did anything aggressive, they would be on their own. He doubted whether they would take aggressive action without Russian help. In this connection he noted that the Chinese were attempting to settle their border problems. The President noted, however, that there had been a report of another Chinese raid into India." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

347. Editorial Note

In accordance with a recommendation by the Operations Coordinating Board (see Document 338), the NSC Planning Board reviewed paragraphs 8 and 20 of NSC 5723, "U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China," dated October 4, 1957. Draft revised paragraphs were prepared by the Planning Board and transmitted to the National Security Council with a memorandum from Boggs, August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5723 Series) The Council concurred in the revisions, as recorded in NSC Action No. 2290, approved by the President on August 24. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

A memorandum of August 24 from Lay to all holders of NSC 5723 enclosed two revised pages incorporating the approved revised paragraphs 8 and 20 and requested that the revised pages be substituted for the superseded pages in all copies of NSC 5723 and that the superseded pages be destroyed. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5723 Series) The text of NSC 5723 as printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, volume III, pages 619–623, includes the revised pages including the revised paragraphs.

Paragraphs 8 and 20 of NSC 5723, as approved October 4, 1957, were identical to paragraphs 8 and 20 of NSC 5503, January 11, 1955 (*ibid.*, volume II, pages 30–34), except that references to "Formosa" were changed to "Taiwan." Paragraph 8, as approved October 4, 1957, reads as follows:

> "Increased support for the GRC by non-Communist Chinese outside mainland China and Taiwan, especially the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, in so far as such support does not conflict with obligations to their local governments."

Paragraph 8 as revised reads as follows:

> "GRC adherence to the principle of increased orientation of overseas Chinese, especially in Southeast Asia, toward the host countries and integration into their local communities. In the case of those overseas Chinese who continue to regard China as their home and who look to it for inspiration and leadership, increased support of the GRC as the Government of China."

Paragraph 20, as approved October 4, 1957, reads as follows:

> "To the extent feasible, encourage the GRC to establish closer contact with the Chinese communities outside mainland China and Taiwan and to take steps to win their sympathy and support, in so far as such support does not conflict with obligations to their local governments. Encourage the leaders of these communities to reciprocate by extending sympathy and support to the GRC as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism and as a Free World partner in the defense against Communist expansion in Asia."

Paragraph 20 as revised reads as follows:

> "Encourage the GRC to influence the overseas Chinese, especially in Southeast Asia, to the end that they integrate fully and as rapidly as practicable into the national life of their host countries, becoming loyal citizens and identifying themselves with the interests of these countries so long as they are not Communist-oriented. Seek to ensure that overseas Chinese who continue to feel and act as Chinese rather than as citizens of their host countries look to the GRC as the custodian of Chinese social and cultural values and support it as the representative of the interests and aspirations of the Chinese people. In so far as feasible without jeopardizing our larger interests with respect to our relations with the host countries, assist the GRC in its efforts to influence China-oriented overseas Chinese to look to Taiwan rather than to the Communist mainland."

A copy of NSC 5723, including the original as well as the revised pages, is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File, NSC 5723; see Supplement under date of August 24, 1960. See also Document 298.

348. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, August 26, 1960.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Although the Chinese Communists, with several notable exceptions, have dropped their public attacks against Soviet policies and pronouncements since the June Bucharest conference, there are indications that the rift between the two major bloc powers is widening rather than narrowing.

Since August 12 a series of reports from newsmen and diplomatic missions in Peiping have noted what appears to be an unusual exodus of Soviet technicians from Communist China in recent weeks. For example, a news agency has reported that sources close to the Soviet Embassy in Peiping have admitted that more experts are leaving now than in recent years. The Indian Ambassador to Peiping has said that "several hundred" are leaving, adding that the Chinese explain the departures on the grounds that Chinese progress makes the presence of these experts no longer necessary. There are also several intelligence reports that Soviet Presidium member Suslov, at a recent Party meeting in Moscow, said that in view of the state of Sino-Soviet relations, further Soviet aid may no longer be justified, although existing commitments should be honored.

It is estimated that there are 2–3,000 Soviet technicians in Communist China. Their withdrawal would be a serious but not crippling blow to the Chinese economic effort. More important, if the Soviets are attempting to exert this sort of pressure on Peiping to force it to retreat in its controversy with Moscow, Sino-Soviet relations could reach an almost complete impasse. At present, however, there is no firm evidence that such withdrawals as may be occurring are related to the general Sino-Soviet dispute.

A whole series of intelligence reports has described the bitterness between the Soviets and Chinese at the Bucharest conference, in which, according to one account, Khrushchev directly criticized Mao Tse-tung and was himself directly attacked by the chief Chinese delegate at the meeting. The Soviets distributed a long document attacking Peiping,[1] and the Chinese delegation retorted sharply. A committee was apparently established to prepare for another conference late in 1960—per-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/8–2660. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Sent to Herter with a covering memorandum of the same date from Acting Director of Intelligence and Research Allan Evans.

[1] See Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. Tab A is not attached.]

haps on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution—at which time the whole question is to be reviewed again. Moscow has begun rallying support for its position already and is believed to have circularized a letter within the CPSU along the lines of the document it used at Bucharest. Several non-bloc communist parties have been holding discussion meetings to refute and criticize the Chinese Communist position. Within the bloc, at least the Bulgarian Party has also apparently started such discussions. The joint vacations of Khrushchev and the Party first secretaries of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and possibly Rumania in the Crimea for the last few weeks, and the unexplained mid-August appearance in the Soviet Union of North Vietnam leader Ho Chi Minh, may be connected with preparations for a forthcoming Sino-Soviet showdown. Khrushchev publicly announced that he will visit North Korea early in October. (There are unconfirmed reports that he may also go to North Vietnam.) This visit could be to safeguard Soviet interests and to hold a meeting with Mao on "neutral" territory.

Moscow has sharply stepped up its press and radio attacks on Peiping, leveling a number of harsh editorial blows, all indirect but obviously aimed against Peiping's interpretation of international trends and its disruption of bloc unity. Several Soviet articles have strongly reaffirmed the obligatory nature of the Soviet system as a model for other bloc states, a view which Peiping has categorically rejected. Moscow has also commenced broadcasts in Mandarin, beamed to mainland China, of commentaries on the ideological issues in dispute. At the same time, Moscow Radio's home service since early July has maintained an unprecedented silence on developments in the CPR.

During August Peiping leaders, beginning with Chou En-lai's resurrection of a proposal for an atom-free zone in Asia and a collective peace pact in the Asian-Pacific area, including the U.S., have given increasing emphasis to "peaceful coexistence" and Sino-Soviet solidarity. This public stance suggests that Peiping is attempting to give an impression of greater moderation both to the outside world and within the bloc in order to strengthen its defense against Moscow's charges that it has been "warmongering" and disrupting the solidarity of the communist movement.

As a corollary, Peiping's press and radio have given extensive coverage to alleged instances of U.S. "war preparations" and attempts to suppress nationalist movements. However, Peiping's handling of news stories, its commentaries on current events and at least two important magazine and newspaper articles suggest that its views on international affairs and its appraisal of Soviet policy remain essentially unchanged. A *People's Daily* editorial of August 13 attributed to "modern revisionists . . . who parrot the U.S. imperialists"[2] the same charges made by the Soviets and observed that "the Chinese people hold all these blasphemous words in contempt." A major article by Politburo member Li Fu-ch'un in *Red Flag,* August 15, decried the attacks by "imperialists, revisionists, and those who echo them" on Peiping's domestic programs since 1958 and reaffirmed Peiping's intention to adhere to these programs.

---

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

Further concrete manifestations of the continuing cooling of Sino-Soviet relations are: (1) Chinese Communist failure to participate in the International Orientalist Congress recently held in Moscow, although a large delegation had been expected; (2) suspension in late June of distribution within the USSR of the Russian-language weekly organ of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society published by Peiping; and (3) the reported refusal of TASS to handle New China News Agency releases in India after the latter's representative had been expelled by India.

In summary, Sino-Soviet relations appear to resemble in important respects the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations before their break in 1948. Even if Peiping backs down somewhat (Moscow shows every intention of maintaining its stand), fundamental differences will remain and future relations between the two will be colored by considerable suspicion and bitterness.

---

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, September 6, 1960, 7 p.m.

403. Beam–Wang Talks. Report on 100 meeting lasting two hours 35 minutes:[1]

1. I opened with statement based on paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 Deptel 255.[2]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–660. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 419, September 8, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–93, September 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–860 and 611.93/9–960, respectively)

[2] Telegram 255 to Warsaw, September 1, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. Paragraph 5 reads in part as follows: "Wang's side cannot have it both ways. Concept of 'countries with different social systems coexisting together' completly incompatible with that of 'struggle' and 'uninterrupted revolution'. If Wang's side genuinely supports former, it must unequivocally reject latter and take concrete action to prove its good faith. Example would be in joining with us in renouncing use of force in Taiwan area, which we both acknowledge is main source of tension between us." (*Ibid.,* 611.93/9–160)

2. Wang replied with distorted 5 year history of talks, claiming Chou En-lai initiated at Bandung conference, referring to alleged ChiCom constructive proposals, US imperialistic attitude which had sabotaged talks despite patient ChiCom negotiation, ending with charge US occupying Taiwan and dividing China, etc.

3. In reply I stressed deception we had experienced re prisoners, including Bishop Walsh, inhuman refusal account for missing Korean servicemen, rebuttal on Pacific free nuclear zone, ChiCom threats and aggression in Taiwan area and ChiCom refusal renounce force, etc.

4. Wang then rejected our draft on newsmen exchange attributing ulterior motives to mention US constitution and laws before principles of reciprocity and to lack stated purpose of exchange. He then distributed draft counter-proposal sent Embtel 402[3] which I attacked on following grounds: (A) Apart from ChiCom disregard in practice of stated five principles of coexistence, draft completely inacceptable in reference withdrawal US forces from Taiwan and inappropriate for newsmen exchange; (B) equal numerical exchange previously rejected by US for good reasons; (C) US cannot put aside existing laws and regulations; (D) two last paragraphs of draft restrictive of legitimate press freedom.

5. I deplored Wang's confusion and obstruction of simple practical proposal we had made in interest taking preliminary step toward better understanding. Stating I was empowered reject this counter-proposal, I said I would report to Washington where public statement may be made on subject.[4] Wang reserved right his government make similar public announcement.

Date next meeting October 18 at 2 p.m.

Beam

---

[3] Telegram 402 from Warsaw, September 6, transmitted the text of Wang's draft counterproposal on exchange of newsmen. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/9–660; see Supplement) For text of the counterproposal, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960,* pp. 662–663.

[4] For text of a statement issued by the Department of State on September 8, see *ibid.*, pp. 661–663.

350. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 43–60 Washington, September 6, 1960.

THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS[1]

The Problem

To re-examine the likelihood of renewed Chinese Communist military activity in the Taiwan Strait area in the next year or so, and the consequences of the loss, evacuation, or successful defense of the offshore islands.[2]

Conclusions

1. Chinese Communist military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait area have improved since 1958. At the same time, Peiping's objectives in the Strait have not changed. We therefore believe that the Chinese Communists are likely within the next year or so to initiate a probing action to test again nationalist strength and morale and US resolve. Although it is possible, we believe it unlikely that the Chinese Communists would launch surprise frontal attacks on one or more of the major offshore islands. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. The Soviet attitude toward Chinese Communist initiatives in the Taiwan Strait area, and the degree of support they might accord the Chinese, would depend to a considerable extent on the course of the current Sino-Soviet controversy. On balance, we believe that the USSR would agree to a Chinese Communist renewal of military pressure. However, we believe that Moscow would attempt to obtain assurances that Peiping would avoid actions likely to provoke a direct clash with US forces. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

3. The loss of the major offshore islands either through assault or evacuation would be a severe blow to the Nationalist government and

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 September 1960."

[1] This estimate supplements NIE 43–59, "Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China," dated 17 November 1959 and SNIE 100–4–59, "Chinese Communist Intentions and Probable Courses of Action in the Taiwan Strait Area," dated 13 March 1959. [Footnote in the source text. See Documents 341 and 272.]

[2] This estimate is concerned primarily with the major offshore islands, Big and Little Chinmen and the Matsus. [Footnote in the source text.]

would impose a very heavy strain on US-Nationalist relations. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. If the islands were lost as the result of a Chinese Communist military attack, the Nationalist armed forces would be seriously weakened and the contribution the Nationalists could make to the defense of Taiwan would be seriously reduced. The Nationalist leaders would probably conclude initially that their government's rationale, national direction, and purpose had been all but swept away. These reactions might be somewhat mitigated in time if with US assistance a large part of the island garrisons were saved. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. Only the strongest US pressure could persuade the Nationalists to withdraw their troops from the offshore islands. Even if they could be persuaded, which is by no means certain, the pressures that would have to be exerted on them would leave a residue of great bitterness toward the US and would initially produce most of the political and psychological manifestations of Nationalist distress which would follow a military defeat. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. If the Nationalists were still convinced that the US would defend Taiwan and lend its full support to the political and economic development of the island, most of them would in time probably adjust to the situation and establish a new sense of individual and national purpose which would not necessarily exclude the hope of eventually regaining control of the mainland. Despite the demoralization and the political difficulties resulting from the loss of the major offshore islands, we believe that the government would continue to function and to maintain order on Taiwan, that it would still be possible to deny Taiwan to the Communists, and that the US could salvage some position of strength there. Taiwan would probably remain a link, although a much weaker and less militant one, in the anti-Communist defenses in the western Pacific. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. Loss of the offshore islands, whether or not the US had intervened, would damage US prestige in the non-Communist world. A successful defense of the islands would give non-Communist nations greater confidence in US strength and determination. At the same time most of the non-Communist world would have been gravely alarmed by the outbreak of overt hostilities and in general would probably still believe that continued Nationalist control of the islands constituted a dangerous point of international tension. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[*2 paragraphs (47 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified*]

[Here follow 9-1/2 pages of 2-column source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

351. Editorial Note

At the 458th meeting of the National Security Council, September 7, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, September 12, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that he had briefed the Council about a month ago [on August 18; see Document 346] on Sino-Soviet relations, reporting on problems that had developed between the two countries. We now believe, Mr. Dulles indicated, that Communist China and the USSR have been quarreling for about two years. This quarrel has involved five fundamental issues. The first is whether Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence should be replaced by a more militant and revolutionary policy, especially in the underdeveloped countries. The Communist Chinese favor such a change. The second is whether the Bloc should avoid local wars or whether it should actually stimulate or incite 'just' wars. The Chinese favor the latter policy, the Soviets do not. The third issue is whether disarmament should be seriously negotiated. Moscow apparently favors serious negotiations, the Chinese do not. The fourth issue is whether Communist parties in non-Communist countries can hope to take power without armed struggle. The Soviets believe that they can, the Chinese believe that they cannot. The final issue is whether Communist parties in non-Communist countries should press minimum or maximum programs and whether they should cooperate with non-Communist political forces. The USSR favors minimum programs and cooperation with the non-Communists, the Chinese take the opposite position.

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Chinese had brought these issues forward at a meeting in Peiping of the World Federation of Trade Unions shortly before the Bucharest meeting in June. At Bucharest the Soviet Communists had been on the offensive. Following the Bucharest meeting, an eighty-four page memorandum had been distributed by the Soviets to all Communist parties. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] This memorandum re-affirmed the Soviet position on the issues in dispute and directly rebuked the Communist Chinese. It closed with a warning that if the Chinese failed to draw the proper conclusions, Soviet aid to Communist China would be reduced or eliminated.

"Khrushchev followed this memorandum with a bitter speech attacking Communist China. About a week later the Chinese issued a harsh rejoinder rejecting Soviet charges and reciting grievances relating to the failure of the USSR to support Communist China on the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese stated that unless the USSR backed down, Communist China would expel Soviet technicians and publicly repudiate Soviet aid. The Soviets replied to this statement with an angry letter re-affirming the Soviet position. Mr. Dulles noted that the Soviet home radio has begun to prepare the Soviet people for this dispute, having ceased comment in recent weeks on Communist China.

"Mr. Dulles stated that the Soviets had called a party plenum at which Communist China had been denounced for a Left sectarian deviationism. This denunciation was similar in character but not as strong as the Cominform's original denunciation of Tito. Shortly after this denunciation, Soviet technicians began to leave Communist China. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] There has been some increase in the rate of departure but a number of technicians are still in Communist China. It is not clear who took the initiative with respect to the departure of the technicians; whether it was the Chinese or the Soviets. Concurrently with these developments and after a meeting of the Chinese Communist leadership, the *Shanghai Journal* published an emotional editorial expressing anger with the USSR. Mr. Dulles quoted from this editorial. He went on to say that similar emotional passages appeared in an article by a member of the Communist Chinese Politburo. This latter article also discussed a new Chinese policy of increased emphasis on agriculture. This new policy may reflect a concern over Chinese crop failures but it also perhaps reflects the likelihood of less Soviet aid for Chinese industry.

"Mr. Dulles noted that there will be an international Communist conclave in November at which an attempt will be made to resolve this issue. The Soviets have moved to isolate Communist China within the world Communist movement. Harsh attacks have been made on the Communist Chinese in Soviet media and the Soviets have charged Communist China with disorganizing and disorienting other Communist parties. The contents of a letter sent in August to all Communist parties has been obtained [*1 line of source text not declassified*]. This letter contained a sober analysis of the dispute and emphasized that the dispute should not be publicized because to do so would help the West. The letter also stated that the USSR would try to resolve the dispute in November. Between now and November both sides will be seeking to judge the degree of support they will obtain from other Communist parties. In this connection Mr. Dulles noted that the North Koreans had sided with Moscow. The Soviets, he said, may induce Communist China to seek an accommodation. However, Mr. Dulles saw little prospect that the dispute could be resolved under the present leadership in the two countries because the leadership in both countries had committed its prestige to too great an extent. The next move was up to Peiping. Mr. Dulles said the CIA had a great deal of documentation on this dispute and finally observed that he was afraid that the Communist Chinese and the USSR might get together in November. Secretary Herter asked whether it was correct that there were about 1000 technicians left in Communist China. Mr. Dulles confirmed that this was the fact." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

352. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 10, 1960, 4 p.m.

724. I am inclined to agree with Consul General Hong Kong[1] that while Soviet and Chinese may succeed in plastering over cracks in their relations, they will probably not succeed in actually resolving their differences and in long run I believe these will tend to grow more acute. I would not, however, expect complete break [at] least in near future, but would not exclude break in party relations along lines of Soviet quarrel with Yugoslavia. These conclusions flow from analysis of what would appear from Moscow to be principal areas of disagreement between two countries and regimes.

Difficult distinguish between ideology and practice, particularly since communists almost invariably conduct arguments in doctrinal terms. There have been evidences that Mao takes particular pride his standing as theoretician, which no doubt higher than Khrushchev thoughout Bloc, but both men must be conscious of fact that ideological and political leadership will inevitably go together. With Khrushchev's practical bent and greater maturity Soviet regime, natural Soviets should be revisionists and Chinese doctrinists. Despite emphasis on ideological matters, however, would seem unlikely that questions pure doctrine in themselves of great importance in dispute.

One of major issues is surely that of purpose for which power of Bloc to be used. In recent years Khrushchev as leader of Bloc has pressed for achievement of objectives which primarily of interest to USSR. China doubtless considers its primary objective of taking Taiwan has been neglected, as have other areas of major interest to China.

There is also obvious disagreement on tactics which Bloc should follow, which is of fundamental importance. This arises partly from differences in internal and external needs between two countries (Soviets, with growing economic strength, believe continuation peace, if not détente atmosphere, in their best interests). Khrushchev appears be personally completely convinced communists can win through demonstration superiority their system and exploitation growing Soviet economic powers. Red Chinese, with grave domestic economic problems, consider high stage tension necessary their survival and development.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/9–1060. Confidential. Repeated to Hong Kong, Paris, London, Bonn, and USUN. A copy bears the President's initials. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

[1] Telegram 465 from Hong Kong, September 2, transmitted the Country Team's assessment of Sino-Soviet relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/9–260; see Supplement)

Chinese Communists no doubt deeply resent failure Soviets assist them in attaining atomic capability. Prevention such development probably one of chief reasons for persistence with which Soviets have pressed for agreement end atomic testing.

Chinese probably believe commune system effective form of social organization in their present condition. Soviets probably oppose on ideological as well as practical grounds. From Soviet viewpoint, if commune system succeeded one of fundamental bases Soviet claim for Bloc leadership would be shaken; that is that USSR, being first to establish communist state and having had greater experience, has right to choose path for others to follow. On other hand, I suspect Soviets are also concerned as result their own experience that if Chinese push commune system too hard and too far, whole communist regime in China might be overthrown.

Whatever two regimes actually believe about inevitability of war, they clearly differ in methods avoiding it. Soviets place reliance on military strength of Bloc combined with reliance on peace forces (Bloc populations, friendly neutrals, "progressives" in capitalist countries) as well as negotiations and moves designed weaken and forestall determined reactions by free world governments. Chinese would appear believe in all-out support for revolutionary movements as means earliest seizure power by communists wherever possible. For example they have diplomatic relations with FNG rebels while Soviets so far have avoided this in order not irreparably damage relations with France. ChiComs must believe Soviet policy inhibits exploitation targets of opportunity whereas Soviets follow longer-range strategy and are prepared on occasion to use restraint in order go for bigger game. Chinese probably prepared run greater risk of war where specific Chinese interest involved than Soviets, though it cannot be said Khrushchev's policies have been cautious in this respect.

Chinese doubtless resent fact Soviets have not given them free economic assistance and consider aid which Soviets have given non-Bloc countries could better be given them (though Khrushchev announced some time ago that all members socialist bloc would arrive at stage of communism at about same time, thereby implying large-scale assistance to China, what has happened thus far has been concentration external aid on non-Bloc countries).

On purely nationalistic basis there are conflicts of interest in Mongolia, Korea and Central Asia and Soviets doubtless view with apprehension exploding Chinese population.

Likely that Chinese sensitive over Soviet neutral position on Chinese disputes with India, Indonesia, Burma and Nepal and prob-ably over Soviet restraint in Laos situation. On other hand Soviets undoubtedly annoyed over damage their larger designs these areas by ChiCom actions.

We see many evidences here of temperamental and psychological conflict between Russians and Chinese. Chinese resent exclusion from World Councils whereas Khrushchev's wide travels and many public appearances in part designed consolidate his personal position Bloc leadership. Both Russians and Chinese inordinately proud as well as sensitive. From what we know of Soviet methods they must certainly have offended Chinese sensibilities on many occasions and it seems clear Chinese have not concealed their contempt for Russians as inferior intellectually and culturally.

On other side of picture, both regimes believe in communist system and its eventual triumph. Both also cannot fail realize that Bloc as whole would be seriously and perhaps fatally weakened if their differences allowed develop into full break. Seems unlikely either side will renounce its position of fundamental disagreements however either under pressure or by negotiation though strong effort will be made present united front to world.

Thompson

---

353. Editorial Note

In a conversation between President Eisenhower and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home on September 19, 1960, the President commented briefly on Sino-Soviet relations and on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The relevant portion of a memorandum of the conversation by John S.D. Eisenhower reads as follows:

"Lord Home then requested the President to notify the British in advance of what he is going to say at the UN. The President agreed. He then brought up the matter of the closing down of nuclear plants on a plant-by-plant basis. This he felt was infeasible since it would be possible for the Soviets to open new plants in Red China while closing down old ones in Russia. Mr. Herter and Mr. Kohler expressed doubt that this could happen in view of the distrust the Soviets hold for the Chinese Communists and the present strain in their relationships. The President pointed out that we cannot count on any strain in relationships to work to our advantage. Ambassador Whitney then volunteered that the present sanctuary status of Communist China, in which the UN would have no inspection rights within her borders, would present a strong argument for bringing the Chinese Communists into the UN. The President replied rather sharply that if the Chinese Communists are admitted, the U.S. will leave. Opinion is strong on this line and will remain so, barring a change in deportment on the part of the Chinese Communists. As evidence, the President noted that both Presidential candidates are strongly advocating nonadmittance of the Red Chinese to the UN." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

---

354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State

Taipei, October 7, 1960, 2 p.m.

201. Deptel 151.[1] I doubt that high GRC officials misunderstand our attitude toward and part we played in Korean uprising. At any rate we provided them with full explanation at time of trouble. These approaches included a conversation I had with President Chiang (Embassy despatch 603),[2] Steeve's conversation with Ambassador Yeh (Deptel 613)[3] which was no doubt reported to Foreign Minister and President, and written summaries of CA 9705[4] passed to Foreign Ministry and Chiang Ching-Kuo. I believe it would be accurate to say GRC high leaders disagree with actions we took in Korea. They believe we intervened

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/10–760. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in three sections. Received at 12:14 a.m. on October 8.

[1] Telegram 151 to Taipei, September 30, stated that the Department was disturbed by reports indicating that the recent arrest of journalist Lei Chen had been "politically motivated". It commented that "any GRC policy of freezing political status quo would conflict directly with long established U.S. policy objective of working toward responsible representative government capable of attracting growing support people Taiwan" and suggested that a presentation of the U.S. attitude on the events leading to Syngman Rhee's downfall, which GRC leaders apparently misunderstod, might indirectly demonstrate "U.S. concern that GRC not make fatal mistakes of Rhee regime." (*Ibid.*, 795B.00/9–3060; see Supplement)

[2] Despatch 603, May 4, reported a conversation on April 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–460)

[3] Telegram 613 to Taipei, April 29, summarized a conversation on April 28. (*Ibid.*, 795B.00/4–2960)

[4] Not found.

after uprisings started to encourage Rhee's opponents. They believe ouster of Rhee has created political instability which may lead to loss of Korea to free world. Only last night Foreign Minister voiced informally his renewed apprehensions in Korean developments and said he wished to discuss subject with me after double tenth.

In short, rather than misunderstanding our position, GRC leaders disagree with it. I am convinced that further explanation and justification of our Korean position would be profitless. In my view, it would be particularly inadvisable to approach Prime Minister Chen Cheng with our justification. He is almost certainly aware of our position; he has no alternative but to support position adopted by his chief; and his political position, recently rendered insecure for reasons already reported, would be made more vulnerable if he supported our position. In my opinion, chances are negligible that he would speak for US. See Embassy despatch 671[5] for our assessment of impact of Korean developments on Taiwan. I believe considerations we adduced in that despatch and in my official-informal letter of May 24 to E.W. Martin[6] continue to have validity.

With regard to Lei Chen case, my staff and I agree his arrest and prosecution resulted from his leadership of movement to form an international opposition party. I have no doubt President Chiang ordered his arrest. I am informed by his Secretary General that Chiang took action after urgings of GRC security authorities. Probability is Chiang Ching-kuo was active in obtaining action by his father. Lei Chen action bears out our prognostications that Chiang will not tolerate rise of strong well-organized political opposition. Chiang saw in Lei's persistent organizing efforts a growing threat to his and KMT's political supremacy. He therefore took action to nip Lei's activities in bud and checkmate activities of Taiwanese politicians before they could take root. I am convinced that Chiang would take drastic action if he deemed it necessary to maintain politicial stability and his own supremacy. I think it a fair conclusion that he carefully considered problem of US reaction before nabbing Lei. I believe he is prepared to reject US intervention if it comes and take steps he thinks necessary, including use of force, to keep down threat to his regime and his mission—recovery of mainland.

It is to be regretted that Chiang felt compelled to take action against Lei and that prosecution of case has been handled so clumsily as to reflect discredit on GRC. Yet it would be risky on our part to rebuke Chiang for checkmating Lei. While I believed Chiang and his security agencies have been oversensitive to Lei and his activities, potentiality for resentment and trouble is always present because of irritant of Taiwanese-mainlander problem. KMT is fully aware of this problem and has handled it subtly and well except for two or three lapses during past decade. KMT has shown capability to keep lid on despite heavy burdens imposed by "return to mainland" policy which is not popular among Taiwanese. But this has been possible because KMT has always been able to neutralize political opposition. KMT also has more positive acts of credit which have helped it retain some measure of support. But fact remains that if an effective political opposition should ever be able to organize, it would pose a direct threat to KMT. Such a party would inevitably devolve into a Taiwanese organ which would direct its appeal to Taiwanese. If such an organization could come out as a political alternative to KMT and formulate its policies freely in honest elections, then the KMT would almost certainly be doomed. Of course, Chiang and KMT would not voluntarily abandon themselves to this fate.

---

[5] Dated June 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6–860)

[6] Not printed.

Even if KMT were to submit to extinction and this could be arranged without struggle, results would probably be disastrous to US interests. Taiwanese politicians are mainly unprincipled opportunists with no experience in self-government. They have yet to show any capability to work together and prospects are that product of their government would be chaos. Moreover, Taiwanese politicians would almost certainly adopt an "independent Taiwan" policy and withdraw from the heavy military commitments imposed by Chiang in his mainland recovery policy.

We have now been supporting Chiang and supremacy of KMT for a decade and this through K. C. Wu and Sun Li-Jen episodes. We have known all along that a free political atmosphere is an unattainable goal if we want stable, militarily secure Taiwan to deter Communists and preserve our peripheral defenses. We have invested several billions in this effort and it has paid off relatively well. Without Taiwan, our military position in Pacific would be gravely impaired.

In my judgment, we really have no alternative in terms of our own security but to continue policy of past decade which is to work with Chiang and KMT. Neither world situation nor objective conditions here permit luxury of free organized political opposition.

Deptel makes much of parallel here to Korea. I believe there are important differences, apart from the mainlander-Taiwanese relationship stressed above. For one thing, Taiwan is much more prosperous and there is little economic ferment. Accelerated economic program will further contribute to stability. After service in both areas, I find governmental administration here is of much higher and experienced order. Police here are light, not heavy handed. KMT operates in a persuasive and relatively subtle way throughout Taiwan and is much more sophisticated than political organization Rhee was able to contrive in Korea. There has been lack of effective political opposition here, and, as stressed above, it is primary KMT preoccupation to keep opposition down to harmless, unorganized local levels (administrative as well as political devices are used to perpetuate this situation). Actually, local elections here have been fairly well conducted; election of April 24, 1960 is case in point since it was unmixed success to KMT. Only recently steps were taken to initiate election reforms and there is a conscious effort in train to broaden Taiwanese representation in Central Government. There is also slow but continuing progress in area of human rights and even press is able to indulge in fair degree of criticism. This is evidenced by existence of Lei Chen's opposition magazine for over period of 2 years. I am hopeful accelerated economic program will lead to further expansion of freedom. As example, travel exit and entry procedures have been greatly liberalized. Another significant recent development was decision to place courts under control of Judicial Yuan. Another desirable step would be to limit jurisdiction of military courts-martial, but it is doubtful whether Chiang would favor this move in existing world and local situation.

Deptel refers to paragraph 2 of NSC 5723. We have interpreted the terms of this paragraph as envisaging a gradual approach toward representative government in line with provisions of paragraph 18 of courses of action of same paper. I submit that slow, steady progress is being made in implementation of that mandate. Patience is necessary. Moreover, overriding consideration is security and stability. In my judgment, opening of gates now to untrammelled political activity could easily lead to chaos and disaster. Overt support of such course of action on our part could provide Communists with heaven-sent opportunity they constantly seek to divide us from Chiang.

To sum up, I think our best course of action is partially to encourage gradual and piecemeal political reforms both in and out of KMT. We should carefully avoid actions that would set off mainlanders against Taiwanese or otherwise undermine stability of this anti-Communist bastion. I believe time is in our favor and patience is our best course of action.

Drumright

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, October 19, 1960, 8 a.m.

640. Beam–Wang Talks. 101 meeting, two hours ten minutes.[1] Wang led off criticizing our rejection ChiCom draft agreement on newsmen along lines Peiping Ministry Foreign Affairs statement September 13.[2] He also reiterated declaration made in that statement that history of talks showed no agreement could be reached with US on minor matters until major problem of "US occupation of Taiwan" resolved. He charged that prompt US rejection ChiCom draft on newsmen showed US had already decided prior to last meeting to reject their draft and make public statement.

I denied any decision prior last meeting to reject ChiCom draft and make public statement. Then pointed out why their draft unacceptable along lines paragraph six Deptel 430.[3] I followed with statement incorporating paragraphs two, three and four of Deptel 430[4] and concluded by expressing disagreement with Wang's conclusion other questions could not be settled prior to agreement regarding Taiwan.

Wang came back with lengthy statement intended refute our accusation their side committed to inevitability of [garble—war] and then proceeded cite various examples US military preparations as evidence that US was aggressively minded. He then put series of questions regarding US attitude to Cairo and Potsdam declarations, Japanese surrender document,[5] UN Charter, Truman statement January 1950 on Taiwan, et cetera aimed at demonstrating that US by its "occupation" of Taiwan was violating various international commitments and public statements. In responding, I pointed out his questions all "loaded" and based

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1960. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Hong Kong.

[1] The meeting was held on October 18. Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 641 from Warsaw, October 19, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G–155, October 21. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/10–1960 and 611.93/10–2160, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] For text, see *Peking Review*, September 14, 1960.

[3] Telegram 430 to Warsaw, October 14, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–1460; see Supplement)

[4] They argued that repatriation of civilians and missing and unaccounted-for servicemen were not "minor matters," that the United States had made many proposals which would not require Wang's side to renounce its claim to Taiwan but merely to renounce the use of force in pursuing its claims, and that his side had proclaimed its dedication to the doctrine of the inevitability of war.

[5] For text of the Japanese instrument of surrender, signed September 2, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 9, 1945, pp. 364–365.

on false premise that US had occupied Taiwan. I briefly reiterated [garble—treaty] relationship with GRC which I said were fully in accord with US obligations under UN Charter and other international commitments.

I then asked Wang for further detail on Chinese Communist proposal for nuclear-free zone.[6] Wang's rejoinder was diatribe against US hostility to his country as demonstrated by our actions in UNGA regarding ChiRep issue and Tibet. He then said he would reserve response to my question regarding nuclear-free zone until next meeting. I refuted his accusations concerning US activities in UN and expressed interest in hearing at next meeting his comments regarding nuclear-free zone.

I proposed November 17 for next meeting. Wang countered with November 22 and we finally agreed on December 1 at 2 p.m.

Beam

---

[6] A message from Premier Chou to the Sixth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and for Total Disarmament, July 30, 1960, stated, "We have repeatedly proposed that all countries of the Asian and Pacific area conclude a peace pact of mutual nonaggression and make this area a nuclear weapon-free zone." For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1960* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 180–181. Telegrams 255 and 430 to Warsaw (cited in footnote 2, Document 349, and in footnote 3 above) instructed Beam to probe the Chinese position on this proposal.

---

356. Editorial Note

At the 464th meeting of the National Security Council, October 20, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, October 24, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles next turned to the Sino-Soviet dispute, describing a review of the dispute which Khrushchev made to the satellite leaders while they were in New York. Khrushchev had stated that the U.S. was now deterred from war by the military strength of the USSR. While the USSR could liberate the world from capitalism by war, to do so would now set humanity back centuries. Therefore, the USSR could not urge war. The Communist Chinese, he said, did not understand this situation. They cited Lenin's authority and argued that peaceful co-existence will lead to the downfall of socialism. Khrushchev stated that the Chinese did not understand that Lenin taught the inevitability of war before any socialist society existed. Lenin would have revised his views today because socialist systems are now in existence. Khrushchev made the following charges, among others, against the Chinese: the Chinese were engaged in splinter activity; they pretended to accept Soviet leadership but actually rejected it; they say that Nehru and Nasser support imperialism and thus antagonize these important leaders; they refuse the USSR bases in their harbors for Soviet submarines; and after the Bucharest Conference China had invaded Soviet territory and built fortifications. We have no confirmation of this last Soviet claim; it could be the Soviet version of certain incidents that have occurred along the USSR-Communist Chinese border.

"Khrushchev had gone on to say that the November meeting to deal with this dispute was scheduled to go forward as planned and that a Party commission was preparing documents for signature at that meeting. He stated that the Chinese needed discipline; that Mao lives the life of a hermit; and that the cult of personality was strong in Communist China and is mixed with Buddhism. The USSR could not accept the claim that Mao is the greatest Marxist dialectician. Moscow, he indicated, cannot back down in this dispute.

"Mr. Dulles continued, stating that the Soviets were apparently working to confront the Chinese with unanimous condemnation by world Communist Parties. Why Albania stands out against the Soviets is strange. Albania is apparently quite seriously irritating the Russians. This situation might give us a chance to do something about Albania. He noted that Albanian ports and intercept stations were important to the Russians and that the Soviets would be dealt a significant blow if Albania were to be separated from them. He noted finally that a Yugoslav in New York had stated that Khrushchev's visit to the UN was the greatest fiasco that Communism had ever suffered.

"Secretary Herter observed that State experts who had analyzed Khrushchev's behavior in New York believe that it is related to his battle with Mao. His actions were designed to show that he could be tough with the West. Mr. McCone asked how we could account for the violent Soviet support of Communist China for UN membership. He had been surprised, he said, by the violence with which the Russians had made a play for Chinese representation at the recent meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. He said that he took the schism between the Chinese and the Russians with a grain of salt. In response Mr. Dillon observed that the Chinese may not want to get into the UN at this time and that Soviet support does not necessarily coincide with Chinese views. Mr. Dulles agreed that having Communist China in the UN would put the Chinese Communists under some discipline." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

357. Editorial Note

At the 466th meeting of the National Security Council, November 7, 1960, Acting Director of Central Intelligence General Charles P. Cabell discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Robert H. Johnson, November 8, reads as follows:

"General Cabell began his briefing with a discussion of Sino-Soviet relations. He stated that we have evidence that meetings in October of top-ranking Soviet and Communist Chinese leaders had been a fiasco. They had ended with bitter accusations by both sides. The Chinese had entered these negotiations with a chip on their shoulders, having written a 160-page letter accusing Moscow of forgetting basic Communist dogma and attacking Khrushchev personally. Contrary to the impression left by some news reports, the article in the October 31 issue of the Chinese Communist publication, *Red Flag,* had reiterated a hard line and had argued that the present was unprecedentedly favorable for violent seizure of power. Khrushchev had made an equally tough speech and an article in the Soviet publication, *Problems of Philosophy,* indicated the possibility of economic isolation of Communist China from the rest of the Bloc. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

"The stage had now been set for the meeting of the Communist leaders in Moscow and another try for a settlement. This meeting was being held in connection with the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. International Communist leaders have not usually attended these celebrations. The Peiping delegation was unusually strong including six Politburo members. The composition of the Chinese delegation suggests that the Chinese will strongly affirm and defend their position. The welcoming speeches at the Moscow airport indicated no retreat by either side. It was possible, however, that the communiqué issued at the end of these meetings would indicate superficial unity. General Cabell then summarized other evidence that the dispute continued, referring specifically to a speech by Kuzlov and a recent article by Madame Sun Yatsen." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

358. Editorial Note

Negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement concerning U.S. forces in the Republic of China had begun on August 2, 1955, and continued intermittently through the spring of 1957; for information, see *Foreign Relations,* 1955–1957, volume II, pages 607–610, and volume III, pages 282–283. At a negotiating meeting on August 12, 1958, the first formal session since March 1957, the Republic of China put forward a new draft agreement. Two accompanying notes proposed (1) understandings on implementation of the proposed agreement and (2) revision of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1951 (for the text, see 2 UST 1499) in order to limit the number of MAAG personnel with diplomatic status. The texts of the draft and the notes were sent to the Department with despatch 67 from Taipei, August 15, 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–1558)

On November 2, 1958, the Embassy gave the Foreign Ministry a U.S. proposal for an interim agreement to establish the status of U.S. personnel deployed to Taiwan during the Taiwan Strait crisis. On December 29, Minister Hsu Shao-chang of the Republic of China Embassy indicated to Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs Edwin W. Martin that his government preferred to resume the SOFA negotiations rather than to conclude an interim agreement. These and other developments were summarized in a letter of March 18, 1959, from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John N. Irwin II. (*Ibid.,* 793.5/9–358; see Supplement)

On April 28, 1959, Minister Hsu raised the subject with Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs LaRue R. Lutkins. When Lutkins said the Department of Defense was reluctant to accept the GRC proposal on criminal jurisdiction, Hsu suggested reopening negotiations, taking up other issues, and leaving the question of jurisdiction to be discussed later. According to Lutkins' memorandum of the conversation, Hsu "stated emphatically that the GRC could not possibly accept any proposal providing for exclusive United States jurisdiction and that this had been repeatedly made clear to United States negotiators in Taipei." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4–2859; see Supplement)

A new U.S. proposal for Article XIV on criminal jurisdiction was sent to the Embassy in Taipei with airgram A–122, March 29, 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–2960) GRC counterdrafts of all articles except Article XIV were given to the Embassy on May 11 and transmitted with despatch 627, May 16, 1960. (*Ibid.,* 611.937/5–1660) On July 23, Ambassador George K.C. Yeh raised the subject with Assistant Secretary of State J. Graham Parsons. Acting Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs Lutkins told Yeh that the Department of Defense was studying the GRC counterdrafts and that the GRC was still studying the U.S. proposal on jurisdiction. Yeh stated that he anticipated increasing pressure on the Executive Yuan from the legislative branch to limit the diplomatic immunity of MAAG personnel to relatively high-ranking members. (Memorandum of conversation by Lutkins; *ibid.*, 793.5/7–2360; see Supplement) Circular airgram 4829 to Taipei, November 29, authorized the Embassy to begin article-by-article negotiation using the GRC counterdraft of May 11 as a basis for negotiation. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.937/11–2960)

---

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State

Warsaw, December 1, 1960, 6 p.m.

834. Beam–Wang Talks. 102nd meeting one hour fifty-five minutes.[1] I opened with statement along lines paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 Deptel 603.[2] Wang responded in familiar fashion charging US with aggressive activities throughout the world. Pointing out that Department spokesman had rejected Chou En-lai's proposal of nuclear-free zone,[3] he questioned US motive in bringing up matter at these talks. He also referred to questions he has asked at last meeting, declared I had made no serious attempt to answer them, and then elaborated them in effort prove US had invaded and occupied Taiwan.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–160. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Taipei, Hong Kong, and Moscow.

[1] Beam sent his comments and recommendations in telegram 838 from Warsaw, December 2, and a transcript of the meeting in airgram G-212, December 6. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/12–260 and 611.93/12–660, respectively; see Supplement)

[2] Telegram 603 to Warsaw, November 29, conveyed Beam's instructions for the meeting. The reference paragraphs instructed Beam to point out that Wang's statements on peaceful coexistence were contradicted by editorials in Chinese publications, to rebut his charges of U.S. aggression, and to urge that his side demonstrate its sincerity by responding affirmatively to U.S. proposals for the renunciation of force, by releasing detained Americans, and by accounting for all missing U.S. servicemen. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–2960; see Supplement)

[3] The proposal cited in footnote 6, Document 355. An August 1 comment by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, is quoted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1960*, p. 181, footnote 1.

I rejected Wang's charges of US aggressive intent, pointing out he had blandly slid over basic cause of tension which was his side's advocacy of violent struggle against all non-Communist governments. I then quoted Mao, Liu and Khrushchev as suggested paragraph 4 reference telegram and expressed regret Chou nuclear-free zone proposal appeared to be just propaganda.

Wang replied with some routine remarks on US aggressiveness, then alleged US "propaganda" on horrors of nuclear war was simply atomic blackmail intended to frighten people. He said Mao's statement on atomic weapons was correct. (He made no reference to my quotation of Khrushchev.) After brief further exchange along established lines, Wang proposed next meeting January 31 and we agreed on Thursday February 2, 2 p.m.

Beam

---

360. Letter From the Ambassador to Poland (Beam) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Martin)

Warsaw, December 2, 1960.

DEAR ED: At Ralph Clough's suggestion we are writing you about some ideas we have been discussing here.

The sterile atmosphere of our last exchange with Wang and the exceptionally long interval before the next meeting have prompted us to consider whether anything might be done to re-inject some concrete, small issue into the meetings on which both sides would have some negotiating leeway. It would have to be a proposal from which, if finally agreed upon, both sides could derive some benefit. In order to render it more difficult for them to reject, it should also be a proposal, the rejection of which by the Chinese Communists would make them look unreasonable and adamantly hostile to the U.S. The introduction of such a proposal would enable us to test the firmness of their determination not to discuss "minor" issues, and might have certain other advantages which I will discuss below.

Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 71 D 368. Secret; Official–Informal.

Whether we should take the initiative suggested depends ultimately on the conception we have of the purpose of the diplomatic channel to Peiping provided by the Warsaw talks, and that, in turn, depends upon how we visualize the future shape of our relations with the Chinese Communists. We recognize that such projections cannot extend far into the future in today's uncertain world and we would not presume to suggest from here what even our short-range objectives and tactics should be with respect to Peiping. However, whatever they are determined to be, the Warsaw talks can conceivably provide a useful tool.

There is some danger that the usefulness of the talks as a tool will be impaired if they are permitted to degenerate completely into nothing more than a barren exchange of charges and counter-charges. If both sides become accustomed to regarding them as merely a propaganda gimmick, it may become increasingly difficult to conduct any serious negotiations through this channel. The likelihood of such a development would increase if Wang were replaced by a more doctrinaire type of negotiator who had no experience of the early stages of the talks when a real effort was made on both sides to keep the propaganda content down and concentrate on limited and therefore negotiable points. It seems to us that the less "hard" content there is to the talks, the more likely it is that when Wang is replaced we will find ourselves faced with a man whose forte is propaganda, and with whom it may be far more difficult than with Wang to negotiate on practical problems.

Of course, when we come down to conceiving a practical subject to discuss, it isn't easy. Without being able from here to see precisely how actions at these talks fit into the whole picture of our relations with Communist China, we would imagine that these actions should be designed, in part at least, to demonstrate to Peiping that our relationship is not a frozen one, soluble only through war. It is admittedly difficult to project a convincing message of this sort through the veil of dogma, hostility, suspicion and ill-will which obscures the outlook of the Chinese Communist leaders. It may be impossible; but we would think it worth working at.

The most promising area in which to work still seems to us to be that of exchange of persons, particularly journalists. Although our last effort was rejected in a way which led almost inevitably to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists don't want American journalists in mainland China under any conditions which we could accept, it should still be possible to devise new approaches. For example, we might offer to exchange lists of journalists from which each side would consider whether it could select 2 or 3 names of persons it would be willing to admit. Through discussion in Warsaw an equal number from each side could be agreed upon. This would ensure numerical reciprocity without binding us in advance to accept anyone they might propose. Other variations of this idea are possible. It might be extended to professors, for example. Obviously, any such idea contains problems which we probably cannot foresee from here, but we just put these up as points of departure.

The next meeting might be a particularly favorable time to table a specific proposal, or if we are not ready to table one, to hint that we might at the following meeting. Despite Peiping's disparaging remarks about our new President, the Chinese Communists are bound to be curious to see whether anything has changed and they may be more receptive—or conceivably more suspicious—regarding our next moves.

Sincerely yours,

Jake Beam

---

361. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Drumright)

Washington, December 2, 1960.

DEAR DRUM: We have been giving much serious thought to your long and thoughtful telegram no. 201.[1]

Subsequent reporting by the Embassy and [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*] has supported your judgment regarding the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT toward the development of any genuine opposition movement. In this connection, we have found discouraging Ching-kuo's remarks to [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*] relating to the necessity to "stop Lei Chen"[2] from working with Taiwanese politicians, that some of the GRC's difficulties on the mainland were attributable to misguided application of American methods and resulting popular misunderstanding of the government's policies.

Source: Department of State, CA Files: Lot 67 D 579, 1960—Chinese Nationalist Internal Affairs. Top Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Arthur H. Rosen of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

[1] Document 354.

[2] Lei was tried by a military court, convicted of sedition, and sentenced on October 9 to 10 years' imprisonment. Merchant expressed U.S. concern with the case in a meeting with Yeh on November 28; a record of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 993.62/11–2860; see Supplement. Records of similar conversations between Parsons and Steeves and Yeh on September 13 and October 24 are in Department of State, Central Files, 993.62/9–1360 and 993.62/10–2460.

We share your view that we should not pursue "liberalization" at the expense of security and stability in Taiwan. However, we are concerned that these objectives may actually be jeopardized unless steps are taken in good time to prevent an explosion such as took place in Korea. We wonder whether a considerably freer political atmosphere and a stable, militarily secure Taiwan are not in the long run compatible objectives.

We have in the past taken the long view of Taiwanese-mainlander relations and hoped that gradually increasing representation of the Taiwanese in the government, and the effects of time, were acting to blur Taiwanese-mainlander differences and ease the causes of political tension. We agree with you that there has been considerable over-all improvement since the low point of 1947. In recent months, however, we have had reason to question whether the underlying forces at work in Taiwan and in the world outside will permit a gradual, evolutionary resolution of the problem, and whether GRC policies relating thereto are moving in the right direction at the right pace. The Department has received indications recently of continuing and even intensified anti-mainlander feeling. Ed Martin's recent discussions with American missionaries familiar with Taiwanese attitudes have revealed deep pessimism among them as to the future. Some of them reported a rising tide of Taiwanese resentment against the GRC and foresaw serious trouble unless steps were taken to satisfy Taiwanese aspirations. Discussions that Department officers have had with [*less then 1 line of source text not declassified*] indicated considerable doubt on his part that the KMT will remain able to control the situation in the future as it does now. The burgeoning independence movement among Taiwanese students in the Unites States is an additional source of concern to us and to the Chinese Embassy.

To these domestic considerations must now be added the damaging impact of international developments on the position of the GRC, the major one of which is the erosion of support for the GRC in the United Nations. To the extent that these developments have the effect of increasing world sentiment and pressures for a "two Chinas" settlement, they can be expected to encourage the Taiwanese to press for fulfillment of their political aspirations and thus to affect the stability of the GRC. I might note also that GRC handling of the Lei Chen case has seriously damaged its reputation among some of the most important people in the Congress and among some of the staunchest supporters of the GRC in the United States.

We agree that the Taiwanese are inexperienced in government, and that many of the Taiwanese now in politics are self-seeking, disputatious and possibly corrupt. It seems to me that this argues for a broadening of the base of Taiwanese participation in government. If we want a smooth evolution toward stable democracy in Taiwan, more must be done to build up a Taiwanese stake in the government and to give them responsibility and experience. In this connection we have often cited statements by GRC officials that more than half of the executive-level positions in the Provincial Government are now held by Taiwanese. A study of the latest GRC Statistical Abstract and of the "Taiwan Tung Lan", however, throws doubt on the accuracy of these claims. According to these sources, 58% of the Provincial Government employees are mainlanders, and only 42% are Taiwanese. Of 39 Department Directors and Deputies, 31 are mainlanders. Of 34 Commission Chairmen and Deputies, 28 are mainlanders. Of 155 Bureau Chiefs and Deputies, 112 are mainlanders. Of 323 local Government officials of the rank of Section Chief and above, 254 are mainlanders.

We certainly would not want to open the gates to "untrammelled" political activity that might lead to chaos and disaster. What we seek is measured and steady progress toward representative, democratic government in Taiwan. We endorse your view that the situation is substantially different from that which prevailed in Korea in the period preceding Rhee's downfall, but we must be continuously conscious of those elements in the situation (chief of them being the continued suppression of Taiwanese political aspirations) which could lead to another Korea-type explosion.

In view of the considerations set forth in your telegram, we concur in the view that we should not at this time again present our explanation and analysis of developments in Korea to GRC officials, but rather leave such action to your discretion should the Chinese again raise the subject. However, we would appreciate your further views and comments on the various aspects of the longer-term problem which are discussed in this letter. Your suggestions as to ways in which we might appropriately and feasibly act to guide the GRC along a more forward-looking and hopeful course than that it now seems embarked on would be particularly welcome.

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons[3]

---

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

362. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–60 Washington, December 6, 1960.

COMMUNIST CHINA

[Here follows a table of contents.]

The Problem

To analyze Chinese Communist domestic developments and external relations, and to estimate probable trends during the next five years.

Conclusions

1. The leaders of Communist China are determined to make China a leading world power as rapidly as possible. Over the past 11 years Communist China has made impressive gains in industrial and military strength and in the organization and regimentation of the Chinese people. These gains, together with a conviction that world trends strongly favor the Communist cause, have been increasingly manifested during the past year in aggressive self-confidence towards both the West and the USSR. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

2. We believe that over the period of this estimate, Communist China's economy will continue to grow rapidly, especially in heavy industry, although at a less rapid rate than 1958–1960. Communist China's dependence on the rest of the Bloc for economic and military equipment and for technological assistance will have been substantially reduced. By 1965 Communist China will probably be the world's leading producer of coal, the third ranking producer of crude steel, a major producer of electric power, and it will have a merchant marine of significant size. It will also have made substantial progress toward becoming a modern power in science and technology, though its relative standing will remain well behind that of the advanced nations. However, if Sino-Soviet relations should deteriorate to the point where Bloc sources of industrial equipment and technical assistance were greatly reduced, Communist China's economic growth would be slowed, expansion into more complex fields of industry inhibited, and military development retarded. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. This supersedes NIE 13–59 (Document 292). A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 December 1960."

3. Peiping will continue to face major economic problems for many years to come. It will continue to be dependent upon foreign sources for some key items of industrial and military equipment and for specialized technical knowledge. Communist China's petroleum requirements will grow rapidly during the next five years, and even the expected tripling of domestic production will not end China's dependence upon petroleum imports. Transportation will remain overburdened. Agricultural production will still be meager in relation to domestic and export needs. Per capita supplies of food and other consumer goods will not have risen enough to enable material incentives to replace coercion and political pressures as the chief spurs to production. An increasingly urgent population problem will confront the regime with difficult policy decisions. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

4. There will probably be growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the Chinese masses concerning the heavy burdens they will be forced to carry, and the regime will face increasing problems in overcoming public apathy, fatigue, and passive resistance. In addition, there may be an increase in party factionalism when Mao Tse-tung dies. Such developments, however, will not threaten the regime's ability to control and direct the country. Furthermore, there is positive support from some millions of people who have made real advances under Peiping's rule, and among many there is a feeling of pride in Communist China's rapid advance as a world power. In any case, we now see no serious threat, either internal or external, to the continuance of the regime. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

5. Peiping's conventional military capabilities will probably continue to grow, and will increasingly threaten the non-Communist Asian periphery. The rate of increase in Communist China's military capabilities will be determined in large part by the economic demands of the regime's overall economic development program and by the nature and extent of Soviet assistance. Communist China will probably have exploded a nuclear device during the period of this estimate and may have produced a small number of elementary nuclear weapons. It may also have produced a jet medium bomber. However, unless there is a great increase in Soviet aid in the missile field, which we believe is unlikely, China will be unable to develop and produce even medium-range guided missiles by 1965. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

6. The most important development of the past year in Communist China's affairs has been the breaking out of the long-smouldering Sino-Soviet dispute over Communist world policy and authority within the Bloc. We believe that the differences between Peiping and Moscow are so basic and are so much a product of the different situations and problems in the two countries that any genuine resolution of the fundamental differences is unlikely. Although the possibility of a complete break cannot

be excluded, we believe that the alliance against the West will hold together. Nevertheless, the estrangement will probably continue, with ups and downs as new issues arise.[1] [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

7. A basic tenet of Communist China's foreign policy—to establish Chinese hegemony in the Far East—almost certainly will not change appreciably during the period of this estimate. The regime will continue to be violently anti-American and to strike at US interests wherever and whenever it can do so without paying a disproportionate price. It will continue and almost certainly step up its efforts to create trouble and confusion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to subvert anti-Communist and, probably, non-Communist governments in these areas. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

8. During the period of this estimate Peiping's policies will range between relative moderation and outright toughness. Peiping will probably again increase its military pressures in the Taiwan Strait area. However, we believe that Peiping does not intend to advance its aims by overt military action elsewhere, although it probably will react forcefully to challenges and opportunities. Its arrogant self-confidence, revolutionary fervor, and distorted view of the world may lead Peiping to miscalculate risks. This danger would be heightened if Communist China achieved a nuclear weapons capability. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

9. Even before the explosion of a nuclear device, Peiping's military power and potential may increasingly complicate the international disarmament problem. Peiping will exploit this situation in an effort to enhance its international status, but at the same time may attempt to prevent the conclusion of any disarmament agreement, at least until it becomes a nuclear power. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

10. In 1965 Communist China will be playing more fully the role of a leading world power, whether or not it is a member of the UN. Its arrogance, pretensions, and capabilities for independent action will remain a source of concern to the USSR. At the same time the danger posed by Communist China to US interests, particularly in Asia, will have increased. [*less than 1 line of 2-column source text not declassified*]

[Here follow 43-1/2 pages of 2-column source text scheduled for inclusion in the Supplement but not declassified.]

---

[1] [*Footnote in the source text (3 lines of source text) not declassified.*]

363. Editorial Note

At the 469th meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, December 8, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders had adjourned after three weeks of wrangling. Eighty-one Communist Parties had been represented at the conference. Six Communist Parties had not been represented. Mr. Dulles did not know which Communist Parties were missing. The conference had issued a manifesto which re-affirmed the positions on which Moscow and Peiping have been able to agree. The manifesto contained an attack on imperialism, alliances, the U.S., Adenauer, and the 'imperialist-colonialist world'. The manifesto also contained a mixture of the positions on which the Chinese Communists and the Soviets have not been able to agree, a mixture not a reconciliation of these positions. CIA experts have isolated seventeen issues dividing Communist China and the USSR. The manifesto indicates that the Soviets won six rounds, the Chinese Communists won four rounds, and seven rounds ended in a draw. On the question of war and peace the manifesto leans to the Soviet side. On the question of emphasizing imperialist preparations for war and on the idea that the Socialist camp is so strong that it can deter or win a general war, the manifesto leans to the Chinese side. On support for local wars, the manifesto is evasive. On peaceful co-existence and economic competition, the manifesto leans toward the Soviets; but on the harsh nature of the peaceful struggle, it leans toward the Chinese. The manifesto is ambiguous on the question of discipline in the world Communist movement but it leans toward Peiping in a statement that Moscow is the vanguard of the world Communist movement rather than the ultimate authority. Certain sensitive matters such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Communist China are not discussed at all in the manifesto. Mr. Dulles thought that the compromise arrived at in the manifesto had required long hours of struggle. The chief Chinese Communist delegate to the conference was said to have made a four hour speech attacking Khrushchev personally. Khrushchev was alleged to have lost his temper twice. In Mr. Dulles' view, the manifesto settled nothing; the document can be cited by both parties to substantiate the ideological views they have previously held. The Chinese Communist and Soviet newspapers started interpreting the manifesto differently almost as soon as it was issued. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was possible a secret agreement had been reached between the USSR and Communist China at this conference. Assessing the effects of the conference on the West, Mr. Dulles estimated that the anti-Western tone of the manifesto may reduce Khrushchev's freedom of maneuver toward the West and make it difficult for him to pursue his pre-summit 1960 tactics. The manifesto commits the USSR to maintain an aggressive line against the West. Mr. Dulles believed that Khrushchev now intends to return to the tactic of negotiation with the West while vigorously pursuing an anti-colonialism campaign. Mr. Dulles thought consideration should be given to ways in which the manifesto might be exploited.

"Secretary Herter said a telegram from Ambassador Thompson in Moscow had suggested that the U.S. should characterize the manifesto as a redeclaration of the cold war and a charter for the Communization of the world. The telegram also pointed out that the manifesto also contains a large number of blatant lies which might be exploited, e.g., the lie that the West never grants freedom to a colony. Ambassador Thompson also believed that we should endeavor to put the Soviets on the defensive by drawing attention to the inconsistencies in the manifesto and by pointing out the concessions the Soviets were compelled to make to the Chinese Communists. Secretary Dillon wished to point out one of the concessions of the manifesto in the economic field. In one place the document declares that automation is the means by which the Western capitalists are endeavoring to enslave the worker. A few pages later the document declares that the Socialist countries must promote the maximum automation. Mr. Dulles felt that pure Communism would require a great deal of automation. Concluding the discussion of this subject, Mr. Dulles noted that Ambassador Thompson was having a talk with Mikoyan to ask him whether the manifesto stated the policy of the USSR or merely the policy of the Communist Parties of the world." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

An analysis of the Moscow Statement prepared in the Department of State, sent to the President with a covering memorandum, December 9, from Secretary Herter, is *ibid.*, Dulles–Herter Series; see Supplement.

364. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–2–60 Washington, December 13, 1960.

THE COMMUNIST CHINESE ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

The Problem

To determine the current status and the probable future course of the Chinese Communist atomic energy program to mid-1965.

Summary and Conclusions

General

1. Communist China is energetically developing her native capabilities in the field of atomic energy. Since the early 1950's she has been making a concerted effort to develop the corps of scientists and technicians and establish the research facilities essential to the exploitation of nuclear energy. The overall effort has progressed steadily since 1955 with the benefit of a substantial amount of Soviet aid. This assistance has been obtained by the Chinese Communists via negotiated, formal arrangements under which they apparently have maintained a considerable degree of autonomy. However, we believe that the Soviets have provided this aid at a deliberate pace, hoping to postpone the attainment of a native Chinese nuclear weapons capability as long as possible.

Organization

2. There are indications that the control of the Chinese Communist military atomic energy program is currently vested in the Second Ministry of Machine Building. The functions of this ministry have never been made known, unlike other Chinese ministries, and its minister Liu Chieh, is known to have certain interests in the Chinese Communist atomic energy program. We believe that this ministry may be patterned after the Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The peaceful uses aspects of the program, covering nuclear research, training, and isotope applications, are largely under the control of the Scientific and Technological Commission of the State Council, with the Institute of Atomic

---

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 13 December 1960."

Energy of the Academy of Sciences as the most prominent research establishment.

Technical Capabilities

3. The Chinese Communists have acquired a small but highly competent cadre of Western-trained Chinese nuclear specialists. Their nuclear research effort has expanded rapidly since the early 1950's and more than twenty nuclear research facilities have been established at institutes and universities. In addition to the Soviet-supplied research reactor and cyclotron, there are a variety of cyclotrons and other accelerators, most of which are of Chinese manufacture. The Chinese have access, through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, to the large Soviet accelerators at Dubna. China's share of the financial costs of the institute is 20 percent, a share exceeded only by that of the Soviet Union. We believe that the widespread Chinese training and research effort is coordinated to the needs of the military atomic energy program. The Chinese Communists are now capable of comprehending and exploiting the large body of open scientific literature in the nuclear sciences. However, the present shortage of trained scientists and engineers will probably persist throughout the period of this estimate. This shortage would hamper Chinese efforts to design, construct, and operate facilities for the production of fissionable materials and would be particularly serious, should the Soviets decide to reduce or terminate their technical aid.

Uranium Ore Production

4. The exploitation of native uranium resources has been underway, with Soviet assistance, since 1950. Over 10 deposits are now being worked, and we believe that ore with a uranium metal equivalent of several hundred tons is being mined annually and retained in China.

Uranium Metal

5. The Chinese Communists have probably initiated the processing of uranium ores into metals.

Fissionable Materials

6. Chinese development of uranium resources and their probable construction of ore concentration and uranium metal plants certainly would imply an intended use for the uranium in plutonium production. Although uranium metal is not required for U–235 production, the first stages of the process could also supply feed for U–235 separation.

7. We estimate that a first Chinese production reactor could attain criticality in late 1961, and the first plutonium might become available

late in 1962.[1] Since there is no conclusive evidence for the date of the uranium plant startup, and since the construction of reactor and chemical separation facilities has not been directly established, the actual start of plutonium production could be a year earlier or several years later.

8. It is possible that a U–235 plant is now under construction. Considering the magnitude of the developmental work and industrial support required for the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant, however, it is improbable that the Chinese could produce highly enriched U–235 earlier than late 1962.[2]

Nuclear Weapons

9. On the basis of all available evidence, we now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists could detonate a first nuclear device is sometime in 1963, though it might be as late as 1964, or as early as 1962, depending upon the actual degree of Soviet assistance.[1–2] If the Soviets provide fissionable materials, and assist in the design and fabrication of a nuclear device, the Chinese could produce a nuclear detonation in China at almost any time in the immediate future. On the other hand, if there were a lessening of Soviet assistance in the nuclear field as a result of current Sino-Soviet dissensions, progress would be substantially retarded.

10. While the explosion of a nuclear device would give the Chinese Communists political and propaganda rewards, they would almost certainly proceed to create an operational nuclear capability as quickly as feasible. However, at least two years would probably be required after the explosion of a nuclear device to produce a small number of elementary weapons.

---

[1] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the Chinese will probably detonate their first nuclear device in 1962, and posssibly as early as late 1961. The great political, psychological and military advantages to be gained are such that the Chinese would accord top national priority to the development of a nuclear weapons program. He interprets the available evidence on the production schedule of uranium metal and fissionable material to indicate that in 1959 a uranium metal plant started producing fuel elements for the production reactor which is believed to have gone critical in 1960. The first nuclear device will probably use plutonium from this reactor. Finally, he believes that after late 1961 highly enriched U–235 will be available for subsequent devices. [Footnote in the source text.]

[2] The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, believes that information on the nature and extent of Soviet aid to Communist China is as yet insufficient for a reliable estimate of the year in which the Chinese Communists could detonate a nuclear device. He considers, however, that certain basic information should have become available to us by this time if the Chinese Communists were progressing toward detonation of a domestically produced nuclear device very much before the final stages of this five-year estimate. In the absence of what he considers to be any evidence pertaining to or indicative of the production of fissionable materials in Communist China and in the light of the relatively elementary state of known nuclear research facilities, he is unable to accept the time schedule for nuclear weapons as given in this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]

Nuclear Power

11. Based on known Chinese Communist desire to become a nuclear power, we believe that production reactors would be given precedence over reactors designed for nuclear power. Further, we do not believe that the Chinese would complicate the design of their first production reactors in an effort to extract by-product power. We estimate that the Chinese will not construct nuclear power stations in the 1960–1965 period.

Soviet Assistance

12. Soviet assistance has been an important factor in the Chinese atomic energy program. Under an agreement for cooperation concluded in 1955, the Soviets have provided to the Chinese a research reactor, cyclotron, technical assistance and training. A Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Agreement for the years 1958–1962 was concluded in 1958. Other known Soviet aid has been largely concerned with uranium prospecting. We have no firm evidence of Soviet assistance in designing or constructing fissionable materials production facilities or in supplying the materials or equipment needed for such production.

13. There is some evidence that Soviet aid may have been curtailed, based on reports that a general withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China took place in mid-1960. Such diminution of aid in the Chinese Communists' atomic energy program would substantially retard China's progress in becoming a nuclear power.

---

365. Letter From President Chiang to President Eisenhower

Taipei, December 14, 1960.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since you assumed in 1952 the leadership of the free world in its struggle against Communism and slavery, the Republic of China has benefited much from your country in way of moral support and material aid. The spirit of utmost cooperation as demonstrated by the signing of the Sino-American defense treaty has soared to a height unprecedented in relations between our two countries during the past half a century. Now as your term of office is about to expire, I wish to express to you, on behalf of the Chinese people as a whole, civilians and military alike, our profound admiration as well as our deep gratitude.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Personal and Confidential. Filed with a memorandum of December 17 from Acting Director of the Executive Secretariat Emory C. Swank to Parsons, which states that the letter was delivered at the White House that day by Ambassador Yeh.

During the past eight years, your country has helped us in numerous ways. Among the most concrete, most remarkable and also most memorable accomplishments has been the economic assistance which has enabled us to build the East-West cross-island highway on Taiwan in a record time, and also to undertake the construction of the Ta-chien Dam, which, when completed, will be the second highest dam in the world. It is this American economic aid which has encouraged us in our own efforts to seek further economic development and improvement of the people's standard of living.

During the same period, your country has continuously supplied our army, air force and navy with new equipment with a view to strengthening our defense capabilities. Your country's prompt logistic aid at the time of the Chinese Communists' ferocious and prolonged bombardment of the Kinmen complex in 1958 not only improved the foundation for the modernization of our armed forces, but also had a great boosting effect on the morale of our military personnel as well as our civilian population. Particularly inestimable has been its impact on the spirit of millions upon millions of enslaved people on the Chinese mainland because it sustains them in their longings for democracy and freedom.

In this connection, aside from expressing my sincere thanks for your approval of the plan [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] for the purpose of encouraging an anti-Communist and anti-tyranny movement on the mainland, I also hope that your side will continue to work with us to ensure the smooth implementation of the said plan. In particular, I wish you would authorize the delivery to us before you leave office several long-range and large-capacity C–130s or other transport planes with similar capabilities, so that prompt use can be made of them when preparations for the execution of the above-mentioned plan are completed.[1]

Your leaving office at a time when the International Communists are menacingly vociferous and when the world situation is dangerously uncertain, is causing concern because it will deprive the free world of an experienced helmsman. However, I personally and the Chinese people as a whole will continue to look upon you as a symbol in the free world's resistance against the onslaught of Communism.

---

[1] A December 22 memorandum from Herter to the President enclosed a draft reply expressing regret that it was not possible to respond affirmatively to this request and suggesting that a request be submitted through the normal Military Assistance Program channels. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/12–2260) The draft was apparently not approved by the White House; a memorandum of January 4 from Herter to the President enclosed a new draft, stating that the President had authorized the delivery of one C–130B. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/1–461) The second draft was signed by the President; his reply, dated January 12, 1961, was sent to Taipei in telegram 310 of that date. (*Ibid.*, 793.5–MSP/1–1261)

Once again, I wish to thank you for the great friendship and good wishes which you have all along shown to the Republic of China during the past eight years.

With the Season's Greetings,

Sincerely yours,

Chiang Kai-shek[2]

---

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

366. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State-Designate Rusk

Washington, December 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

A New Approach to Our China Policy Objectives

The continued effectiveness of the moratorium formula on the representation of China in the United Nations is now in question as a result of the recent close vote in the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.[1] We are thus faced with an urgent problem on an important aspect of our China policy. We consider that our policy toward and in relation to China is central to the achievement of our national objectives in the Far East. These may be defined as the development in freedom of countries peripheral to Communist China and the frustration of the Communist purpose to dominate the entire area as a key step toward world domination.

Attached are three papers[2] which it is hoped may be useful in a current consideration of our policy toward China, with particular emphasis on the United Nations aspect of it.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/12–2860. Top Secret. Drafted by Parsons.

[1] In Resolution 1493 (XV), adopted October 8, 1960, the General Assembly decided not to consider at its 15th session any proposals on the question of Chinese representation; the resolution was adopted by a vote of 42 to 34, with 22 abstentions.

[2] The attachments are not printed but see Supplement. All are unsigned and undated and each indicates that the drafting date was December 28.

The first of these papers[3] deals with our China policy in general, and offers some suggestions as to possible courses of action within the somewhat limited scope chiefly circumscribed by the Chinese Communists themselves.

The second paper[4] outlines a new approach to the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations, which would be difficult to implement but which would seem to serve United States interests if it could be implemented. The attempt to do so, even if it falls short, might prove salutary.

The third paper[5] describes the probable strong adverse reaction of the GRC to the plan in the second paper, and suggests what is believed to be the best approach in negotiating with the GRC on the representation question.

In developing these papers within FE, we have assumed that the advent of the new administration offers a unique opportunity for us to attempt some such change in approach. We do not advocate any change in broad objective but rather tactical changes to promote that objective under the new circumstances which obtain.

(Because of the sensitivity of this subject, knowledge of the content of these papers has been limited to key officers of FE and the papers have no official standing in the Department or within the Government.)

---

[3] Headed "China Policy;" drafted by Parsons and Jenkins. The penultimate paragraph reads as follows:

"In summary, it would appear that 1) an attempted basic shift in the near future in the objectives of United States China policy would be at too great cost both regionally and globally, and that the Chinese Communists would not be likely to cooperate in such a shift in any event; 2) we might, however, make significant gains propaganda-wise and conceivably otherwise by changing our approach to the representation issue; 3) there are a few other specific areas in which a shift would seem to hold some promise; and 4) most importantly, our interests in the Far East will be a major beneficiary of a globally exhibited full awareness that we are in a war to the finish and that we have the human and material resources to prevail and the will and imagination to apply them successfully."

[4] Headed "Chinese Representation in the United Nations." Annex I, "Alternative Courses to the Moratorium Procedure," with Tabs A and B, and Annex II, "Conclusions from an Examination of the Alternatives to the Moratorium Procedure," were attached. All were drafted by William H. Sullivan, U.N. Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, except Tab B, "Some Possible Alternatives for Dealing with the Question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations," drafted by Acting Deputy Legal Adviser Leonard C. Meeker. The memorandum proposed a sequence of steps including: a General Assembly resolution declaring that the Republic of China was an original and continuing U.N. member but had lost control of much of its territory and that the People's Republic of China was eligible for membership; the introduction of another resolution providing for the enlargement of the Security Council and changing the "Republic of China" seat to the "China" seat; and a GRC declaration that it would not seek to occupy the seat unless and until it could once again act for all of China. It was anticipated that the PRC would refuse to apply for membership under these circumstances, with the result of continuing GRC membership in the General Assembly.

[5] Headed "Negotiating with the GRC Regarding Its Future in the United Nations;" drafted by Martin.

U.S. RESPONSE TO THE REBELLION IN TIBET

367. Editorial Note

At the 400th meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by S. Everett Gleason reads as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would report first on the situation in Tibet as it had developed up to this hour. Beginning on March 10 at Lhasa there had occurred a series of events which led to the flight from Lhasa of the Dalai Lama whom the Chinese Communists were about to kidnap and carry off to Peiping. When the people of Lhasa became aware of these plans, thousands of Tibetans flocked to the city and took the Dalai Lama into protective custody. Disorders followed in Lhasa. A Chinese Communist strongpoint was captured. The Lama supported the rebel activity. Peiping at first tried a policy of leniency but subsequently was obliged to take strong measures. The rebels had abandoned Lhasa on March 24.

"While these events do not constitute any real threat to Peiping's control of the main towns of Tibet, the Chinese Communists will certainly be obliged to face guerrilla operations by rebellious Tibetans. The situation will also be awkward because the Chinese Communists wish to avoid drastic action in Tibet lest such action offend India.

"Mr. Dulles followed these remarks by citing statistics on Chinese Communist military strength in Tibet together with statistics of the population of Tibet proper and of Tibetans living in areas bordering on Tibet.

"Thereafter Mr. Dulles pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek was much encouraged by the uprising in Tibet and had been extremely anxious to do something to encourage its continuation. To this end he had issued a pronunciamento today which went pretty far. On the other hand, Chiang does not have much influence in Tibet because in the past he himself has consistently opposed independence for Tibet. Prime Minister Nehru was very worried about these developments. He fears frontier clashes if the Tibetan rebels attempt to flee into India. While he has publicly declared a hands off policy for India, he has let it be known privately that he will give religious asylum to the Dalai Lama. Publicly he has declared that India will not admit fleeing Tibetan rebels to cross over into India. We have every reason to hope that the Dalai Lama will get out of Tibet fairly soon.

"[*1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified*]"

A further exchange relating to Tibet between Dulles and United States Information Agency Director George V. Allen is recorded in Gleason's memorandum as follows:

"At the close of Mr. Dulles's briefing, Mr. George Allen asked the President's permission to comment on the subject of the U.S. public position with respect to the revolt in Tibet. Mr. Allen stated that the Tibetan revolt was not so much anti-Communist in character as it was anti-Chinese. The Tibetans would probably dislike the Chinese Nationalist Government as much as they disliked the government at Peiping. Accordingly, he felt that we should try to tone down Chiang Kai-shek. He said he hoped of course that the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese Communist domination would be successful [*5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The text of Chiang Kai-shek's March 26 message to the Tibetans is in telegram 1041 from Taipei, March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2659) The text of a statement issued on March 26 by Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959,* page 1162.

For accounts by the Dalai Lama of his flight from Tibet and its background, see *Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), pages 123–143, as well as *My Land and My People* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), pages 155–216.

---

368. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Tibet

1. As background to current developments in Tibet, I am submitting for your information this summary of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Tibet.

2. In May 1956, the Dalai Lama visited India as a guest of the Indian government, upon the occasion of the 2500th anniversary of the Bud-

---

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80 M 01009 A, Box 9, Folder 11, Dulles Correspondence with White House, Jan–June 1959. Secret. Filed with a covering note of the same date from CIA Executive Officer J.S. Earman to Goodpaster. Drafted on March 31 in the Far East Division and cleared by the chief of that division and by the Deputy Director for Plans.

dhist religion. During this visit, the Dalai Lama appealed to the Indian government for support of the anti-Communist resistance in his country, but his appeal was rejected. [4-1/2 *lines of source text not declassified*]

[4 *paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified*]

7. In light of the recent upsurge of Tibetan resistance and the flight of the Dalai Lama toward India, which have resulted in a complete break between the legitimate Tibetan authorities and the Chinese Communist government, plans are currently being made, within existing policy authorizations, [2-1/2 *lines of source text not declassified*].

[1 *paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Allen W. Dulles[1]

---

[1] Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

---

369. Editorial Note

Intelligence briefing notes for April 1, 1959, prepared for President Eisenhower, unsigned but probably prepared by Colonel John Eisenhower, include the following section:

"Tibet

"We have informed Embassy New Delhi we think the US should take no action with respect to Tibetan refugees which would diminish the effect the revolt appears to be having in India. We anticipate, however, that a future substantial influx might produce requests from the Indian Government or private charities for international assistance. We think any US aid should be provided indirectly to avoid giving the Indians the impression our interest is political rather than humanitarian. Consequently, we believe it should be granted in response to an Indian request. Possible media for making our contributions are: 1) international voluntary relief agencies; 2) Indian-owned PL 480 agricultural commodities diverted through the Indian Government or voluntary agencies; 3) International Red Cross channels; or 4) direct cash contributions to the Indian Government. We have requested the Embassy's estimate of the refugee influx and its views on approaches to India on the subject." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Subject Series, Alpha Subseries, Intelligence Briefing Notes, Vol. I)

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

Washington, April 2, 1959, 7:13 p.m.

654. Department has noted continuing GRC concern re Tibetan situation as evidenced by following reported statements and actions past few days:

a. Four-point resolution adopted by Legislative Yuan March 31 calling on GRC inter alia to seek UN consideration of question;
b. T.F. Tsiang allusion in press conference March 27 to possibility UN consideration of problem;
c. CBS stringer Taipei report GRC considering make appeal UN High Commissioner for Refugees for help to Tibetan refugees;
d. President Chiang statement to youth rally March 29 calling for accelerated aid to mainland revolutionary movement, especially to Tibetan rebels;
e. Control Yuan April 1 six-point resolution.

Embassy requested submit appraisal these statements and actions and in general to report what it believes GRC's thinking and intentions to be re Tibetan situation. Department particularly interested to know whether GRC seriously contemplating move in UN.

While recognizing pressures on GRC to proclaim intention support Tibetan resistance and help refugees, we strongly believe it in best interests both Tibetans and GRC itself to play matter in lowest key possible at this time. Matters now moving favorably, with Indian public opinion forcing Nehru and GOI into more forthright position in support of Tibetan resistance. Reaction elsewhere among less committed countries in free Asia also taking encouragingly anti-Chinese Communist line. It not desirable this favorable trend be impaired by over-eager GRC exploitation efforts, which would tend blur spontaneous nature Tibetan uprising and lend credibility to Peiping's charges of GRC instigation. Most useful contribution GRC could make would be to reiterate and spell out President Chiang's promise of self-determination for Tibetans.

Re possibility UN consideration Tibetan situation, although we would not wish exclude this, we believe it would require careful consideration. For example, various problems involved, including question degree friendly support likely be obtainable and certain technical

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–259. Secret. Drafted by United Nations Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs Ruth E. Bacon and Lutkins, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Parker T. Hart and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Walter N. Walmsley, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to New Delhi and USUN.

considerations such as Tibet's status and relation Chinese Communists to any UN consideration of issue would need explanation. It would also be desirable await developments, especially as to position taken by Dalai and his government following emergence from Tibet, subsequent GOI attitude, and more concrete information on events in Tibet.

In discussing situation with GRC officials you should seek as feasible to convey Department's thinking points contained in previous two paragraphs at appropriate level.[1]

Herter

---

[1] Drumright conveyed the Department's views to Foreign Minister Huang, who told him on April 10 that he had relayed them to the President and Premier. The April 10 conversation was reported in telegram 1091 from Taipei, April 10. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/4–1059; see Supplement)

---

371. Editorial Note

At the 403d meeting of the National Security Council on April 23, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles reported on Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion prepared by S. Everett Gleason, April 23, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said that the latest messages about the situation in Tibet clearly indicated that the dissidents or the patriots had been severely beaten by the Chinese Communists. As of now, the patriots had been pressed into a relatively small area of Tibet. The messages had a rather pathetic quality. The patriots had no food and no ammunition and they were requesting our intercession with the Indian Government to permit their passage into India. Mr. Dulles said that of course we would do all that we could to help them but it was a difficult situation. The Chinese Communists had put on a very effective military showing. They were making use of veterans of the Korean War and they were also making very efficient use of aircraft. It looked as though the rebel forces in the Khamba area had been pretty well knocked to pieces. The same was probably true of the rebel forces in the Lhasa area.

"[*2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified*]

"With respect to the lack of food for the refugees, Secretary Herter wondered whether we could make use of PL 480. Mr. Dulles replied that we were considering this problem with General Gruenther as head of the Red Cross in case a request came from India for food supplies for these refugees. The Vice President commented that he felt that the use of the Red Cross as an instrumentality to relieve the refugees was better than direct U.S. Government intervention.

"Secretary McElroy inquired whether this government was doing all it could in order to keep the ruthless Chinese Communist action against Tibet on the front pages. Secretary McElroy thought that Tibet should be treated as a new Hungary and it seemed to him that the Tibetan situation was in fact getting out of the front pages. It was in our interest to keep it there.

"Secretary Herter cautioned that we must be careful that we ourselves do not appear to stimulate reactions to the Chinese Communists' action in Tibet but rather covertly assist the Asian peoples themselves to keep the Tibetan action prominently before the world. Mr. Dulles promised to get to work on this problem." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

372. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Tibetan Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–2359. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins.

Ambassador Yeh observed that while the situation in Tibet is generally evolving favorably from the GRC's point of view, Taipei is somewhat concerned that Nehru may attempt to pressure the Dalai Lama into returning to Tibet. The unsettled status of the Indian-Tibetan border is involved in this matter. The Ambassador explained that the GOI bases its position on the McMahon line[1] which it inherited from the British, while the Chinese Communist claims are based on the Chien Lung line (on the basis of which the Kalimpong–Darjeeling area of Sikkim and the Towang area of Assam fall within Chinese territory). Nehru is reportedly under strong pressure from the Indian Parliament to obtain Peiping's formal recognition of the McMahon line, and might be tempted to sacrifice the Dalai Lama as a means of gaining a quick settlement of the border issue. The GRC considers it important that the Dalai Lama enjoy real freedom in India and not be held as a prisoner by the GOI.

Mr. Robertson said that it would help a great deal if the GRC could publicly renounce suzerainty over Tibet and recognize its independent status. Ambassador Yeh commented that the GRC cannot do this since Tibet is described as part of China in the GRC Constitution, and for practical purposes it is virtually impossible to amend the Constitution under present conditions. A Constitutional amendment requires approval by at least two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Yuan or by three-quarters of the members of the National Assembly. The number of members of these two bodies presently living in Taiwan barely exceeds the required figures, so that in effect unanimous votes would be needed. The Ambassador's opinion was that neither body would be willing to assume the responsibility of giving up Chinese territory. He said that the GRC has already made a forthright declaration on the subject in the form of President Chiang's statement of March 26[2] promising the Tibetans that when the GRC recovers the mainland it will assist the Tibetans to realize their aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Mr. Robertson observed that President Chiang's statement was certainly a good one, but that it did not go far enough to meet the needs of the present situation. In order to have any real psychological impact what is needed is not a promise of action at an unspecified future date, but forthright, unambiguous action now.

---

[1] Reference is to the boundary line between Tibet and northeast India agreed upon by British and Tibetan representatives in March 1914 and confirmed by the Simla Convention, initialed July 3, 1914, by British, Chinese, and Tibetan representatives but never signed or ratified by the Chinese Government. The text is in *Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic: A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960), pp. 330–333. A map showing the McMahon Line is appended to *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, September–November 1959: White Paper No. II* (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [1959]).

[2] See Document 367.

According to Ambassador Yeh, one complicating factor is that of the roughly 4 million Tibetan people only about 1.2 million live in Tibet proper. The rest are located in neighboring areas including Sikang, Tsinghai, and Kansu. The Panchen Lama can probably obtain statements from leaders of the latter group taking the line that they are loyal citizens of China and that Tibet should be part of China. Such statements, of course, would have a strong appeal for any Chinese. Mr. Robertson commented that this difficulty like the others mentioned by the Ambassador would apply equally when the GRC returns to the mainland. Returning to President Chiang's March 26 statement, he said it seemed to him, by deferring action until recovery of the mainland, to leave the impression of imposing self-limitations on the GRC's authority to speak as the government of the whole of China. Therefore, the position taken in it is a weak and undesirable one from the GRC's point of view. Our own view, of course, is that the GRC represents the whole of China and therefore can take and announce a position regarding a part of mainland China at any time without having to await recovery of the mainland.

Mr. Robertson concluded by stating that we recognize the type of action suggested by him presents real problems for the GRC, but it would make things much more difficult for Peiping and he hoped the GRC would give our views careful consideration. Ambassador Yeh said he would report our views to Taipei.

---

373. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

REVIEW OF TIBETAN OPERATIONS

1. *Background.* The international legal status of Tibet has been a question for decades. China has made sporadic invasions into Tibet and, in recent history, has made constant attempts to affirm her right of suzerainty over Tibet, which she claims to have inherited from the Ching Dynasty.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Intelligence Matters (9). Secret; Eyes Only. Filed with a covering memorandum of April 27 from CIA Executive Officer J.S. Earman to Goodpaster, which notes that the memorandum was being sent pursuant to an April 25 conversation between Goodpaster and Allen Dulles. The source text bears no drafting information.

a. The Chinese Communist attitude towards Tibet is that Tibet is politically a part of China as a result of historic military conquest.

b. Tibet, on the other hand, has sought complete independence, although in 1951 the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama under duress signed an agreement recognizing Chinese Communist suzerainty over Tibet.

c. The British and the United States have long recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet was to be regarded as autonomous.

d. Since 1948, the Government of India has appeared to give tacit acceptance to the suzerainty status of Tibet. This was reaffirmed in 1951 through the joint declaration with Peking which announced mutual agreement to the five principles of peaceful coexistence publicized as the "Panchshila."

e. The Tibetans, particularly the Khambas, Goloks and other tribes of East Tibet, are a fierce, brave and warlike people. Battle in defense of their religion and the Dalai Lama is looked upon as a means of achieving merit towards their next reincarnation.

f. The greater part of the terrain in Tibet, and especially in the centers of active resistance in the east, is exceedingly rugged, with few established lines of communications. To add to the problems of the Chinese Communists, the area is unable to support a large occupation force and almost all supplies must be brought in overland or by air.

[*9 paragraphs (3 pages of source text) not declassified*]

a. In May 1956 the Dalai Lama visited India as a guest of the Indian Government upon the occasion of the 2500th anniversary of the Buddhist religion. During this visit the Dalai Lama appealed to the Indian government for support of the anti-Communist resistance in his country, but this appeal was rejected. [*31 lines of source text not declassified*]

[*10 paragraphs (5 pages of source text) not declassified*]

8. Later intelligence from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Tibet—the last message was received today, April 25—reports that the Tibetan resistance in the South has been heavily engaged and decimated, and is tragically short of food and ammunition.

374. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

Attitude of GRC Toward Independent Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, CA

Ambassador Yeh called on Mr. Robertson at his own request. He said that he had reported the views expressed by Mr. Robertson during their conversation of April 23 and had just received a telegram from Taipei in reply. According to this message, if the Dalai Lama were to proclaim a provisional government of Tibet, the GRC would make a statement 1) recognizing the Dalai Lama's government as the Government of Tibet under Article 120 of the Chinese constitution, which provides for safeguarding of Tibetan self-government, 2) asserting that the GRC would continue to pursue with the Tibetans their aim of achieving self-determination, and 3) supporting the heroic struggle of the Tibetan people against the Communists for religious and cultural freedom. The Ambassador said that the statement probably would not use these exact words but would be along these lines.

Mr. Robertson asked if the GRC had not always recognized the Dalai Lama as the government of Tibet? Dr. Yeh replied in the negative. He said that the statement proposed by the GRC would be consistent with the statement made by President Chiang on March 26 concerning self-determination for the Tibetans. Mr. Robertson asked whether the proposed statement could not make a reference to Tibetan independence. Ambassador Yeh replied that this could not be done because of the constitutional difficulties involved in changing China's boundaries.

Ambassador Yeh then requested, on behalf of his Government, that the United States endeavor to seek assurance from the Dalai Lama that he would react favorably to a GRC statement along the lines suggested above. He said that it was important for his Government to know that its proposed statement would be well received by the Dalai Lama before making the statement. His Government did not want to be slapped down by the Dalai Lama after making such a statement. Ambassador Yeh also indicated that following the issuance of the GRC's statement, it would like to establish contact with the Dalai Lama.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–2959. Secret. Drafted by Martin.

Ambassador Yeh further requested that if the United States were to make a statement regarding any provisional government setup by the Dalai Lama that this statement not be too much different from that of the GRC. He suggested that the United States might simply declare that it gave recognition to the Dalai Lama's government as the Government of Tibet. Mr. Robertson said that we did not know at present whether the situation would arise, but if it did, we would consult the GRC before taking any further steps. He then asked Ambassador Yeh whether it would involve any embarrassment to the GRC if the United States recognized the Dalai Lama's government as an independent one. Ambassador Yeh asked whether it would not be satisfactory for the United States to recognize it simply as the Government of Tibet. Mr. Robertson said that he didn't know but that it might be that the United States would want to recognize a declaration of independence by the Dalai Lama. It would depend upon circumstances at the time and in any case we would certainly consult with the GRC before making a decision. Ambassador Yeh said that the United States must exercise leadership in these matters and if it felt it must make a statement of this kind, it should of course do so.

Ambassador Yeh said he was startled by reports of thousands of refugees in India [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]. Dr. Yeh felt that this number of refugees could only mean that the Khamba tribesmen, who had been the main anti-Communist fighting force in Tibet, had fled to India. He thought it was vital to set up some organization which would enable these people to rally around the Dalai Lama. He was certain that Nehru would resist the setting up of a provisional government and therefore he had thought of alternative places, such as Ceylon or Thailand. Kandy, in Ceylon, would be ideal, since it was a center of Buddhism and also offered a high altitude suitable to the Tibetans. Mr. Robertson referred to the statement of the Prime Minister of Ceylon that the Tibetan revolt was a Chinese internal affair. Ambassador Yeh said that this statement was discouraging and that perhaps Thailand was the only alternative. He did not have much confidence in the willingness of the Thais to take bold action, however.

375. Editorial Note

At the 404th meeting of the National Security Council on April 30, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion ensued. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by Marion W. Boggs reads as follows:

"Turning to Tibet, Mr. Dulles said that the Chinese Communists had been making an all-out effort to mop up the rebels and seal off the southern border. As a result, organized Tibetan resistance had disintegrated. The rebels had initially made the mistake of fighting in large groups; from now on they would probably discover that the essence of guerrilla warfare consists of fighting in small bands. In Lhasa many Tibetans had been killed and the young men had been rounded up and apparently headed for concentration camps. According to Nehru, some thousands of Tibetan refugees had crossed over into India. The President said that General Gruenther was hoping that the Indian Red Cross, with some help from the American Red Cross, would be able to care for these refugees. Mr. Dulles said that the Chinese Communists were trying to get the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Eventually the question would arise whether the Dalai Lama should stay in India or should go to some other Buddhist country. The President said that the present situation should promote a better understanding between Pakistan and India. Pakistan had always maintained that it was arming because of the danger from Communist China, but Nehru had pooh-poohed this contention. Now, however, Nehru must recognize that Communist China is getting tough and might start trouble in Nepal next. The President thought that in this situation the U.S. should work quite actively toward promoting a better understanding between India and Pakistan."

When Dulles resumed his briefing, he made further comments relating to China:

"Mr. Dulles said that the appointment of Liu Shao-chi as President of Communist China points to his probable succession to Mao. Liu is the No. 2 man in the Communist Chinese hierarchy and has been Mao's first lieutenant for many years. The appointment of Liu means that Communist China will continue to follow a "hard line." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Liu had been elected on April 27 by the National People's Congress to replace Mao as Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

376. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower

Washington, April 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

Message from the Dalai Lama

I enclose herewith a paraphrased message from the Dalai Lama received through his brother, Gyalo Thondup, on April 23, 1959 for transmission to this Government.[1]

In this message the Dalai Lama thanks the United States Government for its help and makes two main requests. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] He also asks that the United States recognize the Free Tibetan Government and influence other countries to do so. In this connection, he emphasizes his determination to work for complete independence, regardless of the time required for ending the opposition of India, and declares that autonomy is not enough. Later in the message, he says that he has not had time to think the whole problem through.

With reference to the Dalai Lama's request for supplies, a separate memorandum will be furnished.[2]

As the Dalai Lama has not publicly asked for international recognition of the Free Tibetan Government, his request for United States recognition is probably intended to feel out the United States attitude as a guide to his future moves. Recognition is a political act and we could grant recognition when publicly asked if such a step is in the national interest. In response to previous approaches from the Dalai Lama in 1949–1951 we refrained from committing ourselves to recognition of Tibet as an independent state.[3] We continue to recognize both the claim of the Republic of China to suzerainty over Tibet and Tibet's claim to de facto autonomy.

If the Dalai Lama should now publicly ask for international recognition for Tibet as an independent state, and if this request is met by a substantial number of recognitions from the world community, including Asian states, it would be a most helpful step from the free world point of

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. A handwritten notation by John Eisenhower on the source text reads: "Briefed to President 2 May 59. JSDE."

[1] See Supplement.

[2] Not found.

[3] For documentation on U.S. policy toward Tibet between 1949 and 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 1064–1097; *ibid.*, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 272–618 *passim;* and *ibid.*, 1951, vol. VII, pp. 1506–1858 *passim.*

view. On the other hand, if such a request should not be well received it would be a severe setback. Therefore, the Dalai Lama should not be encouraged to make such a public request until and unless we can be certain that it will be well received. The United States position is a key element here, but it is highly desirable that we avoid moves which could give the impression that we are endeavoring to take advantage of the Tibetan situation for general cold war purposes. India is still opposing Tibetan independence and as Tibet's neighbor in control of the main roads into Tibet and as the Dalai Lama's host, India is an important factor. From the onset of the current crisis we have been remaining in the background so as to permit opinion in the "uncommitted" Asian states on which Indian opinion is influential to crystallize favorably. The developments to date in India and in these "uncommitted" Asian states have been very favorable from a free world point of view even though India has not acted as aggressively as we would have liked. We cannot of course allow the future decision as to our course to rest in India's hands, but we must take into account world opinion, including especially that of other Asian states.

Therefore, we should avoid taking a position which might appear to encourage the Dalai Lama to seek international recognition in the absence of clear knowledge of the firmness of his plans or of the attitudes which other friendly states are likely to take.

In this situation we propose in our reply to the Dalai Lama:

a) To restate the concern and sympathy of the U.S. Government and people with his and his people's courageous struggle against Chinese Communist efforts to crush Tibet's freedom, destroy its religion and kill its people;

b) To assure him that developments in Tibet have your personal attention and the personal attention of the Secretary and other high officials here;

c) To tell him that we are giving immediate study to his requests concerning recognition, and that we are considering what we might do and what others might do;

d) To say that in connection with our study we would like to know his further thinking on his future steps;

e) To assure him again of our desire to be helpful.

The Department is also considering what steps this Government might appropriately take to ensure that the Dalai Lama and his followers have a full opportunity to present their case to world opinion. Depending on developments and the attitudes of other key governments, it might be useful for the United States to favor, though preferably not directly to initiate, a hearing of the Dalai Lama's case before the United Nations. We also intend discreetly to sound out our close friends, beginning with the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of China (which technically continues to claim suzerainty over Tibet) on the attitude they would take if the Dalai Lama requests recognition. It seems to us that we could regard recognition as a practical measure only if it is believed that the request would meet with a warm response on the part of other nations, including Asian nations. We do not, however, plan at this stage to mention to the Dalai Lama the matters referred to in this paragraph.[4]

Douglas Dillon

---

[4] A draft message to the Ambassador in New Delhi, incorporating a draft message to the Dalai Lama, was sent to John Eisenhower for the President's approval with a covering memorandum of May 2 from Murphy's special assistant Joseph W. Scott. The message to the Dalai Lama, which the Ambassador was to deliver orally, was based on subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this memorandum. The message to the Ambassador also stated that it might be suggested informally to the Dalai Lama (1) that it would be inadvisable for him to make a public request for international recognition unless it could be determined that it would meet with a warm response from other nations, including Asian nations, and (2) that he should use all means at his disposal to determine the attitude of Asian nations toward eventual recognition before making such a request. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File; see Supplement) No further record of the message has been found.

---

377. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, May 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Position on Recognition of an Independent Tibetan Government and United Nations Consideration of Tibet Issue

Judging by intelligence reports and in the light of developments in Tibet during the past few months, it is a real possibility that the Dalai

---

Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Tibetan. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins, Martin, and Bacon on May 5. The memorandum was never sent to the Secretary. It was sent to IO and NEA for concurrence, but neither bureau concurred. Their responses were set forth in memoranda from Walmsley and Rountree to Robertson, dated May 18 and 21, respectively, which indicate that they felt Robertson's policy recommendations did not reflect the staff study which had been prepared by an interbureau working group. Rountree attached suggestions for revisions in the recommendations concerning the recognition question, and Walmsley suggested revisions in the recommendations concerning possible U.N. action. (*Ibid.*; see Supplement) A handwritten note by Lutkins on the source text states that at a meeting with Murphy in late May, it was decided that "we should act to have matter raised at U.N." The staff study, attached to the source text, is not printed.

Lama will shortly 1) proclaim the existence of an independent Tibetan state and government in exile; 2) request United States and free world recognition of this state and government; and 3) appeal to the United Nations to consider Tibet's case against Communist China. If the Tibetans do take such steps, or if some other government should seek to submit the issue to the United Nations in Tibet's behalf, the United States will have to decide quickly whether it is in our interest to support the Tibetan cause by affirmative action.

There is attached a staff study (Tab A) prepared by FE in coordination with NEA, IO, and L, which states United States objectives with respect to the Tibet issue; examines the attitudes, intentions, and interests of the parties chiefly concerned with the issue; and discusses the two problems of recognition of an independent Tibetan state and government and United Nations action in terms of historical background, factors relevant to a decision in the present case, and the potential benefits and disadvantages to the United States of positive action. On the basis of this analysis of the situation and the policy problems posed by it, it is believed that our policy with respect to the questions of recognition and United Nations action should be as follows:

1) *Recognition*

We should at once discreetly sound out friendly states including the United Kingdom on the attitude they would take if the Dalai Lama requests recognition of Tibet as an independent state, adding our view that such a request if made publicly should be given sympathetic consideration.

We should not encourage the Dalai Lama to make such a request until and unless we can be certain that it will be well received.

If the Tibetans publicly appeal for international recognition of an independent state of Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama,

a) We should give the Tibetans prompt assurances that we are giving their appeal sympathetic consideration and encourage them to seek the support of other free world nations.

b) We should extend our consultations with other free world nations on an urgent basis, seeking to persuade them to respond favorably.

c) Provided we are able to obtain the cooperation of a number of free world nations including Asian nations, we should extend recognition. If such cooperation is not forthcoming, we should reassess the situation to determine what course we should take. The attitude of India and other uncommitted Asian states should be considered, but would not be decisive.

d) If as a result of seeking international recognition for Tibetan independence the Dalai Lama should have to leave India, we should try to assist him to gain asylum in some other free world country and, if appropriate, offer him asylum in the United States.

e) If we extend recognition, we should seek to induce the GRC to join us. If the GRC feels unable to do so, we should seek to induce it at least not to challenge the validity of United States and other free world recognition.

2) United Nations Action

We should at once discreetly sound out friendly states including the United Kingdom on their attitude toward possible United Nations consideration of the Tibetan problem and on the best procedure if it appears desirable to seek such consideration.

If the Tibetans publicly appeal to the United Nations,

a) We should extend our consultations with other free world nations on an urgent basis, informing them that we support inscription of the appeal and urging support.
b) We should seek to determine the most promising form of United Nations action and the most appropriate sponsorship, keeping in mind the desirability of as broad sponsorship as possible.
c) Depending on developments, we should favor an invitation to the Dalai Lama to appear before the Security Council or the General Assembly.
d) In the event India and other uncommitted Asian nations should oppose any prospective United Nations action, we should give consideration to their objections and the implications for the success of such action, but their attitude should not be decisive.

In the absence of action by the Tibetans themselves to appeal to the United Nations,

a) We should not, in the present circumstances, ourselves take an initiative in submitting the matter to the United Nations, but should keep the question under constant review.
b) We should, insofar as feasible, seek to determine the desires and intentions of the Dalai Lama with respect to United Nations action.
c) We should consult fully and on a continuing basis with other free world countries to ascertain their views regarding possible courses of United Nations action.
d) Depending on the circumstances, if another free world country, especially an Asian one, should indicate to us an interest in taking an initiative in the United Nations, we should discreetly encourage it to do so.
e) If it appears that the Dalai Lama would welcome consideration of the Tibetan issue by the United Nations and that there would be adequate support, we might wish to stimulate another government, especially an Asian one, to take the matter to the United Nations.

378. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower

Washington, May 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

Dalai Lama's Request for Supplies for the Tibetan Resistance

With reference to the Acting Secretary of State's memorandum of 30 April 1959,[1] [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] I wish to advise that preparations are under way [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]. These preparations were inaugurated following your approval of the memorandum shown you by Mr. Gordon Gray on 30 March 1959.[2] [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] However, the recent setback which befell the Tibetan resistance forces south of Lhasa following the flight of the Dalai Lama has resulted in a delay [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pending receipt of fuller information as to the continuing existence and location of active resistance forces. Every effort is being made to identify and establish communications with such forces; [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].

Allen W. Dulles

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80 M 01009 A, Box 9, Folder 11, Dulles Correspondence with White House, Jan–June 1959. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The initials "DE" on the source text indicate the President's approval.

[1] Document 376.

[2] Not identified.

---

379. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

Washington, May 8, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 27 persons present, including Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Generals Lemnitzer, White, and McCaul, Admiral Russell, General Cabell, and NSC Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason.]

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, Volume VII. Top Secret.

1. *Tibet*

General Cabell provided an operational briefing. Following the briefing there was a short discussion of the Tibetan situation. Mr. Murphy described the refugee situation and the steps that were being taken to channel private aid from the U.S. through the Red Cross and the Indian Committee for Tibetan Refugees. He indicated that it was important to avoid an indication of U.S. Government involvement and to keep the aid and assistance on a private voluntary basis. There followed a further discussion of the legal status of Tibet in which Mr. Robertson referred to the Treaty of Autonomy[1] and to the fact that Tibet has not been fully independent in recent centuries. Mr. Martin mentioned that the Treaty had been reaffirmed with the Chinese Communists[2] and that it was clear in its provisions allowing regional autonomy but providing for Chinese suzerainty.

Several members of the Joint Chiefs expressed their hope that the U.S. would be able to take affirmative and positive action in support of the Tibetan people. There followed a discussion of the attitudes of India and the rest of the Asian world. Mr. Murphy described the difficulties which might result if the U.S. established itself as the protector of the Dali Lama and the Tibetan people. He thought it was extremely important that Nehru not be able to place the Tibetan problem in the context of the cold war and thereby to find it possible to wash his hands of the matter. General Lemnitzer hoped we were documenting the Tibetan fighting so we could prepare the necessary "White Paper" to influence world opinion at the proper time.

There then followed a general discussion of the current status of Indian-Pakistan relations and of the possibilities for settlement of the Indus waters problem.

[Here follows discussion relating to U.S. bases in the Caribbean.]

---

[1] Reference is apparently to the Simla Convention, see footnote 1, Document 372.

[2] Reference is apparently to the agreement of the Central People's Government and the Tibetan authorities on "measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet," signed at Peking on May 23, 1951; text is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1951,* issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 577–579.

380. Editorial Note

At the 409th meeting of the National Security Council on June 4, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief exchange followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by S. Everett Gleason reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said that the Dalai Lama was planning to make a public statement on June 6 denouncing Communist China's action in Tibet and calling for a campaign to free Tibet. While Nehru was trying to stop this public statement, it was thought that the Dalai Lama might make it nevertheless.

"Mr. Gray observed that there existed very strong feeling in some parts of the Department of Defense that our current U.S. 'hands off' policy with respect to Tibet needed re-examination. Mr. Gray suggested that this matter not be discussed at the Council meeting at the present time but that it might be brought up later. The President commented sharply that he thought the State Department should take the lead in such matters." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Three unsigned and undated memoranda concerning Tibet, which had been sent to Gray with a covering note of June 3 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates are filed with a covering memorandum of June 15 from Gray to Gates. One of them, an unsigned memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, reads in part as follows:

"1. In its regular meeting of this date, the Collateral Activities Coordinating Group of which I am Chairman, expressed its deep concern over the situation in Asia as a result of the Chinese Communist aggression in Tibet. We believe that the United States Government should take positive action to denounce the Communist action as additional evidence of the inevitable course of international communism. Concurrently, we believe that the United States should openly proffer assistance to the Tibetans in every way possible in order to capitalize on the present climate in Asia.

"2. We do not accept the view of some who may feel that it is wise for the West to refrain from action while the Indians and other Asians work out their own immediate destiny. Inaction, at this time, by the West can be interpreted by the Asians as an indication of weakness, indifference, and a lack of dynamic leadership. We are convinced that the question of the security of India and the remaining free nations of Asia is at stake." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1574, Tibet 1959)

381. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower

Washington, June 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Letter to The President and the Secretary of State from the Dalai Lama

There follows a rough summarized translation of a letter from the Dalai Lama to you and the Secretary of State which was delivered in India through his brother Gyalo Thondup.[1]

The Dalai Lama thanks you and the United States Government for sustaining and helping the Tibetan people and for the advice recently provided him. All Tibetans are united in their desire for their freedom and independence. Unless Tibet is free and independent of Chinese control, peace in Asia and surrounding countries cannot be achieved. The Dalai Lama requests that when the time comes to consider the question of Communist China's entry into the United Nations you will support the cause of Tibet and its people by insisting that Tibet be granted full independence as a prerequisite for Communist China's entry into the United Nations. The Dalai Lama hopes to receive additional advice from you or the Secretary of State in the near future.

The Dalai Lama's brother Gyalo Thondup has been informed that this letter is being transmitted to you, that a reply will take some time and that meanwhile it is highly undesirable to raise publicly the question of Communist China's entry into the United Nations.

In view of Indian sensitivities the Dalai Lama has carefully avoided any overt political activities since his arrival in India. However, in a letter to Nehru dated May 7, the Dalai Lama put forward the following points: (1) The Chinese Communists should immediately free all Tibetans who are imprisoned or undergoing forced labor. (2) The entire Chinese Communist military forces should be withdrawn from Tibet. (3) A Committee representing countries having common boundaries with Tibet under the leadership of India and representatives from neighboring Buddhist countries should be sent to Tibet to ensure that the above demands have been carried out, and an enquiry should be made whether damage has been caused to Buddhism in Tibet. (4) The International Red Cross should be permitted to open a branch in Tibet in order to give medical aid and assistance to wounded persons and to prevent the outbreak of epidemics and famine.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. The source text is initialed "DE". The documents cited in footnotes 1 and 2 below are in the Supplement.

[1] Dated May 26; filed with an undated covering memorandum from Allen Dulles to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

The Dalai Lama wishes to make public the above 4-point proposal at a press conference now scheduled for June 20, but Nehru is strongly opposed, favoring rather the Dalai Lama's publicly committing himself to working for the reestablishment of Tibetan autonomy. Nehru is said to have warned that if the Dalai Lama makes public his proposal, the Government of India will take no further responsibility for the Dalai Lama's future support or for a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan problem. The Dalai Lama is unwilling to take the risk of a break with Nehru until he receives official and positive assurance of specific United States Government support. The Dalai Lama would also like to visit Southeast Asian countries to solicit international support for the Tibetan cause.

The Dalai Lama has already made it clear that he is no longer interested in autonomy for Tibet under the Chinese Communists (having twice tried this course with disastrous results) but is determined to work for Tibet's independence. This puts him in fundamental conflict with Nehru's policy on Tibet. If we do not now respond positively to the Dalai Lama's appeal for support, Nehru's policy may well prevail, which would mean the destruction of the Dalai Lama as an effective symbol of resistance to Chinese Communist political and cultural tyranny. Therefore, although we are not now in a position to recognize the Dalai Lama as the head of an independent Tibetan state, we believe that we should convincingly assure him that he is regarded by the United States Government the rightful leader of the Tibetan people in their struggle against oppression, and that to this end we are prepared to support him financially if he is forced to leave India and to help him find asylum elsewhere.

We believe further that the Tibetans should be given a chance to present their grievances to the United Nations just as the Hungarian case was heard. The United Nations should not be less concerned with human rights in Asia than in Europe. While we have not yet come to a firm conclusion as to what form the approach to the United Nations on the Tibetan issue should take, we believe that the personal appearance of the Dalai Lama at the General Assembly would be beneficial. A problem connected with presentation of the Tibetan case to the United Nations is the collection of thorough documentation which will require considerable time. A final decision as to the type of approach that should be taken in the United Nations can be made in the light of such documentation, of the Dalai Lama's attitude, and of the views of certain key members of the United Nations.

In the meantime we propose to reply to the Dalai Lama as follows:

(1) Inform him that his letter has been brought to your attention and that of the Secretary and that you both continue to give personal attention to developments in Tibet. (2) Assure him once again of the admiration of the United States Government and people for the courageous struggle against Communist tyranny waged by the Tibetan people.

(3) Assure him that he is regarded by this Government as the rightful leader of the Tibetan people in their struggle against oppression. (4) Inform him that the United States continues unequivocally to oppose the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. (5) Assure him of our concern that his Government have full opportunity to present its case to world opinion and suggest to this end he should carefully consider the possibility of going to the United Nations. (6) Caution him that such a move should only be made after thorough preparation and further consultation with us. (7) Agree to the desirability of his making, at an early date, a tour to selected capitals of nations from the governments of which he has reason to expect support in connection with any appeal to the United Nations which he might eventually make. (8) Tell him that if he is forced to leave India as a result of following our advice, we will assume the obligation to support him and an appropriate entourage, and will also undertake to help him in finding asylum elsewhere.[2]

Douglas Dillon

---

[2] A June 20 memorandum by Goodpaster states that the President had asked that the reply to the Dalai Lama be sent through the same channels as the incoming message and that it be revised to indicate that the Dalai Lama should avoid or minimize an open break with Nehru, to suggest only indirectly that he go to the United Nations, and to make only a qualified or limited commitment of support. The memorandum states that the outgoing message conformed in substance with these requests. (*Ibid.*) A copy of the message, headed "Message of June 18," is filed with a July 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Murphy to the President which stated that the Tibetans were unhappy with the oral transmission of the President's message and recommended a brief written communication. (*Ibid.*) A letter of July 6 from the President to the Dalai Lama referred to his earlier message and confirmed that it represented his considered counsel. (*Ibid.*)

---

382. Editorial Note

At the 415th meeting of the National Security Council on July 30, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by Marion W. Boggs reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said that with respect to Tibet, Nehru was in a dilemma between widespread sympathy in India for Tibet and the need to conciliate Communist China. Heretofore Nehru had attempted to adopt a neutralist attitude and permit asylum for the Dalai Lama while avoiding political support of the Tibetan independence movement. The Dalai Lama is now modifying his attitude of caution and becoming more active. He is trying to get his case before the United Nations on the grounds of genocide. The U.S. has put out feelers in Buddhist countries about accepting the Dalai Lama, but no country has been receptive, probably because there is reluctance to alienate Communist China and because there are so many different sects of Buddhism. In any case the U.S. is faced with the problem of what to do about the Dalai Lama." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

383. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) and the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, August 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

Developments with Respect to United Nations Action on Tibetan Issue

1. *Communications with the Dalai Lama*

At a meeting in Mr. Murphy's office on July 28 attended by representatives of FE, NEA and IO it was decided that the Dalai Lama should be informed of our intention to do whatever we can to assist the Dalai Lama in connection with submitting Tibet's case to the General Assembly if, as we understand is the case, he intends to make a public appeal for United Nations action. There is attached (Tab A)[1] a message transmitted through other channels instructing that the Dalai Lama be informed that we would so assist him; that his initial public statement of appeal for United Nations action should be made in the relatively near future; that this appeal should be phrased in terms of the suffering and denial of human rights endured by the Tibetan people and avoid charges of aggression; and that following issuance of his statement we would consult with governments of friendly countries in his behalf. The Dalai Lama is being in-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/8–559. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins and Sisco and cleared with NEA and the Office of the Under Secretary.

[1] Not printed.

formed in another message that if he takes the initiative in pushing for submission of Tibet's case to the General Assembly, the Department will approach suitable Asian governments in an effort to arrange invitations for the Dalai Lama to visit their countries, with a view to enabling him to publicize his case prior to discussion in the United Nations.

The Dalai Lama has also indicated his desire to establish a formal connection with our Ambassador in New Delhi to facilitate consultation on matters of joint concern, and has also asked whether the United States Government would be willing to propose to some other government, preferably in Asia, that it extend recognition to his government-in-exile. We are informing the Dalai Lama that once he issues his appeal for United Nations action it would then be appropriate for him to have direct contact with American officials, and that if he should invite the American Ambassador or the Chargé d'Affaires to visit him they would be pleased to do so. With regard to the second point, the Dalai Lama has been informed that in our view consideration of obtaining recognition for a Tibetan government-in-exile should be deferred for the time being, but that the matter might usefully be reexamined following the contemplated United Nations action.

2. *Consultation with Other Governments*

It was decided at the July 28 meeting that as soon as the Dalai Lama made his initial public statement appealing for United Nations action we should approach the British, informing them of our intention to do whatever we appropriately can to support the Tibetan case and seeking their advice and support with respect to arranging the most effective form of resolution and sponsorship. We plan to request the British specifically to join with us in seeking to induce Japan to take the lead in sponsoring a resolution on Tibet's behalf.

3. *Indian Government Attitude*

Embassy New Delhi has reported (Tab B)[2] that while the GOI would consider that raising the Tibetan issue in the United Nations would serve no useful purpose, it would concede that the Dalai Lama has the right to appeal and to be heard if the United Nations wishes. The Embassy's assessment is that an appeal by the Dalai Lama and his appearance at the United Nations would probably not jeopardize his return to India so long as he avoided insisting on the concept of Tibetan independence. The Embassy recommends that before encouraging other countries to support an appeal by the Dalai Lama for United Nations action we should approach Nehru and inform him of our intentions. It was the sense of the

---

[2] Telegram 161 from New Delhi, July 20; not attached to the source text. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/7–1659)

July 28 meeting that Nehru should be so informed. We believe that this should be done immediately after we have initiated consultation with the British and obtained their reaction to our plans.

We believe that, both from the point of view of influencing future developments in Tibet and with respect to the morale of the Tibetan refugees in India, it is desirable that the Dalai Lama be able to remain in and return to India. We have emphasized this point in our recent messages to the Dalai Lama, pointing out the importance we attach to his avoiding a break with the Indian government to the extent that this can be avoided without prejudicing his basic principles and negotiating position.

4. *GRC Attitude Toward United Nations Action*

Ambassador Drumright reported on August 3 (Tab C)[3] that in a discussion of the Tibetan issue the Chinese Foreign Minister told him the GRC would not itself raise the Tibetan issue at the General Assembly but would strongly support any other country which might bring up the problem. He further stated that the GRC delegation would participate in any debate that might occur, castigating Chinese Communist actions in Tibet and reiterating President Chiang's statement of March 26 promising the Tibetan people the right of self-determination following the overthrow of the Peiping regime.

5. *Consultation with Ambassador Lodge*

FE and IO are advising Ambassador Lodge of the foregoing.

6. *International Commission of Jurists' Report*

On July 25 the International Commission of Jurists released a preliminary report[4] concluding that the Chinese Communists have by acts of genocide attempted to destroy the Tibetan nation and the Buddhist religion in Tibet. The Commission is a non-governmental and non-political organization supported by some 30,000 judges, practicing lawyers, and law professors from over fifty countries. The report, which is based on documents and findings presented by a senior advocate of the Indian Supreme Court, is reportedly being circulated to United Nations delegations.

7. *Report of Philippine Intention to Bring Tibetan Problem Before United Nations*

An Associated Press item of July 29 reported Philippine Ambassador Delgado as having stated that the Philippine mission to the United

---

[3] Telegram 100 from Taipei, August 3; not attached to the source text. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/8–359)

[4] *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959).

Nations considered the Tibetan problem worthy of consideration by the General Assembly and that it was consulting with other delegations on how to accomplish this. Subsequent inquiries by USUN indicated that this report was erroneous. We were informed that Ambassador Delgado had merely mentioned Tibet in a staff meeting as a subject likely to arise at the 14th General Assembly and had asked his staff to study the legal and political problems involved.

---

384. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, September 4, 1959, 9 p.m.

792. Department pass USUN. I called on Dalai Lama this morning at his request.

After expression his great appreciation for kind and generous assistance rendered by Americans through Thomas Committee[1] and other channels to refugees from his country and asking that his appreciation and that of his people be extended to those who had organized and contributed to this work, Dalai Lama observed that there were two or three points which he would like me communicate my Government. Condition of people in Tibet was growing steadily worse. For many months Dalai had hoped obtain some amelioration of their lot and solution of problem of his country by peaceful negotiation. GOI had had same hopes and had followed same course. It was now clear this method of procedure could not have any success. After very considerable thought Dalai had decided appeal to Supreme International body, United Nations.

Dalai Lama recalled that in 1950 Tibet had been invaded by China and that matter had been raised in United Nations.[2] On representation of "certain countries" that settlement of problem could be reached by peaceful means, UN had deferred action. Settlement by peaceful means had not been possible and case therefore was still validly before UN.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–459. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 9:53 a.m. on September 5. Repeated to London.

[1] The American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees.

[2] Reference is to a proposal by El Salvador in November 1950 to add the "invasion of Tibet by foreign forces" to the agenda of the General Assembly; the General Committee voted to postpone consideration of the item. For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 577–584 *passim*.

Dalai said that he hoped that USG would give every support to Tibetan case in UN and indeed that it would be willing sponsor Tibet's case and try mobilize support for it. He said news reports had already indicated appeal which he had made on August 31 was receiving sympathetic consideration by USG and that he appreciated that.

I replied that I would communicate message to my Government at once and that although I had no specific instructions at moment I was sure that as he already knew, US believed that Tibetans should be heard in UN and would do everything possible to help bring this hearing about and support Tibetan cause in debate. We were also prepared talk to other countries in effort elicit their full support.

I said it would be helpful in order enable US plan most effective way of bringing this result about if we could know as much as possible about Dalai's own thinking, what he planned do, and reactions he had received from other interested parties. I therefore asked if he would mind if I put series of questions to him. He said he would be happy to try to answer them.

I asked whether Dalai planned base his case in UN on old case raised in 1950 by El Salvador, or whether he planned present it as new case. I said that we felt that form in which case was presented was important from point of view of eliciting support and recalled that 1950 case was based on aggression. We felt that way in which case would be likely to command greatest support would be if it were represented, primarily at least, as one of human rights.

Dalai replied that after very hopeful thought he had decided present case as revival and continuance of old case and therefore aggression would be one of the grounds charged. However, this would not be only ground. He would also charge violation of human rights, stamping out of basic freedoms, such as freedom of religion, and genocide.

I repeated that, as he knew, our hope was that it would be possible get widest measure of support for his case and that if case were based upon violation of human rights, it would be likely command wider support than if it got into questions of aggression, sovereignty and so forth which were not as clear because of long history of different treaties, recognition of Chinese suzerainty by several countries, et cetera.

When I asked Dalai if he had received any indications particularly from Asian countries of willingness to (A) sponsor or (B) support Tibet's case in the UN, he made rather helpless gesture with his hands and said that he had not had much response, although missions with which he had only been in touch since arriving Delhi had not been in position to make any commitments. I gathered he not too optimistic he will get much support. He plans extend his stay in Delhi till about 11th or 12th September in order to continue efforts.

When I asked if he would be willing tell me impressions he had gained from his talks with Prime Minister about India's attitude toward his raising question in UN and possible attitude of Indian delegation in event someone else raised it, Dalai replied Nehru had told him India could not sponsor his case in UN, but that he, Dalai, was entirely free, so far as Nehru was concerned to take any action with respect to UN that he saw fit. He said that he had not received any very clear impression from Prime Minister re position Indian UN delegation would take.

Dalai said Nehru had remarked Soviets had been very quiet about Tibet case thus far and nothing should be done to keep them from continuing to do so.

Whether Dalai still intended appear personally at UN if his case was heard, he said that this was point on which he had not as yet made up his mind. Would appreciate any advice that US cared to give him. I said I had no specific instructions from my government on this point and would seek them, but I had general impression that USG would probably consider that personal appearance by him would be useful.

Dalai said it would be most important for him to have clear understanding with GOI before he went to New York that his appearance before UN would not create problems between him and GOI and most important that there would be no difficulty about his coming back to India.

I asked him if he planned to visit any other countries before his case was heard in the UN. He again looked rather hopeless and said, "the time is rather short".

Further questions elicited information that (1) Dalai intends make another public statement before returning to Mussoorie, in which he will set forth fully reasons why he appealing to UN and would stress sufferings of his people. He thought case would be convincing. (2) Dalai planning to open office in New Delhi. His representative would be Tsepon Shakapa and procedure was satisfactory to GOI.

Dalai then said that there was very important point that he wished me stress with my government: Matter of independence of Tibet would have to be settled before Communist China was admitted to UN. I asked him if he intended, in his presentation, to stress independence of Tibet, or to ask UN or its members to support Tibetan independence. He replied that 1950 case had been case of invasion of an independent country and that by basing his appeal to UN on continuance of previous case he was thereby reasserting independence of invaded Tibet.

I assured Dalai that US would vigorously oppose admission of Communist China to UN this year as it had done successfully in the past and said that I felt that sufferings inflicted on his people by Communist Chinese would certainly render task of opposition easier. I had, again, no specific instructions on point, but felt personally that there would be merit in not having two issues of Tibet and admission of Red China to UN tied up too closely together; rather would it be preferable to have Tibetan case discussed separately and heard on its own merits without being tied up with what would be considered a cold war issue.

As I left, I repeated I would pass his messages on to my government expeditiously and that I hoped I might have some answer for him before he left Delhi.

MEA was earlier informed of Dalai's invitation and my acceptance. I will inform Foreign Secretary Dutt tomorrow at ten without details that purpose of Dalai's invitation was to request our fullest support his appeal to UN.

Brown

---

385. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, September 5, 1959, 7 p.m.

812. Reference: Embtel 792.[1] In my talk this morning with Foreign Secretary Dutt, I told him Dalai Lama had informed me of decision to appeal to UN and had asked me convey to USG his request we give him every possible support in getting case heard by UN and in securing some satisfactory action. I added I had promised Dalai transmit his request and, while I had no specific instructions on the point, I was sure request would receive prompt and sympathetic consideration.

Dutt commented:

(1) India does not feel it appropriate bring Tibetan matter before UN since Communist China not member;

(2) "No one is going to war with China over Tibet" and so no effective action would result and were harsh words passed in debate, only likely effect would be to incite ChiComs to reprisals against Tibetans;

(3) (In reply question) Soviets have been very quiet over Tibet and Sino-Indian border problems, which might indicate they do not approve of ChiComs actions and statements, particularly regarding India, but if they were forced to take position by item being debated in UNGA they would certainly have to side completely with ChiComs;

(4) Re human rights approach (which I raised), UN might take cognizance but this would depend on what could be proved.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–559. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:52 p.m. Repeated to London and Hong Kong.

[1] Document 384.

Above points follow closely what we understand Nehru told Dalai and Dutt told Japanese Ambassador several days ago. Regarding (3), Dutt left impression on my mind without being explicit that he would regard as regrettable anything which forced USSR openly side with CPR. He mentioned that Soviet representatives "in various capitals" have been quietly indicating they deplored some things ChiComs had been doing. It is not clear in this case whether Dutt would regret closing of some possible breach between USSR and CPR or was only fearful USSR might be led or forced into anti-Indian statements. In talks with Japanese Ambassador Dutt expressed fear that forcing of USSR take position might create difficulties between it and US and impair chances of détente possible through Eisenhower–Khrushchev talks.

I reminded Dutt I had told Prime Minister, under instructions, that we hoped we could avoid working at cross purposes with Indian delegation in any debate on Tibet. USG realized India's special even primary interest in question. I expressed hope to Dutt that even if GOI unable sponsor case in UNGA, at least it would not oppose its being considered and would be able support a proposal for constructive action. Dutt said much would depend how case presented and what action proposed. Indian GA delegation would not indulge in strong words but "you never know what Krishna Menon will do". Menon would be "under very strict instructions in this case". Tibetan item "very delicate situation" because there were also "strong feelings" in India that case should be heard by UN. India prepared be firm on certain points but "we have to be friends with powerful country with whom we have border of 2680 miles."

Dutt confirmed Menon still going to lead delegation.

Brown

---

386. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

Appeal of the Dalai Lama to the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Viscount Hood, C.M.G., Minister, British Embassy

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–559. Secret. Drafted by Murphy.

After our meeting today with the French Chargé d'Affaires, I asked Lord Hood to remain and brought up with him the question of Tibet. I explained in general terms the situation as we see it regarding the appeal made by the Dalai Lama to the United Nations. I said we were awaiting further news from Delhi but that, if it remained clear that he intended to pursue his appeal, we would want to give him support. We agreed that Asiatic support, especially of Buddhist countries, would be a requisite. I stressed that the attitude of the United States during these past months provides adequate evidence of the American desire to remain as much as possible in the background, permitting Asian countries to take the lead. However, we did not wish to appear remiss or lukewarm because of the human issues involved. If the Dalai Lama asked our assistance in his travels, we would wish to be helpful and, if he comes to New York, we would feel obliged to give support there. We did not wish to cause unnecessary difficulties or embarrassment to Mr. Nehru.

Lord Hood said that he agreed with all of this. The principal British preoccupation, as explained by Mr. Lloyd to Secretary Herter,[1] related to Mr. Nehru's situation. London did not wish to add to Nehru's difficulties. The British appreciated, he said, our tactful handling of this matter. He would take note of my remarks and inform London.

---

[1] In a conversation in London on September 1. The discussion relating to Tibet was reported in Secto 37 from London, September 1. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/9–159; see Supplement) A memorandum of the entire conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

---

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Washington, September 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

869. Your 792 repeated London 34.[1] You should seek further interview with Dalai Lama before he returns to Mussoorie and make following points:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–459. Secret. Repeated to London and USUN. Drafted by Martin and Michael H. Devlin of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, cleared by Wilcox and Parsons and in NEA, and approved by Murphy.

[1] Document 384.

1. USG continues to be deeply concerned for welfare of Tibetan people and believes that they entitled have their grievances against Chicom regime fully aired in UNGA.

2. USG is currently consulting with friendly governments regard sponsorship for inscription of Tibetan item on GA agenda and welcomes Dalai's discussions this subject with Asian missions in New Delhi.

3. In meantime Dalai might wish consider cable urgent written appeal to SYG along lines his recent public appeal with request latter circulate it to UN members.[2]

4. USG continues strongly believe that wider support can be obtained in UNGA for Tibetan appeal based on Chicom suppression human rights than on aggression.

5. We agree that in reaching decision re possible appearance at UN Dalai Lama would be wise in assuring himself on Indian Government attitude, especially with regard his return to India. (View Nehru's reported assertion to Dalai Lama that he free take any action he saw fit with respect UN difficult see how GOI could refuse him readmission India following UN trip.) We believe personal appearance at UN would benefit Tibetan cause.

6. Reassure Dalai Lama USG intends strongly oppose admission Communist China to UN and is firmly convinced that all efforts seat Peiping regime at upcoming UNGA will fail.[3]

FYI. Department instructing our missions in several Asian countries approach governments to which accredited on urgent basis seek their sponsorship inscription item on Tibet.[4] In meantime should you be approached by your diplomatic colleagues in New Delhi as to US attitude toward Dalai Lama's appeal to UN stress USG's belief that UN cannot afford to ignore plight of Tibetans as victims brutal suppression by alien military power. For UN to turn its back on Tibetans would compound their tragedy. We do not accept idea that Tibetans would be better off if appeal by their authentic spokesman, Dalai Lama, were ignored. Even Peiping regime has on occasion shown sensitivity to world opinion. Moreover, must recall that well-intentioned advice of India in 1950 that

---

[2] Reference is to a statement released to the press in New Delhi on August 30; text is quoted in telegram 533 to Tokyo, September 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–859; see Supplement)

[3] Telegram 877 from New Delhi, September 10, reported that Brown had seen the Dalai Lama that day and made the points in this telegram. He noted that the Dalai Lama had already anticipated point 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–1059; see Supplement) The text of a September 9 message from the Dalai Lama to U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1176–1178.

[4] Telegram 553 to Tokyo, also sent to Karachi, Rangoon, Ankara, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Colombo, and Phnom Penh; cited in footnote 2 above.

UN should keep hands off while Tibetans and Chicoms worked out peaceful settlement only ended in present deep suffering of Tibetan people. End FYI.

Dillon

---

388. Editorial Note

At the 418th meeting of the National Security Council on September 10, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Sino-Indian border dispute and developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by Marion W. Boggs reads as follows:

"Turning to the Sino-Indian border situation, Mr. Dulles expressed the view that the increased assertiveness of Communist China was an outgrowth of developments in Tibet. The Chinese Communists appear anxious to take over the area north of Assam, which is the route for escape from Tibet and for help from India to Tibet. The Chinese had made a number of incursions into this area in the last several years; they had even built a road in Ladakh in 1957 without India's knowledge. The Chinese attack on the Longju outpost on August 26 resulted in a penetration 3 miles beyond the McMahon line. Although India is committed to the McMahon line, China does not recognize it, claiming it is a remnant of imperialism. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Mr. Dulles believed Nehru would strive for a settlement of this dispute while at the same time defending the border. [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] Mr. Dulles believed the USSR would be anxious to see the dispute settled. Bhutan, Sikkhim and Nepal are disturbed over possible Chinese Communist incursions.

"Mr. Dulles then took up Tibet. He said the Dalai Lama was talking to a great many diplomats while preparing his case for the U.N. Many powers are sympathetic to his appeal, but he has yet to find an active sponsor. The U.S. has felt that he should not, in his presentation to the U.N., emphasize aggression, since Tibet was for many years a part of China. In our view, his case is stronger on a human rights basis. India has been lukewarm toward the Dalai Lama, but has recently displayed a somewhat friendlier attitude toward him as a result of Indian public opinion (which is sympathetic to him) and the Sino-Indian border incidents.

"Mr. Dillon said that the appeal of the Dalai Lama to the U.N. involved a difficult legal question: was Tibet an independent nation or not? He believed human rights was the best basis for the Tibetan appeal.

"The President asked where the natural geographic boundary was in this area. Mr. Dulles said the lack of a natural boundary was one of the difficulties. A series of high mountain crests obscure the natural boundary. If the Chinese Communists took over the area now in dispute, they would be over the high mountain ranges and just above the Assam plain.

"Mr. Dulles said the Chinese Communist leaders were in an ugly mood because of their lessened prestige due to the failure of their economic program to meet expectations. However, they refuse to admit failure; they maintain the 'leap forward' program is still in force and blame shortcomings on drought. The image of Mao as the all-wise father has been somewhat impaired, but the leaders are still firmly in the saddle. The Chinese are showing exasperation at Soviet criticism of their economic program. In their present mood, the Chinese leaders are not disposed to retreat from any international positions they have taken, despite possible pressure on them from the USSR to 'tidy up' the Tibetan and Indian border situations." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

---

389. Telegram From the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to the Department of State

New York, September 18, 1959, 9 p.m.

Delga 21. Reference: Tibet. Secretary met with Lloyd and Couve on Tibet this morning. Secretary said he would like very much to see Tibet item inscribed and hoped that Asians would take lead, but this has not eventuated thus far. He informed Lloyd and Couve of his intention to talk to Aiken[1] with a view to getting him to move forward on inscription of an item along with Malayans and Philippines. He explained our view that case in UN should be based on human rights and not independence. He also informed Lloyd and Couve that Irish would prefer not to have us

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–1859. Secret. Received at 12:53 a.m. on September 19. Repeated to London, Paris, New Delhi, and Dublin.

[1] Irish Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken.

co-inscribe with them. Secretary also mentioned that contiguous Asian states are reluctant and appear to fear retribution from Chinese Communists.

Lloyd stressed acute difficulty and embarrassment which would be caused for UK if Tibetan item were inscribed. He feared that if Tibetan matter inscribed this year, this would have unfortunate precedent re Oman case. He described Nehru as depressed and wishing to avoid futile UN action. When Secretary stressed that this matter like Hungarian situation, Lloyd maintained it was different in that Hungary was independent and Tibet is not. He feared that bringing the matter to UN would divide Commonwealth. Lloyd felt Indians probably would have to vote against inscription, that Nepal would definitely vote against, and probably Burma, Ceylon, and South Africa as well. He stressed that it would look bad if some of principal neighbors of Tibet were either against inscription of item or were lukewarm. The Secretary agreed that this would be a victory for Communist China if that happened. Lloyd maintained that these negative reactions provided basis for relieving US of any commitments it might have with Dalai Lama. Lloyd stressed that way to help Tibetans is for its neighbors to do as much as they can and that in his judgment a Western initiative would not be helpful in circumstances. He believed that Dalai Lama ought to be told this. In addition, Western initiative, in Lloyd's judgment, would isolate Tibet and Dalai Lama from neighboring countries. Lloyd also mentioned that recent Soviet statement of neutrality between India and Chinese Communists was also an important factor in this situation. Dixon maintained that inscription Tibetan item would further enrage Chinese Communists against Tibetans and split Asians as well.

Couve agreed with Lloyd. He said it was strange that an Irish Catholic would be taking lead on this matter rather than neighboring Buddhist countries. He pointed out that neither Malaya nor Philippines fell in this category. Couve stressed that inscription of Tibet would give French great difficulty with respect to Algeria since question of human rights could be raised in either instance. Couve added that in his judgment Tibetan item would also split Western European countries, and that even close friends such as Belgium and the Netherlands would find themselves in embarrassing position because of their overseas protectorates. Couve also said that generally speaking he believes it is desirable not to interfere with Indian relationships with China. In his judgment "if the white people interfere, it will only result in bringing China and India together." Couve maintained that in view of negative and lukewarm responses we could not get a two-thirds majority on a resolution.

Both Couve and Lloyd placed great stress on strong statements by various speakers in the general debate and during plenary discussion of

Chinese representation issue, but without inscription of a separate Tibetan item.

Secretary countered that Hungarian and Tibetan matters essentially same sort of situation in that fundamental human rights had been denied. Moreover we have gone a long way in indicating to Dalai Lama that we would assist him in trying to have Tibetan case heard by General Assembly. Fact was that Dalai Lama had appealed and he had sought assistance of the UN. This appeal had largely gone unheeded. As to hostility of ChiComs they were as hostile as could be at moment and that inscription of Tibetan matter could hardly add to that. As to a two-thirds majority, that would depend upon kind or proposal that was presented. If we could get over hurdle of inscribing item, then number of Asians might be embarrassed if they did not come along and support a reasonable proposal based on human rights and genocide.

Conversation on this matter concluded with Secretary saying that we would look into this matter further, first step being to talk with Aiken.

Herter

---

390. Telegram From the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to the Department of State

New York, September 19, 1959, 1 p.m.

Delga 26. Re: Tibet. In conversation with Secretary late yesterday Aiken (Ireland) outlined efforts made by his delegation to secure support on Tibetan resolution. He said he was afraid the resolution would not get a good vote and that such a result would be interpreted as a defeat for the free world point of view. He plans to speak Monday[1] in general debate and will suggest that his delegation feels strongly that it is appropriate for the GA to have a resolution on this problem. It is his intention that the speech would be so worded as to make it difficult for the Africans and Asians not to go along with a resolution. After that the Irish Delegation would see what impact his speech had made and proceed to

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–1959. Confidential. Received at 2:14 p.m.

[1] September 21.

secure additional support for inscription of the item. Aiken expressed again the undesirability of the United States taking any part in the venture at this time.

The Secretary expressed the great interest of the US in this matter and agreed that the tactics outlined by Mr. Aiken seemed very sensible. Subsequently we received copy of the Irish resolution which was forwarded to Department last night as Delga 23.[2]

Herter

---

[2] The draft resolution reaffirmed "the right of dependent peoples to respect for their culture, just treatment and protection against abuses" and condemned "the violation of the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and the destruction of their civil and religious liberties." (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–1859)

---

391. Telegram From the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to the Department of State

New York, September 28, 1959, 8 p.m.

Delga 82. Re: Tibet. Dixon (UK) told us Kuznetsov (USSR) had spoken to him "very seriously" about Irish initiative on Tibet which latter assumed US and UK were actively encouraging. Kuznetsov argued discussion would range beyond Tibet; would spoil present international atmosphere and relaxation of tensions; and would increase difficulties between India and Communist China. He added USSR had hoped present session might be free from cold war taint. He urged British to "use their influence" to ensure that no discussion take place.

Dixon said Kuznetsov's approach had caught him unprepared but that he had made quick decision to be completely frank. He had therefore told Kuznetsov UK did not favor Tibetan item and had been seeking to discourage idea. At same time he had noted widespread sympathy for Tibetan people and had emphasized UK was in no position to seek to dictate to Irish. Furthermore, British public opinion was such that if item were proposed UK would support it. Kuznetsov expressed doubt British could not dissuade Aiken. However, when Dixon asked whether he had

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–2859. Confidential.

not talked to Aiken himself, Kuznetsov admitted that he had and had been unable to make any headway with him. He went so far as to suggest UK and USSR might jointly approach Aiken, though he did not press this suggestion.

Dixon said he had emphasized British desire to see Tibetan item considered in "non-political" manner and expressed hope USSR would approach item in same way. Kuznetsov had replied he would do his best but qualified this by saying he was not afraid to fight and would undoubtedly have to say "hard things" in discussion.

Wadsworth

---

392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Washington, October 6, 1959, 8:16 p.m.

1247. Verbatim text. Ambassador should address the following letter to the Dalai Lama over his signature and have it delivered by safe hand:[1]

"Your Holiness: President Eisenhower has asked me to thank you for your letter to him which was delivered to the American Embassy in New Delhi on September 11, 1959.[2] He has asked me to assure you in connection with your appeal addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations that the United States Government welcomes the initiative of Ireland and Malaya in requesting the inscription of an item entitled 'The Question of Tibet' on the agenda of the Fourteenth General Assembly. The United States will support inscription of the item and full

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newlin and Martin; cleared in the White House, by Parsons, and in NEA; and approved by Wilcox.

[1] Telegram 1273 from New Delhi, October 8, reported that the letter had been delivered to the Dalai Lama's representative in New Delhi. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/10–859)

[2] Transmitted in telegram 901 from New Delhi, September 12; it enclosed a copy of the Dalai Lama's message of September 9 to Hammarskjöld and expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would give its "fullest support" to the Tibetan appeal. (*Ibid.*, 795B.00/9–1259; see Supplement) The signed letter, dated September 11, is filed with a covering memorandum of September 22 from Calhoun to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

consideration by the General Assembly of the shocking record of Chinese Communist activities in Tibet.

"Consultations with other United Nations Members on this subject have confirmed our view, made known to you earlier, that wider support can be obtained for a hearing of Tibet's case if the suppression of human rights aspects of it are stressed rather than matters relating to sovereignty.

"President Eisenhower has asked me to extend to you and the people of Tibet the respect and sympathy of the people and the Government of the United States in your courageous struggle against ruthless oppression. Respectfully yours."

Herter

---

393. Telegram From the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to the Department of State

New York, October 8, 1959, 9 p.m.

Delga 137. Re: Tibet.

1. Thondup[1] and two other Tibetans accompanied by Gross[2] called on Lodge at Waldorf. Thondup made effective plea for Tibetan cause, emphasizing particularly independence theme. Although aware of practical problems involved in any UN consideration of Tibet involving independence, he questioned US repeatedly as to whether action on human rights basis would in some way affect adversely cause of Tibetan independence. He clearly continued hope GA might address itself to question of Tibetan independence.

2. Lodge told him any move in GA on this basis would not be prudent in view of preoccupations and attitudes of majority in GA. We also reassured him that consideration of violations of human rights in Tibet would in no way adversely affect broader Tibetan aspirations. Lodge

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–859. Secret.

[1] The Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, was heading a Tibetan Delegation in New York in support of the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations.

[2] Ernest A. Gross, a former Department of State Legal Adviser (1947–1949) and alternate delegate to the 3d, 5th, and 6th U.N. General Assemblies, had been engaged as an attorney by the Tibetans.

also noted difficulties for other dels if precedent set re Tibet which might later be cited in other cases adversely.

3. Thondup stressed his great confidence in American people and government and expressed hope that whatever happened in UN would be of character to encourage and not discourage Tibetan people. He urged us to speak, support, and use our good offices in behalf of Tibetan cause.

4. Lodge promised complete support and cooperation but noted obvious reasons why it was tactically wise for U.S. remain in background where it would work hard to achieve support for resolution.

5. Gross explained Thondup had arrived with instructions: (I) to raise question of independence which Tibetans refer to as "international position" of Tibet; and (II) to obtain invitation for Dalai Lama to appear. Gross said Thondup now fully understood reasons why both these points could not be achieved. Thondup was therefore prepared to take position Dalai Lama was of course ready to come if GA wished and invited him to do so, but he was in no way pressing to appear.

6. Lodge noted importance of maintaining dignity of Dalai Lama and urged he be protected and kept above battle. Thondup agreed. He referred to advice he had been given by Irish and Malayans on this point and repeated he intended take line making clear Dalai Lama was in no sense seeking appearance before UN.[3]

7. Thondup returned to point that concentration upon human rights might in some way prejudice cause of Tibetan independence which seemed worry him considerably. Lodge pointed out that effort to obtain UN action on independence would fail and would then be exploited by ChiComs, whereas res expressing sympathy with Tibetan people on human rights grounds, no matter how moderately it might be worded, could be used by Tibetans as evidence of UN interest and support for people of Tibet.

8. Thondup plans see number of other dels with whom appointments are being arranged, both by Malayans and, in some cases, by Gross. Lodge emphasized our desire to be as helpful as possible and indicated he was ready see Thondup at any time to give him whatever advice and assistance he might wish.

---

[3] Telegram 322 to USUN, October 7, a message from Herter to Lodge, reiterated previous instructions to Lodge concerning this possibility. It reads in part: "I do not believe, in light of way things have developed, it feasible for US to press hearing of Dalai Lama. However, I believe it remains important that this judgment be arrived at by Tibetans themselves. Therefore, this should be handled tactically in such way so that Tibetans arrive at this judgment as result their consultations with others." (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–759)

Delga 124 from USUN, October 6, reported on the Tibetan Delegation's conversations with a number of representatives at the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/10–659) Both documents are in the Supplement.

9. At close of conversation Thondup showed us text of prepared statement for press conference which he expected to follow by question and answer period. In separate conversation after meeting with Gross we noted difficulty presented by reference to UN machinery for mediation and conciliation in statement. Gross said he had shaped statement as best he could and there was no possibility of any further revision.

10. From our conversation we believe Thondup understands UN situation and has no intention to press question of hearing for Dalai Lama. Because of his unfamiliarity with UN procedures and authority he remains confused about relationship of Irish-Malayan initiative to Tibetans' own long-range objectives.

11. Thondup makes extremely favorable impression and is excellent spokesman for Tibetan cause. We were struck by his deep sincerity and by his strong desire to do whatever circumstances here seem to require in best interests of Tibetan people. He recognizes importance of not seeking action on basis which would fail to receive necessary support and which could then be exploited by ChiComs and others against Tibetans.

Lodge

---

394. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, October 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Position on the Status of Tibet

Our Embassy in New Delhi has reported (Tab A)[1] that the Dalai Lama has requested United States support for hearing the Tibetan case in the United Nations on the basis of aggression and that the Tibetans are pressing for recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tibet. I

Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Tibetan. Secret. Drafted in the Office of Chinese Affairs by Bennett and John H. Holdridge; cleared by Green and Bacon and with IO, NEA, EUR, SOA, and S/P; and sent through Murphy. Filed with a memorandum of October 28 from Parsons to Murphy on a scheduled call by Gyalo Thondup.

[1] In telegram 1120 from New Delhi, September 25, which reported a conversation between Ambassador Bunker and Gyalo Thondup; not attached to the source text. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793B.00/9–2559)

consider it important that we come to an early decision on the question of the status of Tibet, both to enable us to reply to the Dalai Lama's request and to prepare for conversations with Gyalo Thondup, brother of the Dalai Lama. Thondup is now in New York in connection with the Tibetan item in the United Nations General Assembly. He plans to come to Washington, perhaps next week, and hopes to call on you. I recommend that you receive him and use the opportunity to explain our position on the status of Tibet.

FE has completed a study (Tab B)[2] of the question of United States recognition of the independence of Tibet in which the considerations both for and against such action are examined in detail. Taking these factors into account, we have concluded that on balance the arguments against recognition of Tibetan independence under present conditions are stronger than those in favor. I consider this conclusion valid from the standpoint of both United States national interest and from that of the Tibetans. We share with the Tibetans the objectives of keeping the Tibetan cause alive in the consciousness of the world and maintaining the Dalai Lama as an effective spokesman of the Tibetan people. I believe that United States recognition of the Dalai Lama's government as that of an independent country would serve neither purpose well. Since very few countries could be expected to follow our lead, our recognition now would make the Dalai Lama the leader of a government-in-exile obviously dependent on the United States for political support. This would almost certainly damage the prestige and influence he now enjoys as one of Asia's revered leaders and would hamper his activities on behalf of the Tibetan people.

Nonetheless, there remains the need for the United States to appear responsive to the Dalai Lama's appeal and take a stand conforming to our historic position as a supporter of the principle of the self-determination of peoples. The Republic of China might feel that by taking such a stand we would be going too far. However, President Chiang Kai-shek has already said that his government would "assist the Tibetan people to realize their own aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination" after reconquest of the mainland from the Communists and is himself thus committed to the ultimate realization of Tibetan self-determination. Also, unless the Tibetans are given some definite indication of our sympathy for their cause, there is the danger that the morale of the resistance movement will flag. As pointed out in the study, for the United States to ignore the Dalai Lama's appeal altogether might weaken his determination to keep pressing the Tibetan case before the world and might damage the reputation of the United States as an upholder of international morality. We therefore have reviewed the other courses of action open to us and have taken note of the fact that in December 1950, when the Chinese Communists began their conquest of Tibet, we had come to a policy decision on Tibet as follows:

---

[2] Not printed.

1) We recognized that Tibetans have the same "inherent right" of self-determination as any other people;
2) Should developments warrant, consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state;
3) We did not desire to formulate a definitive legal position on Tibet at that time; and
4) It was adequate "for present purposes" to state that we recognized "the de facto autonomy that Tibet has exercised since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, and particularly since the Simla Conference."

This position was communicated to the British and Indian Governments in a note of December 30, 1950 (Tab C)[3] and a copy was made available to the Canadians.

I believe that this position could be used as the basis for your discussions with Thondup. In response to his request for recognition of Tibetan independence, you could tell him that, while we cannot accord Tibet recognition as an independent country at this time, we do wholly support the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny and that we would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to the end that the Tibetans might realize self-determination should a change in the situation make this practicable. You could also inform him that at an appropriate time after the General Assembly had completed its consideration of the Tibetan item we would be prepared to issue a public statement supporting the right of Tibetans to self-determination.

The Tibetans will probably be unhappy at our failure to go all the way toward recognition of Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, I think Thondup could be made to see that recognition under present conditions would not serve the best interests of the Tibetan people and that in offering to state publicly at an appropriate time in the future our support of the right of the Tibetans to self-determination we are moving in the direction that he desires us to take. However, so long as the Chinese Communists occupy Tibet self-determination is not practicable and the struggle of the Tibetan people for control of their own political destiny is likely to be a long one. If Thondup should appear persuaded of the merit of our position, you could tell him that we plan to communicate it formally to the Dalai Lama through our Embassy in New Delhi. On the other hand, if Thondup's reaction to the suggestion should be adverse, you could refrain from telling him that we had made a final decision in the matter.

---

[3] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 612–613.

If you approve this course and if the interview with Thondup proves satisfactory, I recommend that the Governments of the Republic of China, India, and the United Kingdom be informed of our intentions before we send a formal notification to the Dalai Lama.

Recommendations:

1) That you receive Gyalo Thondup when he comes to Washington for the purpose of explaining to him our attitude toward the status of Tibet.[4]

2) That you[5] inform him that, while the United States cannot accord recognition to the Dalai Lama's government under present circumstances, it

a) fully supports the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny,
b) would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to this end should a change in the situation make this practicable, and
c) would be prepared to make a public statement, after completion of General Assembly consideration of the Tibetan item, affirming our support of Tibetan self-determination.

3) That, if Thondup's response is encouraging, you authorize our Ambassador in New Delhi to inform the Dalai Lama formally of the above position.

4) That you authorize the notification of the Governments of the Republic of China, India, and Great Britain of our decision prior to sending formal notification to the Dalai Lama.[6]

---

[4] A memorandum of October 15 from Murphy to Herter recommended that Thondup be received at a lower level. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.93B11/10–1559) Herter initialed disapproval of this recommendation.

[5] On the source text, the word "you" was crossed out and the words "the Dept" were inserted, apparently by Herter, in the margin.

[6] Herter initialed approval of recommendations 2–4.

395. Telegram From the Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly to the Department of State

New York, October 23, 1959, 8 p.m.

Delga 251. For Secretary and Wilcox from Lodge. Re: Tibet.

I believe we obtained maximum results in UN on Tibetan item.[1] This confirms wisdom of strategy we adopted of permitting Irish and Malayans to take lead. In this way we also were able deny USSR handle it was always seeking in order to tag US with responsibility of reviving cold war and to convince others US not truly interested in peace.

I believe it would be desirable and worthwhile for Secretary to send personal letters of appreciation to Irish and Malayan Foreign Ministers commending them for their joint initiative in behalf of Tibet and for effective way in which they handled themselves in difficult tactical situation in GA.

It is regrettable in one way that our closest Allies, UK and France, abstained on what was extremely moderate resolution. But being separated from colonial powers on issue of this sort also has compensations. Contrary to Embassy's report from London,[2] Dixon made unhelpful speech which by its suggestion no resolution was necessary, tended to encourage advocates of adjourning debate on Tibetan item without any action. We managed to block any such maneuver by immediately making known (in private) our intention to oppose adjournment in strongest possible way. We appeared clearly as a non-colonial power, which is always an attractive way to appear in the GA and which we all too often are unable to do.

I think you should also know that there was widespread distaste for the whole operation.

Lodge

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–2359. Secret.

[1] Resolution 1353 (XIV), adopted by the General Assembly on October 21 by a vote of 45 to 9, with 26 abstentions, expressed concern at reports to the effect that "the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them" and called for "respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life." For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, p. 1187.

[2] Telegram 2138 from London, October 21, reported that the British decision to abstain was firm but that Dixon had been instructed to make a strong speech near the end of the debate making clear British abhorrence of the Tibetan situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–2159)

396. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Murphy—Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Gyalo Thondup, Personal Representative of the Dalai Lama
Mr. Scott—M
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Mr. Gyalo Thondup, the Personal Representative of the Dalai Lama, and "Foreign Minister" of the Dalai Lama's Government, called at his request on Under Secretary Murphy this afternoon. Upon being introduced to Mr. Murphy, Mr. Thondup made the traditional presentation of a Tibetan silk scarf to the Under Secretary. Mr. Thondup said that he had come on behalf of his brother, the Dalai Lama, who wished to convey to President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter the deep gratitude of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people for the sympathy and help which the American Government and people have rendered to them. He also thanked Mr. Murphy for the assistance of the U.S. in connection with the recent United Nations deliberations on the Tibetan item.

Mr. Thondup then said he would like to make the following points with regard to the Tibetan situation:

1. It was the hope of the Dalai Lama that the U.S. Government would continue to help the people of Tibet in their struggle for independence. The Tibetans were now facing great difficulties but they intended to continue their struggle for freedom and they looked to the U.S. for support. The Dalai Lama would like very much to have advice and guidance as to what he should do to keep the Tibetan cause alive and before the conscience of the world.
2. The Dalai Lama was grateful for the assistance from U.S. sources for the Tibetan refugees who had fled after the uprising in March. He hoped that some of the refugees might go to the U.S. and other countries for training and education. He hoped for U.S. assistance in this respect.
3. Due to the attitude of the Government of India, at present it was not feasible for the Dalai Lama to set up a government in exile. However, he hoped that the attitude of the Indian Government might change in time, and that it would be possible eventually to establish such a government. The Dalai Lama hoped that the U.S. Government would use its influence with the Indian Government and other governments to encourage the recognition of a Tibetan Government in exile.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–2959. Secret. Drafted by Martin and approved in M on November 3.

4. The Tibetans needed financial and arms assistance from the U.S. in order to continue their resistance within Tibet against Chinese Communist oppression.

Mr. Murphy said that he was extremely happy to have this opportunity to meet with Mr. Thondup. He wanted to assure him of the personal sympathy of President Eisenhower, as well as that of the American people, for the situation of the Tibetans. The President and Secretary Herter would be most interested to hear of the message which Mr. Thondup had brought from his brother, the Dalai Lama.

Mr. Murphy indicated that great importance is attached to keeping the Tibetan situation before world public opinion. He suggested that the Dalai Lama might consider making some trips to the capitals of other countries, especially neighboring Asian countries. This would be a good means of educating people about the Tibetan problem. Mr. Thondup agreed. He said that the Dalai Lama had thought about traveling but that it was not easy to make appropriate arrangements. However, he felt that some invitations from Buddhist groups in other countries might be accepted by the Dalai Lama.

Mr. Murphy asked how Mr. Thondup felt about the recent UN deliberations on the Tibetan item. Mr. Thondup expressed general satisfaction with the outcome of the United Nations deliberations and again voiced his thanks for U.S. support. He indicated that the Tibetans would have liked to have received more support in the U.N. for independence, which was their principal goal. However, they felt that a good start had been made by the UN consideration of the human rights aspects of their case. He hoped that the UN could eventually do something more. Mr. Thondup expressed satisfaction with the services which had been rendered to the Tibetan delegation by their lawyer, Mr. Ernest Gross.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Thondup about the relations of the Tibetans with the Indian Government. Mr. Thondup indicated that the Indian Government was in a difficult position. It considered that Tibet was part of China. Referring to the recent border incidents between Communist China and India, Mr. Thondup expressed the fear that the Indian Government might be willing to make some deal with Peiping regarding Tibet in return for assurances as to its own territory.

Mr. Murphy told Mr. Thondup that the U.S. had traditionally stood for self-determination of peoples. We believed this principle should apply also to the Tibetans. Mr. Thondup expressed appreciation for this stand.

In reply to a question from Mr. Murphy as to the actual state of government in Tibet at present, Mr. Thondup said that it was a Chinese Communist military government with the participation of a few pro-Communist Tibetans. The Panchen Lama was now acting Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Autonomous Region of Tibet.

When asked how large the population of Tibet was, Mr. Thondup replied that he did not know the exact population but that according to his government's estimate there were 6,000,000 Tibetans. This included those who were living outside of Tibet proper. Mr. Thondup made it clear that the Tibetans were entirely separate from the Chinese in language and culture. The present Chinese military government, however, was doing its best to suppress the Tibetan way of life. Although he did not know the exact number of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet, he estimated that there were about 300,000 Chinese Communists "in uniform". In answer to another question, Mr. Thondup said that the Buddhists of Tibet were entirely on the side of the resistance against the Communists.

[*1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified*]

Mr. Murphy asked what Mr. Thondup had in mind when he expressed the hope that the UN might do something further. Mr. Thondup felt that it might play some role in mediation between Tibet and Communist China. Mr. Thondup indicated that he had taken this matter up with the Secretary General during a recent call in company with Mr. Gross. Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Thondup had received any indication from the Secretary General that he might look into conciliation possibilities during his prospective trip to Southeast Asia in connection with the Laos question. Mr. Thondup replied that the Secretary General had advised that for the time being the best thing the Tibetans could do was to educate the world as to the Tibetan problem.

Mr. Thondup recalled that in his letter to President Eisenhower,[1] the Dalai Lama had expressed the hope that before the U.S. agreed to admission of Communist China in the UN, it would insist on settlement of the Tibetan problem. Mr. Murphy indicated that the U.S. was not thinking in terms of recognition of Communist China or of agreeing to its admission to the UN.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Martin if there was anything which could be said on the subject of refugees which had been raised by Mr. Thondup. Mr. Martin, after recalling that considerable relief supplies had been furnished the Tibetan refugees in India from the U.S. sources, indicated that the problem of training Tibetan refugees in the U.S. and other countries, such as India, was being closely studied by the Department. He could not give any specific plan at present, but this matter was being most carefully studied and considered.

Mr. Murphy mentioned that Mr. Thondup was going to address the National Press Club Friday[2] and indicated this would be a good way of keeping the Tibetan cause before the public. Mr. Thondup said he found it difficult to do much public speaking about Tibet at present because he has not yet had a chance to report to the Dalai Lama on the UN developments or to find out what has been developing in India during his absence. He indicated that relations with the Indian Government were delicate and he did not want to say anything here in the United States which might prejudice these relations.

---

[1] Of May 26; summarized in Document 381.

[2] October 30.

In closing, Mr. Murphy reiterated the desire of the U.S. to support the principle of self-determination for the people of Tibet, in keeping with our traditional belief that all peoples should have a determining voice in their future. He said we would wish to keep this position confidential until we had a chance to communicate it formally to the Dalai Lama. Furthermore we wished to inform certain other governments, such as the Chinese Nationalist Government and the British Government, as to our position. Mr. Thondup again expressed appreciation for the stand taken by the U.S. on this matter.

Mr. Murphy said that he knew that President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter would be most interested to hear about the views which Mr. Thondup had expressed to him and he would pass these on to them.

---

397. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 3, 1959.

SUBJECT

Gyalo Thondup's Calls on Mr. Murphy and Mr. Parsons;
U.S. Attitude Toward Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Parsons said that he wanted to tell Ambassador Yeh about the calls which the Dalai Lama's brother and representative, Gyalo Thondup, had made on Under Secretary Murphy and himself last week.[1] There was one thing of particular policy importance which had tran-

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/11–359. Secret. Drafted by Martin.

[1] See Document 396. A conversation between Parsons and Thondup on October 31 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation of that date. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–3159; see Supplement)

spired during these calls. The United States had made a decision to go somewhat beyond its previous position with regard to Tibet, namely, that it is an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China. In making this decision the United States had been mindful of the statement on Tibetan self-determination made by President Chiang on March 26[2] and reiterated by Ambassador T.F. Tsiang in the United Nations debate last month. In line with this decision, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Parsons had informed Gyalo Thondup that the United States Government was prepared to apply the principle of self-determination to the people of Tibet. The United States wished, however, to keep this position confidential until it had been communicated formally to the Dalai Lama and until the Governments of the Republic of China, of the United Kingdom, and of India had been informed. After that the United States would be prepared to make its position public at some appropriate time.

Mr. Parsons pointed out that we had taken this decision as a step toward keeping the Tibetan issue alive before the world. He emphasized that the United States, of course, had at no time recognized Chinese Communist claims to Tibet or the agreement of 1951 which the Peiping regime made with the Tibetans.

Ambassador Yeh said that he would report this decision of the United States to his Government. He asked whether we had some particular occasion in mind on which to make our position public, and whether the Dalai Lama would first reveal it and the United States then confirm it. Mr. Parsons replied that we had no fixed idea as to when the statement might be made or in what manner. Ambassador Yeh asked whether our intention was simply to state that the principle of self-determination should apply to Tibet, or whether we would say that after a certain day the United States would recognize the sovereignty of Tibet. Mr. Parsons answered that our intention was the former, i. e., to support the principle of self-determination for Tibet. He pointed out that Thondup had not said that his brother was planning to set up a government-in-exile. If he had indicated such an intention, we would in all probability have sought to discourage him from such a course. Mr. Parsons remarked on the sensitivity which Thondup had shown as to the feelings of the Indian Government and its attitude toward Tibet.

Ambassador Yeh asked whether Thondup had raised the problem of aid to the Tibetans. Mr. Parsons said that in his conversation with Thondup the latter had raised the question of aid only with regard to refugees and students. Mr. Parsons asked Mr. Martin whether the subject had come up in Thondup's conversation with Mr. Murphy. Mr. Martin replied that (as Ambassador Yeh had anticipated in an earlier conversation with Mr. Murphy last week) Thondup had raised with Mr. Murphy the need of the Tibetans for arms aid. Mr. Martin pointed out, however, that other than to ask a question or two as to what the Tibetans would do with arms assistance, Mr. Murphy had made no reply to Thondup's request.

---

[2] See Document 367.

Mr. Parsons mentioned that Thondup had asked to see the Secretary but that no appointment had been arranged for him.

Ambassador Yeh then discussed at some length the call which Thondup, and the other two members of his party, had paid on him on October 30. Thondup had expressed gratification for the help which the Chinese Government had given to the Tibetans. He had recalled the conversation he had had with Dr. Yeh in 1951, when Dr. Yeh was Chinese Foreign Minister, during which the subject of Tibetan independence was discussed. At that time Ambassador Yeh had told Thondup the Tibetans would have to work for their independence.

According to Dr. Yeh, Thondup told him that Mr. Murphy had supported Tibetan independence in principle. Mr. Parsons interjected that Mr. Murphy had dealt only with the principle of self-determination and had done this only briefly. When Thondup called on Mr. Parsons on October 31, he mentioned this to Mr. Parsons and asked for further explanation. Mr. Parsons had therefore presented our position on self-determination in more detail.[3] Mr. Martin remarked that he had been present during both conversations, and that neither Mr. Murphy nor Mr. Parsons had used the word independence at any time. Ambassador Yeh indicated that he had advised Thondup to thank the United States for the sympathy which it had shown to the Tibetans and for its support in the United Nations.

Ambassador Yeh said that Thondup had asked for a clearer Chinese Government declaration in favor of Tibetan independence. Thondup had said that if such a declaration were forthcoming the Dalai Lama could deal more openly, and have closer relations, with the GRC. Ambassador Yeh had replied to Thondup that President Chiang had already exceeded his powers in making his declaration of last March regarding self-determination for Tibet. Under the Chinese constitution only the legislative branch of the government had the power to make any decisions which would change the territorial limits of China. It would take a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly to bring this about, and there was no chance that such a vote would be forthcoming at present—not because of opposition to Tibetan self-determination but because of the reluctance of the National Assembly to make such a decision when the government was not in control of the mainland. However, he had assured Thondup that President Chiang's declaration was of great significance because it not only supported the aspirations of the Tibetan people for self-determination but in effect was a promise of future political independence.

---

[3] According to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 1 above, Parsons "noted that the historical position of the United States on Tibet hitherto has been to consider Tibet an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China. However, it was also the traditional policy of the American people to support the principle of self-determination for all peoples. This was why the United States believed the Tibetans entitled to have the controlling voice in their own affairs and felt that it could at an appropriate time make a public declaration of its support for the self-determination of the Tibetan people. We envisaged that two steps would have to be taken before such a declaration were made. The Dalai Lama would be formally notified of our position, and three foreign governments, those of the Republic of China, India and the United Kingdom, would be informed of our intention. After these things had been done we could then make a public statement when a suitable opportunity presented itself."

In this connection Ambassador Yeh advised Thondup to tell his brother Norbu that he should not make such statements as he had been making on the West Coast—that Tibetans were hostile to all Chinese. That statement would do the Tibetan cause no good. The Tibetans should make a distinction between non-Communist and Communist Chinese. They should confine their hostility to the Chinese Communists and not be "anti-Han." The Ambassador said that he had recalled to Thondup that the atrocities committed against the Tibetans in the early part of this century were the doing of a Manchu general, who was subsequently condemned for these atrocities by the Chinese.

Ambassador Yeh said that he had given Thondup two pieces of advice. One was that the Dalai Lama should preserve his status as a spiritual leader. He was recognized throughout the world in this capacity. He would lose his status if he were to move to the United States. He should remain in India. In answer to a question from Thondup, Ambassador Yeh had indicated that visits by the Dalai Lama to Asian countries would be a good thing, especially if they were to Buddhist countries, but he should be sure that he could return to India. The second piece of advice which Ambassador Yeh had given to Thondup was to keep alive the resistance forces within Tibet. According to Dr. Yeh, Thondup had told him that the Dalai Lama could count on 40 to 50,000 fighting men, about one-third of whom were in India. Ambassador Yeh suggested that the Tibetans should endeavor to obtain arms wherever they could be bought in order to continue guerilla activities.

Dr. Yeh said that he was surprised to learn from Thondup that the Dalai Lama did not bring out any treasures from Tibet and consequently was very hard up financially. When asked who was supporting the Dalai Lama at present, Thondup had replied that all his support was coming from the Indian Government. Ambassador Yeh said that he had warned Thondup (who had made many disparaging remarks about Nehru) not to be too hard on Nehru, because if Nehru were to fall there would be chaos in India and a good chance of the Communists coming to power.

398. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, November 23, 1959, 1 p.m.

1858. Reference Deptel 1833.[1] I have informed Foreign Secretary Dutt that we had received informal request for interview Dalai Lama with President from former's New Delhi office and that I had just received personal letter in Tibetan from Dalai Lama saying he could be in Delhi during President's visit and would like meet President if he has time and thinks he should receive Dalai.

I made points contained reftel and added that while we had been restrained here in commenting on ChiCom aggression against Tibet, he undoubtedly knew this had caused questions in some quarters whether U.S. only interested in aggression against Westerners as in Hungary and that refusal of Dalai Lama's request (already publicized) might give rise to unfortunate press speculation.

Dutt replied that he thought it would be most unfortunate if Dalai Lama should attempt to see President. Efforts as suggested to keep interview entirely private without press fanfair would be impossible achieve. A controversial matter would be injected into President's good will visit which is being so warmly welcomed as such as the government's and people of India. It would cast cloud on whole visit. It would heighten suspicions of ChiComs and add fuel to their charge (which Dutt characterized as "insulting") that GOI was being pressured by U.S. Government to encourage Tibetan resistance. Dutt said that GOI had given and would continue to give Dalai all reasonable freedom of action. The latter expected leave Mussoorie December 7 to visit Buddhist shrines around India. GOI glad have him do this but did not want him to make political speeches in course his travels.

To my observation that President would be meeting other non-government leaders, some religious associated with peoples of West, and comment might be caused if distinction made with regard to Asiatic religious leader, Dutt replied that he felt situation different with Dalai in that President would meet either leaders in their own countries whereas Dalai was political and religious refugee guest of another country.

To my question Dutt said he reluctant to take up matter with Nehru since he felt it would be disturbing to Nehru in view latter's present deep

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/11–2359. Secret; Priority.

[1] Telegram 1833 to New Delhi, November 18, transmitted instructions to the Embassy concerning an informal request from the Dalai Lama to meet with President Eisenhower when the latter visited India in December. (*Ibid.*, 711.11–EI/11–1359; see Supplement)

involvement in so many difficult problems and would be cloud warm atmosphere surrounding President's visit. While Dutt advised against bringing request by U.S. Government to Nehru's attention, he said he would of course do so if U.S. Government insisted. Dutt has been Nehru's closest advisor on Tibet and ChiCom situations, has drafted GOI notes to ChiComs, and I believe is good judge of what latter's reactions would be. Moreover, Dutt's unusual firmness and willingness take responsibility for GOI on this matter suggest to me possibility that Nehru, knowing from press of Dalai's request to see President, has already indicated to Dutt he does not wish this problem to be raised with him.

I am aware force of arguments contained reftel and Merchant's eyes only message to me[2] but in my judgment proposed meeting would be highly undesirable. I believe it could only be frustrating to both principals. Moreover proposal would cause acute embarrassment to GOI, since meeting would have to be fitted into schedule by GOI as host government and might even affect Dalai's future position in India as guest GOI. I believe policy we have followed here has paid off as it relates both to Tibetan situation and ChiCom aggression and it would be unfortunate to offset substantial advantages already secured. Same considerations would apply almost to some extent to call by Under Secretary Murphy on Dalai. This could not be kept secret. Moreover such visit unlikely satisfy Dalai, e.g., Gyalo Thondup has expressed great disappointment at not having been received by Secretary.

My recommendation therefore would be that I should write to Dalai replying his letter that request for interview should be channeled through GOI as host government of President and that President will of course respect wishes of GOI concerning his program in India.[3]

Bunker

---

[2] Not found.

[3] Telegram 1946 to New Delhi, November 25, instructed Bunker to write to the Dalai Lama along the lines of this paragraph and to have the letter delivered simultaneously with the letter forwarded in Document 399.

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Washington, November 25, 1959, 10:18 p.m.

1947. Department's 1652, repeated London 3695, repeated information Taipei 301.[1] You should take earliest suitable occasion deliver letter given below to Dalai Lama for purpose informing him formally US Government position on Tibetan self-determination. It left your discretion whether to deliver letter in person, or transmit by other means, according your judgment probable reaction of GOI as well as possibilities attracting unwanted public attention. Transmittal of letter should be performed in advance of President's arrival New Delhi. Letter should be on official stationery and signed by yourself as Ambassador to India. In transmitting to Dalai Lama request him undertake not make existence of letter or any portion of its contents public without prior approval US Government, citing need for careful timing of public announcement of US position on Tibetan self-determination. FYI: We plan making announcement as soon as appears advisable following President's trip to India. Before announcement actually made Dept will communicate with you regarding timing. End FYI. Text letter follows:

"Your Holiness:

"I have been instructed by the Department of State to inform you of the position of the US Government with respect to the political aspirations of the Tibetan people. As you may have heard from your brother and special representative Gyalo Thondup, the views of the US on this subject were conveyed to him by Under Secretary Robert Murphy and Assistant Secretary J. Graham Parsons respectively, on October 29 and October 31.[2] This position was subsequently set forth in a letter dated November 4, 1959, from Mr. Murphy to your brother[3] as follows:

'While it has been the historical position of the United States to consider Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China, the American people have also traditionally stood for the principle of self-determination. It is the belief of the United States Government that this principle should apply to the people of Tibet and that they should have

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/11–2559. Secret. Drafted by Bennett; cleared by Bartlett, Hart, Steeves, and Parsons and in draft with IO, L/FE, and BNA; and approved by Merchant. Repeated to Taipei and London.

[1] Telegram 1652 to New Delhi, November 6, instructed the Embassies in London and New Delhi to inform the British and Indian Governments of the U.S. decision to support the principle of self-determination with respect to Tibet. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/11–659; see Supplement)

[2] See Document 396 and footnotes 1 and 3, Document 397.

[3] Filed with a letter of November 2 from Thondup to Murphy. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/11–259; see Supplement)

the determining voice in their own political destiny. The United States Government is prepared, when a suitable opportunity presents itself, to make a public declaration of its support for the principle of self-determination for the Tibetan people.'

"During their conversations with Gyalo Thondup, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Parsons indicated that the US Government intended to inform the Governments of the Republic of China, the UK, and India of its position. I have been asked to tell you that my Government has already so notified these Governments.[4] I may also add that my Government has noted the statement of President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China on March 26 of this year that his Government, once the Chinese Communist regime has disappeared, would 'assist the Tibetan people to realize their own aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination.' My Government has noted with satisfaction the adoption by the UNGA last month of the Resolution calling for respect for fundamental human rights in Tibet[5] and believes that this Resolution bespoke the deep sympathy of the free peoples of the world in the cause of the Tibetan people.

"The American people have watched with admiration the heroic effort of the Tibetan people to defend their liberties and to resist the attempt of the Chinese Communists to fasten an oppressive and dictatorial rule on Tibet. I wish to express to your Holiness on behalf of my Government its profound sympathy for the Tibetan people in their present suffering and its hope that the day may soon come when the Tibetans can again live in peace and freedom."

Herter

---

[4] Telegram 2482 from London, November 9, reported that the Embassy had informed the Foreign Office that day; telegram 1791 from New Delhi, November 17, reported that the Ambassador had informed Foreign Secretary Dutt on November 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/11–959 and 793B.00/11–1759, respectively)

[5] On October 21; see footnote 1, Document 395.

400. Memorandum for the Record by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, February 4, 1960.

SUBJECT

Discussion with the President on Tibet, 4 February 1960

PRESENT

White House:
Mr. Gray

State:
Mr. Herter
Mr. Merchant

Defense:
Mr. Douglas
Mr. Irwin

CIA
Mr. Dulles
General Cabell
Mr. FitzGerald

Mr. Dulles briefed the group on CIA operations in support of the Tibetan resistance. He covered the history of the program [*1 line of source text not declassified*] and he described the high quality of the resistance fighters and their strong motivation.

The DCI requested approval for the continuation of the program [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to the resistance elements so far identified and to those which are expected to be contacted in the future. [*3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

The President wondered whether the net result of these operations would not be more brutal repressive reprisals by the Chinese Communists who he felt might not find continued resistance tolerable. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that there could be no greater brutality than had been experienced in Tibet in the past.

The President asked the Secretary of State whether he was in favor of proceeding as recommended by Mr. Dulles. The Secretary responded that he was so in favor after full consultation with appropriate persons in his department. He felt not only would continued successful resistance by the Tibetans prove to be a serious harassment to the Chinese Communists but would serve to keep the spark alive in the entire area. He felt that the long-range results could mean much to the free world apart from humanitarian considerations for the Tibetans.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Secret; Eyes Only.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that this program has been, and will continue to be, subject to close review by the Designated Representatives under NSC 5412/2;[1] that all significant developments will be brought to the attention of the Representatives; and that in the event anything arises indicating the desirability of a change in plans, the Representatives will be consulted.

The President gave his approval for the continuation of the program as outlined.

Gordon Gray

---

[1] NSC 5412/2, "National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations," December 28, 1955, provided that designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the President should be advised in advance of major covert programs and should be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs. (*Ibid.*, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records)

---

401. Editorial Note

A letter from Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama, February 20, 1960, reads as follows:

> "Thank you for your letter to me dated January 5, 1960.
>
> "As you know, while it has been the historical position of the United States to consider Tibet as an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China, the American people have also traditionally stood for the principle of self-determination. It is the belief of the United States Government that this principle should apply to the people of Tibet and that they should have the determining voice in their own political destiny." (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/2–2060; see Supplement)

The text of the letter was released to the press on February 29 and is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1960, pages 443–444, along with the text of a January 5 letter from the Dalai Lama to Herter expressing thanks for U.S. support during the U.N. debate on Tibet. The letter summarized a letter of December 10 from the Dalai Lama to Herter, transmitted in Murto 18 from New Delhi, December 10; a slightly different version, dated January 5, was transmitted in telegram 2800 from New Delhi, February 23, 1960. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/12–1059 and 793B.00/2–2360, respectively; see Supplement)

An aide-mémoire from the Republic of China Embassy, February 28, expressed disappointment that the Chinese Government had not been consulted in advance concerning the letter, of which it had been informed on February 26, and took exception to the use in the letter of the word "suzerainty" and the reference to Tibet as an autonomous "country." (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/2–2860; see Supplement) An aide-mémoire from the Department of State to the Embassy, March 3, noted that the Chinese Government had been informed of the U.S. position with respect to self-determination of Tibet and the decision to make it public (see Document 399), and had not expressed dissatisfaction. (Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/2–2860; see Supplement) It also pointed out that a Department of State spokesman had stated on September 11, 1959, that the historical position of the United States was that Tibet was "an autonomous country under Chinese suzerainty." The text of that statement is in Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Tibetan; see Supplement.

---

402. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama

Washington, October 11, 1960.

YOUR HOLINESS: Thank you for your letters of September 13 and 16, 1960.[1]

In your letter of September 13 you requested United States' assistance for the Tibetan people in their struggle against Communist oppression and support for renewed United Nations consideration of Tibet. I assure you that the United States, by every appropriate means, will continue its endeavors to bring the pressure of world public opinion to bear against the actions of the Chinese Communists in Tibet. Experience has shown that even Communistic regimes cannot completely disregard strong expressions of world public opinion, and I hope that further action by the United Nations General Assembly will, in some measure, help to alleviate the sufferings of your people. I also assure you that the United States is ready to render such assistance as may be requested by

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/9–1660. No classification marking. Drafted by Newlin and cleared with FE, CA, SOA, and IO.

[1] The former has not been found. The latter is filed with the source text. See Supplement.

Malaya and Thailand, co-sponsors of the item on Tibet, which appears likely to further the above-mentioned goal.

In your letter of September 16 you suggested that the United States seek adoption of a resolution by which the General Assembly would recognize the Tibetan people's right of self-determination, appoint the Secretary General of the United Nations or a committee to supervise the exercise of this right, and establish some machinery for ensuring continuing United Nations consideration of the Tibetan question.

First, let me assure you that the position of the United States remains as stated in my letter to you of February 20, 1960, i.e., that the principle of self-determination should apply to the people of Tibet and that they should have the determining voice in their own political destiny. The United States intends to reiterate its position on this matter during the General Assembly debate on Tibet. Concerning your suggestion for specific elements to be included in a resolution, I will be happy to bring them to the attention of Malaya and Thailand, who, as co-sponsors, have the primary responsibility for drafting a resolution on Tibet.[2] Although it would clearly be desirable to have the three elements which you mentioned included in a resolution, I am certain that the co-sponsors will wish to consider carefully the support these suggestions are likely to receive in the General Assembly. They may well find that it is preferable to concentrate on seeking increased support for a resolution along the lines of the one adopted last year if it should appear that there would be a decline in support as the result of adding new elements.

The American people continue to admire the heroic struggle of the Tibetan people to maintain their religion and culture in the face of ruthless efforts to Communize them by force. I am certain that free men everywhere continue to hope that the brave Tibetan people will survive their present ordeal and that they will eventually be able to live a life of their own choosing in peace.

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter[3]

---

[2] On August 19, Malaya and Thailand had proposed inscription of "The Question of Tibet" on the General Assembly's agenda.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

403. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 27, 1960.

SUBJECT

Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Gyalo Thondup, Brother of the Dalai Lama
Mr. Rinchen Sadutshang
Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Mr. Gyalo Thondup, brother of the Dalai Lama, accompanied by Mr. Rinchen Sadutshang, called on the Secretary this morning. Mr. Thondup opened the conversation by saying he had been instructed by His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, to call on the Secretary to express his gratitude and that of the Tibetan people for the sympathy and support which they had received from the United States. Mr. Thondup then referred to the Tibetan item on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and expressed hope that the United States would support a resolution on Tibet. He went on to say that the Dalai Lama had instructed him to solicit the advice of the Secretary on the problem of keeping the Tibetan issue alive before the world.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Thondup for bringing the message from the Dalai Lama and asked him to convey to the Dalai Lama his best wishes. Referring to the Tibetan item at the UN, the Secretary said that, as he had pointed out in his correspondence with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, the United States intended to consult closely with the co-sponsors, Malaya and Thailand, on this matter and to support their efforts in every way that we could.

In connection with the problem of keeping the Tibetan issue alive before the world, the Secretary suggested that perhaps travel to various countries by the Dalai Lama, in his capacity as a great religious leader rather than as head of state, would be the most effective way of accomplishing this aim. The Secretary pointed out that no one could bring the message of the Tibetan people to the world as effectively as the Dalai Lama himself. The Secretary made it clear that the Dalai Lama would be most welcome if he wished to come to the United States as a religious leader.

Mr. Thondup thanked the Secretary for his advice and promised to convey it to the Dalai Lama. He agreed that it would be desirable for the

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/10–2760. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin and approved in S on November 3.

Dalai Lama to travel, but mentioned that working out his itinerary was a complicated problem and there would have to be consultation with the Indian Government.

Mr. Thondup then spoke of the desirability of including in any United Nations resolution on Tibet a provision supporting Tibetan self-determination. He felt there was considerable reluctance among various delegations at the United Nations to back a resolution which would include such a provision. He asked the Secretary if the United States Government would use its influence and good offices with other countries in favor of such a provision. The Secretary replied that as Mr. Thondup knew, the United States Government strongly supported the principle of self-determination for Tibet and we would like to see this principle included in a United Nations resolution on Tibet. However, it was important to determine what kind of resolution would gain the widest support in the General Assembly. It would be better not to have a resolution containing such a provision if such a resolution would be defeated.

Mr. Thondup agreed with the Secretary. He then asked for the Secretary's advice as to how we could assure that the Tibetan issue would be considered in future United Nations General Assemblies. He thought it important not to let the matter drop with the current session. The Secretary said that this problem, of course, would need careful consideration. Speaking off the cuff, he thought it might be useful to explore the possibility of including in any resolution on the Tibetan question a provision calling on the Secretary General to report at the next GA on what progress had been made. The Secretary said he did not know if this suggestion would be feasible, but it would be worth exploring.

Mr. Thondup thanked the Secretary for his opinion. He said that before taking leave he would again like to convey the Dalai Lama's request for U.S. support of the cause of Tibetan freedom. The Secretary said that, as Mr. Thondup knew, we had been helping in every way we can and would continue to do so. Mr. Thondup expressed appreciation for the position of the United States and thanked the Secretary for taking time from his busy schedule to see him.

404. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, November 26, 1960, 8 p.m.

1099. Foreign Secretary Dutt called my attention to GOI white paper covering Indo-Chinese Communist relations from period March–October 1960[1] in which India had protested repeated violations from Indian airspace by Chinese Communist planes. Chinese Communist reply asserted twice no Chinese planes over Indian territory but these American planes based Formosa which had been dropping arms, agents and equipment to Tibetans. Dutt added by way of comment that four Tibetan refugees recently arrived Ladakh had US arms but I pointed out that most arms this area war surplus to which he agreed.

Dutt said he of course did not know whether we had dropped supplies in Tibet but he wished inform me GOI planning take vigorous action shoot down planes violating Indian territory. Therefore he hoped that if we planning air drops in future we would not fly over Indian territory. If US plane shot down it would create "tremendous furor".

Dutt added GOI preparing further documentary evidence against Chinese Communists.

Comment: I believe Dutt's statement indication that while GOI not averse to aid being rendered Tibetans fearful that if US plane brought down over Indian territory it would greatly weaken Indian position vis-à-vis Chinese Communists, lend color to Chinese Communist assertion rebellion instigated by US, pull rug from under severe critics of Chinese Communists in press and parliament, and turn public opinion against US, which GOI most anxious avoid.

Bunker

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/11–2660. Secret; Limit Distribution.

[1] *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, March 1960–November 1960: White Paper No. IV* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1960).

Index

Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 698
Acheson, Dean, 565*n*
Adenauer, Konrad, 676
Aiken, Frank, 785, 787–788, 789
Akalovsky, Alexander, 595*n*
Albania, 730
Allen, George V., 18, 142*n*, 162, 602, 670, 689, 752
Allendorfer, Cmdr., 245
Allison, John M., 7*n*
Alphand, Hervé, 518
Ambassadorial talks. *See* Warsaw talks.
Anderson, Robert B., 54, 691, 710
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 488
Arneson, R. Gordon, 371*n*, 375*n*
Asbjornson, Mildred, 247
Atomic weapons. *See* Nuclear weapons.
Aurand, Capt. E. P., 130, 196
Australia, 140, 180, 391–396
Aylward, Robert A., 491*n*

Bacon, Ruth E., 754*n*, 765*n*, 792*n*
Ballantyne, R. J., 646*n*, 647*n*
Barbour, Walworth, 646, 647, 648
Barco, James W., 275–278, 339
Bartlett, Frederic P., 806*n*
Beakley, Vice Adm. Wallace M., 188, 224
Beale, Howard, 391, 396
Beam, Jacob D.:
  Warsaw talks:
    appointment to, 7*n*, 31–32
    informal meetings, proposed, 542
    instructions from State Department, 186, 187, 198–199, 200, 229–230, 267–269, 291–296, 324–326, 354–356, 397–398, 405–406, 433–437, 479–482, 491–493, 511*n*, 567*n*, 576*n*, 621–622, 625*n*, 638*n*, 650*n*, 652*n*, 715*n*, 733*n*
Beam, Jacob D.—Continued
  Warsaw talks—Continued
    negotiating sessions, 193–195, 209–216, 257, 258–264, 270–271, 305–306, 312–314, 328, 373, 406–407, 453, 482–483, 495, 500–501, 511–512, 531–532, 553–554, 566, 567, 576–577, 585–586, 625–626, 638–639, 650–651, 652–655, 665–666, 694–695, 715–716, 728–729, 733–734
    personnel changes, 409*n*
    PRC objectives, 190–191
    preliminary arrangements, 35*n*, 61, 184–185
    reports on, 195–196, 218, 270–271, 734–736
    U.S. criticism of PRC record, 305–306
    U.S. long-term strategy, 323
    U.S. opening statement, 191–192
Becker, Loftus E., 68, 157, 158, 200*n*, 293*n*, 324*n*, 350, 352, 354*n*, 397*n*, 399*n*, 405*n*, 433*n*, 491*n*
Beeley, Howard S., 216
Belgium, 360
Bell, John O., 633*n*
Bennett, Josiah W., 35*n*, 219*n*, 229*n*, 479*n*, 509*n*, 515*n*, 545*n*, 591*n*, 627*n*, 633*n*, 792*n*, 806*n*
Berding, Andrew H., 200*n*, 609*n*
Bernau, Phyllis D., 166*n*, 185*n*, 200*n*, 316*n*, 335*n*, 412, 413*n*
Bevan, Aneurin, 21
Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 256, 639–640, 656–662
Blackburn, Rear Adm. P. P., 189
Boas, Frank, 433*n*

Boggs, Marion W., 43, 87, 508, 538, 589, 602, 639, 672, 691, 711, 742, 762, 773, 784
Bonesteel, Brig. Gen. Charles H., III, 426
Booker, Malcolm R., 391
Bork, Gen., 348
Bowen, Maj. Gen. John W., 14
Bowie, Robert R., 462*n*
Bowles, Chester B., 699, 705, 706
Brewster, Robert C., 692*n*
Brown, Winthrop G., 777–781, 783*n*
Brucker, Wilber M., 108, 109–111, 260
Bunker, Ellsworth, 327, 490, 792*n*, 804–805, 806, 814
Bureau of the Budget, U.S., 667–668
Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 68, 188, 224, 427*n*
  China, People's Republic of:
    U.S. naval patrols, PRC protests re, 571–572
    U.S.–ROC overflights of, 494
  China, Republic of, amphibious equipment for, 367
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    ROC troop reductions, 364, 367, 369, 370
    smaller islands, U.S. policy re, 574–576
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 73, 75, 121
    cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*), 369–370
    commercial shipping, impact on, 371
    invasion of islands, possible, 117
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 120
    PRC intentions, 242, 243
    PRC military build–up, 116
    regional significance, 119
    resupply of islands, 116–117
    Soviet position, 244
    Tan Islands, defense of, 282, 370
    U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 97
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 90–91, 92–93, 94, 95, 98–99, 119, 145, 244–245, 329, 330, 336, 412, 477
    U.S. intelligence on, 116, 117
    U.S. military strategy, 92, 118
    U.S. naval patrols, 342
    U.S. non–provocation policy, 483–484
Byers, Lt. Gen. Clovis E., 47, 116

Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 67, 142, 559, 561, 689, 768, 808
  China, People's Republic of:
    nuclear capability, 691
    U.S.–ROC overflights of, 256–257
  Sino–Soviet relations, 690, 691, 731
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    Hong Kong, impact on, 269
    interdiction of islands, 208–209
    PRC intentions, 242
    regional significance, 245
    retaliation by ROC, 270
    Soviet position, 243, 244
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 93, 94, 95
Caccia, Sir Harold, 164*n*, 168–171, 175*n*, 249, 279, 316–317, 357, 358, 408–409, 449*n*, 518
Calhoun, John A., 89*n*, 399*n*, 583*n*
Cambodia, 201–203
Campbell, Gen., 585
Canada, 30–31, 140, 360, 361–362
Carpenter, William T., Jr., 496*n*
Carson, James, 247
Casey, Richard G., 180*n*, 391–396
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). *See* Cabell, Gen. Charles P.; Dulles, Allen W.; National Intelligence Estimates; Special National Intelligence Estimates.
Ceylon, 139
Chamberlain, William Henry, 388
Chang Chien–Yuh, 650
Chang Chun, 8, 77, 319, 421, 424
Chatterjee, D. N., 628
Chen Cheng, 8, 226, 265, 500, 564
  China, Republic of:
    economic development program, 644, 645, 648–649, 702
    military reductions, 552
    "use of force" policy, 545
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 422, 424, 437
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, proposed ROC withdrawal from, 696
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    cease–fire proposal (Sept. *28*–Oct. *3*), 300
    interdiction of islands, 78
    resupply of islands, 300
    retaliation by ROC, 71, 224–225, 239–240, 299–300

- Chen Cheng—Continued
  - Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    - ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 319, 321
    - U.S. warnings to PRC, 78
  - Warsaw talks, 300
- Chen Yi, 201*n*, 202, 397*n*, 653
- Chiang Ching-kuo, Lt. Gen., 331, 524, 635, 656, 659, 661, 724, 725, 736
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo:
  - China, People's Republic of:
    - commune system, 617–618
    - downfall of Communist government, plan for, 683–685, 686–687, 748
    - uprisings against Communist government, 555, 556, 620
  - China, Republic of:
    - economic development program, 648–649
    - economic situation, 529–530
    - "free China" image, 424–426, 515
    - military reductions, 529, 685–686
    - political situation, 725–726
    - U.S. economic assistance, 530, 748
    - U.S. military assistance, 748
    - "use of force" policy, 526, 562–563
  - Dillon, meeting with, 613–621
  - Dulles, assessment of, 562
  - Dulles' assessment of, 169–170
  - Dulles visit to ROC (Mar. *1958*), 8–15
  - Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 379, 388, 467–468
    - communiqué on, 441
    - meetings with Dulles, 418–419, 421–426, 430–433, 438–440
  - Eisenhower, correspondence with, 83–86, 115*n*, 446, 486–487, 747–749
  - Eisenhower, meetings with, 675–687
  - Indonesia, 9
  - infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 748
    - failures of early *1950s*, 19–20
    - paramilitary activities, proposed, 562, 564, 658, 660, 662
    - position on, 12–14, 603–604, 618–620
    - training for troops, 4–5
    - U.S.–ROC discussions re, 651–652
  - inflexibility and stubborness of, 169–170
  - Japan, 9–10, 678–679, 682
  - Korea, 9
- Chiang Kai-shek—Continued
  - McElroy, meeting with, 379–381, 389–390
  - military confrontations between Chinas, 39–40, 41, 570
  - Mountbatten and, 410–411
  - Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    - artillery for, 433, 484–485
    - fate of ROC and, 439
    - ROC troop reductions, 389–390, 439–440, 454, 485–486, 551
    - ROC withdrawal, proposed, 706–707
    - Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 519, 533–535, 537
    - retreat on positions, 410–411
  - Sino-Soviet relations, 562, 614–616, 676–679
  - Soviet attitude toward, 596–597
  - Taiwan Strait crisis:
    - "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 71
    - cease-fire (Oct. *6–20*), 331, 332
    - Dulles-Chiang discussions re, 422, 430–433
    - interdiction of islands, 77–78, 83–84
    - nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 431–432
    - political concerns, 112, 144
    - resupply of islands, 114, 178, 284
    - retaliation by ROC, 71, 84–86, 109–110, 111–113, 179, 182, 183, 226, 240, 265–266
    - ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 319–321
    - Tan Islands, defense of, 291
    - U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 179, 331, 333
    - U.S. military strategy, 107–108
    - U.S.–ROC cooperation, 160
  - Tibet problem, 562, 751, 754
  - Warsaw talks, 154, 389
- Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 8, 614, 683
- China, People's Republic of (PRC) (*see also* Infiltration of PRC by ROC forces; Sino-Soviet relations; Taiwan Strait crisis; Tibet problem; U.N. membership for PRC; Warsaw talks):
  - Afro-Asian world and, 26–27, 408, 586–588
  - anti-intellectual movement, 592

China, People's Republic of (PRC)—Continued
  atomic capabilities, *see nuclear subheadings below*
  birth control policy, 592
  Canada, relations with, 30–31
  commune system, 472, 508, 556, 557, 593
    Chiang's assessment of, 617–618
    Sino–Soviet relations and, 722
    U.S. assessments of, 521, 522–523, 578–579
  Communist leaders' meeting (Dec. *1960*), 742–743
  Communist regime's secure position, 740
  "crazy trend" in, 593
  disarmament and, 741
  "division of U.S.–ROC alliance" strategy, 391–392
  downfall of Communist government, Chiang's plan for, 683–685, 686–687, 748
  economic situation, 24–25, 578, 739
  foreign diplomats, treatment of, 592
  foreign policy, 25–26, 521–522, 580, 741
  France, relations with, 30
  future prospects, U.S. assessment of, 739–741
  Great Leap Forward, 472, 520–523, 593
  Harriman's proposed visit, 565
  Hong Kong and, 674
  India, relations with, 587
    border dispute, 628–629, 664, 757, 784, 798
    U.S. intelligence report on, 664–665
  Indochina policy, 202
  Japan, relations with, 26
  kidnapping of U.S. diplomat, 638–639, 650, 653
  Korean war, perspective on, 309–310
  military confrontations with ROC (*see also* Infiltration of PRC by ROC forces; Taiwan Strait crisis), 33, 39–42, 154, 570
  military forces, 25, 740
  newsmen exchanges with U.S., 565*n*, 653–654, 655, 666, 695, 716, 728, 735–736
  nuclear energy program, 744–747
  nuclear–free zone proposal, 729, 733–734

China, People's Republic of (PRC)—Continued
  nuclear weapons capability, 579–580, 691, 740, 746
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    intentions and courses of action, 548–550
    military build–up in *1960*, 663, 672, 688–689
  Outer Mongolia, relations with, 677–678
  paratrooper capabilities, 547–548
  political situation, 7–8, 23–24, 508, 521, 579, 762
  Soviet diplomats in, 592
  territorial waters claim, 131*n*
  "two Chinas" option, 528, 539
  uprising against Communist government, 513, 518, 554–557, 583–585, 589–590, 620
  uranium resources, 745
  U.S. change of administration and, 749–750
  U.S. military assistance to ROC, protests re, 311–312, 313
  U.S. naval patrols, protests re, 571–572, 576, 581, 585
  U.S. nuclear attack on, possible, 569
  U.S. policy review, proposed, 462–463
  U.S. policy statement on, proposed, 512–513, 516–518
  U.S. prisoners in, 6, 28, 491–493, 495, 501, 512, 531, 554, 585–586, 626, 650
  U.S. recognition issue, 49, 605
  U.S.–ROC overflights of, 162–163, 256–257, 280, 475, 494, 572–574
  U.S.–Soviet war, impact of, 544, 546–547
  "use of force" issue:
    PRC position, 495, 625–626, 639
    U.S. proposal re, 479–482, 491, 621–622
    U.S.–Soviet exchanges re, 595–598, 600–601, 606–609
  war/co–existence policy, 663
  warfare, political use of, 541–542
China, Republic of (ROC) (*see also* Infiltration of PRC by ROC forces; Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area; Taiwan Strait crisis):
  anti–American sentiments, 392

China, Republic of (ROC)—Continued
  arrangement with PRC, U.S. concerns re, 378
  coordination of U.S. programs, 2–3
  Dulles visit (Mar. *1958*), 8–15
  Dulles visit (Oct. *1958*), *see* visit to ROC (Oct *1958*) *under* Dulles, John Foster
  economic development program:
    Chiang's concurrence, 648–649
    program development, 643–646
    progress report on, 702–703
    U.S.–ROC exchange of letters, 649*n*
  economic situation, 17–18, 529–530, 632, 689
    U.S. economic assistance, relation to, 535–536
  Eisenhower visit (June, *1960*), 665, 675–687
  foreign policy, 688
  "free China" image:
    Dulles' assessment of, 515–516
    Eisenhower's position, 446
    ROC position, 428–429, 461–462, 475–476
    U.S. diplomatic efforts re, 451–452
    U.S. position, 415–417, 440
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 359–362, 385, 424–426
    U.S.–ROC joint statement on, 443–444
  future prospects, U.S. assessments of, 527–528, 632–633
  military confrontations with PRC (*see also* Infiltration of PRC by ROC forces; Taiwan Strait crisis), 33, 39–42, 154, 570
  military exercises with U.S. troops, 447
  military modernization, 496–497
  military reductions, 528–529, 552, 685–686, 687
  neutral government proposal, 251
  New Zealand's policy toward, 304
  nuclear weapons issue, 509–510
  OCB meeting on, 558
  offensive action against Communist territory, U.S. policy re, 589, 590
  overseas Chinese and, 17, 463–464, 465, 498–499, 688, 712
  paratroop units, 367–368, 619–621, 634, 635, 641–642
  plebiscite, possible, 392–393

China, Republic of (ROC)—Continued
  political reporting by U.S. personnel, 3–4
  political situation, 689, 725–727, 736–738
  population growth, 529
  "Republic of China" name, origin of, 438
  retaliation for Communist attack, U.S. policy re, 589
  Rhee's downfall, reaction to, 724–725
  Special Forces, 20*n*, 22–23, 634, 635, 636, 656
  successor to Chiang, 689
  Taiwanese influence in, 377
  Taiwanese–mainlander relations, 220, 298, 396, 471–472, 737–738
  Tibet problem:
    "independence for Tibet" option, 757–758, 760–761, 802–803
    ROC exploitation efforts, 562, 751, 754
    Tibetan–ROC discussions re, 802–803
    U.N. actions, 776
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 800–803
  "two Chinas" option, 395–396, 528
  U.S. covert operations in, 3
  U.S. economic assistance (*see also* economic development program *above*), 530, 748
    economic situation, relation to, 535–536
    ROC requests, 465–466, 552
  "use of force" policy:
    Chiang's position, 562–563
    criticisms of, 463–464, 465, 499
    Dulles' assessment of, 468–469
    Eisenhower's letter to Chiang re, 486–487
    infiltration of PRC and, 642
    international support for ROC and, 563
    ROC deviation from, possible, 545–546
    ROC interpretation of, 526
    U.S. diplomatic efforts re, 452
    U.S. position, 399–401, 406, 414, 423, 476
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 462, 463–465, 467, 498–500
    U.S.–ROC joint statement on, 444
    U.S.–U.K. correspondence re, 490

China, Republic of (ROC)—Continued
  U.S. long-range interest in, 409
  U.S. military assistance (*see also under* Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area; *under* Taiwan Strait crisis), 40, 45, 748
    aircraft, 33–34
    amphibious ships, 196–197, 296–297, 346–347, 366, 367–368, 401, 489
    funding for, 571
    missiles, 509–510
    PRC protests re, 311–312, 313
  U.S. military forces in, 390, 732–733
Chou Chih-jou, 570
Chou En-lai, 142–143, 144, 149, 201*n*, 202, 317, 318, 322, 617, 630, 653, 714, 729*n*
Chow, S. K., 239, 461
Churchill, Sir Winston S., 103, 140
Chu Teh, 617
CINCPAC. *See* Felt, Adm. Harry D.
Clough, Ralph N., 6*n*, 17, 18, 27–28, 35, 581*n*, 734 Congress, U.S., 378
Cook, Charles D., 275*n*, 339–341
Couve de Murville, Maurice, 30, 785, 786
Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., 172, 173, 375*n*, 593–594, 611–613
Cutler, Gen. Robert, 17, 21

Dalai Lama, 556, 751, 812–813
  asylum for, 772, 773–774
  Eisenhower, proposed meeting with, 804–805
  financial situation, 803
  Tibet problem:
    government in exile, proposed, 797
    "independence for Tibet" option, 760–761, 763, 765*n*, 770, 771–772, 775, 779, 806, 809–810
    Indian support for rebels, 752–753
    PRC suzerainty issue, 759
    U.N. actions, 774–775, 777–780, 782–783, 789–790, 810
    U.S. military assistance for rebels, 755–756, 768
Dalton, Peter, 647
Davis, Richard H., 145*n*
Dean, Brig. Gen. Fred Murray, 33, 572, 573, 662
De Gaulle, Charles, 30
De la Mare, A. J., 322, 571*n*, 591
Delgado, Francisco, 776–777
Deming, Olcott H., 564
Dennison, Adm. Robert L., 172, 173, 174, 175
Devlin, Michael H., 782*n*
Dexter, John B., 27, 32, 34–35
Diefenbaker, John G., 30–31, 166, 362, 463
Dillon, C. Douglas:
  Afro-Asian world, PRC and, 586–588
  Chiang, meeting with, 613–621
  Hong Kong, 668, 669, 670, 671
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 619, 633, 636*n*
  Sino-Soviet relations, 730, 743
  Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 519–520
  Tibet problem:
    asylum for Dalai Lama, 772, 773
    "independence for Tibet" option, 763–765, 771–772
    U.N. actions, 782–784, 785
Disarmament (*see also* Nuclear weapons), 601, 608–609, 729, 733–734, 741
Dixon, Sir Pierson, 786, 788–789, 796
Doan, Maj. Gen. L. L., 22*n*, 382, 533, 573, 603
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 426–427
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    artillery for, 484, 485
    ROC troop reductions, 426–427, 454, 552*n*
Douglas, James H., 669, 808
Doyle, Vice Adm. A. K., 2, 14, 22*n*, 33, 38*n*
Draper, William H., Jr., 528–529
Drumright, Everett F., 8, 86, 447, 563, 675*n*, 683*n*
  Chiang-McElroy meeting, 379–381, 389–390
  China, People's Republic of, 572–574, 557
  China, Republic of:
    economic development program, 702–703
    economic situation, 529–530, 535–536
    "free China" image, 428, 461–462
    military modernization, 496–497
    military reductions, 528–529
    paratroop units for, 619–620
    political situation, 725–727, 736

Drumright, Everett F.—Continued
  China, Republic of—Continued
    Rhee's downfall, reaction to, 724–725
    Special Forces, 22–23
    U.S. economic assistance, 535–536
    U.S. military assistance, 33–34, 571
    U.S. military forces in, 390
    "use of force" policy, 462
  Dulles visit to ROC (Mar. *1958*), 12–15
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 421, 424, 426, 430, 437
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 19
    Chiang's position, 12–14, 603–604, 619–620
    paramilitary activities, proposed, 523–526, 656, 659, 662
    training for troops, 20*n*
    U.S. policy re, 14–15
    U.S.-ROC discussions re, 651–652
  military confrontations between Chinas, 40–42, 154, 570
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    artillery for, 484–486
    ROC troop reductions, 389–390, 454, 485–486
    Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 519*n*, 533–535
  Sino-Soviet relations, 617
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 46, 71
    cease-fire (Oct. *6–20*), 330–331, 332–334, 338, 339*n*
    cease-fire, suggestion re, 106–107
    Chiang's political concerns, 112
    demilitarization option, 226–227
    interdiction of islands, 77–78
    international opinion on, 285
    PRC intentions, 41, 110
    PRC military build-up, 34, 41
    resupply of islands, 178–179, 284, 285, 478
    retaliation by ROC, 70–71, 109–110, 111–113, 226, 227, 228, 239–240, 265–266, 299–300
    ROC restraint in patrolling operations, 374
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 227, 315, 319–321
    Tan Islands, defense of, 371–372
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 331, 333–334, 337
    U.S. military strategy, 107–108

Drumright, Everett F.—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    U.S. prestige issue, 228
    U.S.-ROC cooperation, 159–160
    U.S. warnings to PRC, 72, 78
  Tibet problem, 754*n*
  Warsaw talks, 154, 183*n*, 226, 389
Dulles, Allen W., 17, 18, 208, 279, 543, 582, 758*n*, 771*n*
  China, People's Republic of:
    commune system, 472, 508
    India, border dispute with, 784
    paratrooper capabilities, 548
    political situation, 508
    uprisings against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 554–555, 556
  Hong Kong, 670, 671
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, PRC military build-up in *1960*, 663, 672
  Sino-Soviet relations:
    ideological debates, 662–663
    Khrushchev's visit to Peiping, 43
    rift in relationship, 602, 709–711, 719–720, 729–730, 742–743
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 51, 73, 75, 366
    cease-fire (Oct. *6–20*), 370, 371
    commercial shipping, impact on, 371
    PRC-Indian discussions re, 318
    PRC military build-up, 42–43, 66, 86–87
    resupply of islands, 318, 396
    shelling of islands, 69, 86
    U.N. actions, 396
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 330
    U.S. military strategy, 54, 55
  Tibet problem:
    asylum for Dalai Lama, 773–774
    fighting in Tibet, 751, 762
    "independence for Tibet" option, 770
    Indian support for rebels, 752–753
    PRC attitude toward, 785
    U.N. actions, 784
    U.S. military assistance for rebels, 755–756, 768, 808, 809
Dulles, John Foster, 81*n*, 144*n*, 169, 200*n*, 229*n*, 243, 296*n*, 402*n*, 484*n*, 486*n*
  Chiang, assessment of, 169–170
  Chiang's assessment of, 562
  China, People's Republic of:
    Afro-Asian world, influence in, 408

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  China, People's Republic of—Continued
    commune system, 472
    "division of U.S.–ROC alliance" strategy, 391–392
    France, relations with, 30
    uprisings against Communist government, 518*n*
    U.S. policy review, proposed, 462–463
    U.S. policy statement on, proposed, 516*n*
    U.S. recognition issue, 49
    U.S.–ROC overflights of, 162–163, 256–257, 280, 475
    "use of force" issue, 479–482
  China, Republic of (*see also* visit to ROC *below*), 346–347
    arrangement with PRC, U.S. concerns re, 378
    "free China" image, 359–362, 385, 415–417, 424–426, 440, 451–452, 475–476, 515–516
    paratroop units, 367
    plebiscite, possible, 392–393
    Taiwanese influence in, 377
    Taiwanese–mainlander relations, 298, 396, 471–472
    "two Chinas" option, 395–396
    U.S. long-range interest in, 409
    U.S. military assistance, 196–197, 346, 366, 367, 401
    "use of force" policy, 399–401, 406, 414, 423, 468–469, 476, 490
  death of, 614
  Indonesia, 9
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 12
  Japan, 11
  Khrushchev, assessment of, 302–303
  Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower, rejection of, 247–248
  Korea, 9
  Mountbatten, meeting with, 410–411
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    artillery for, 427, 433
    Communist rule, islanders' rejection of, 395
    constructive suggestions from PRC, U.S. request for, 397–398
    fate of ROC and, 439
    political warfare by PRC, 383–384

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area—Continued
    ROC troop reductions, 365, 366–369, 370, 384, 402, 416–417, 425, 427, 439–440, 444, 471, 707
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    allies' position, 162, 180–181
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 50
    cease-fire (Oct. 6–20), 335*n*, 349–350, 354–355, 375, 382–383, 411–412, 420
    chemical weapons, alleged ROC use of, 480
    Chiang–Dulles discussions re, 422, 430–433
    commercial shipping, impact on, 304, 371
    Congressional interest in, 378
    demilitarization option, 141*n*, 157–158, 216–217
    general war, danger of, 57, 273
    Hammarskjöld–Dulles discussions re, 286–287
    international opinion on, 245, 267
    invasion of islands, possible, 126, 366
    Japanese position, 376
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 118, 120, 122, 130, 138, 431–432, 487
    Philippine position, 377
    "policing of vacated islands" option, 352
    PRC–Indian discussions re, 316, 318
    PRC intentions, 242–243, 375–376, 449–450
    PRC military build-up, 38–39, 44, 116
    propaganda war, 134–135
    provocative actions, PRC views on, 353, 355, 356
    regional significance, 119, 137, 170–171, 245, 279
    resupply of islands, 172, 173–175, 182, 266–267, 272
    retaliation by ROC, 88, 117, 183
    ROC concentration of forces, 181–182, 267, 356
    "ROC initiation of hostilities" rumor, 280

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    ROC political use of islands, 69–70, 157, 162
    ROC restraint in patrolling operations, 374*n*
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 197, 290, 301, 315–316, 319, 351–352, 353, 393
    shelling of islands, 451, 480
    Soviet position, 163, 166*n*, 244
    Tan Islands, defense of, 350, 353
    territorial waters issue, 131, 482
    third–party approaches to PRC, 127, 170, 177, 275, 280–281, 357–358, 490
    U.K. position, 164
    U.N. actions, 173, 180, 217, 246, 247, 273, 280, 287, 297–299, 397
    U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 68
    U.S.–Australia discussion re, 391–396
    U.S. defense of islands under all circumstances, 62
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 119, 121–122, 163, 282, 355, 420, 427, 473–474
    U.S. intelligence on, 113
    U.S. military strategy, 47
    U.S.–New Zealand discussion re, 302–304
    U.S. prestige issue, 303
    U.S. public statements on, 130, 134–136, 161–162, 273*n*, 301, 393
    U.S.–ROC cooperation, 253–254
    U.S. summary report on, 131–134
    U.S.–U.K. correspondence re, 136–142, 175–177
    U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 168–171, 216–217, 272–273, 278–281
    U.S. warnings to PRC, 56, 88–89
    U.S. withdrawal/PRC takeover option, 268, 397–398
  U.N. membership for PRC, 21, 281, 360, 438
  visit to ROC (Mar. *1958*), 8–15
  visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 361, 379, 383, 385, 387, 388, 467–468
    Chiang, meetings with, 418–419, 421–426, 430–433, 438–440
    communiqué on, 430, 433*n*, 440–444

Dulles, John Foster—Continued
  visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*)—Continued
    Dulles' reports, 420–421, 427, 444, 445, 450–451, 468–469, 470–472
    Eisenhower's attitude toward, 404–405
    Eisenhower's letter to Chiang re, 446
    Taiwan Strait crisis and, 411–412
    talking paper for Dulles, 399–401, 413–417
    U.N. membership issue, 437–438
    U.S. military, meeting with, 426–427
    U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 408
  Warsaw talks, 291*n*, 293*n*, 323*n*
    Beam's appointment to, 31–32
    instructions for Beam, 186, 187, 267–269, 354–356, 397–398, 405–406, 479–482
    PRC assent to, 143
    preliminary arrangements, 1, 6, 29, 34–35, 155–156, 185*n*
    provocative actions issue, 159
    ROC attitude toward, 395
    ROC rights issue, 170
    U.S. assessments of, 268–269, 368–369, 394, 409–410
    U.S. expectations for, 169, 173, 273
    U.S. intentions, 156, 241–242, 246
    U.S.–ROC consultations re, 183
  Western Pacific, U.S. policy re, 514–515
Dutt, Subimal, 780–781, 804–805, 814

Earman, J. S., 752*n*, 758*n*
Eaton, Cyrus, 163
Eden, Sir Anthony, 102, 272*n*
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 136*n*, 324*n*, 412, 699*n*, 721*n*
  Chiang, correspondence with, 83–86, 115*n*, 446, 486–487, 747–749
  Chiang, meetings with, 675–687
  China, People's Republic of:
    Canada, relations with, 30–31
    downfall of Communist government, Chiang's plan for, 683, 686, 687*n*, 748*n*
    India, border dispute with, 628–629
    uprisings against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 555, 556, 589

- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - China, People's Republic of—Continued
    - U.S. nuclear attack on, possible, 569
    - U.S.–ROC overflights of, 475, 494*n*
    - use of force against ROC, U.S.–Soviet exchanges re, 595–598, 600–601, 606
  - China, Republic of:
    - "free China" image, 446
    - military reductions, 687
    - neutral government proposal, 251
    - U.S. military assistance, 196–197, 296–297, 346–347
    - visit to (June *1960*), 665, 675–687
  - Dalai Lama, proposed meeting with, 804–805
  - Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 404–405, 420, 444, 445, 446
  - free world, views on, 680–681
  - Hong Kong, 668–670, 671, 673*n*
  - infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 5
  - Japan, Communist threat to, 682–683
  - Khrushchev, correspondence with, 145–153, 166–168, 231–238, 247–248, 600–601, 606–609
  - Khrushchev, meeting with, 595–598
  - Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    - artillery for, 497
    - ROC troop reductions, 381–382, 497, 553
    - ROC withdrawal, proposed, 698
  - Paris Summit Conference (*1960*), 677–678, 679–680
  - Sino–Soviet relations, 479, 679–680, 711
  - Soviet Union, U.S. war planning re, 544, 546–547
  - Taiwan Strait crisis:
    - "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 50–51
    - cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*), 335
    - Chiang's political concerns, 144
    - five–power conference, proposed, 251
    - international opinion on, 267
    - nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 74, 130, 252
    - PRC military build–up, 43
    - propaganda war, 99
    - resupply of islands, 266–267
    - retaliation by ROC, 97
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.—Continued
  - Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    - ROC concentration of forces, 181–182, 267
    - ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 161, 197, 290, 296–297
    - Soviet position, 145–153, 163, 166–168, 231, 250
    - territorial waters issue, 131
    - U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 97
    - U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 98–99, 163, 455, 473–474
    - U.S. forces sent to Strait, 73–74
    - U.S. intelligence on, 113
    - U.S. military strategy, 48, 53–54, 55, 97, 143
    - U.S. public statements on, 74–75, 130, 161–162 U.S.–U.K. correspondence re, 144
    - U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 249–252, 552–553
  - Tibet problem, 771, 773*n*, 798
    - "independence for Tibet" option, 763
    - Indian support for rebels, 752
    - regional significance, 762
    - U.N. actions, 785, 789–790
    - U.S. military assistance for rebels, 768, 770, 808, 809
  - U.N. membership for PRC, 22, 723–724
  - Warsaw talks, 143, 144
- Eisenhower, Maj. John S. D., 142, 455, 474, 475, 494*n*, 497, 723, 753, 763*n*, 765*n*
- Elbrick, C. Burke, 102, 136*n*, 247
- Ellis, William A., 643
- Engen, Hans, 340–341
- Ethiopia, 588
- Evans, Allan, 713*n*

- Farley, Philip J., 115
- Felt, Adm. Harry D., 159, 188, 265, 330, 348, 478, 603*n*
  - China, People's Republic of, U.S.–ROC overflights of, 494
  - infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 657–658
  - Taiwan Strait crisis:
    - nuclear actions by U.S., 80
    - resupply of islands, 114, 172, 255, 318
    - retaliation by ROC, 224, 254–256

Felt, Adm. Harry D.—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    Smoot's summary report on, 502
    Tan Islands, defense of, 282, 288
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 108–109, 145, 240, 241*n*, 336, 448, 473–474, 477
    U.S. military strategy, 75, 79–80, 100
    U.S. non–provocation policy, 483
  Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 533–535
FitzGerald, Desmond, 89, 656*n*, 657*n*, 660, 808
Foster, William C., 479
France, 30, 360, 786
Freers, Edward L., 514
Fujiyama, Aiichiro, 255
Fulbright, J. William, 465
Fuller, Leon W., 49
Furnas, Howard E., 462*n*, 532–533

Garcia, Carlos P., 377
Gates, Thomas S., 667*n*, 689, 690, 691, 711, 770
Geneva talks, U.S.–PRC, 310, 325, 492, 493
Germany, Federal Republic of, 361
Ghana, 139
Gleason, S. Everett, 21, 51, 66, 208, 269, 318, 472, 543, 546, 559, 569, 662, 751, 755, 768, 770
Gleysteen, Culver, 609*n*
Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 48, 50, 73, 96*n*, 115, 125, 130*n*, 142*n*, 161, 296*n*, 381*n*, 494*n*, 552, 556, 583*n*, 752*n*, 758*n*, 771*n*, 773*n*
Gray, Gordon, 47, 48, 52, 479, 687*n*, 689
  China, People's Republic of:
    uprisings against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 554, 555–556, 583, 589–590
    U.S. policy statement on, proposed, 512–513, 516
  Hong Kong, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671
  Sino–Soviet relations, 602
  Soviet Union, U.S. war planning re, 547
  Tibet problem, 768, 770, 808–809
Green, Marshall, 35*n*, 59–60, 115*n*, 159, 172*n*, 186*n*, 198*n*, 229*n*, 241*n*, 272*n*, 274*n*, 326*n*, 329*n*, 337*n*, 349*n*, 397*n*, 413*n*, 426*n*, 479*n*, 489, 491*n*, 518*n*, 519*n*, 532533, 561, 571–572, 581*n*, 583, 591–593, 609*n*, 792*n*
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 221–224
Green, Theodore Francis, 324*n*, 374–378
Greene, Joseph N., Jr., 1, 115*n*, 130, 161*n*, 197–198, 266*n*, 278*n*, 286*n*, 323*n*, 346*n*, 430*n*, 433*n*, 437*n*, 440–442
Gromyko, Andrei, 217, 277, 279, 595
Gross, Ernest A., 789*n*, 790, 791, 792, 798, 799
Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 756, 762
Gubanov (USSR), 341
Gundersen (Norway), 347
Gyalo Thondup, 763, 771, 789*n*, 793, 806
  Tibet problem:
    ROC–Tibetan discussions re, 802–803
    U.N. actions, 790–792, 812–813
    U.S.–Tibetan discussions re, 797–800

Hager, Eric H., 621*n*
Hagerty, James C., 143, 252, 653*n*
Halla, P. J., 667*n*
Hammarskjöld, Dag 276, 280, 286–287, 341, 783*n*, 799
Hansen, Krogh, 340–341
Haraldson, Wesley C., 643, 644, 645, 648, 649
Harlow, Bryce N., 142*n*
Harr, Karl G., Jr., 17, 18, 558, 688–689
Harriman, W. Averell, 565, 568
Hart, Parker T., 754*n*, 806*n*
Hayward, Vice Adm. John T., 197–198, 282–283
Henderson, Loy, 113*n*
Herter, Christian A., 17, 18, 57*n*, 89–90, 121, 221*n*, 282, 399*n*, 600*n*, 609*n*, 713*n*, 723
  China, People's Republic of:
    downfall of Communist government, Chiang's plan for, 748*n*
    Harriman's proposed visit, 565

Herter, Christian A.—Continued
  China, People's Republic of—Continued
    India, border dispute with, 628
    nuclear capability, 691
    paratrooper capabilities, 547–548
    uprisings against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 518, 555
    U.S. policy statement on, proposed, 512, 516–518
    U.S. prisoners in, 491–493
    U.S. recognition issue, 605
    U.S.–ROC overflights of, 494*n*
    "use of force" issue, 491, 596, 598, 621–622
  China, Republic of, 22, 367–368, 545–546, 689
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 412
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 4–5
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 695, 699–701, 705
  Sino–Soviet relations, 593, 720, 730, 743
    ideological debates, 690
    "partial responsibility" doctrine re Soviet Union, 604–605, 609, 622, 629, 637
    U.S.–Soviet discussions re, 35
  Soviet Union, U.S. war planning re, 544, 547
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 87
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 55
    cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*), 335, 338–339, 433–436
    cease–fire proposal (Sept. *16–22*), 200, 207–208, 229
    cease–fire proposal (Sept. *28*–Oct. *3*), 293–296, 323–325
    invasion of islands, possible, 117, 323
    PRC intentions, 105
    PRC military build–up, 43
    propaganda war, 93, 99, 105
    retaliation by ROC, 274–275
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 353
    Tan Islands, defense of, 350
    territorial waters issue, 434–436
    third–party approaches to PRC, 104, 326–327
    U.N. actions, 105, 275
    U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 92

Herter, Christian A.—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 90, 91, 95, 98, 119, 329, 330, 337, 370–371, 413
    U.S. forces sent to Strait, 73–74
    U.S. military strategy, 47, 53, 54
    U.S. public statements on, 74–75
    U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 102–105, 553
    U.S. warnings to PRC, 56–57, 88–89
    U.S. withdrawal/PRC takeover option, 229–230, 325–326
  Tibet problem, 765, 772–773
    "independence for Tibet" option, 792, 795*n*, 806–807, 809–810, 811, 813
    media coverage in U.S., 756
    ROC exploitation efforts, 754
    U.N. actions, 754, 774, 782, 785–787, 789–790, 791*n*, 796, 810–811, 812– 813
    U.S. military assistance for rebels, 756, 808
  U.N. membership for PRC, 605
  Warsaw talks:
    instructions for Beam, 198–199, 200, 229–230, 291–296, 324–326, 433–437, 491– 493, 621–622
    preliminary arrangements, 61
    U.S. criticism of PRC record, 292
    U.S. intentions, 274
    U.S. long–term strategy, 323–324
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 207–208
Herter Doctrine. *See* "partial responsibility" doctrine re Soviet Union *under* Sino–Soviet relations.
Ho Chi Minh, 714
Holdridge, John H., 792*n*
Holmes (Canada), 339
Home, Lord, 723
Hong Kong, 269, 667–675
Hood, Viscount, 103, 104–105, 139*n*, 141*n*, 144*n*, 357, 408, 781–782
Ho–tung, Sir Robert, 464
Howe, Fisher, 46*n*, 67*n*, 247
Hsu Shao–chang, 291, 498, 732
Huang Hua, 409, 532
Huang Shao–ku, 70, 154*n*, 239, 319, 331, 461, 464, 563, 570, 754*n*
  China, People's Republic of, U.S.–ROC overflights of, 573
  China, Republic of, 428–429, 571

Huang Shao-ku—Continued
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 421, 424, 437
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, ROC troop reductions in, 454
  Sino–Soviet relations, 570–571
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 106*n*, 160, 284, 285, 332–334, 339*n*
  Warsaw talks, 183*n*
  Wong's demotion, 570
Hu Lien, Gen., 112, 182, 289, 348
Hull, Gen. John E., 529
Hunsberger, Warren A., 643

India, 710
  China, People's Republic of, relations with and border dispute, 587, 628–629, 664–665, 757, 784, 798
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 139, 276, 278–279, 316–317, 318, 322, 326–327, 490
  Tibet problem, 751
    asylum for Dalai Lama, 773–774
    Eisenhower–Dalai Lama meeting, proposed, 804–805
    government in exile, proposed, 797
    "independence for Tibet" option, 764
    Indian support for rebels, 752–753
    PRC suzerainty issue, 759
    refugee situation, 753, 761
    regional significance, 762
    U.N. actions, 775–776, 779, 780–781, 783
    U.S. military assistance for rebels, 814
Indonesia, 9
Infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 748
  Chiang's position, 12–14, 603–604, 618–620
  failures of early *1950*s, 19–20
  paramilitary activities, proposed, 523–526, 562, 564, 656–662
  PRC response, 41
  ROC "use of force" policy and, 642
  study of options, 15, 20
  training for troops, 4–5, 20*n*
  U.S. policy re, 14–15, 633–636, 642
  U.S.–ROC discussions re, 11–12, 641–642, 651–652
  U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and, 5, 13
Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), 66
International Commission of Jurists, 776
Iraq, 307, 552
Ireland, 787–788
Irwin, John N., II, 92, 282–283, 599, 732, 808

Jackson, C. D., 50
Japan, 9–10, 11, 217
  Communist threat to, 678–679, 682–683
  PRC, relations with, 26
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 106, 120, 376, 540
Jenkins, Alfred leS., 750*n*
Johnson, Robert H., 582, 709, 719, 729, 731
Johnson, U. Alexis, 1, 184, 185, 192, 492, 493
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    artillery for, 497–498
    ROC troop reductions, 497–498
    smaller islands, U.S. policy re, 559–561, 574–576, 599
    Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 520*n*
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 402*n*
    blockade of PRC, proposed, 284
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 118, 120
    retaliation by ROC, 254–256
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 161
    U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 68
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 108, 241*n*, 282–284
    U.S. military strategy, 59–60, 75–76, 79, 100–102, 125–126, 143
    U.S. warnings to PRC, 56–57
  Tibet problem, 561, 769
Jones, Howard P., 7*n*

Kahmann, William M., 447*n*, 509*n*, 599*n*, 627*n*, 633*n*
Kennedy, John F., 706
Kerrigan, William, 297
Khamba tribesmen, 556
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 220, 370, 582, 681
  China, People's Republic of (*see also* Sino–Soviet relations *below*):
    use of force against ROC, U.S.–Soviet exchanges re, 595–598, 600, 606–609
    visit to, 39, 43

Khrushchev, Nikita S.—Continued
  Dulles' assessment of, 302–303
  Eisenhower, correspondence with, 145–153, 166–168, 231–238, 247–248, 600–601, 606–609
  Eisenhower, meetings with, 595–598
  Korea, 150
  Mao and, 616, 617
  Paris Summit Conference (*1960*), 677–678, 679–680
  Sino–Soviet relations, 36–37, 568, 602, 604, 614–615, 616–617, 640, 676, 690–691, 713–714, 719, 721, 729–730, 731, 742–743
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 145–153, 166, 231–238, 385
  U.N. membership for PRC, 146, 152
  Warsaw talks, 237–238
Kirk, Roger, 692*n*
Kishi, Nobusuke, 376
Kissinger, Henry A., 538
Kivette, Adm., 319, 402
Knight, Robert H., 574*n*
Kohler, Foy D., 156, 565, 568, 595*n*, 609–610, 723
Koht, Paul, 297, 298
Koirala, B.P., 588
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 9, 514
Korea, Republic of, 150, 514, 589, 724–725
Korean war, 309–310, 325
Krebs, Max V., 197–198
Kuh, Fred, 339
Kuter, Gen. Laurence S., 296
Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilievich, 145*n*, 248, 788–789

Lai Ming–tang, Gen., 635
Lai Ya–li, 16, 184
Lange, Halvard, 276–277, 297–299, 339, 348
Lansdale, Col. Edward G., 656, 657, 659, 660 Laos, 202, 585
Laskey, Denis, 216
Lay, James S., Jr., 52*n*, 396, 590, 673*n*, 711
Lei Chen, 724*n*, 725, 736
LeMay, Gen. Curtis E., 154
Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 559, 560–561, 769
Li, K. T., 648
Li Fu–ch'un, 715
Li Teh–chuan, Madam, 492
Liang, Adm., 178, 182
Lincoln, Katherine F., 621*n*
Lin Piao, 617
Liu Chieh, 744
Liu Ho–tu, Rear Adm., 288
Liu Shao–chi, 562, 579, 617, 762
Lloyd, Selwyn, 255, 316, 449
  China, Republic of, 251, 490
  Offshore islands/Taiwan Strait area, ROC troop reductions in, 402
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    five–power conference, proposed, 251
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 252
    regional significance, 279
    Soviet position, 250, 279
    third–party approaches to PRC, 280–281, 490
    U.K. position, 164–166
    U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 216–217, 249–252, 278–281, 553
  Tibet problem, 782, 785–786
  U.N. membership for PRC, 281, 646–648
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 270, 291, 305, 324*n*, 328, 354*n*, 468*n*, 479*n*, 482, 491*n*, 621*n*, 776
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 275, 276, 326, 347–348
  Tibet problem, 790–792, 796
  U.N. membership for PRC, 273*n*
Lutkins, LaRue R., 6*n*, 27*n*, 31*n*, 34*n*, 35*n*, 38*n*, 44*n*, 61*n*, 87*n*, 89*n*, 102*n*, 115*n*, 155*n*, 168*n*, 198*n*, 267*n*, 274*n*, 324*n*, 397*n*, 408*n*, 410*n*, 433*n*, 491*n*, 550*n*, 558, 572, 581*n*, 732, 754*n*, 756*n*, 765*n*

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 676
MacArthur, Douglas, II, 106, 120, 222
MacDermot, D. F., 647
MacDonald, Malcolm, 317, 490
Macmillan, Harold, 127*n*, 166
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 136–142, 144, 175, 552–553
Macomber, William B., 57, 68, 155, 374*n*, 399*n*
Malaya, 139
Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion, 677–678
Mao Tse–tung (*see also* Sino–Soviet relations), 6, 37, 43, 201*n*, 202, 220, 466, 508, 521, 541, 579, 616, 617, 618, 630, 679, 710–711, 713–714, 721, 785

Marcy, Carl, 374, 376, 377, 378
Martin, Edwin W., 1, 16, 31, 32*n*, 179*n*, 186*n*, 198*n*, 207*n*, 229*n*, 253*n*, 267*n*, 274*n*, 291*n*, 322, 324*n*, 326*n*, 337*n*, 338*n*, 343*n*, 354*n*, 359*n*, 363*n*, 382*n*, 397*n*, 405*n*, 413*n*, 433*n*, 451*n*, 463*n*, 475*n*, 479*n*, 489, 491*n*, 498, 509*n*, 518*n*, 519*n*, 533*n*, 537*n*, 542–543, 545*n*, 574*n*, 591, 621*n*, 641*n*, 732, 734, 737, 750*n*, 760*n*, 765*n*, 769, 782*n*, 797*n*, 799, 800*n*, 801–802, 812*n*
Martin, Graham, 614
Massey, Cmdr., 174
Mathews, Elbert G., 60
McCann, Robert, 586
McCaul, Gen., 768
McCloy, John J., 290
McCone, John A., 669, 730
McElroy, Neil H., 55, 142, 260, 283*n*, 494*n*, 509*n*, 547, 574
  Chiang, meeting with, 379–381, 389–390
  China, People's Republic of, 163, 569
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 603–604
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 221
    invasion of islands, possible, 126
    resupply of islands, 173, 174, 175
    ROC restraint in patrolling operations, 374*n*
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 161
    third-party approaches to PRC, 127
    U.S. military strategy, 125–126
    U.S. public statements on, 149
  Tibet problem, 756
McIntosh, A. D., 302
Meeker, Leonard C., 750*n*
Mein, J. Gordon, 302*n*, 391*n*
Mendès-France, Pierre, 568
Menon, Krishna, 277, 279, 326–327, 781
Menzies, R. Gordon, 180
Merchant, Livingston T., 595*n*, 609*n*, 621*n*, 622*n*, 624*n*, 629*n*, 806*n*, 808
Mikoyan, Anastas I., 514–515, 565
Molotov, Vyacheslav, 678
Morgan, George A., 591, 629*n*, 699*n*
Morgan, Thomas E., 68*n*
Mountbatten, Adm. Lord Louis, 410–411
Mueller, Frederick H., 602, 667*n*
Munro, Sir Leslie, 302*n*
Murphy, Robert D., 56, 197, 351, 352, 367, 368, 369, 399*n*, 518, 558, 565*n*, 574*n*, 583*n*, 609*n*, 627*n*, 765*n*, 782*n*, 792*n*, 795*n*
  China, People's Republic of, U.S. naval patrols and, 581
  Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower, rejection of, 247
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 560, 599
  Sino–Soviet relations, 611
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 218–220
  Tibet problem, 773*n*
    "independence for Tibet" option, 806–807
    refugee situation, 769
    U.N. actions, 781–782
    U.S.–Tibetan discussions re, 797–800
  Warsaw talks, 7*n*

Nash, Walter, 180, 302–304, 362
National Intelligence Estimates (*see also* Special National Intelligence Estimates), 7
  NIE *10–58*, 7–8
  NIE *13–2–59*, 520–523
  NIE *13–2–60*, 744–747
  NIE *13–58*, 23–27
  NIE *13–59*, 577–581
  NIE *13–60*, 739–741
  NIE *43–59*, 632–633
  NIE *100–2–60*, 664–665
  NIE *100–3–60*, 703–705
  political opinions and, 3–4
National Security Council (NSC):
  documents:
    NSC *166/1*, 517
    NSC *5412/2*, 555*n*, 809*n*
    NSC *5429/5*, 517
    NSC *5723*, 590, 711–712
    NSC *5733*, 688–690
    NSC *5810*, 21–22
    NSC *5904/1*, 543–544, 546–547
    NSC *5906*, 569
    NSC *5913/1*, 588–590
    NSC *6007/1*, 673–675
  meetings, 18*n*
    364th, May 2, 1958, 21–22
    375th, Aug. 7, 1958, 42–43
    376th, Aug. 14, 1958, 51–55

National Security Council (NSC)—Continued
  meetings—Continued
    377th, Aug. 21, 1958, 66
    378th, Aug. 27, 1958, 86–87
    379th, Sept. 18, 1958, 208–209
    380th, Sept. 25, 1958, 269–270
    381st, Oct. 2, 1958, 318
    382d, Oct. 13, 1958, 396
    384th, Oct. 30, 1959, 470–472
    391st, Dec. 18, 1958, 508
    392d, Dec. 23, 1958, 508
    398th, Mar. 5, 1959, 543–544
    399th, Mar. 12, 1959, 546–548
    400th, Mar. 26, 1959, 751–752
    403d, Apr. 23, 1959, 755–756
    404th, Apr. 30, 1959, 762
    409th, June 4, 1959, 770
    412th, July 9, 1959, 569
    415th, July 30, 1959, 773–774
    417th, Aug. 18, 1959, 582
    418th, Sept. 10, 1959, 784–785
    419th, Sept. 17, 1959, 588–590
    420th, Oct. 1, 1959, 602
    428th, Dec. 10, 1959, 639–640
    442d, Apr. 28, 1960, 662–663
    447th, June 8, 1960, 667–672
    448th, June 22, 1960, 688–691
    456th, Aug. 18, 1960, 709–711
    458th, Sept. 7, 1960, 719–720
    464th, Oct. 20, 1960, 729–730
    466th, Nov. 7, 1960, 731
    469th, Dec. 8,. 1960, 742–743
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, 6, 280, 630
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 327, 490
  Tibet problem, 751, 762, 804–805
    asylum for Dalai Lama, 773–774
    "independence for Tibet" option, 771–772
    U.N. actions, 779, 783, 786
Nepal, 588
Netherlands, 361
Newlin, Michael H., 810*n*
New Zealand, 140, 180, 302–304, 360, 362
Ni, Vice Adm., 255
Nielsen, Sievert Andreas, 275–278, 297, 339–341, 347–348
Nixon, Richard M., 53, 55, 568, 640, 670–671, 689, 690, 691, 695*n*, 756
Nong Kimny, 201
Norodom Sihanouk, 201–203
Norway, 275–278, 297–299, 339–341, 347–348
Nuclear-free zone proposal (*see also* Disarmament), 729, 733–734
Nuclear weapons (*see also under* Taiwan Strait crisis):
  PRC's nuclear capability, 579–580, 691, 740, 746
  Sino-Soviet relationship and, 36, 579–580, 691
  U.N. membership for PRC and, 723–724
  U.S. placement of weapons in ROC, 509–510
  U.S. use against PRC, possible, 569

O'Connor, Jeremiah J., 558
Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area (*see also* Taiwan Strait crisis):
  artillery for, 427, 433, 454–455, 484–486, 497–498, 560–561
  Communist rule, islanders' rejection of, 395
  constructive suggestions from PRC, U.S. request for, 397–398
  defensive orientation for, 403–404
  neutralization under U.N. auspices, proposed, 275–278
  political warfare by PRC, 383–384
  PRC attacks on islands, U.S. planning re, 709*n*, 717–718
  PRC intentions and courses of action, 548–550
  PRC military build-up in *1960*,, 663, 672, 688–689
  ROC loss of islands, possible consequences of, 439, 717–718
  ROC troop reductions, 471, 561, 707–708
    Dulles' expectations, 445
    failures re, 550–552
    "free China" image of ROC and, 416–417, 425
    plans for, 426–427
    ROC position, 389–390
    Smoot's position, 403
    U.K. position, 402
    U.S. discussions, 363–371, 381–382
    U.S. policy, 497–498
    U.S.-ROC discussions, 384, 385–388, 439–440, 454–455, 485–486
    U.S.-U.K. discussions, 553
  ROC withdrawal, proposed, 692–694, 695–698, 706–707

Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area—Continued
  smaller islands, U.S. policy re, 559–561, 574–576, 599
  Soviet policy, 717
  Tan Islands (*see also* smaller islands *above*), 519–520, 524, 533–535, 537–538
  U.K. policy, 408–409
  U.S. commitment to defense of islands, 699–701, 705–709
  U.S. naval patrols, 627–628
  U.S. policy review, 532–533
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 17–18, 557–558, 688–689, 711
Osborn, David L., 496–497, 527–528, 613*n*
O'Sullivan, James L., 201
Outer Mongolia, 677–678
Overseas Chinese, 17, 463–464, 465, 498–499, 688, 712

Pakistan, 139, 762
Panchen Lama, 758, 798
Paris Summit Conference (*1960*), 677–678, 679–680
Parker, Rear Adm. Edward N., 488
Parrott, Thomas J., 555–556
Parsons, J. Graham, 59, 73*n*, 96*n*, 115, 125, 155*n*, 198*n*, 200*n*, 207*n*, 208*n*, 221*n*, 229*n*, 253*n*, 323*n*, 324*n*, 329, 337*n*, 338*n*, 354*n*, 357*n*, 397*n*, 405*n*, 413*n*, 433*n*, 447, 475*n*, 479*n*, 515*n*, 519*n*, 532*n*, 533*n*, 586*n*, 599*n*, 609*n*, 621*n*, 627*n*, 629*n*, 747*n*, 782*n*, 806*n*
  China, People's Republic of, 571, 583–585, 687*n*
  China, Republic of:
    paratroop units, 641–642
    political situation, 736–738
    U.S. military assistance, 489
    U.S. military forces in, 732
    visit to (May *1959*), 561–564
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 633–636, 641–642, 658
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 695–698, 705–709
  Sino-Soviet relations, 622–624, 637–638
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 87–88, 92, 94–96

Parsons, J. Graham—Continued
  Tibet problem:
    "independence for Tibet" option, 792–795, 800–801
    U.N. actions, 774–777
    U.S.-ROC discussions re, 800–803
  U.N. membership for PRC, 646–648, 749–750
Parthasarathi, 317
Pate, Gen. Randolph McC., 319
Peng Meng-chi, 570
Peng Te-huai, 329*n*, 451*n*, 466
People's Republic of China (PRC). *See* China, People's Republic of.
Philippines, 377, 776–777
Phleger, Herman V. , 200*n*
Picher, Maj. Gen. OliverS., 488
Plimsoll, J., 391
Porter, Dwight J., 559*n*
PRC. *See* China, People's Republic of.
Proctor, Carolyn J., 196

Quarles, Donald, 47, 54, 368, 494*n*, 555
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 74, 75
    cease-fire (Oct. 6–20), 369
    invasion of islands, possible, 126, 366
    propaganda war, 93
    retaliation by ROC, 95–96
    Tan Islands, defense of, 369
    U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 92
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95
    U.S. military strategy, 93, 95, 96–97
Quemoy and Matsu crisis. *See* Taiwan Strait crisis.

Radford, Adm. Arthur, 20, 534, 537–538, 706
Rankin, Karl L., 2–4, 20
Red Cross, 492, 493, 495, 756
Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 8, 163*n*, 200*n*, 216*n*, 324*n*, 354*n*, 399*n*, 402*n*, 433*n*, 487
Republic of China (ROC). *See* China, Republic of.
Rhee, Syngman, 150, 724–725
Rice, Edward E., 629*n*, 695*n*, 698*n*
Richards, Arthur L., 17–18
Rinchen Sadutshang, 812

Riley, Vice Adm. Herbert D., 188, 224
Robertson, Walter S., 31*n*, 34*n*, 38*n*, 56, 61*n*, 125, 136*n*, 178, 179*n*, 186*n*, 198*n*, 200*n*, 207*n*, 229*n*, 239, 243, 267*n*, 274*n*, 291*n*, 293*n*, 302, 315*n*, 323*n*, 326*n*, 338*n*, 346*n*, 354*n*, 362, 384, 399*n*, 405*n*, 408, 412, 449*n*, 451*n*, 467*n*, 475*n*, 479*n*, 484*n*, 490*n*, 491*n*, 509*n*, 516*n*, 561, 562*n*, 563, 706, 732, 754*n*
  China, People's Republic of:
    "division of U.S.–ROC alliance" strategy, 392
    uprising against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 518*n*
    U.S. prisoners in, 6
  China, Republic of:
    coordination of U.S. programs, 2
    OCB meeting on, 558
    Taiwanese–mainlander relations, 396
    U.S. economic assistance, 465–466
    U.S. military assistance, 45, 368
    "use of force" policy, 463–465, 467, 498–500, 545
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 388, 421, 424, 426, 430, 437
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 19–20
  Japan, 10
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    Communist rule, islanders' rejection of, 395
    ROC troop reductions, 369, 386–388, 550–551
    smaller islands, U.S. policy on, 559, 560
    Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 519, 537–538
    U.S. policy review, 532
  Sino–Soviet relations, 35–37
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 45–46, 65
    cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*), 343–345
    demilitarization option, 157
    nuclear actions by U.S., 64
    PRC military build–up, 44–45
    resupply of islands, 173, 174
    retaliation by ROC, 182, 183
    ROC concentration of forces issue, 181
    ROC political use of islands, 69
Robertson, Walter S.—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 351, 352, 353, 393
    Tan Islands, defense of, 291, 350
    third–party approaches to PRC, 201–203
    U.S. defense of islands under all circumstances, 62–65
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 244, 337, 343–344, 345
    U.S.–ROC cooperation, 253–254
    U.S. warnings to PRC, 62, 65
  Tibet problem:
    "independence for Tibet" option, 757–758, 760–761, 765–767, 769
    India–PRC border dispute and, 757
    refugee situation, 761
    U.N. actions, 766, 767
  U.N. membership for PRC, 605
  Warsaw talks, 180, 190, 191, 209, 394
    Beam's reports, 218
    informal meetings, proposed, 542–543
    preliminary arrangements, 1, 6–7, 155–156, 185*n*
    provocative actions issue, 159
ROC. *See* China, Republic of.
Rosen, Arthur H., 586*n*, 736*n*
Rountree, William M., 216, 765*n*
Rusk, Dean, 749
Russell, Adm. James S., 559, 768
Ryerson, Edward, 163

Saccio, Leonard J., 643
Scott, Joseph W., 687*n*, 765*n*
Scott, Sir Robert, 279, 490*n*
Scribner, Fred C., Jr., 18, 670
Service, Richard M., 621*n*
Shao–Chang Hsu, 343
Shao–Hwa Tan, 179
Sharp, Rear Adm. U.S.G., 483*n*
Shelton, Dr. Otis N., 488
Shen, James, 8, 321*n*, 332, 379*n*
Sino–Soviet relations:
  Chiang's assessment of, 562, 676–679
  economic assistance for PRC, 722
  Eisenhower's assessment of, 679–680
  ideological debates, 662–663, 690–691
  intelligence reports on, 25, 580, 703–705, 713–715, 740–741
  interdependence in, 37
  Khrushchev's visit to Peiping (*1958*), 39, 43

Sino–Soviet relations—Continued
  missiles for PRC, 568, 570–571, 579–580
  nuclear power assistance for PRC, 747
  nuclear weapons issue, 36, 579–580, 691
  Outer Mongolia and, 677–678
  "partial responsibility" doctrine re Soviet Union:
    Chiang's assessment of, 614–615
    Herter's comments on, 604–605
    Parsons' assessment of, 622–624, 637–638
    Sino–Soviet attitude toward, 612–613
    Smith's assessment of, 629–631
    two–edged nature of, 631
    U.S. policy re, 609–610
  rift in relationship:
    assassination of Mao, possible, 710–711
    causes of tension, 593–594, 704, 719, 721–723
    Chiang's assessment of, 615–616
    diplomatic issues, 602
    evidence of, 640, 709–710, 713–715, 719–720, 723, 729–730
    PRC military response, possible, 711
    resolution of dispute, attempts at, 720, 731, 742–743
    Thompson's assessment of, 35–37, 721–723
    U.S. exploitation of, 513, 611–613, 743
  U.N. membership for PRC and, 730
  uprisings in PRC and, 584
  U.S.–Soviet discussions re, 35–37, 479, 568
  war/peaceful coexistence issue, 663, 714, 722
  Wilson's assessment of, 591–592
Sisco, Joseph J., 326*n*, 774*n*
Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., 606*n*
Smith, Gerard C., 18, 49, 56, 399*n*, 695*n*, 698*n*
  China, People's Republic of, 462–463
  Sino–Soviet relations, 629–631
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*), 349–350
    general war, danger of, 57–59
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 122–123, 487–488
    PRC intentions, 124
Smith, Gerard C.—Continued
  Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 352, 353
    U.S. military strategy, 124
Smith, Sidney, 31
Smoot, Vice Adm. Roland N., 38*n*, 265, 319, 533, 662
  China, People's Republic of,
    U.S.–ROC overflights of, 572–573
  China, Republic of:
    military exercises with U.S. troops, 447*n*
    modernization of armed forces, 496–497
    Special Forces, 22*n*
    U.S. military assistance, 40
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 426
  military confrontations between Chinas, 39–40, 154
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    artillery for, 484
    defensive orientation for, 403–404
    ROC troop reductions, 454
    Tan Islands, 520*n*, 524
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 70, 71–72
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 46
    interdiction of islands, 77, 78
    nuclear actions by U.S., 448–449
    PRC military build–up, 47*n*
    propaganda war, 188–189
    resupply of islands, 114–115, 178, 189, 285, 300, 342, 348–349, 402–403, 478
    retaliation by ROC, 128–129, 224–225, 227
    ROC restraint in patrolling operations, 374
    summary report on, 502–507
    Tan Islands, defense of, 282, 288–289, 353, 370*n*, 371
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 240–241, 330, 331, 336*n*, 339*n*, 412, 427, 448
    U.S. intelligence on, 189–190
    U.S. military strategy, 107–108
    U.S. naval patrols, 342
    U.S. prestige issue, 225
    U.S. public statements on, 149
    U.S.–ROC cooperation, 507
  Warsaw talks, 188
Snow, Edgar, 695
Sobolev, Arkady A., 297

Soldatov, Aleksandr, 595
Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 410–411
South Africa, 140
Soviet Union (*see also* Khrushchev, Nikita S.):
  China, People's Republic of (*see also* Sino–Soviet relations):
    India, border dispute with, 784
    use of force against ROC, U.S.–Soviet exchanges re, 595–598, 600–601, 606–609
  Communist leaders' meeting (Dec. *1960*), 742–743
  Korea policy, 150, 514
  Offshore islands/Taiwan Strait area, policy re, 717
  Paris Summit Conference (*1960*), 677–678, 679–680
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 145–153, 163, 166–168, 231–238, 243–244, 250, 270, 279, 385, 457
    third–party approaches to PRC, 277
    U.N. actions, 341
    U.S. estimates of Soviet intentions, 205–206
  Tibet problem, 779, 781, 788–789
  U.N. membership for PRC, 146, 152, 730
  U.S. war planning re, 544, 546–547
  Warsaw talks, 237–238
  Western Pacific, U.S. policy re, 514–515
Spaak, Paul–Henri, 362
Special National Intelligence Estimates (*see also* National Intelligence Estimates), 7
  SNIE *43–60*, 717–718
  SNIE *100–4–59*, 548–550
  SNIE *100–7–58*, 32
  SNIE *100–9–58*, 81–82
  SNIE *100–11–58*, 203–207
  SNIE *100–12–58*, 456–461
Sprague, Mansfield B., 174, 245, 246, 509*n*
Steeves, John M., 159, 478, 621*n*, 627*n*, 724, 806*n*
Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 410–411
Strong, Anna Louise, 541
Stump, Adm. Felix B., 8, 39
Sullivan, William H., 750*n*
Sun, Patrick Pichi, 498*n*
Suslov, Mikhail A., 713
Swank, Emory C., 747*n*

Taiwan Strait crisis:
  allies' position, 127, 162, 180–181
  "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 45–46, 50–51, 54, 55, 65, 71
  blockade of PRC, proposed, 197–198, 284
  casualties, 116, 181, 219
  cease–fire (Oct. *6–20*):
    announcement of, 329*n*
    Drumright's position, 331, 333–334
    extension of, 354–355, 375, 382–383, 466
    foreshadowings of, 331
    PRC position, 347, 373, 466
    ROC position, 330–331, 332–334
    termination of, 369–371, 411–412, 420, 433–436
    U.S. position, 335, 338–339, 349–350
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 343–345
  cease–fire, Drumright's suggestion re, 106–107
  cease–fire proposal (Sept. *16–22*), 200, 207–208, 209–216, 223, 229, 258–264
  cease–fire proposal (Sept. *28*–Oct. *3*), 293–296, 300, 306–307, 311, 312, 313–314, 323–325, 328, 407
  chemical weapons, alleged ROC use of, 480, 482
  Chiang's political concerns, 112, 144
  civilian disappearances, 501, 512, 653
  commercial shipping, impact on, 303–304, 371
  Congressional interest in, 378
  demilitarization option, 141, 157–158, 216–217, 226–227
  Dulles–Chiang discussions re, 422, 430–433
  Dulles–Hammarskjöld discussion re, 286–287
  Eisenhower–Chiang correspondence re, 115*n*
  five–power conference, proposed, 251
  general war, danger of, 57–59, 273, 322
  Hong Kong, impact on, 269
  interdiction of islands, 77–78, 83–84, 208–209
  international opinion on, 245, 267, 285
  invasion of islands, possible, 117–118, 126, 323, 366
  islands under attack, 73
  Japanese position, 376, 540

Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
  lessons from crisis, U.S. report on, 538–542
  negotiations re, *see* Warsaw talks
  nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 32, 47, 56, 58, 74, 130, 138
    estimates on effects and casualties, 487–488
    Felt's position, 80
    international response, 120, 122–123, 133, 222
    JCS position, 118, 120
    military consequences, 123
    Robertson's position, 64
    ROC position, 431–432
    Soviet position, 149, 235–236
    U.K. position, 252
    U.S.–ROC discussions re, 448–449
  Philippine position, 377
  "policing of vacated islands" option, 352
  PRC expenditures on, 365–366
  PRC–Indian discussions re, 316–317, 318, 322
  PRC intentions, 41, 105, 110, 124, 131–132, 203–207, 219–220, 242–243, 375–376, 449–450, 456–459, 521, 539–540
  PRC military build-up, 34, 38–39, 41, 42–43, 44–45, 47*n*, 66, 86–87, 116
  propaganda war, 93, 99, 101*n*, 105, 134–135, 188–189
  provocative actions, PRC views on, 353, 355, 356, 373
  psychological importance of islands, 57–58, 219
  regional significance, 119–120, 133, 137, 170–171, 245, 279, 540
  resumption of hostilities, possible, 580–581, 699
  resupply of islands (*see also* U.S. escorts for supply convoys *below*), 114–115, 116–117, 220, 255, 300, 342, 478
    airdrops, 284
    military outcome, relation to, 266–267
    needs of island troops, 272
    ROC panic re, 402–403
    ROC performance, 172–175, 178, 182, 285
    status reports, 189, 318, 348–349, 382, 396

Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
  resupply of islands—Continued
    U.S. direct participation, proposed, 178–179, 284–285
  retaliation by ROC, 113, 228
    "hot pursuit" issue, 97, 129
    JCS position, 254–256
    likelihood of actions, U.S. assessment of, 270
    PRC Air Force as target of, 128–129
    ROC position, 84–86, 88, 95–96, 109–110, 111–113, 179, 182–183, 224–225, 226, 227, 239–240, 265–266, 299–300
    U.S. position, 117, 183, 244, 274–275
    U.S.–ROC consultations re, 70–71, 109–111, 128–129, 299–300
  ROC concentration of forces, 181–182, 219, 267, 356
  "ROC initiation of hostilities" rumor, 280
  ROC political use of islands, 69–70, 157, 162, 169
  ROC position and courses of action, 459–461
  ROC restraint in patrolling operations, 374
  ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 180, 290
    Dulles' statements on, 301, 315–316, 393
    ROC position, 227, 319–321
    U.K. position, 165
    U.S. discussions re, 161, 197, 296–297, 350–353
  shelling of islands, 69, 71, 72, 83, 86, 155, 411–412
    every-other-day shellings, 448*n*, 451, 480, 511
    Smoot's summary report on, 502–507
    Soviet position, 145–153, 163, 205–206, 231–238, 270, 279, 385, 457
    U.S. attitude toward, 166–168, 243–244
    U.S.–U.K. discussion re, 250
  Tan Islands, defense of, 282, 288–289, 291, 350, 353, 369–370, 371–372
  territorial waters issue, 131, 140, 434–436, 437*n*, 453, 482
  third-party approaches to PRC:
    Cambodia's mediation offer, 201–203

- Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
  - third-party approaches to PRC—Continued
    - Dulles' attitude toward, 127, 170, 357–358
    - India's possible role, 279, 316–317, 326–327
    - Norway's efforts, 275–278, 339–341, 347–348
    - U.K.'s possible role, 177
    - U.S.–U.K. communications re, 104, 278–279, 280–281, 490
  - U.K. position, 102–103, 127*n*, 139–142, 164–166
  - U.N. actions, 165, 173, 180, 217
    - Dulles–Hammarskjöld discussion re, 287
    - Green's attitude toward, 223–224
    - Japanese proposals, 106*n*
    - PRC position, 396, 397
    - Soviet position, 341
    - U.K. position, 140–141
    - U.S.–Norway discussion re, 297–299
    - U.S. position, 246–247, 273, 275, 280
    - U.S.–U.K. discussion re, 105
  - U.N. Charter issue, 308–309
  - U.S. arms supplies for ROC, 68, 76, 92, 97, 100–101
  - U.S.–Australia discussion re, 391–396
  - U.S. defense of islands under all circumstances, 62–65
  - U.S. escorts for supply convoys:
    - attacks on ships, U.S. response to, 116, 119, 240–241
    - emergency situations, plan for, 455
    - Felt's position, 108–109
    - increased U.S. participation, possible, 282–284
    - instructions for Felt, 76, 473–474, 477
    - instructions for Smoot, 121–122
    - PRC protests, 163
    - provocative actions, avoidance of, 145
    - resumption of, 420, 427, 448
    - ROC assessment of, 179
    - suspension of, 329–330, 331, 333–334, 336, 337, 339*n*, 343–344, 345, 355, 370–371, 412, 413
    - U.S. discussions re, 75, 90–93, 94–95, 98–99, 244–245
  - U.S. expenditures on, 245

- Taiwan Strait crisis—Continued
  - U.S. forces sent to Strait, 73–74, 76
  - U.S. intelligence on, 81–82, 113, 116, 117, 189–190, 203–207, 375, 456–461
  - U.S. military strategy (*see also* nuclear actions by U.S. *above*):
    - contingency planning, 47, 48, 52–55, 59–60, 67–68, 92, 93, 94–95, 96–97, 118
    - conventional forces, focus on, 119, 124
    - emergency powers for JCS, 143
    - Felt's position, 79–80
    - instructions for Felt, 75–76, 100–102
    - JCS position, 125–126
    - ROC attitude toward, 107–108
  - U.S. naval patrols, 342
  - U.S.–New Zealand discussion re, 302–304
  - U.S. non-provocation policy, 483–484
    - U.S. prestige issue, 225, 228, 303
  - U.S. public statements on, 74–75, 130, 134–136, 149, 161–162, 273*n*, 301, 393
  - U.S.–ROC cooperation, 159–160, 253–254, 507
  - U.S. summary report on, 131–134
  - U.S.–U.K. correspondence re, 136–142, 144, 164–166, 175–177
  - U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 102–105, 168–171, 216–217, 249–252, 272–273, 278–281, 552–553
  - U.S. warnings to PRC, 56–57, 62, 65, 72, 78, 88–89
  - U.S. withdrawal/PRC takeover option:
    - negotiations on, 193–196, 209–216, 262–264, 500
    - PRC proposal, 190–191, 257, 511
    - Soviet position, 238
    - U.S. position, 229–230, 268, 325–326, 397–398, 436–437
- Tan, S. Y., 219
- Taylor, Henry N., 706
- Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 115–116, 117, 118, 119, 120–121, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 426*n*, 427
- Teng Hsiao-ping, 617
- Thompson, Llewellyn S., 35–37, 513, 595, 721–723, 743
- Thondup. *See* Gyalo Thondup.
- Tibet problem, 7
  - asylum for Dalai Lama, 772, 773–774

Tibet problem—Continued
  Eisenhower–Dalai Lama meeting, proposed, 804–805
  fighting in Tibet, 751, 762, 803
  government in exile, proposed, 797
  "independence for Tibet" option:
    Dalai Lama's four-point proposal, 771–772
    Dalai Lama's position, 770, 779
    ROC position, 760–761, 802–803
    Tibetan request for recognition, 763
    U.S. position, 763–767, 769, 775, 792–795, 800–801, 802, 806–807, 811, 813
    U.S.-ROC discussions re, 757–758
    U.S.-Tibetan exchange of letters, 809–810
  India–PRC border dispute and, 757, 798
  Indian support for rebels, 752–753
  legal opinions on, 776
  media coverage in U.S., 756
  military government in Tibet, 798–799
  PRC attitude toward, 785
  PRC suzerainty issue, 758–759
  PRC's foreign relations, impact on, 587–588
  refugee situation, 753, 761, 769, 799
  regional significance, 762
  ROC exploitation efforts, 562, 751, 754
  ROC–Tibetan discussions re, 802–803
  Soviet response, 779, 781
  U.N. actions:
    allies' discussions re, 785–787
    French policy, 786
    human rights focus, 778, 791
    Indian policy, 775–776, 779, 780–781, 783
    resolution on Tibet, 787–788, 796
    ROC policy, 776
    Soviet policy, 788–789
    Tibetan assessment of, 798–799
    U.K. policy, 782, 786, 788–789, 796
    U.S. policy, 754, 766, 767, 772–773, 774–777, 781–782, 783–785, 789–790, 810– 811
    U.S.–Tibetan discussions re, 777–780, 782–784, 790–792, 812–813
  U.N. membership for PRC and, 779–780
  U.S. military assistance for rebels, 561, 755–756, 768, 770, 801–802, 808–809, 814
  U.S. public position, 752
  U.S.–ROC discussions re, 800–803
  U.S.–Tibetan discussions re, 797–800
Troyanovsky, Aleksandr A., 595
Truman, Harry S, 308, 325
Tsao Chu-jen, 331
Tsepon Shakapa, 779
Tsiang, T. F., 754, 801
Tunisia, 588
Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 67, 248, 283*n*, 368, 405*n*, 509*n*
  China, People's Republic of:
    paratrooper capabilities, 548
    uprisings against Communist government, U.S. policy re, 589
    U.S.-ROC overflights of, 163, 475, 494*n*
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    ROC troop reductions, 363–364, 367, 369, 381–382, 561
    smaller islands, U.S. policy on, 560, 561
  Soviet Union, U.S. war planning re, 544
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 74
    invasion of islands, possible, 126
    nuclear actions by U.S., possible, 118, 120
    PRC intentions, 242, 243
    resupply of islands, 172–173, 174, 175, 318, 382
    retaliation by ROC, 244
    ROC withdrawal from islands, proposed, 296–297
    U.N. actions, 246
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 98, 119, 121–122, 455, 473–474
    U.S. military strategy, 48, 52, 53, 54, 125, 143

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.
United Kingdom (*see also* Hong Kong):
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 402, 408–409
  Taiwan Strait crisis, 102–105, 127*n*, 136–142, 144, 164–166, 175–177, 216– 217, 249–252, 278–279, 280–281, 490, 552–553
  Tibet problem:
    PRC suzerainty issue, 759
    U.N. actions, 782, 786, 788–789, 796

United Kingdom—Continued
  Tibet problem—Continued
    U.N. membership for PRC, 21, 165, 281, 646–648, 723–724
  Warsaw talks, 165–166
United Nations (*see also* U.N. membership for PRC; *U.N. subheadings under* Taiwan Strait crisis *and under* Tibet problem):
  G.A. Resolution *1353 (XIV)* on Tibet, 796*n*
  G.A. Resolution *1493 (XV)* on Chinese representation, 749*n*
U.N. membership for PRC:
  admission of PRC, U.S. proposal re, 750*n*
  international support for PRC, 360
  "new member" approach, 437–438
  nuclear inspection issue, 723–724
  Soviet position, 146, 152, 730
  Tibet problem and, 779–780
  U.K. position, 165
  U.N. debate on, 273*n*
  U.S. change of administration and, 749–750
  U.S. policy, 21–22, 281, 605, 724
  U.S.–U.K. discussions re, 281, 646–648, 723–724

Vietnam, Republic of, 137

Wadsworth, James J., 275*n*, 788–789
Wagner, Father, 492–493
Walmsley, Walter N., 754*n*, 765*n*, 774–777
Walsh, James Edward, 493, 501, 512, 532, 554, 566, 577, 639, 651, 653, 654, 666
Wang Ping-nan:
  Geneva talks, 492, 493
  Warsaw talks:
    Beam's appointment to, 32*n*
    informal meetings, proposed, 542*n*
    negotiating sessions, 193–195, 209–216, 257, 258–264, 270–271, 306–314, 328, 373, 406–407, 453, 482–483, 495, 500–501, 511–512, 531–532, 553–554, 566, 567, 576–577, 585–586, 625–626, 638–639, 650–651, 652–655, 665–666, 694–695, 715–716, 728–729, 733–734
    personnel changes, 409*n*
Wang Ping-nan—Continued
  Warsaw talks—Continued
    PRC objectives, 190–191
    preliminary arrangements, 1, 184–185
Wang Shu-ming, Gen. ("Tiger" Wang), 8, 22*n*, 70, 342
  demotion of, 570
  military confrontations between Chinas, 154
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 454, 520*n*, 524, 552*n*
  Smoot's assessment of, 507
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    resupply of islands, 178, 478
    retaliation by ROC, 128, 255–256
    Tan Islands, defense of, 288–289
Warsaw talks:
  Beam's appointment to, 7*n*, 31–32
  Beam's reports, 195–196, 218, 270–271, 734–736
  higher level conference, proposed, 292–293
  informal meetings, proposed, 542–543
  instructions for Beam, 186, 187, 198–199, 200, 229–230, 267–269, 291–296, 324– 326, 354–356, 397–398, 405–406, 433–437, 479–482, 491–493, 511*n*, 567*n*, 576*n*, 621–622, 625*n*, 638*n*, 650*n*, 652*n*, 715*n*, 733*n*
  negotiating sessions, 193–195, 209–216, 257, 258–264, 270–271, 305–314, 328, 373, 406–407, 453, 482–483, 495, 500–501, 511–512, 531–532, 553–554, 566, 567, 576–577, 585–586, 625–626, 638–639, 650–651, 652–655, 665–666, 694–695, 715–716, 728–729, 733–734
  personnel changes, 409*n*
  PRC assent to, 142–143, 144
  PRC attitude toward, 317
  PRC objectives, 190–191
  PRC ultimatum re, 29
  preliminary arrangements, 1, 6–7, 16, 27–28, 29, 31–32, 34–35, 61, 155–156, 180, 184–185, 190*n*
  propaganda, use as, 735–736
  prospects, U.S. estimate on, 206–207
  provocative actions issue, 159

Warsaw talks—Continued
  ROC attitude toward, 154, 188, 226, 300, 389, 395
  ROC rights issue, 170
  Soviet attitude toward, 237–238
  U.K. attitude toward, 165–166
  U.S. assessments of, 268–269, 368–369, 394, 409–410
  U.S. criticism of PRC record, 292, 305–306
  U.S. expectations for, 169, 173, 273
  U.S. intentions, 156, 241–242, 246, 274
  U.S. long-term strategy, 323–324
  U.S. opening statement, 191–192
  U.S.-ROC consultations re, 183, 207–208
Western Pacific, U.S. policy re, 514–515
Whisenand, Brig. Gen. James F., 241
White, Gen. Isaac D., 426
White, Lincoln, 29, 653*n*, 733*n*
White, Lloyd, 302
White, Gen. Thomas D., 42, 43, 120, 121, 364–365, 366, 369, 561, 603, 768
Whitney, John Hay, 272*n*, 723–724
Wilcox, Francis O., 326*n*, 782*n*, 796
Wilson, Duncan, 591–593
Wilson, James, 614
Wong, Martin, 536
Wu Ching-fu, 499

Yager, Joseph A., 646
Yao Kuang, 532
Yeh, George K. C., 8, 54, 170, 285, 329, 535*n*, 724, 747*n*
  China, Republic of:
    "free China" image, 359–362
    military reductions, 552
    overseas Chinese and, 463–464, 465
    Special Forces, 23*n*
    Taiwanese-mainlander relations, 220
    U.S. economic assistance, 465–466, 552
    "use of force" policy, 463–465, 467, 498–500, 545
    U.S. military forces in, 732–733
  Dulles visit to ROC (Oct. *1958*), 383, 385, 387, 388, 418, 421, 424, 430, 438
  infiltration of PRC by ROC forces, 641–642
  military confrontations between Chinas, 570

Yeh, George K. C.—Continued
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area:
    ROC troop reductions, 384, 386–388, 454, 550–552
    Tan Islands, proposed evacuation of, 519, 537–538
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 46
    cease-fire (Oct. *6–20*), 343–345, 383, 466
    cease-fire proposal (Sept. *16*–22), 207–208
    PRC intentions, 219–220
    psychological importance of islands, 219
    resupply of islands, 182, 220
    retaliation by ROC, 182, 183
    ROC concentration of forces, 219
    Soviet position, 385
    Tan Islands, defense of, 291, 350
    U.S. escorts for supply convoys, 179
    U.S.-ROC cooperation, 160, 253–254
  Tibet problem:
    "independence for Tibet" option, 757–758, 760–761
    India-PRC border dispute and, 757
    refugee situation, 761
    Tibetan-ROC discussions re, 802–803
    U.S.-ROC discussions re, 800–803
  U.N. membership for PRC, 438
  Warsaw talks, 180, 207–208
Yen, C. K., 648
Yin, K. Y., 643, 648, 649
Yui, O. K., 8
Yu Ta-wei, 38*n*, 78, 265, 342, 368, 380, 570, 573, 603
  China, Republic of:
    modernization of armed forces, 496–497
    Special Forces, 22*n*
    U.S. military assistance, 33
  Offshore Islands/Taiwan Strait area, 454
  Taiwan Strait crisis:
    "attack on islands as attack on ROC" issue, 45–46, 71
    PRC military build-up, 47*n*
    resupply of islands, 178, 478
    Tan Islands, defense of, 288
  Warsaw talks, 188

*U.S. G.P.O.:1995-312-918:60007

ISBN 0-16-041757-0

90000

9 780160 417573